Recent Developments

Showing: 36 - 42 of 152 Articles

The Return Of The Rule 2019 Question: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Weighs In On Whether Creditor Groups Must Disclose Trading Data

It’s been a few years since decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the Southern District of New York, and later from the Southern District of Texas, examined whether hedge funds and other investors could be required to disclose the details of their trades when they form an ad hoc committee or group in a Chapter 11 case.  Last week, Judge Mary Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision in the Washington Mutual, Inc. Chapter 11 case, for the first time giving us a Delaware bankruptcy judge’s views on the subject. Before turning to the new decision, a copy of which is available below, let’s first put the issue in context.

Ad Hoc Committees and Groups. In recent years, hedge funds and other investors in distressed debt or the equity securities of bankrupt companies have taken active roles in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Often, these investors form unofficial or "ad hoc" committees.

  • Much like official committees of unsecured creditors, equity security holders, retirees, or other constituencies, unofficial or ad hoc committees typically hire counsel and file motions and other pleadings during the course of a bankruptcy case.
  • Sometimes these creditors call themselves a committee but more recently the more informal term "group" has been used.
  • By acting as a committee or group, the creditors not only share the costs of participating in the bankruptcy case but also have the ability to wield greater influence by acting collectively instead of on an individual basis.

The Rule 2019(a) Statement. After making an appearance in a bankruptcy case, these groups or committees, their counsel, or both will typically file what’s known as a "Rule 2019(a) Statement." This is a public filing required by Rule 2019(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the set of procedural rules which, together with the United States Bankruptcy Code itself, govern the conduct of bankruptcy cases. Rule 2019(a) provides, in part, as follows:

[E]very entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder . . . shall file a verified statement setting forth (1) the name and address of the creditor or equity security holder; (2) the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the employment of the entity . . . ; and (4) . . . the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the members of the committee or the indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof. 

The Northwest Airlines And Scotia Pacific Decisions. In early 2007, first in the Northwest Airlines case, and then in the Scotia Pacific Company LLC ("Scotia Development") case, two bankruptcy judges reached opposite conclusions on the question of whether groups of investors had to comply with Rule 2019.

  • In February and March of 2007, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, presiding over the Northwest Airlines Chapter 11 case, required an ad hoc committee of hedge funds and other stockholders to disclose publicly full details of their trades in Northwest Airlines claims and stock. This was big news because hedge funds and other distressed debt investors carefully guard their trading data. Follow the links in this sentence for copies of Judge Gropper’s first decision requiring the disclosure and second decision ordering that the trading data not be filed under seal. You can find earlier posts on these decisions and their aftermath here, here, here, here, and here.
  • Then in April 2007, Judge Richard S. Schmidt of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued an order denying Scopac’s motion to compel disclosure of the details of trades in Scotia Development’s secured timber notes. In his two-page order, Judge Schmidt ruled that a noteholder group that had formed in the Scopac case was not a "committee" within the meaning of Rule 2019 and, as such, the disclosure requirements of that rule did not apply. Following the links in this sentence will lead you to a copy of Judge Schmidt’s two-page order in the Scotia Development case and to an earlier post on the case.

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s Decision In The Washington Mutual Case. On December 2, 2009, more than two and a half years since the Scotia Development decision, Judge Walrath of the Delaware bankruptcy court faced the same issue in the Washington Mutual, Inc. case.  J. P. Morgan Chase Bank moved to compel a group of creditors calling themselves the "Washington Mutual, Inc. Noteholders Group" ("WMI Noteholders Group") to provide trading and other information required by Rule 2019. The WMI Noteholders Group argued, among other points, that they were not an ad hoc committee but only a loose affiliation of creditors who came together on at at-will basis to share the cost of advisory services as a matter of efficiency.

In her decision, Judge Walrath rejected that argument, siding with Judge Gropper’s analysis in Northwest Airlines and declining to follow the two-page order issued by Judge Schmidt in the Scotia Development case. Specifically, she held:

Here, the WMI Noteholders Group possesses virtually all the characteristics typically found in an ad hoc committee, save the name. The WMI Noteholders Group consists of multiple creditors holding similar claims. The members of the WMI Noteholders Group filed pleadings and appeared in these chapter 11 cases collectively, not individually. The WMI Noteholders Group retained counsel, which takes its instructions from the Group as a whole. While counsel contends that it speaks only for the members of the WMI Noteholders Group that agree with the filing of each pleading or position taken in each appearance, counsel for the Group has never advised this Court that it is representing less than all the Group. Rather the pleadings and appearances by counsel demonstrate that the Group and counsel represent not each individual member in its individual capacity, but rather the Group as a whole. In fact, it is the collective $1.1 billion in holdings of the members of the Group that counsel uses to argue in favor of the Group’s position, not each individual’s separate holding.

Under the plain language of Rule 2019, therefore, the Court finds that although the WMI Noteholders Group call themselves a Group, they are in fact acting as an ad hoc committee or entity representing more than one creditor. The WMI Noteholders Group, therefore, must comply with Rule 2019.

Follow the link for a copy of Judge Walrath’s 20 page Washington Mutual decision.

Another Issue: Do Groups Owe Fiduciary Duties? One of the most interesting parts of Judge Walrath’s decision came in response to the WMI Noteholders Group’s argument that Rule 2019 was not intended to apply to the Group because it does not speak for other noteholders. Judge Walrath not only rejected this argument but in doing so also suggested that creditor or shareholder groups may owe fiduciary duties to others in the same class:

The WMI Noteholders Group contends, however, that the Rule was only intended to apply to ‘a body that purports to speak on behalf of an entire class or broader group of stakeholders in a fiduciary capacity with the power to bind the stakeholders that are members of such a committee.’ The WMI Noteholders Group’s argument is premised on the erroneous assumption that the Group owes no fiduciary duties to other similarly situated creditors, either in or outside the Group. The case law, however, suggests that members of a class of creditors may, in fact, owe fiduciary duties to other members of the class.

Judge Walrath, however, deferred any further decision on the issue, noting:

It is not necessary, at this stage, to determine the precise extent of fiduciary duties owed but only to recognize that collective action by creditors in a class implies some obligation to other members of that class.
 

With this decision, ad hoc committees and other groups are on notice that, at least in Delaware, they may be found to owe duties to other members of their respective class of creditors or investors.

Conclusion. This new decision means that Delaware now joins the Southern District of New York in holding that ad hoc committees and investor groups will be required to comply fully with Rule 2019, including the requirement to disclose details of their trades in the debtor’s claims or interests. In addition, the Washington Mutual decision goes another step and suggests that these groups may be held to owe fiduciary duties to other members of their class, whether or not they have joined the group or ad hoc committee. With judges in the two most active jurisdictions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases now applying Rule 2019 more broadly, it will be interesting to see how creditors, investors, and debtors react in future cases.

Bankruptcy Judge’s Research Binder Now Updated And Available

I have posted in the past about the helpful research binder that Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California makes available to bankruptcy professionals and the public. Fortunately, Chief Judge Newsome has again updated his binder as of December 1, 2009, covering cases through Volume 410 of Bankruptcy Reports. Follow the links in this sentence to access the entire binder in PDF format and the HTML version organized by topic. The PDF version is capable of being searched using a key word or phrase.

The primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law, as Chief Judge Newsome presides in the Northern District of California, but some out-of-circuit law is also included. The disclaimer Chief Judge Newsome includes puts the binder’s use in context:

The following list of cases and supplemental information is presented for informational and educational purposes only. Though it represents the aggregation of 19 years of research, the Court makes no claims as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases set forth may very well have been superseded, reversed, or otherwise may no longer be good law. The Court has posted it with the intention to educate and assist those who may find it helpful. Accordingly, users should consider it a first, but by no means final, research tool, and should cite check all cases listed herein for continued viability prior to relying on such cases in practice.

With those caveats, and especially when used in combination with the new Google Scholar legal research tool, the binder is a helpful place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

Powerful, Free Legal Research Tool Now Available

Last week, Google launched a new feature on its Google Scholar specialized search engine that enables full-text searching of published federal and state court opinions, as well as articles in certain legal journals. Users can access the new features by selecting the "Legal opinions and journals" bullet on the Google Scholar main search page. The cases in the Google Scholar database generally include official reporter citation page numbers throughout the decision. The other main search category available is "Articles," including or excluding patents.

By using the Advanced Scholar Search feature, you can engage in more tailored searches, such as within just federal court decisions, decisions from one or more individual states, or articles by specific authors, or in designated journals, date ranges, or subject matter fields. Google’s official blog post on the new search feature gives additional information.

At the moment, it appears that not all unpublished decisions are available in Google Scholar search results, and Google’s disclaimer states that it does not represent that results are complete or accurate. In addition, among other features, Google Scholar lacks the key number system, headnotes, cite-checking ability (although the "How Cited" link gives some information on follow-on citations), and access to a full range of legal journals available from long-standing legal search services such as LexisNexis and Westlaw. Still, as a supplement to Google’s standard web search, the Google Scholar legal opinion and journal search engine is a powerful new — and free — place to start when doing bankruptcy or other legal research.

Second Circuit Decides Whether Unsecured Creditors Can Recover Post-Petition Attorney’s Fees

On November 5, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the second court of appeals to answer the question left open in the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007): Can unsecured creditors recover post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their unsecured claims? For more on the Travelers decision, follow the link to this earlier post.

The Ninth Circuit’s Earlier SNTL Corp. Decision. In June 2009, the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam decision in In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2009), held that post-petition attorney’s fees were allowable as part of an unsecured prepetition contract claim. The Ninth Circuit adopted the December 2007 opinion of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), which is available by following the link in this sentence. You may find this earlier post on the SNTL Corp. case of interest as well.

The Second Circuit’s New Decision. In its November 5, 2009 opinion in Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, the Second Circuit held — as the Ninth Circuit did in the SNTL Corp. case — that an unsecured creditor can include post-petition attorney’s fees authorized under a prepetition contract valid under state law. In Ogle, the Second Circuit extended its holding in United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982), a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, and concluded that United Merchants survived both the statutory revisions made by the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court’s Travelers decision.

In reaching this result, the Second Circuit analyzed the issues presented, in part, as follows:

All of the fees at issue in Travelers were incurred post-petition; so the amount was necessarily unknown when the bankruptcy petition was filed. It follows that if an unsecured claim for post-petition fees was for that reason unrecoverable, the Travelers Court could have disposed of the claim on that simple, available ground alone. Travelers, therefore, proceeds along lines that, reasonably extended, would suggest (notwithstanding the Court’s express disclaimer) that section 502(b)’s requirement–that the court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition”–does not bar recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees.

In the present appeal, as in Travelers: The underlying contract is valid as a matter of state substantive law; none of the section 502(b)(2)-(9) exceptions apply; and the Code is silent as to the particular question presented–in Travelers, whether the Code allows “unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law,” 549 U.S. at 453; and here, whether the Code allows unsecured claims for “fees incurred while litigating issues of” contract law more generally.

Accordingly, we hold that an unsecured claim for post-petition fees, authorized by a valid pre-petition contract, is allowable under section 502(b) and is deemed to have
arisen pre-petition.  Accord SNTL, 571 F.3d at 844 (“[W]e reject the position . . . that section 502(b) precludes such fees.”).
 

The Court then turned to the question of whether Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly disallows the recovery of attorney’s fees as part of an unsecured claim:

As Travelers makes clear, the question is whether the Code disallows post-petition attorneys’ fees, and does so expressly. It was therefore decisive in Travelers that “the Code says nothing about unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law.” 459 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). And while Travelers declined to address section 506(b) (because the parties had not raised the issue below), see id. at 454-56, it is decisive here that the Code says nothing about such fees incurred litigating things other than issues of bankruptcy law. The teaching of Travelers is therefore fully consonant with our decision in United Merchants.

Accordingly, we hold that section 506(b) does not implicate unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees, and it therefore interposes no bar to recovery.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected arguments that (1) Section 502(b)(2)’s disallowance of unmatured interest bars claims for post-petition attorney’s fees, (2) Section 502(e)(2) regarding claims for reimbursement or contribution implicitly forecloses post-petition attorney’s fees, and (3) as a policy matter it would be unfair to allow contract creditors to recover post-petition attorney’s fees when tort claimants and many trade creditors cannot.

Conclusion. We now have two U.S. Court of Appeals decisions this year holding that, after Travelers, post-petition attorney’s fees are allowable as part of an unsecured claim if otherwise recoverable under a prepetition contract. Particularly given the major bankruptcy cases filed in the Southern District of New York, within the Second Circuit, unsecured creditors may make a point of including post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their claims when their contracts so provide. This decision raises questions as well:

  • Will the potential allowance of post-petition attorney’s fees for bankruptcy-related issues impact a debtor’s reorganization prospects?
  • What procedures will debtors propose for managing the process as unsecured creditors amend their claims to add attorney’s fees incurred in protecting their rights during the course of a bankruptcy case?
  • Will individual unsecured creditors become more active in Chapter 11 cases, particularly in those cases in which a large distribution is likely?
  • What standards will bankruptcy courts use to assess the reasonableness of an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorney’s fees for bankruptcy-related issues?
  • Will claims buyers pay more for unsecured claims based on contracts providing for recovery of post-petition attorney’s fees now that bankruptcy-related fees are recoverable?
  • Will creditors be more insistent on including attorney’s fees provisions in contracts?

Not every unsecured creditor will have the right to attorney’s fees, and most may not incur significant fees after a bankruptcy is filed. However, those that do now have another important arrow in their quiver when seeking to add those fees to their unsecured claims. It will be interesting to see how these issues play out in the months ahead.

 

A Matter Of Time: Important Amendments To The Bankruptcy Rules Are Coming December 1st

Nearly every year, changes are made to the set of rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Normally, the changes address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. This year, the amendments to the national bankruptcy rules are mainly the result of statutory changes enacted by Congress. The new amendments will take effect on December 1, 2009.

Timing Changes Across The Board. For years, the standard time periods for many actions in bankruptcy cases have been measured in round numbers — 10 days for some, 20 days for others. Sometimes this has led to confusion about deadlines, especially when time periods straddle weekends or holidays. To simplify the calculation of bankruptcy time periods, and those in other non-bankruptcy laws, earlier this year Congress enacted the Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009. The main purpose of the Act is to switch to 7, 14, 21, and 28 day intervals for most bankruptcy procedures. Here’s how the changes will be implemented in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure:

  • 5 day periods become 7 day periods;
  • 10 day periods become 14 day periods;
  • 15 day periods become 14 day periods;
  • 20 day periods become 21 day periods;
  • 25 day periods become 28 day periods.

For example, a motion set for hearing on a Friday will now have objection and reply deadlines fall on Fridays. It also means that the era of the "20 day notice" in bankruptcy is over — but it’s just being replaced with the era of the "21 day notice." The change should make calculating due dates easier, although be aware that it will shorten or lengthen most of the previously standard notice periods under prior law. Rule 9006 is being revised extensively to reflect the new way of accounting for weekends and holidays. Periods that were 30 days or longer are essentially unchanged.

A Longer Appeal Period. So where is this going to have the biggest effect in the business bankruptcy realm? I think the impact will be felt most in the time to file an appeal from a bankruptcy court order. Amendments to Rule 8001 will extend the time for filing a notice of appeal by four days — from 10 days to 14 days. This means that an order approving a settlement under Rule 9019, authorizing a Section 363 sale of assets, or confirming a plan of reorganization, among others, will not become final and no longer appealable until the 15th day following entry compared to the 11th day following entry under current law. After years of counting on bankruptcy court orders being final after only 10 days, parties will need to adjust their expectations on the finality of orders.

How To Access The Amended Rules. Bankruptcy attorneys and other professionals should review the amended rules to see the full range of the changes.

Local Rule Changes Are Also Coming. Expect to see bankruptcy courts around the country adopt conforming changes to their local rules. Two examples: the Northern District of California has already done so and the Southern District of New York is proposing to do so.

Conclusion. Although these timing changes are not as significant as amendments made a few years ago, they will affect virtually all time periods in the national, and in time local, bankruptcy rules that are currently less than 30 days. With under a month to go before they take effect, now is a good time to get on top of these amendments.

Major Amendments To The CCAA, Canada’s Reorganization Law, Are Now In Force

In a post last year entitled "North Of The Border: Reorganization Under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act," I discussed the various types of bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings available under Canadian law. Included in the discussion was the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, known as the CCAA, used by many Canadian companies to reorganize. At that time, although significant amendments had been enacted to the CCAA and other Canadian bankruptcy laws, those amendments had not "come into force," the final act necessary under the Canadian system before the changes in the law would become effective.

That changed on September 18, 2009, when these revisions to the CCAA and to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or BIA, finally came into force (joining a few other changes that came into force in July 2008). Canadian bankruptcy law has now been modified in a number of important ways, applicable to cases filed going forward.

For more on the new law, and Canadian bankruptcy issues generally, be sure to check out the website of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada.

Fall 2009 Edition Of Absolute Priority Now Available

The Fall 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Developments in the General Growth Chapter 11 cases;
  • Updates on the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies;
  • Efforts in Congress to repeal certain of BAPCPA’s business bankruptcy provisions; and
  • The "settlement payment" defense to fraudulent transfer claims against shareholders in leveraged buyouts.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including debtors Pacific Ethanol Holding Co. and Crabtree & Evelyn, Ltd., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. Recent committee cases include Eddie Bauer, Ritz Camera, Filene’s Basement, BT Tires Group, Boscov’s, Gottschalk’s, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and G.I. Joe’s, among others. Also discussed is our work for Levi Strauss & Co. in purchasing 73 outlet stores from the Anchor Blue Retail Group case and for Rackable Systems, Inc. (now known as Silicon Graphics International) in purchasing substantially all of the assets of Silicon Graphics, Inc. in its recent Chapter 11 case.

In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how Section 363 asset sales have become the chief means for companies to restructure in bankruptcy, and how the number of "going concern" sales has grown over the past few months compared to the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

I hope you find this Fall’s edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.