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Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

A Fly In The Ointment: Sale Of Property May Cut Off Landlord’s Section 502(b)(6) Lease Rejection Claim For Future Rent

Here’s a scenario frequently seen in Chapter 11 cases. A tenant files bankruptcy and rejects a commercial real estate lease. The landlord files an unsecured lease rejection claim seeking to recover the lost future rent under the rejected lease. The claim amount is capped by Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b)(6) but may still be one of the larger unsecured claims in the case. Now let’s add a small, but relatively common, twist. Sometime later, but before distributions are made on the claim, the landlord sells the real estate that the debtor had occupied under the rejected lease.

The FLYi Chapter 11 Case. That, complete with the twist, was the situation in the In re FLYi, Inc. Chapter 11 case pending in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. After the landlord sold the property, the liquidation trust established under the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization objected to the landlord’s claim, arguing that after the sale of the property the debtor had no further obligations under the lease. Virginia law applied because the property was located in Dulles, Virginia. As described by the Bankruptcy Court, the landlord had three options under Virginia law:

[D]o nothing and sue for the rent remaining under the Lease; reenter the Premises for the sole purpose of re-letting it without terminating the Lease; or re-enter the Premises and exercise full dominion over the premises thereby terminating the Lease and eliminating FLYi’s obligation to pay any future rent.

The landlord argued that this interpretation of the law was wrong but asserted that provisions in the lease protected the landlord’s claim anyway. The Bankruptcy Court rejected those arguments and held that the landlord’s sale of the property terminated both the lease and the landlord’s right to future rent after the date of the sale. A copy of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision is available here.

Be sure to read the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report’s interesting discussion for more details on the decision, including the arguments advanced and the Bankruptcy Court’s treatment of them.

What Does This Mean For Landlords? A landlord contemplating a sale of the real property will have to consider what impact that sale might have on its lease rejection claim.

  • In states like Virginia where, according to the Bankruptcy Court in the FLYi case, termination of a lease cuts off a landlord’s claim for future rent, landlords will have to be prepared to lose all or a portion of a lease rejection claim if they sell the real property. 
  • The outcome may be different in other states. Section 1951.2 of the California Civil Code, for example, expressly permits a landlord, upon termination of a lease, to recover the present value of the difference between the unpaid future rent under the lease and the amount of rent that could reasonably be avoided through mitigation efforts. This may permit a landlord to sell the property and still retain a lease rejection claim.
  • When state law allows it, landlords may seek to include provisions in a lease to preserve contractually the right to a post-sale lease damages claim.

What Does This Mean For Bankruptcy Estates? Debtors, liquidation trusts, and other estate representatives may have an incentive to determine whether the landlord still owns the property. In states where a post-rejection sale of the property operates to cut off the landlord’s future rent claim, this fact could provide a new ground for an objection to the landlord’s Section 502(b)(6) claim.

Conclusion. Time will tell how frequently this scenario will play out in future cases, but landlords should expect to see the "did you sell the property" question asked more often going forward.

Business Bankruptcy Issues

The Terrible Twos? A Look At BAPCPA’s Impact On Business Bankruptcy Cases At Its Second Anniversary

Tomorrow, October 17, 2007, marks the second anniversary of the effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, known as BAPCPA.  BAPCPA was enacted primarily to make sweeping changes to the consumer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, BAPCPA also made significant revisions in the business bankruptcy arena.  When it was passed, bankruptcy lawyers, creditors, and potential debtors had many questions about how these changes would play out as new cases made their way through the system. Two years out, we now have answers to some of those questions.

In this post I’ll look at a few of BAPCPA’s more substantial revisions and how courts have addressed them so far. These include new rules governing real estate leases, reclamation, the "20 day goods" administrative claim, key employee retention plans, cross-border bankruptcy cases, and an important preference defense. As we walk down memory lane, I’ll also point you to earlier posts where you can find more details on these issues.

Commercial Real Estate Leases. Under BAPCPA, if the debtor is the tenant under an unexpired commercial lease, it must either assume or reject the lease within 120 days of the filing of bankruptcy. The court can extend this time period without the landlord’s consent for 90 additional days, making a total of 210 days, but any further extensions require the landlord’s prior written consent. If the lease is not assumed (or assumed and assigned) within this period, the lease automatically will be deemed rejected and the debtor will have to move out. 

  • Before BAPCPA, debtors initially had only 60 days to assume or reject leases but there was no statutory limit on extensions of that period. Cumulative extensions of a year or more, over a landlord’s objection, were not uncommon under the pre-BAPCPA version of the Bankruptcy Code. That is no longer possible under BAPCPA.
  • Below market leases can represent a significant asset, particularly for retailers with many store leases, and BAPCPA has forced these debtors to move very quickly to assume and assign leases or to sell designation rights to make the most of the 210 day maximum period. In a number of cases, this 210 day limit has depressed the value of the debtor’s leases and the recovery for its creditors.
  • For more on real estate leases, you may want to read "Commercial Real Estate Leases: How Are They Treated In Bankruptcy?" previously posted on this blog.

Reclamation. When a debtor becomes insolvent or files bankruptcy, some vendors may be able to take advantage of a special, although limited, right to get back or "reclaim" certain of the goods. This reclamation right is part of both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code. BAPCPA made some changes in the reclamation area and post-BAPCPA cases have put some meat on the bones of those changes. A new, 45-day bankruptcy reclamation right was added to Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, expanding the Uniform Commercial Code’s 10-day rule. Under BAPCPA, the goods must have been sold in the "ordinary course" of the vendor’s business and the debtor must have received the goods while insolvent. The reclamation demand must be in writing and made within 45 days of the receipt of the goods by the customer (now the debtor in bankruptcy).  If the 45-day period expires after the bankruptcy case is filed, the vendor must make the reclamation demand within 20 days after the bankruptcy filing.

Two decisions from earlier this year have helped clarify the impact, and highlight the limitations, of BAPCPA’s reclamation changes.

  • In January 2007, Judge Christopher S. Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to issue a temporary restraining order in favor of a reclamation claimant in the Advanced Marketing Services case who sought to prevent the sale of goods it was trying to reclaim. The Court cited the superior rights of the secured creditor, which had a lien on the goods. A discussion of the case and a copy of the Court’s decision is available at this earlier post.
  • Then, in April 2007, Judge Burton R. Lifland of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York applied the "prior lien defense" in favor of a secured creditor by valuing all reclamation claims in the Dana Corporation case at zero. You can find a discussion of that case and a copy of the decision at this previous post.

The "20 Day Goods" Administrative Claim. Although the post-BAPCPA decisions have not been favorable to vendors in the reclamation area, recent developments have underscored the value of the new Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim. That new provision, added by BAPCPA, gives vendors an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor’s business."  For an overview of the new provision, you may find the post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy," of interest.

Key Employee Retention Plans. One of BAPCPA’s most notable changes was the significant restrictions imposed on key employee retention plans, known as KERPs. Prior to BAPCPA, KERPs were a very popular way of making sure that a company could retain its most important officers and employees to guide it through bankruptcy. Citing perceived abuses, however, Congress added language in BAPCPA that requires debtors to satisfy nearly impossible standards before courts would be permitted to approve payment of retention bonuses (or severance payments) as administrative claims to officers and other insiders of a bankrupt company. In short, a debtor would have to show that the individual was essential the the survival of the business and that he or she had a bona fide job offer from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation.

Debtors looking to compensate key officers have moved away from retention plans entirely and instead have turned to incentive plans. 

  • Several courts have approved incentive plans covering insiders but have applied certain factors to judge the reasonableness of the plan, including an assessment of the relationship between the plan and the results to be obtained, the cost of the plan, and whether the plan’s overall scope is fair and reasonable.
  • In May 2007, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court even approved a downward adjustment to an incentive plan’s targets, permitting a bonus to be paid to insiders, when the original plan’s targets turned out to be unrealistic. 
  • For more on this topic, including copies of three significant decisions in the Dana Corporation, Global Home Products, and Nellson Nutraceuticals cases, follow the link to this earlier post on key employee incentive plans.

Chapter 15 On Cross-Border Bankruptcies. BAPCPA added a new chapter to the Bankruptcy Code to adopt an internationally drafted Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.  Chapter 15 is used principally by representatives of, or creditors in, foreign insolvency proceedings to obtain assistance in the United States, by a debtor or others seeking to obtain assistance in a foreign country regarding a bankruptcy case in the United States, or when both a foreign proceeding and a bankruptcy case in the United States are pending with respect to the same debtor. Follow the link in this sentence for a detailed overview of Chapter 15.

  • In a recent case involving two Bear Stearns hedge funds, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York refused to recognize proceedings pending in the Cayman Islands as either a foreign main or foreign nonmain proceeding, denying those entities Chapter 15 protection in the United States.
  • You can find the details on this case (and a copy of the original and amended decisions) here and here.

Preferences. Before it took effect, one of BAPCPA’s most talked about changes was a revision to the "ordinary course of business" defense to preference claims. BAPCPA dropped the requirement that a preference defendant establish that a transfer was both (i) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs between the debtor and the defendant and (ii) made according to ordinary business terms.

  • BAPCPA’s main change was to replace the "and" with an "or", meaning that a preference defendant now has to establish only one of the two prongs (instead of both) to prevail on the defense. When it was enacted, many bankruptcy lawyers believed this change would favor preference defendants. 
  • In something of a surprise, however, the first case interpreting the revised statute applied a brand new standard to the "ordinary business terms" provision. Unlike the prior analysis of that prong, the new standard examined the question from the perspective of both the creditor (as had been done pre-BAPCPA) and the debtor (the new BAPCPA twist). As a result, in that decision the preference defendant lost. For more on the decision, in the In re National Gas Distributors, LLC case, check out this post on David Rosendorf’s BAPCPA Blog.
  • There have been surprisingly few cases interpreting this section, so it remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the National Gas Distributors interpretation.

Another Great BAPCPA Resource. In addition to the BAPCPA Blog, which has posts on many decisions from BAPCPA’s first year, don’t miss Steve Jakubowski’s Bankruptcy Litigation Blog, in particular his BAPCPA and BAPCPA Outline topics. Steve has posted on a range of BAPCPA issues, including major consumer decisions and many business bankruptcy decisions.

Acting Like A Two Year Old? As we begin the third year under BAPCPA, the law is beginning to take early steps toward greater clarity in some areas but much remains to be decided. In particular, few appellate decisions have been issued on BAPCPA’s key changes, giving us little guidance on how the Courts of Appeals will interpret the new law.  As always, stay tuned for more developments and feel free to subscribe to the blog by email or by RSS to your feedreader.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

The Bull Rips A Hole In The Matador’s Cape: New Ninth Circuit Decision Limits Reach Of Section 502(b)(6)’s Landlord Cap

A commercial real estate lease often represents the largest single liability of many debtors. For retailers, which typically have scores or even hundreds of store leases, the liability involved is orders of magnitude larger. It’s fair to say that the management of lease obligations can be of enormous consequence to debtors, landlords, and other creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

Rejected Leases And The Capped Claim. As explained in an earlier post on how commercial real estate leases are treated in bankruptcy, one of a debtor’s options in a Chapter 11 case is to reject uneconomic or otherwise burdensome leases, terminating the debtor’s obligation to pay rent and turning the landlord’s claim for termination of the lease into a prepetition claim. Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code goes further and caps the landlord’s prepetition rejection claim at an amount equal to the greater of (1) one year’s rent or (2) fifteen percent of the remaining lease term, up to a maximum of three years’ worth of rent. The starting date for calculating the claim is the earlier of the date when the bankruptcy petition was filed or when the landlord recovered possession of, or the tenant surrendered, the premises. A landlord with six years left on a rejected lease, for example, would have its claim capped at one year’s worth of rent.

What’s Covered By The Cap? This ability to cap a landlord’s claim in bankruptcy can be a major benefit to debtor tenants. Ever since a 1995 decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit in In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), debtors have been successful in many cases in capping a variety of claims by landlords. In McSheridan, the BAP held that the cap applied to all damages for the lessee’s nonperformance of the lease, not just to claims based on future rent. Landlords have challenged that analysis but, at least in the Ninth Circuit, have had little success — until this week.

The Ninth Circuit’s El Toro Decision. In an eight-page opinion (available here) issued on October 1, 2007 in the In re El Toro Materials Company, Inc. Chapter 11 case,, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a very different view of the landlord cap under Section 502(b)(6). In the El Toro case, the debtor was a mining company that leased property from the Saddleback Community Church, paying $28,000 per month in rent. After the lease was rejected, Saddleback brought an adversary proceeding against El Toro for $23 million in damages alleging that El Toro left a million tons of wet clay "goo," mining equipment, and other materials on the property.

  • The bankruptcy court held that Saddleback’s claim, which asserted waste, nuisance, and other tort theories, would not be limited by the Section 502(b)(6) cap. 
  • Following its McSheridan precedent, the BAP reversed and held that any damages would be subject to the cap. 
  • Interestingly, two of the three judges on the BAP panel filed concurring opinions, voicing doubts about the wisdom of the McSheridan case. A copy of the BAP’s unpublished El Toro decision from July 2005 is available here.

Judge Kozinski’s Analysis. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP’s decision, holding that the cap did not apply to the landlord’s tort claims. Judge Alex Kozinski authored the opinion and analyzed the key issues this way:

The structure of the cap—measured as a fraction of the remaining term—suggests that damages other than those based on a loss of future rental income are not subject to the cap. It makes sense to cap damages for lost rental income based on the amount of expected rent: Landlords may have the ability to mitigate their damages by re-leasing or selling the premises, but will suffer injury in proportion to the value of their lost rent in the meantime. In contrast, collateral damages are likely to bear only a weak correlation to the amount of rent: A tenant may cause a lot of damage to a premises leased cheaply, or cause little damage to premises underlying an expensive leasehold.

One major purpose of bankruptcy law is to allow creditors to receive an aliquot share of the estate to settle their debts. Metering these collateral damages by the amount of the rent would be inconsistent with the goal of providing compensation to each creditor in proportion with what it is owed. Landlords in future cases may have significant claims for both lost rental income and for breach of other provisions of the lease. To limit their recovery for collateral damages only to a portion of their lost rent would leave landlords in a materially worse position than other creditors. In contrast, capping rent claims but allowing uncapped claims for collateral damage to the rented premises will follow congressional intent by preventing a potentially overwhelming claim for lost rent from draining the estate, while putting landlords on equal footing with other creditors for their collateral claims.

The statutory language supports this interpretation. The cap applies to damages “resulting from” the rejection of the lease. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Saddleback’s claims for waste, nuisance and trespass do not result from the rejection of the lease—they result from the pile of dirt allegedly left on the property. Rejection of the lease may or may not have triggered Saddleback’s ability to sue for the alleged damages.But the harm to Saddleback’s property existed whether or not the lease was rejected. A simple test reveals whether the damages result from the rejection of the lease: Assuming all other conditions remain constant, would the landlord have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant were to assume the lease rather than rejecting it? Here, Saddleback would still have the same claim it brings today had El Toro accepted the lease and committed to finish its term: The pile of dirt would still be allegedly trespassing on Saddleback’s land and Saddleback still would have the same basis for its theories of nuisance, waste and breach of contract. The million-ton heap of dirt was not put there by the rejection of the lease—it was put there by the actions and inactions of El Toro in preparing to turn over the site.

(Footnotes omitted.)

McSheridan Holding Overruled. The Ninth Circuit opinion noted the two concurrences from the BAP decision questioning McSheridan and suggested that the BAP consider adopting an en banc procedure to reconsider such doubtful precedents. Given the Ninth Circuit’s holding, it will come as no surprise that the Court of Appeals also explicitly overruled McSheridan:

To the extent that McSheridan holds section 502(b)(6) to be a limit on tort claims other than those based on lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete a lease term, it is overruled.

The Ninth Circuit noted that McSheridan also holds that "damages flowing from the failure of a party that has rejected a lease to perform future routine repairs or pay utility bills are capped," but declined to address — or overrule — that holding.

Post-El Toro Ramifications.  At least in the Ninth Circuit, with McSheridan overruled landlords will work hard to characterize their damage claims as arising from tort theories or otherwise not being based on "lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete the lease term." At the negotiation stage, when the market permits landlords may demand larger security deposits and letters of credit on the view that the Section 502(b)(6) cap no longer limits every type of damage recoverable against such security. They may also structure leases to separate claims for items such as clean-up costs, hazardous waste removal, property damage, and even tenant improvement repayments from rent claims, in an attempt to bolster the argument that these claims fall outside of the cap.

Conclusion. Like a bull charging a matador, the El Toro decision has ripped a hole in the Section 502(b)(6) cape previously used to turn away cap-busting landlord claims. Time will tell just how significant the decision turns out to be, but at first blush it seems that debtors and non-landlord creditors may be the ones who end up seeing red. 

Recent Developments

New Bankruptcy Resource: The Absolute Priority Newsletter

As a member of the Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, I wanted to let you know that we have just launched a new quarterly newsletter called Absolute Priority. The newsletter give updates on current developments in bankruptcies and workouts with the goal of keeping you "ahead of the curve" on these issues. You can access a copy of the first edition here and can register to receive future editions.

The inaugural edition is focused on the first year of experience under the October 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as BAPCPA). It includes articles on:

A two-page chart on M&A transactions involving Chapter 11 cases and an update on some of the bankruptcy and workout matters we have handled recently are also included. The newsletter starts with a welcome from my partner, Lawrence Gottlieb, the Chair of our Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, and a note from another of my partners, Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority.

I hope you find Absolute Priority informative and helpful.

Business Bankruptcy Issues

Commercial Real Estate Leases: How Are They Treated In Bankruptcy?

Much like executory contracts, commercial real estate leases are governed by special rules in bankruptcy. If a lease’s term has not yet expired, it is known as an “unexpired lease” (yet more clever bankruptcy terminology). This post explores how landlords and tenants are treated in bankruptcy, first in the more common situation of a tenant’s bankruptcy and then briefly in the context of a landlord’s bankruptcy.

Assumption and rejection. If the debtor is the tenant under an unexpired commercial lease, it must either assume or reject the lease within 120 days of the filing of bankruptcy. The court can extend this time period without the landlord’s consent for 90 additional days, making a total of 210 days, but any further extensions require the landlord’s prior written consent. If the lease is not assumed (or assumed and assigned) within this period, the lease automatically will be deemed rejected and the debtor will have to move out. 

  • Assumption of a lease requires the debtor to reaffirm the lease, cure all pre- and post-filing defaults, and show that it will be able to perform its obligations in the future. Additional restrictions must be met before a lease located in a shopping center can be assumed or assigned. 
  • Rejection of a lease means that the lease is breached, the debtor tenant has to vacate the property, and the landlord can file a claim against the debtor’s estate for the amount of any past or future rent. 

Capping a landlord’s claim. If a lease is rejected, the landlord’s damage claim for termination of the lease will be treated as a pre-filing unsecured claim.  In addition, the claim for future rent under the lease will be capped at an amount equal to the greater of one year’s rent or fifteen percent of the remaining lease term, up to a maximum of three years’ worth of rent, calculated from the earlier of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed or the date when the landlord recovered possession of, or the tenant surrendered, the premises. This ability to cap a landlord’s claim in bankruptcy is often a major benefit to a debtor tenant, especially when the lease rejected is a long-term lease with rent obligations higher than current market rates. Landlords with security deposits, either in the form of cash or letters of credit, generally will be able to retain or draw on that security at least up to the amount of their capped bankruptcy claim.

Assignments of leases in bankruptcy. Although some leases contain restrictions or outright prohibitions on the tenant’s ability to assign the lease, many of these provisions will be unenforceable in bankruptcy. This can allow a debtor to “assume and assign” a lease to a third party over the landlord’s objection. Since third parties will often pay substantial sums to take over a lease with rent obligations below current market rates, these below-market leases can be valuable assets for debtors.   

The recent bankruptcy law changes. The 210 day maximum lease decision period represents one of the major changes enacted with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), discussed in an earlier post. Before these amendments took effect in October 2005, although debtors initially had only 60 days to assume or reject leases, they were permitted to seek extensions of this period without any statutory limitation. Cumulative extensions of a year or more, over a landlord’s objection, were not uncommon under the pre-BAPCPA version of the Bankruptcy Code. That is no longer possible under BAPCPA.

Impact on retailers. This change is particularly significant for retailers with dozens or even hundreds of leased stores. In the past, retailers usually evaluated sales at stores for at least one holiday shopping season, and sometimes two, before deciding whether to retain the store. Now a retailer has only seven months to make that decision. This shortened period also impacts a retailer’s ability to sell off its unwanted leases, especially through a sale of "designation rights" (the right to designate the assignee of a lease), as the buyer of those rights now will have a limited time to find buyers for those leases.

Landlord as debtor. Sometimes the debtor is not a tenant but a landlord. In that situation, although the debtor can reject a lease and no longer perform any of its duties as landlord, it cannot use bankruptcy to evict a tenant that prefers to stay in possession of the premises. In Section 365(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a special provision reminiscent of the rights of a licensee of intellectual property under Section 365(n), a tenant may elect to remain in the premises for the remaining term of the lease, plus any renewal or extension of the term that may be provided in the lease if enforceable under applicable state law. If it so elects, the tenant must continue to pay the rent required under the lease but can offset against that rent any damages caused by the landlord’s nonperformance. 

Sublandlord as debtor. When the debtor is a sublandlord (also known as a sublessor), these protections generally do not apply and the subtenant is at risk of losing possession of the premises.  Because a sublandlord is a tenant under a master lease (with the "real" landlord), if the debtor rejects the master lease it, and its subtenants, usually will not have any continuing rights to possession of the premises. Subtenants looking to protect themselves in such a situation often obtain, as part of their sublease, a non-disturbance agreement, direct lease right, or similar protection from the master landlord.

Get good advice. Whether the debtor is a tenant or a landlord (or both), bankruptcy can have a significant impact on commercial real estate leases and subleases. For this reason, it is important to get prompt legal advice on your particular lease, both at the time the lease is negotiated and in the event of bankruptcy, to protect your rights.