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Proof Of Claim And Other Bankruptcy Forms Revised To Reflect April 1, 2007 Dollar Amount Adjustments

As reported in this post last month, certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code were increased effective April 1, 2007. The dollar amount changes meant that some of the official bankruptcy forms, most notably the proof of claim form and the voluntary petition, had to be revised as well.

After I put up that post, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (known in the trade as "the AO") made the revised forms available and released a formal notice of the dollar amount adjustments. Copies of the revised forms — with handy arrows pointing out each place where they were revised — are attached to the notice.

Of course, you’ll need to get the forms in blank to use in bankruptcy cases. If you don’t have special bankruptcy form software, a number of the official bankruptcy forms have been designed to allow you to type in information or select choices from drop-down menus before printing the form. Printing is the only way to go because the form won’t let you save your changes. 

If you follow the links above you’ll be able to access blank copies of the revised forms from the AO’s website. That way, you’ll be sure to have the most up-to-date versions.

Defending A Preference: Ninth Circuit Holds That Even First Time Transactions Can Be In The “Ordinary Course”

In a decision issued on April 3, 2007 in the In re: Ahaza Systems, Inc. case, the Ninth Circuit held that even first time transactions can qualify for the "ordinary course of business" defense to preferences. A copy of the Court of Appeal’s decision is available here.

The Bankruptcy Preference. As a quick refresher, preferences are payments or other transfers made in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing, on account of antecedent or pre-existing debt, at a time when the debtor was insolvent, that allow the transferee (the preference defendant) to be "preferred" by recovering more than it would have had the transfer not been made and the defendant instead had simply filed a proof of claim for the amount involved. The 90-day reachback period is extended to a full year prior to the bankruptcy petition for insiders such as officers, directors, and affiliates.

Pre-BAPCPA Statute. The ordinary course of business defense, designed to protect parties who engage in normal transactions with a financially troubled business, is one of the most common defenses available to preference recipients. The Ninth Circuit examined it under the version of the preference statute, Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, as it existed before the 2005 amendments made in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). This pre-BAPCPA statute, specifically Section 547(c)(2), provided that a trustee could not avoid a transfer as a preference

to the extent that such transfer was —

(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;

(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and

(C) made according to ordinary business terms.

The Court’s focus was on subsection (A), the "debt" issue. Usually, parties have a series of contracts or purchase orders, as well as a payment history, that gives context to the ordinary course of business between them. In this case, however, the transaction that led to the allegedly preferential payments was their first one. The Court faced the question of whether a debt can be considered as having been incurred in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the preference defendant when there had been no other past transactions to which it could be compared.

Court Looks To Past Practices With Other Similar Parties. The Court’s answer was yes, holding that a preference defendant can indeed assert the ordinary course of business defense involving a debt created by the first contract or transaction between the parties. However, the Ninth Circuit articulated a special rule when a "first time" debt is involved:

[W]hen we have no past debt between the parties with which to compare the challenged one, the instant debt should be compared to the debt agreements into which we would expect the debtor and creditor to enter as part of their ordinary business operations. Consistent with Food Catering [971 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1982)], however, this analysis should be as specific to the actual parties as possible. Thus, we hold that to fulfill § 547(c)(2)(A), a first-time debt must be ordinary in relation to this debtor’s and this creditor’s past practices when dealing with other, similarly situated parties. Only if a party has never engaged in similar transactions would we consider more generally whether the debt is similar to what we would expect of similarly situated parties, where the debtor is not sliding into bankruptcy.

Both Original And Restructured Agreements Are Relevant. On a related point, since the first transaction here was an agreement that was later restructured to give the debtor more time to pay, the Ninth Circuit also held that both the original and revised agreement should be evaluated for ordinariness.

Ruling Still Important Under BAPCPA. BAPCPA revised the ordinary course of business defense so that Section 547(c)(2) now provides that a payment or other transfer cannot be avoided

to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was—

(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or

(B) made according to ordinary business terms.

Although different, the current statute still makes the issue decided in the In re: Ahaza Systems case, whether the debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business, a requirement. The major change is that the statute now allows the defense to be established by additionally showing that payments were made either (A) in the ordinary course of business of the parties or (B) according to ordinary business terms, rather than both as under the pre-BAPCPA version.

How Hard To Meet? Having established the new test, the Court then reversed the granting of summary judgment to the defendant because it found the proof presented was inadequate. This suggests that although the Ninth Circuit will permit preference defendants to assert the ordinary course of business defense on first time transactions, some defendants may face a challenge in meeting that standard.

Report On The Delaware Supreme Court’s Recent Oral Argument In The Trenwick America Deepening Insolvency Case

One of the most important recent decisions by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the insolvency area was the August 10, 2006 opinion in the Trenwick America Litigation Trust case. As discussed at length in an earlier post, the Trenwick America decision by Vice Chancellor Strine (available here) squarely held that there was no cause of action for "deepening insolvency" under Delaware law. The Chancery Court’s opinion rejected it as a cause of action in no uncertain terms:

Delaware law does not recognize this catchy term as a cause of action, because catchy though the term may be, it does not express a coherent concept. Even when a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out, result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red. The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at that time are creditors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue the firm’s operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate pie such that the firm’s creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so, the directors do not become a guarantor of success.  Put simply, under Delaware law, ‘deepening insolvency’ is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of action for ‘shallowing profitability’ would be when a firm is solvent. Existing equitable causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and existing legal causes of action for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, and breach of contract are the appropriate means by which to challenge the actions of boards of insolvent corporations.

Delaware Supreme Court Hears Appeal. The significance of the Chancery Court decision makes it particularly interesting to follow the appeal in the case, now before the Delaware Supreme Court. The oral argument on the appeal, held on March 14, 2007 at the Widener University School of Law campus in Wilmington, may shed some light on how the Delaware Supreme Court will ultimately rule. Frank Reynolds of Andrews Publications prepared this news story on the oral argument, and the law school’s website also has an article, complete with slideshow, on the oral argument in Trenwick America and in a second case that day. To hear the Trenwick America oral argument for yourself, follow this link and download the audio recording from the Delaware Supreme Court’s website.

Focus At Oral Argument. Having listened to the recording (an entertaining addition to my iPod), it’s interesting to note that the deepening insolvency issue received only a few mentions during oral argument. Those came mainly during a discussion of the business judgment rule and whether existing contractual and statutory remedies sufficiently protect creditors. Instead, the parties and the Justices focused on the following issues during oral argument:

  • Whether the complaint sufficiently pled that the corporation was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency;
  • Whether the business judgment rule protected the directors in permitting the subsidiary corporation to incur guaranty and other obligations;
  • What fiduciary duty was owed and how it was allegedly breached;
  • Whether the zone of insolvency issue was critical to the plaintiff’s case; and
  • Whether the directors breached any fiduciary duties when following the parent corporation’s business plan for the subsidiary and the corporate group.

Reading The Tea Leaves. With the range of issues discussed at oral argument, it’s possible that the Delaware Supreme Court will render its decision in the Trenwick America case without considering the Chancery’s Court’s ruling that deepening insolvency does not exist as a cause of action under Delaware law. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the Delaware Supreme Court could rule for his client without reaching the issue. Likewise, counsel for the defendants urged affirmance based on what Vice Chancellor Strine found to be insufficient pleading of insolvency, a lack of any fiduciary duty owed given the complaint’s allegations, and the application of the business judgment rule. Although not directly involving deepening insolvency, in response to a specific question from one of the Justices, defense counsel also argued that the Delaware Supreme Court should consider holding that directors do not owe fiduciary duties to creditors upon insolvency, leaving creditors to the existing protections and remedies otherwise available to them.

After an interesting oral argument, stay tuned.

New Article On How Distressed Debt Investors Are Preparing For The Next Economic Downturn

The DealBook blog from the New York Times has an interesting post entitled "Stocking Up For A Storm." It describes how certain investment banks have been expanding their distressed debt businesses, believing that the length of the current "good times" period may actually lead to an increase in the level of distress when the economy finally turns. 

The DealBook post points readers to a new article in The Economist on so-called vulture investors. Entitled "The Vultures Take Wing," the article discusses the view of many investors and insolvency professionals that, after a drought of restructurings, a new wave of bankruptcies and defaults may not be too far off. When the problems come, they will likely be even more complex than in past cycles. Not only have very active hedge funds taken a much greater role in recent years, but many companies now have an additional tranche of secured debt in the form of the increasingly popular second lien loans.

While corporate restructurings and Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases have always been complex, when the next surge in defaults hits these trends are likely to present even more challenges — and perhaps opportunities — for both debtors and creditors.

Northwest Airlines Ad Hoc Committee Files Second Appeal On Disclosure Of Trading Details

As reported last week, the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders in the Northwest Airlines case, a group made up chiefly of hedge funds, recently complied with the Bankruptcy Court’s earlier orders and filed a Rule 2019 statement disclosing details of their trades. Having made the filing, it wasn’t clear whether the Ad Hoc Committee would continue to appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s decisions compelling the disclosure. An answer to that question came late in the day on Monday, March 26.

New Appeal Filed. Late Monday, the remaining membership of the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders filed a second notice of appeal, this time from the Bankruptcy Court’s original February 26, 2007 decision requiring the detailed statement to be filed. A copy of the new notice of appeal is available here. An earlier notice of appeal was filed from the Bankruptcy Court’s March 9, 2007 order denying a motion to file the Rule 2019 statement under seal. It appears that the earlier appeal will be pursued as well.

No Stay Pending Appeal. As previously reported, at a March 15, 2007 hearing the Bankruptcy Court also denied the Ad Hoc Committee’s motion for a stay pending appeal. However, the Ad Hoc Committee got until March 25, 2007 to seek a stay from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. (Here’s the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the stay issue, which was filed only last Friday.) Despite the temporary reprieve, the Ad Hoc Committee apparently decided against seeking a stay pending appeal and instead went ahead and filed the updated Rule 2019 statement and then a new appeal.

The Disclosure Issue Moves To Another Court. With the new appeal filed Monday, this issue should be headed to the District Court for briefing and argument in the coming months. It’ll be interesting to see whether the District Court, sitting as an appellate court, has any different reaction to the disclosure issue. Stay tuned for future developments.

A Smaller Ad Hoc Committee Of Hedge Funds Discloses Trading Information In Northwest Airlines

As reported last week, the Bankruptcy Court in the Northwest Airlines Chapter 11 bankruptcy case ordered the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders to make public detailed information about the claims and stock they own and the amounts they paid for them. For those who missed it, here’s the Bankruptcy Court’s first decision on the Rule 2019 disclosure issue back on February 26, 2007. If you want the full story on the hedge fund disclosure issue, check out these two earlier posts, which you can find here and here.

Ad Hoc Committee Discloses Trades. After failing to persuade the Bankruptcy Court to reconsider its decision or to allow the disclosure to be filed under seal, a noticeably smaller Ad Hoc Committee filed this Rule 2019 disclosure on Wednesday, March 21, 2007, providing details on the amounts of claims or stock held, the dates purchased, and the amounts paid. The Ad Hoc Committee’s membership appears to have been reduced by at least four, currently standing at nine, although the Rule 2019 statement does not explain the change in membership or include any disclosure by the former members.

Although Smaller, Ad Hoc Committee Is Still Intact. The filing answers at least one question — whether the hedge funds involved would decide to disband the ad hoc committee to avoid disclosing their trading information. While four dropped out, it seems that the nine remaining Ad Hoc Committee members concluded that the benefits of collective action outweighed the burdens of making the required disclosure.

Appeal Status Unclear. The Ad Hoc Committee had previously filed a notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, seeking review by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. With the disclosure actually filed, it’s not clear whether the Ad Hoc Committee plans to drop the appeal and an accompanying motion for leave to appeal, which it had originally filed in the Bankruptcy Court, and whether the appeal would be moot if continued. Should the Ad Hoc Committee or its former members pursue the appeal effort, I’ll post updates as developments warrant. 

The U.S. Supreme Court Rejects The Fobian Rule Barring Unsecured Creditors From Recovering Attorney’s Fees In Bankruptcy Cases

Attorney’s Fees And Unsecured Claims. For more than 15 years, creditors in the Ninth Circuit who sought to include in unsecured claims amounts for attorney’s fees incurred post-petition litigating bankruptcy issues have had that portion of their claims disallowed. The reason? A decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a 1991 case called In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1991).  

The Fobian Rule. In In re Fobian, the Ninth Circuit held that even if the parties’ underlying contract provided for the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees, "where the litigated issues involve not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, attorney’s fees will not be awarded absent bad faith or harassment by the losing party." 

The Supreme Court Overrules Fobian. That all changed on Tuesday, March 20, 2007, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (click here for the decision). Neither Travelers nor PG&E sought to defend the Fobian rule, and the Supreme Court had little problem disposing of it:

The Fobian rule finds no support in the Bankruptcy Code, either in §502 or elsewhere. In Fobian, the court did not identify any provision of the Bankruptcy Code as providing support for the new rule. See 951 F. 2d, at 1153. Instead, the court cited three of its own prior decisions, In re Johnson, 756 F. 2d 738 (1985); In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686 (1984); and In re Fulwiler, 624 F. 2d 908 (1980) (per curium). Significantly, in none of those cases did the court identify any basis for disallowing a contractual claim for attorney’s fees incurred litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law. Nor did the court have occasion to do so; in each of those cases, the claim for attorney’s fees failed as a matter of state law. See Johnson, supra, at 741–742; Coast Trading, supra, at 693; Fulwiler, supra, at 910. [footnote omitted]

The absence of textual support is fatal for the Fobian rule. Consistent with our prior statements regarding creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy, see, e.g., Raleigh, 530 U.S., at 20, we generally presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed. See 11 U. S. C. §502(b). Neither the court below nor PG&E has offered any reason why the fact that the attorney’s fees in this case were incurred litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law overcomes that presumption.

An Important But Undecided Question. Although the Supreme Court dispatched the Fobian rule, it remanded the case without deciding whether Travelers, an unsecured creditor, could actually recover its attorney’s fees. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the remaining arguments had not been raised below. Still to be resolved is whether Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which expressly allows attorney’s fees to oversecured creditors, means that creditors cannot recover attorney’s fees as part of an unsecured claim. For a flavor of the Supreme Court’s reactions to this open issue, you may find the transcript of the oral argument, held in January 2007, interesting .

Thanks to the Supreme Court of the United States Blog and the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog for first reporting on the decision.