Recent Developments

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Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

New Site Features Free Insolvency Charts And Information

The American Bankruptcy Institute has launched a new site called "ABI’s Chart of the Day," featuring a new insolvency-related economic or financial chart daily, plus a collection of prior charts. The topics covered range from FDIC information showing potentially troubled financial institutions, to the percentage of real estate owned properties sold in certain markets, to economic statistics in comparison to past recessions.

ABI describes the site as follows:

This resource is provided to give insolvency professionals a daily visual peek at the state of the economy.

The charts include links to related news items and other data, covering trends in retailing, housing, commercial real estate, personal income, employment and other indicators important to insolvency professionals.

Please visit abiworld.org for a full suite of tools to stay informed.

This site joins other helpful, free offerings from ABI, such as the Bankruptcy Code Wiki, with the entire current Bankruptcy Code, and a Bankruptcy Rules site, with a handy search feature enabling you to search all of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure using key words.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

First Court Of Appeals Decision Addresses Question Left Open In The Supreme Court’s Travelers Opinion: Can Unsecured Creditors Recover Post-Petition Attorney’s Fees?

On June 23, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to answer the question left open in the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. — whether post-petition attorney’s fees can be added to unsecured claims.

The Travelers Case. Before turning to the SNTL Corp. case itself, let’s look back at the Supreme Court’s decision. In March 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s so-called Fobian rule in the Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. decision. However, it did not decide whether unsecured creditors could recover, as part of their unsecured claims, post-petition attorney’s fees incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case. For more on the Travelers decision, follow the link in this sentence.

The SNTL Corp. BAP Decision. In the December 2007 BAP decision, Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, writing for the unanimous BAP panel, held that that "claims for postpetition attorneys’ fees cannot be disallowed simply because the claim of the creditor is unsecured." On the unrelated issue, the BAP held that a guarantor’s liability was revived after a preference settlement.

The Ninth Circuit Rules In The SNTL Corp. Case. On June 23, 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal, issuing a brief, per curiam decision, stating as follows:

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons stated in its opinion in this case sub nom. We adopt the BAP opinion, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), as our own and attach it as an appendix to this opinion. See Appendix, infra.

A Second Look At The BAP’s Decision. Given that the Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted as its own the BAP opinion in its entirety, further review of the BAP’s analysis is merited. In reaching its decision, the BAP carefully reviewed two earlier decisions by bankruptcy courts that had taken up the open "Travelers" issue, In re Qmect, Inc. (see earlier post on the Qmect decision) and In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. (see prior post on the Electric Machinery decision), as well as pre-Travelers law, and first explained its analysis of the interplay between Sections 502 and 506(b):

We are not persuaded by the approach of the Electric Machinery court and, like Qmect, we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors. While we cannot predict how the Ninth Circuit will decide this issue in Travelers, we do find a clue in Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986), where the Ninth Circuit observed that section 506(b) defines secured claims and does not limit unsecured claims:

When read literally, subsection (b) arguably limits the fees available to the oversecured creditor. When read in conjunction with § 506(a), however, it may be understood to define the portion of the fees which shall be afforded secured status. We adopt the latter reading.

268 Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.

Next, the BAP discussed Section 502(b)(1)’s requirement that the court determine the amount of an unsecured claim as of the petition date:

The Electric Machinery court, like the bankruptcy court here and many of the pre-Travelers majority courts, disallowed the postpetition fees of an unsecured creditor because section 502(b)(1) provides that a bankruptcy court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition” and the postpetition fees did not exist as of that date. Elec. Mach., 371 B.R. at 551; Pride Cos., 285 B.R. at 373. Because the amount of fees incurred postpetition cannot be determined or calculated as of the petition date, section 502(b) purportedly precludes their allowance. Id. We disagree with this approach, as it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim,” which — as discussed previously — includes any right to payment, whether or not that right is contingent and unliquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A); Qmect, 368 B.R. at 884.

The BAP then held that the Supreme Court’s 1988 Timbers decision did not apply:

We believe that Electric Machinery’s reliance on Timbers is misplaced. Timbers provided that an undersecured creditor could not receive postpetition interest on the unsecured portion of its debt. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380. This holding is consistent with section 502(b)(2), which specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest. Inasmuch as section 502(b) does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees, the comparison between the current issue and that presented in Timbers is not persuasive.

Finally, the BAP held that it was unnecessary to reconcile the competing public policy considerations advanced by the Electric Machinery and Qmect decisions:

Because we find that the Bankruptcy Code itself provides the answer to this issue (by not specifically disallowing postpetition fees), we do not attempt to reconcile these policy concerns. In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.

For more on this decision, as well as the BAP’s discussion (now adopted by the Ninth Circuit) on the revival of a guarantor’s liability after a preference settlement, this earlier post on the BAP’s In re SNTL Corp. decision may be of interest.

On Remand From The Supreme Court’s Travelers Decision. One interesting side note involves the BAP’s December 2007 comment in the In re SNTL Corp. decision about being unable to predict how the Ninth Circuit would decide this issue in the Travelers case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. Months later, in May 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued this brief order in the Travelers case, effectively remanding the case for "consideration of the bankruptcy court in the first instance." The bankruptcy judge to whom the decision was remanded? Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, who wrote the BAP opinion in In re SNTL Corp.

Impact On Unsecured Creditors? As the first ruling by a U.S. Court of Appeals on this open issue, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may lead unsecured creditors to include post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their allowed unsecured claims when their contracts or a statute provides for them outside of bankruptcy. It will be interesting to see whether the decision has a significant impact on how unsecured creditors in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions pursue claims in bankruptcy cases, and how bankruptcy estates react to such claims for post-petition attorney’s fees.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

General Motors Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy In New York

General Motors Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection this morning in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Robert E. Gerber has been assigned to preside over the case.

A copy of GM’s bankruptcy petition is available here. The petition listed approximately $82 billion in assets and $172 billion in liabilities. A copy of GM’s press release regarding its bankruptcy can be found at the link in this sentence. GM has also created a restructuring website where additional information for customers, suppliers, and others can be found.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Spring 2009 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

The Spring 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Claim issues involving the Madoff SIPA proceeding;
  • How new Bankruptcy Code provisions involving swap agreements and swap participants are being interpreted;
  • The importance of the mutuality requirement in setoffs;
  • Post-petition rent and Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" claims; and
  • The use of a trademark after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn’s, Boscov’s, Gottschalk’s, Lenox Sales, Goody’s, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and Innovative Luggage, among others. In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses the current economic climate and the impact it continues to have on how debtors and creditors have been approaching bankruptcies and restructurings.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Text Of Legislation To Repeal Certain Of BAPCPA’s Business Bankruptcy Changes Affecting Retailers Now Available

As reported in a post on the blog earlier this week, on April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." At that time the official text of the legislation was not available.

The bill would repeal changes made by BAPCPA relating to (1) the deadline to assume or reject non-residential real property leases, (2) utility deposits, (3) the Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim, and (4) reclamation. These BAPCPA provisions are among those that have had a significant impact on retailers. For a discussion of the bill’s provisions, you can read this blog’s earlier post on the legislation or the explanation of the bill by the NACM. It will be interesting to follow the bill as it makes its way through the legislative process in Congress.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Legislation Introduced To Repeal Certain Business Bankruptcy Changes Made By BAPCPA’s 2005 Amendments

On April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." The bill has been co-sponsored by Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. As of the date of this post, the bill’s official text has not been printed but the National Association of Credit Management has made available on its website what appears to be a final or near-final draft of the legislation, which you can access by clicking here. I plan to provide an update on the blog once the official version of the bill as introduced becomes available.

Introduction of the bill follows testimony before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law by a number of bankruptcy professionals and law professors, including my partner and the Chair of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP‘s Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, Lawrence Gottlieb. Click here for a prior post about his September 26, 2008 testimony, which focused on the disappearance of reorganizations of retailers since the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as "BAPCPA"). A link to Representative Nadler’s press release on the bill’s introduction can be found here.

The Legislation’s Proposed Changes. The Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009, introduced as H.R. 1942, would make several major amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The common theme is that the proposed bill would repeal certain changes made by BAPCPA and restore the statutory language that was in place before BAPCPA was enacted in 2005. The four principal changes are as follows:

  • Real Estate Leases. The bill would change Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code by repealing the maximum 210-day period within which debtors could assume or reject non-residential real property leases. Instead of the current 120-day initial period and up to a 90-day extension, the statute would revert back to the initial 60-day period under the prior law but, more importantly, would allow the bankruptcy court, for cause, to grant further extensions without any time limit.
  • Utilities. Similarly, the bill would repeal Section 366(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which now requires a deposit of cash or certain cash equivalents to provide adequate assurance of payment to utilities. If enacted, the bill would allow debtors to establish adequate assurance of payment with something short of a monetary deposit, as had been the case under the pre-BAPCPA law.
  • 20-Day Goods Administrative Claim. The bill would also make changes to the law relating to shipments by vendors prior to a bankruptcy filing. It would repeal Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, added by BAPCPA, which gives an administrative claim to vendors for the value of goods received by a debtor in the ordinary course of business during the 20 days before the bankruptcy petition.
  • Reclamation. Another change the bill proposes to make is to go back to the pre-BAPCPA language in Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code governing reclamation claims, specifically to repeal language that had expanded the potential reclamation claim for vendors to the 45 days before a bankruptcy petition. The bill would reinstate the pre-BAPCPA provisions restricting reclamation to that provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code (generally only a 10 day period) and permitting an administrative claim or secured claim to be provided to a reclaiming vendor in lieu of a return of the goods pursuant to a valid reclamation claim.
  • Effective Date. Finally, the bill proposes that its changes would apply to cases commenced on or after the date of its enactment, meaning it would apply to cases filed after the bill became law but not to cases filed before it became law.

Conclusion. If the Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009 were enacted, it could have a major impact on Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, in particular those involving retailers. As explained in a recent article by several of my colleagues, the cumulative changes made by BAPCPA have had a profound impact on retail Chapter 11 cases. Repealing them could enable retailers the opportunity to emerge from Chapter 11 — the way they often did in the years before the BAPCPA amendments were adopted. Otherwise, we are likely to continue to see more retailers forced into going of out business sales in Chapter 11.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

U.S. Supreme Court Shows Interest In Deciding Whether The Hypothetical Test Or The Actual Test Should Be Used To Determine If IP Licenses Can Be Assumed In Bankruptcy

It looks like the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least two of the Justices, is interested in deciding whether the "hypothetical test" or the "actual test" should be used in determining whether an intellectual property license can be assumed by a debtor in possession under Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That was the clear message from the somewhat unusual statement by Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Breyer joined, issued on March 23, 2009, in connection with the Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari in the N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. case. You can read a copy of the entire statement by following the link in the prior sentence.

The N.C.P. Marketing Case. As a refresher, in 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here, here, and here to read earlier posts on the case. Last May, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment "for the reasons provided by that court" in an order designed as "not for publication."

Assumption And Assignment. A key basis for the District Court’s decision in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case was the way the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 365(c)(1), specifically on the question of whether a debtor in possession can assume an intellectual property license. In bankruptcy parlance, assumption means that the debtor gets to keep the license. Usually, debtors are allowed to exercise their business judgment when deciding whether to assume or reject (read: breach and stop performing) an executory contract, as well as to assume and assign one to a third party. However, Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code puts a limit on a debtor’s ability to assign executory contracts, and perhaps even to assume them, when "applicable law" gives the non-debtor party to the contract the right to refuse to deal with someone else. In the N.C.P. Marketing Group decision, the District Court held that federal trademark law under the Lanham Act was such "applicable law" and rendered non-exclusive trademark licenses nonassignable.

The Key Bankruptcy Code Section. Section 365(c)(1) is so important to this debate that it bears careful review. Here’s what it says:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

Hypothetical Versus Actual Test. If a debtor cannot assign an IP license without consent of the licensor, can it at least assume the license? That question has led courts to examine ever so closely the first seven words of Section 365(c): "The trustee may not assume or assign…"

  • When the statute says that the trustee may not assume or assign an IP license, does the word "or" really mean "and" too?
  • Put differently, what happens when a debtor is only trying to assume (keep) an IP license and is not actually trying to assign it? Does the Bankruptcy Code language mean that it can neither assume nor assign the license or does it only mean that the debtor cannot assign the license?
  • That, in a nutshell, is the difference between the so-called "hypothetical test" (which reads Section 365(c)(1)’s language as asking whether the debtor hypothetically could assign the license even if it’s only proposing to assume it) and the "actual test" (which interprets the statute’s language as asking only what the debtor is actually proposing to do).
  • The U.S. Courts of Appeals for at least three circuits have adopted the hypothetical test. The Ninth Circuit (covering California, Nevada, Arizona, and a number of other Western states), the Third Circuit (which includes Delaware, the venue of many Chapter 11 cases), and the Fourth Circuit (covering Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and North and South Carolina), have held that Section 365(c)(1) gives most IP licensors a veto right over proposals by a Chapter 11 debtor to assign — and even to assume — IP licenses.
  • For a more complete discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post, entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?"

Justice Kennedy’s Statement. N.C.P. Marketing Group petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the decision denying it the ability to assume the trademark license. Although also voting to deny review, Justice Kennedy issued a three-page statement on that decision to express his view, joined in by Justice Breyer, that the Supreme Court should considering granting certiorari in a future case on the "significant question" of whether the hypothetical test or the actual test should be applied in interpreting Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Kennedy summed up his analysis this way:

The division in the courts over the meaning of §365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable case for our resolution of the conflict. Addressing the issue here might first require us to resolve issues that may turn on the correct interpretation of antecedent questions under state law and trademark-protection principles. For those and other reasons, I reluctantly agree with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. In a different case the Court should consider granting certiorari on this significant question.

Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the two tests suggests that he (and perhaps Justice Breyer) may be leaning toward the actual test. Although noting that the actual test "may present problems of its own," including that it aligns Section 365 "with sound bankruptcy policy only at the cost of departing from at least one interpretation of the plain text of the law," Justice Kennedy aimed most of his criticism in the statement at the hypothetical test.

  • Specifically, Justice Kennedy commented that one "arguable criticism of the hypothetical approach is that it purchases fidelity to the Bankruptcy Code’s text by sacrificing sound bankruptcy policy." He stated that the hypothetical test "may prevent debtors-in-possession from continuing to exercise their rights under nonassignable contracts, such as patent and copyright licenses." Continuing, he noted that without these licenses, "some debtors-in-possession may be unable to effect the successful reorganization that Chapter 11 was designed to promote."
  • He also remarked on what he perceived as a "windfall" to nondebtor parties to valuable executory contracts. While outside of bankruptcy the nondebtor cannot renege on its agreement, if the debtor files bankruptcy "then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim–and resell at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate–the rights it sold to the debtor." Although most non-exclusive licenses are not treated as a sale of intellectual property, Justice Kennedy appears to view the potential loss of IP license rights due to a bankruptcy filing as an unfair result.

Conclusion. In denying review in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case, the Supreme Court has let stand the decision of the courts below that, where the hypothetical test applies as it does in the Ninth Circuit, a non-exclusive trademark license cannot be assumed by a debtor in possession. However, given the detailed statement issued by Justice Kennedy, and joined in by Justice Breyer, it appears that the chances of the Supreme Court granting certiorari in a future IP license assumption case have increased. If such a case reaches the Supreme Court, the current split in the circuits on this important intersection between bankruptcy and intellectual property law may finally be resolved.