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Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

If Madoff Investors Are Sued By The SIPA Trustee And Pay Money Back, Can They File Proofs Of Claim After The Bar Date?

Recently, I posted about SIPA liquidations of brokerage firms, prompted by the Securities Investor Protection Act (known as SIPA) liquidations of Lehman Brothers, Inc. and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. An interesting issue has come up in the Madoff case involving investors who redeemed their accounts before the Madoff bankruptcy was filed. In other alleged Ponzi scheme cases, trustees have sued such investors asserting fraudulent transfer or other claims. The investors in turn often raise defenses, including that they redeemed their accounts in good faith and without any knowledge of the alleged fraud, and lengthy and complex litigation usually results.

Resolution of such litigation can come long after the deadline set for filing proofs of claim (known as a "bar date"). This raises a question: if investors end up paying money back to the estate as a result of the trustee’s litigation, will they be able to file proofs of claim — after the bar date — for the amounts they have to return? Before turning to that question, let’s take a look at how such post-bar date claims are dealt with in non-SIPA bankruptcy cases.

Section 502(h) Of The Bankruptcy Code. Under the Bankruptcy Code, if a person or entity is sued by the bankruptcy estate (usually by a trustee, the debtor in possession, or a creditors’ committee) for receipt of an alleged preference or fraudulent transfer, they will be able to file a proof of claim if they end up paying money back to the bankruptcy estate in settlement or as a result of a judgment. Bankruptcy Code section 502(h) expressly covers this situation:

(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

Section 502(h) recognizes that resolution of avoidance actions may come long after the original bar date for filing proofs of claim has past and allows holders of these later-arising claims to share in the estate along with other creditors. The Bankruptcy Code treats these claims as having arisen at the time of the payment back to the bankruptcy estate and allows proofs of claim to be filed months or even years after the bar date. 

The Claims Bar Date In SIPA Liquidations. In a SIPA liquidation, there are generally two claims bar dates. The first bar date set is for customer claims, in which customers of the failed brokerage firm seek to recover the securities in their accounts (or more likely in the Madoff case, the securities that were supposed to have been in their accounts). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation insurance of up to $500,000 applies to customer claims. A second bar date, usually a few months later, is for general claims. General creditors may include customers with claims in excess of the $500,000 SIPC protection or those who have more traditional trade creditor or other claims. 

The Madoff Case. In the Madoff case, last month several investors filed a motion seeking to have the bar date order clarified with regard to their potential claims in the event that the Madoff trustee later sued them and they were forced to return funds under a fraudulent transfer or other avoidance (sometimes called a  "clawback") cause of action after the general claims bar date.

  • These investors had previously redeemed some or all of their investments, and were seeking an order holding that claims arising from avoidance actions could be filed within 30 days after the judgment giving rise to the claim became final, a provision common in non-SIPA bankruptcy bar date orders due to Bankruptcy Code section 502(h).
  • The moving parties were concerned that without this clarification, any such claims they filed after the bar date might be held to be barred. On the other hand, if they were forced to file a protective claim before the bar date, they would submit to the court’s equitable jurisdiction and may be held to have waived their right to a jury trial in any avoidance action brought against them.
  • The Madoff trustee filed an opposition to the motion (copy available at the prior link) arguing, among other things, that these investors were not creditors, had not been sued, and as a result did not present an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication. In addition, the trustee argued that Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was inapplicable, contending that it was inconsistent with an absolute bar date provision under SIPA. (The SIPA statute provides that Bankruptcy Code provisions are generally applicable in SIPA cases to the extent consistent with SIPA.)
  • The SIPC also filed a response to the motion (copy available at the prior link) making arguments similar to those advanced by the trustee. In particular, the SIPC argued that Section 502(h) was inconsistent with what the SIPC called SIPA’s "immutable" bar date.

The Court’s Decision. In a five-page decision issued on February 24, 2009, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Burton R. Lifland denied the motion, first holding that the Court did not have the discretion to extend the bar dates involved. (A copy of the decision is available by clicking on the link in the prior sentence.) The Court then stated that the motion essentially sought a determination of whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable in SIPA liquidations. Because no avoidance action had yet been filed, the Court held that the requested relief, if granted, would amount to an improper advisory opinion.

  • As a result, the Court refused to decide whether Bankruptcy Code Section 502(h) applies in SIPA cases, commenting as follows: "Although section 78fff(b) of SIPA specifies that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code shall apply in SIPA liquidation proceedings, to the extent that they are consistent with SIPA, it is unclear whether section 502(h) of the Code would apply. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1981)."
  • The Court concluded by noting that the investors could file a protective proof of claim before the general claims bar date, although that would subject them to the Court’s equitable jurisdiction.

An Open Question. Although the Court denied the motion, it left open the ultimate issue involved — whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code applies in SIPA liquidations and permits parties to file proofs of claim after the bar date if they are sued by a trustee and later have to return funds or other property. With the issue undecided for now, some investors may choose to file a protective proof of claim before the bar date passes.

Business Bankruptcy Issues

The SIPC And SIPA Liquidations: When A Brokerage Firm Goes Bankrupt

It’s an organization that can go for years without ever making the news. Then along comes a financial crisis — and Lehman Brothers and Madoff — and suddenly the SIPC finds itself at the center of some very big stories. This post takes a look at the SIPC, its role in broker-dealer liquidations, how a SIPA liquidation differs from Chapter 7 liquidation, and how it affects businesses and individuals with accounts at a failed brokerage firm.

What Is The SIPC? SIPC stands for the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. This federally-created nonprofit corporation describes its mission as follows:

When a brokerage firm is closed due to bankruptcy or other financial difficulties and customer assets are missing, SIPC steps in as quickly as possible and, within certain limits, works to return customers’ cash, stock and other securities. Without SIPC, investors at financially troubled brokerage firms might lose their securities or money forever or wait for years while their assets are tied up in court.

The SIPC and its activities are governed by the Securities Investor Protection Act, known as SIPA, which was enacted in 1970. The SIPA is not in Title 11 of the United States Code where the Bankruptcy Code is found, but in Title 15, together with other securities laws. That said, the SIPA incorporates many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

When Does The SIPC Get Involved? When a SIPC-member brokerage fails, the SIPC has the authority to step in. If the brokerage has filed a bankruptcy — and notwithstanding the automatic stay — the SIPC can file a lawsuit in the district court seeking a protective decree. Once granted, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding is put on hold and the case becomes a SIPA liquidation instead.  Here’s how the SIPC explains its role:

The [SIPC] either acts as trustee or works with an independent court-appointed trustee in a missing asset case to recover funds. The statute that created SIPC provides that customers of a failed brokerage firm receive all non-negotiable securities that are already registered in their names or in the process of being registered. All other so-called "street name" securities are distributed on a pro rata basis. At the same time, funds from the SIPC reserve are available to satisfy the remaining claims of each customer up to a maximum of $500,000. This figure includes a maximum of $100,000 on claims for cash. Recovered funds are used to pay investors whose claims exceed SIPC’s protection limit of $500,000. SIPC often draws down its reserve to aid investors.  

As this explanation notes, there is a $500,000 per customer limit to SIPC protection, including a $100,000 limit on claims for cash held in an account. These apply to both businesses and individuals. Some brokerage firms also have private insurance in addition to the SIPC protection.

How Is A SIPA Liquidation Different From A Chapter 7 Bankruptcy? Although Chapter 7 bankruptcy and SIPA liquidations both involve the liquidation of a brokerage firm, there is an enormous difference in terms of what happens to each customer’s securities.

In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a brokerage firm, the bankruptcy trustee is required to liquidate — that means sell — all of the securities held in "street name" by the failed brokerage. Section 748 of the Bankruptcy Code, part of Chapter 7’s special stockbroker liquidation provisions, spells it out:

As soon as practicable after the date of the order for relief, the trustee shall reduce to money, consistent with good market practice, all securities held as property of the estate, except for customer name securities delivered or reclaimed under section 751 of this title.

Subject to certain exceptions, in Chapter 7 customers receive a pro rata share of the proceeds from the sale of the securities, not the securities themselves. The only securities that are not sold are "customer name securities," which are handed back to their owners. (More on the difference between street name and customer name securities below.)

In a SIPA liquidation, the trustee’s goal is exactly the opposite. Instead of being required to sell the securities, a SIPA trustee works to return to customers the securities in their accounts, often through a transfer of the accounts to a financially healthy brokerage firm.  When that isn’t possible, the SIPA trustee has the authority to purchase securities to replace any that were missing, tapping into the SIPC’s reserve fund when necessary to cover the acquisition costs. If securities are missing or the SIPA trustee is otherwise unable to return a customer’s "street name" securities, then the brokerage’s firms remaining customer assets are divided up and funds distributed on a pro rata basis based on the total size of "net equity claims" of customers (generally, net of any margin loans owed by the customer). As in a Chapter 7, "customer name securities" are returned to the customer, including those in the process of being registered in the customer’s name.

Customers generally prefer SIPA liquidations over Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (Stockbrokers and commodity brokers are not permitted to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.) Most SIPC member brokerages that file bankruptcy end up either in a SIPA liquidation or with the SIPC directly involved.

What Are Customer Name Securities? As an aside, there is a big distinction between street name and customer name securities.

  • As the term implies, customer name securities are a typically limited group of securities held by a brokerage firm that are literally registered with the issuer in the customer’s name, such as an actual stock certificate registered in and bearing the customer’s own name.
  • These days most securities are registered in "street name," with the actual legal owner being Cede & Co., the Depository Trust Corporation’s nominee name.
  • Each brokerage has its own DTC participant account holding the securities for all of its customers, and the brokerage in turn keeps records of which customer owns which securities in the DTC account.
  • Street name securities are far easier to trade than customer name securities because the trade can be accomplished via DTC instead of having to make a physical transfer of a stock certificate.

The Customer Claim Bar Date. In both a Chapter 7 and a SIPA liquidation, a deadline, known as a bar date, will be established by which creditors claims must be filed. However, in a SIPA liquidation a separate "customer claim" bar date is also set. Customers seeking SIPC protection must file their claims by that date using a special customer claim form, which asks for details on the securities in the customer’s account, dates of trades, and other information. Follow the link for an example of the SIPC claim form used in the Lehman Brothers SIPA liquidation. If the customer’s account has not already been transferred to a solvent brokerage firm, a customer with an allowed claim will receive back the securities that were held in their account at the failed brokerage firm, together with any cash held, up to the SIPC protection limits.

Where To Learn More About SIPA Liquidations. For additional information on SIPA liquidations and their Chapter 7 counterparts, you may find this discussion on the U.S. Court system’s website of interest. In addition, SIPA trustees appointed in brokerage cases frequently establish a case-specific website. These links will take you to the websites created by the Lehman Brothers SIPA trustee and the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities SIPA trustee.

Conclusion. They may not be common, and the SIPC does not provide the same type of protection as the FDIC, but SIPA liquidations can play an important role in protecting investors when brokerage firms fail. However, the SIPC is generally able to intervene only when one of its member firms fails, making that little-noticed "Member SIPC" designation more significant that most investors realize. 

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Latest Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

The Spring 2008 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter give updates on current developments in bankruptcies and workouts with the goal of keeping you "ahead of the curve" on these issues. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions.

The latest edition covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • The ability of unsecured creditors to recover post-petition attorney’s fees;
  • Key issues when selling claims in bankruptcy;
  • Jury trials and proofs of claim;
  • Assignments for the benefit of creditors; and
  • The impact of post-petition performance on executory contracts.

We have also included information on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, and unofficial committees in out-of-court workouts, involving major retailers. These include Sharper Image, Lillian Vernon, CompUSA, Wickes Furniture, and The Bombay Company, among others. In addition, a note from my partner Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses the increasing number of bankruptcy filings nationwide and our representation of Bayonne Medical Center in its Chapter 11 reorganization.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Bankruptcy Rule Amendments: New Article Reviews The Important Changes

An article my partner Adam Rogoff, associate Seth Van Aalten, and I wrote was recently published in the January 2008 issue of Pratt’s Journal of Bankruptcy Law. The article discusses the significant amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2007. Those amendments covered a range of procedures from omnibus claims objections to motions to assume executory contracts and real property leases to "first day" motions in Chapter 11 cases. 

If you don’t have a copy of the Journal, you can read the article, entitled "Important Changes To Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect," by clicking on its title in this sentence. For more details on the rule changes, use the links that follow for a copy of the full, "clean" set of rule amendments as well as the redline set showing changes made by the amendments to the existing rules, together with the Advisory Committee’s comments.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

First Appellate Court Decision Addresses Question Left Open In The Supreme Court’s Travelers Opinion: Can Unsecured Creditors Recover Post-Petition Attorney’s Fees?

Happy New Year to everyone. I’m back from a holiday blogging break with a report on the first appellate decision to address the question left open in last year’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. — whether post-petition attorney’s fees can be added to unsecured claims. Although unrelated, this new decision also tackles the interesting question of whether a guarantor of a debt can become liable if the payment of the debt by the primary obligor later is returned in a preference settlement.

The Travelers Case. As a brief refresher, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s so-called Fobian rule in the Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. decision (available here) in March 2007. However, it did not decide whether unsecured creditors could recover, as part of their unsecured claims, post-petition attorney’s fees incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case. For more on the Travelers decision, you may find this earlier post of interest.

A Developing Split. Since the Travelers decision, two bankruptcy courts issued decisions on the open issue, coming to different conclusions. 

  • In May 2007, in the In re Qmect, Inc. decision (available here), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California held that unsecured creditors could recover post-petition attorney’s fees. For more on that decision, see this earlier post on the case and its analysis. 
  • In July 2007, in the In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. case (available here), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida came to the opposite conclusion, following a majority of courts that had addressed this issue unrestrained by the Ninth Circuit’s Fobian decision. See this previous post for more on the Florida decision.
  • Commentators, including with the recent article written by the American Bankruptcy Institute‘s Scholar in Residence Professor Mark Scarberry, have joined the fray as well.

The SNTL Corp. Ruling. On December 19, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") issued its decision in the In re SNTL Corp. case (available here). After carefully reviewing both the Qmect and Electric Machinery decisions, as well as pre-Travelers case law, the BAP chose to follow Qmect, holding that "claims for postpetition attorneys’ fees cannot be disallowed simply because the claim of the creditor is unsecured." Judge Dennis Montali, writing for the unanimous BAP panel, first explained its analysis of the interplay between Sections 502 and 506(b):

We are not persuaded by the approach of the Electric Machinery court and, like Qmect, we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors. While we cannot predict how the Ninth Circuit will decide this issue in Travelers, we do find a clue in Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986), where the Ninth Circuit observed that section 506(b) defines secured claims and does not limit unsecured claims:

When read literally, subsection (b) arguably limits the fees available to the oversecured creditor. When read in conjunction with § 506(a), however, it may be understood to define the portion of the fees which shall be afforded secured status. We adopt the latter reading.

268 Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.

Next, the BAP discussed Section 502(b)(1)’s requirement that the court determine the amount of an unsecured claim as of the petition date: 

The Electric Machinery court, like the bankruptcy court here and many of the pre-Travelers majority courts, disallowed the postpetition fees of an unsecured creditor because section 502(b)(1) provides that a bankruptcy court  “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition” and the postpetition fees did not exist as of that date. Elec. Mach., 371 B.R. at 551; Pride Cos., 285 B.R. at 373. Because the amount of fees incurred postpetition cannot be determined or calculated as of the petition date, section 502(b) purportedly precludes their allowance. Id. We disagree with this approach, as it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim,” which — as discussed previously — includes any right to payment, whether or not that right is contingent and unliquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A); Qmect, 368 B.R. at 884.

The BAP then held that the Supreme Court’s 1988 Timbers decision did not apply:

We believe that Electric Machinery’s reliance on Timbers is misplaced. Timbers provided that an undersecured creditor could not receive postpetition interest on the unsecured portion of its debt. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380. This holding is consistent with section 502(b)(2), which specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest. Inasmuch  as section 502(b) does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees, the comparison between the current issue and that presented in Timbers is not persuasive.

Finally, the BAP held that it was unnecessary to reconcile the competing public policy considerations advanced by the Electric Machinery and Qmect decisions:

Because we find that the Bankruptcy Code itself provides the answer to this issue (by not specifically disallowing postpetition fees), we do not attempt to reconcile these policy concerns. In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.

A Ninth Circuit Decision To Come? In the first quote above, you may have picked up the BAP’s reference to the Ninth Circuit having this issue before it in the Travelers case. That case, on remand from the Supreme Court, appears to have been fully briefed. Any decision from the Ninth Circuit itself on the issue would, of course, supersede this BAP decision and be controlling authority in the circuit, but it may be months before such a ruling comes down.

A Bonus Issue: Guarantor’s Liability Revived After A Preference Settlement. The facts of the SNTL Corp. case are complex, but the key facts are fairly straightforward. In short, one of the debtor’s insurance company subsidiaries owed money to the creditor and the debtor guaranteed the debt. Although the subsidiary paid the creditor, the subsidiary was later placed into state insolvency proceedings. The state insurance commissioner sued the creditor for return of the payment on preference grounds. The creditor settled the preference case and returned most of the payment ($110 million of a $163.4 million original payment). The creditor thereafter amended its proof of claim in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, seeking recovery under the guaranty of the returned preference.

  • After first determining that the guaranty’s language permitted the creditor to assert a claim to the extent provided by law, the BAP next held, "[w]hile we located no Ninth Circuit or California case precisely on point, we agree that the return of a preferential payment by a creditor generally revives the liability of a guarantor."
  • The BAP cited to various case and restatement authority for the proposition that although a guarantor is discharged on payment of a debt, a preferential payment is deemed to be no payment at all.
  • The BAP also held that repayment of a preference in a settlement, following a preference lawsuit, is not a voluntary payment that would avoid the guarantor’s liability.
  • Given the risk of a preference recovery, the creditor’s revival claim under the guaranty was a contingent claim as of the petition date and became allowable once the contingency occurred following the petition. As a result, the creditor’s claim for the full $110 million of the preference settlement was an allowed claim.

An Important Decision. BAP decisions are not binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit, but this first appellate decision on the open, post-Travelers question may encourage unsecured creditors to include post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their allowed unsecured claims when their contracts or a statute provides for them outside of bankruptcy.  We may see creditors begin to include such amounts in unsecured claims at an increasing pace, while we wait for the Ninth Circuit’s decision on this issue in the remanded Travelers case. The added bonus of the SNTL Corp. court’s guaranty analysis and holding makes this decision an even more interesting, and important, read.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Delaware Bankruptcy Court Opts Out Of Newly Amended Rule 3007’s Procedures For Omnibus Claim Objections

As described in a post earlier this week, one of the major changes made by the new amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2007 was the inclusion of limits on the use of omnibus claim objections. Newly revised Rule 3007 restricts omnibus objections to certain situations and imposes formatting standards on the motions that can be filed. 

When describing the amended rule, I commented that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, through Local Rule 3007-1, has had its own omnibus objection procedures for some time and that they seemed to be in conflict with the new national rule. Well, taking advantage of the "unless otherwise ordered by the court" language in amended Rule 3007(c), Chief Judge Mary F. Walrath of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued this General Order noting the conflict but directing that the amended Rule 3007(c) "shall not be applicable to omnibus objections that are filed in accordance with Local Rule 3007-1." As a result, barring an individual judge choosing to apply the national Rule 3007 procedure in a particular situation, omnibus objections in Delaware cases will continue to be governed by Delaware’s own local procedures.

Special thanks to Chuck Kunz of MorrisJames, publishers of the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report, for alerting me to Delaware’s new General Order.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Don’t Miss The Important Business Bankruptcy Rule Amendments That Just Took Effect

On December 1st of almost every year, amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure — the ones that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — take effect to address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. Often the changes are relatively minor and of interest only to bankruptcy practitioners, but this year’s set has made some significant changes that will directly impact debtors, creditors and other stakeholders.

A Look At The Amendments. You may find it interesting to see the entire group of amendments together, so I have included two links. The first is to the full "clean" set of the amended rules. The second is to a redline showing the changes made by these amendments to the existing rules, together with the Advisory Committee’s comments.

The Omnibus Objection Problem. One of the most significant amendments will make changes to the popular practice of filing omnibus objections. In large cases the debtor or other estate representative has so many claims to address that they have combined objections to dozens — sometimes hundreds — of different claims in one single motion. The objection may have a name such as “Debtors’ Fourteenth Omnibus Objections To Claims (Substantive)” or some similarly titled document. Click here for one example. In a post last year called "Objections To Claims: Ignore Them At Your Peril," I discussed how it can be hard to tell which claims an omnibus objection is targeting.

  • The format has often meant that the only reference to an individual creditor is buried within the objection’s many pages of text and exhibits, typically in an attached list or chart.
  • If the creditor doesn’t respond to the objection timely, its claim will likely be disallowed and it will recover absolutely nothing from the bankruptcy estate.

The Amended Rule 3007: An "Anti-Gotcha" Solution. The new rules restrict the use of omnibus objections to certain limited circumstances and impose formatting standards. Otherwise, each claim will require its own separate claim objection unless the combined objection covers claims filed by the same person or entity. What grounds for objection can be made by an omnibus objection under the newly revised Rule 3007?

  • Duplicate claims;
  • Claims filed in the wrong case;
  • Original claims that were amended by later claims;
  • Claims that were not timely filed;
  • Claims that have already been paid or released;
  • Claims filed in a form that does not comply with applicable rules;
  • Claims that are really asserting an equity interest in the debtor; and
  • Priority claims that assert an amount in excess of the maximum amount in the Bankruptcy Code.

In short, if the claim is being challenged on substantive grounds, rather than more technical or procedural ones, then the objection will have to be filed one claimant at a time.

When an omnibus objection does make the permitted objections, it will now have to list claimants in alphabetical order, cross-reference claim numbers, give the ground for the objection and cross-reference that to the text of the objection, describe the objector and the reason for the objection in the document’s title, and combine no more than 100 claims in a single objection. This is all designed to make it easier for the creditor to figure out whether its claim is included and the basis for the objection.

Amended Rule 4001: The Clearer Disclosure Rules. Changes have been made to the rule that governs motions and stipulations for use of cash collateral and obtaining debtor in possession (DIP) financing. The amended rules now require that more details about the key provisions of cash collateral and DIP financing terms and conditions be stated in the motion, that proposed forms of order be filed with the motion, and that cross-references be made in the motion to where in the cash collateral or DIP financing agreements and proposed orders the key provisions are reflected. Since some financing agreements can run hundreds of pages long, with complex formulas and provisions, this rule change is designed to make it easier for the court and the parties to understand their material features without wading through the entire document.

New Rule 6003: Putting The Breaks On Some "First Day" Orders. Another major change is the addition of Rule 6003. This new rule provides that "except and to the extent that relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm, the court shall not, within 20 days after the filing of the petition, grant relief" regarding three key areas:

  • The employment of professionals;
  • A motion to pay any prepetition claims (read: critical vendors) or to use, sell, lease (Section 363 sales), or incur an obligation for property of the estate, other than cash collateral or DIP financing motions; or
  • Assumption or assignment of any executory contract or unexpired lease (including commercial real estate leases).

As drafted, unless there is an emergency, and then only to the extent it’s really necessary, the bankruptcy court should defer these decisions until after the 20th day following the filing of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (although technically these apply under the other chapters of bankruptcy). One reason for the rule is to give time for a creditors committee to be appointed and retain counsel before important decisions are made. That said, the exceptions for cash collateral and DIP financing, as well as for rejection of leases and other executory contracts, means a lot can still be done during the early part of a case. When Section 363 sale or critical vendor motions come up on an emergency basis, it’ll be interesting to see how often courts, in applying this new rule, find the existence of irreparable harm.

Amended Rule 6006: Assumption, Assignment, And Rejection Of Executory Contracts. Similar to Rule 3007, Rule 6006 has been changed to put limits on when omnibus motions can be used to deal with executory contracts and leases. Under new Rule 6006(e), absent special court authorization, omnibus motions may be used for multiple executory contracts or leases only when all of the executory contracts to be assumed or assigned are (1) between the same parties, or (2) being assigned to the same assignee. This latter provision likely covers most Section 363 asset sales, so non-debtor contracting parties should continue to carefully review those motions, as discussed in this earlier post. An omnibus motion may also be used when a debtor or trustee seeks to assume, but not assign to more than one assignee, real property leases. In addition, omnibus motions may be used to request rejection of multiple executory contracts or leases.

New Rule 6006(f) provides that, when allowed, these omnibus motions can list no more than 100 executory contracts or leases in any one motion (unlike the chart on this fairly typical pre-amendment motion), and multiple motions will need to be numbered consecutively. The new rule also requires that permitted omnibus motions provide a variety of new information, including:

  • An alphabetical listing by party name;
  • The terms of the assumption or assignment, including for curing defaults; and
  • The identity of the assignee and the adequate assurance of future performance to be provided.

A Few Other Changes. The other amendments this year (1) permit a court to consider a change of venue, (2) clarify when corporate ownership disclosure needs to be made, (3) address constitutional challenges to statutes, and (4) specify procedures for protecting social security numbers and other private information in court filings. Check the clean or redline sets linked above to read these additional rule amendments.

Conclusion. This year’s amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure have more than their share of real changes and they will have an impact on business bankruptcy cases. The omnibus motion changes should help creditors from missing when their claim is the target of an objection and contract parties from failing to see that their executory contract or lease is part of a motion to assume and assign. Although cash collateral and DIP financing motions are not affected, the new irreparable harm standard for certain relief in the first 20 days of a case may prove interesting when emergency Section 363 sales are attempted. Stay tuned.