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Business Bankruptcy Issues The Financially Troubled Company

A New Way Of Looking At Termination On Bankruptcy Contract Clauses

Contract photo

Image Courtesy of NobMouse

Ken Adams, Professor Adrian Walters, and I recently collaborated on an article about the ubiquitous “termination on bankruptcy” or ipso facto clauses in contracts. The article was just published by the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section in its online publication, Business Law Today. It’s titled “Termination-On-Bankruptcy Provisions: Some Proposed Language” and is available by following the link. You can also download a PDF of the article.

The article offers proposed language for agreements governed by U.S. law and also by foreign law. I have posted on termination on bankruptcy provisions in the past, discussing how U.S. bankruptcy law usually — but not always — renders those clauses unenforceable. This new article recognizes those limitations but suggests proposed model language to address settings in which the provision is enforceable, together with an analysis of the specific language proposed.

I hope you find the article of interest.

Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Ruling Protecting Managers Of Insolvent LLCs

Creditor Derivative Claims Against Fiduciaries Of Insolvent Corporate Entities. In a 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency." 

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation’s directors. That led many to wonder whether the same ruling would be extended to managers of Delaware limited liability companies ("LLCs"), the LLC equivalent of a corporation’s directors. 

The Chancery Court’s Decision. In November 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no." In CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del.Ch. 2010), the Chancery Court held that creditors could not bring derivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty against managers of insolvent LLCs, chiefly because the relevant Delaware LLC Act provision limited standing to bring such suits only to LLC members and their assignees. For a discussion of the Chancery Court decision, follow the link to a November 2010 post on the blog entitled "New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs."

The Delaware Supreme Court Decision. The decision was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. On September 2, 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion analyzing the Delaware LLC Act and affirming the Chancery Court’s decision. A copy of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion is available through this link.

  • The Delaware Supreme Court held that the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, limits standing to bring derivative claims only to LLC members and their assignees because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The Delaware Supreme Court held that this statute was unambiguous and expressly limits standing only to LLC members and their assignees. The creditor plaintiff argued that it was "absurd" for the result to be different as between a corporation and LLC, but the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware General Assembly "was well suited to make that policy choice and we must honor that choice." 
  • The plaintiff also claimed that by limiting standing, the statute violated the Delaware Constitution’s prohibition against curtailing the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed in 1792, when Delaware ratified its first constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument holding that, among other reasons, Delaware limited liability companies, unlike corporations, came into existence only in 1992 and therefore did not exist in 1792. In addition, the LLC statute was properly able to both grant and limit derivative standing.

Creditor Options. Recognizing that this standing provision could limit creditor remedies in the event of insolvency, the Delaware Supreme Court discussed one remedial option available to creditors. In footnote 20 of the opinion, the Court stated:

Admittedly, this approach is not the only option the General Assembly had, and we make no normative comment on the General Assembly’s policy choice. Our only purpose here is to explain that limiting derivative standing to members and assignees in a contractual entity like an LLC is not absurd because other interest holders–like creditors–have other options–as, for example, negotiating automatic assignment of membership interests upon insolvency clauses into the credit agreement and requiring the members and governing board to amend the LLC agreement accordingly.

Key Observations. As the Delaware Supreme Court noted, certain creditors may require that the LLC agreement be amended to provide for automatic assignment of membership interests to the creditors upon insolvency. If so, those creditors would then have standing to bring derivative claims. However, absent such provisions, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision:

  • Managers of a Delaware LLC will not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent, although it is far less certain that the standing statute would preclude a bankruptcy trustee from bringing claims on behalf of the LLC itself;
  • An insolvent LLC’s creditors will not have derivative standing to bring potential D&O type claims; and
  • These creditors will be limited to contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves. 

Although Delaware LLCs and corporations share many common features, this new Delaware Supreme Court decision makes clear that the automatic derivative standing of creditors upon insolvency is one important distinction.

Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs

Derivative Claims Against Directors Of An Insolvent Delaware Corporation. With its 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. To read that decision, click on the case name in the prior sentence. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation’s directors, but a question remained: Would that same ruling extend to managers of Delaware limited liability companies, the LLC equivalent of a corporation’s directors. Although a number of commentators and some court decisions assumed that it would, a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision has answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no."

New Chancery Court Ruling. In the new decision, CML V, LLC v. Bax, C.A. No. 5373-VCL (Del.Ch. Nov. 3, 2010), the Delaware Chancery Court undertook an extensive analysis of the Delaware LLC Act and also examined the issue more broadly.

  • The Court held that under the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, only LLC members and their assignees have standing to bring derivative claims because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The LLC Act does not give an insolvent LLC’s creditors standing to bring derivative claims. The situation is different for creditors of insolvent corporations because the governing Delaware corporation statutes do not impose exclusive derivative standing provisions.
  • Although the Chancery Court acknowledged that arguments could be made for allowing creditors to bring derivative actions against managers of an insolvent LLC, the Court saw no reason to set aside the literal reading of the LLC Act’s standing provision. The Court also noted that the Delaware Limited Partnership Act has a similar exclusive standing provision.

For a full discussion of the decision, including a link to the opinion itself, be sure to read Francis G.X. Pileggi’s excellent post entitled "Chancery Bars Derivative Claim of Creditor Against Insolvent LLC, Based on LLC Act."  

Impact On An Insolvent LLC’s Creditors. So where does this new decision leave creditors of an insolvent Delaware LLC?

  • Under the Chancery Court decision, unlike directors of a Delaware corporation, managers of a Delaware LLC are not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent. 
  • If the decision is followed by other courts — specifically including bankruptcy courts where claims involving managers of bankrupt LLCs may more often be litigated — then an insolvent LLC’s creditors will not have access to potential D&O type claims. Instead, those creditors will have to rely on contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves. 

Stay Tuned. As noted, the bankruptcy court is often the forum where insolvency-related matters are litigated. Should these claims be pursued outside of the Chancery Court, it will be interesting to see how other courts interpret the Delaware LLC Act’s provisions. 

Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

California Court of Appeal Provides Guidance For Directors Of Financially Distressed California Corporations

As I have reported over the past several years, Delaware courts, including the Delaware Supreme Court, have addressed the nature of a director’s fiduciary duties when a Delaware corporation is insolvent or in the "zone of insolvency," most notably with the 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). To read that decision, click on the case name in the prior sentence. For a discussion of that case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

California courts, however, did not have occasion to consider fiduciary duty issues involving directors of financially distressed California corporations until recently. In a decision called Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District has provided directors of California corporations facing potential insolvency with meaningful guidance on the scope of their fiduciary duties, including the application of California’s "trust fund doctrine." 

It will be interesting to see whether other California courts, perhaps eventually including the California Supreme Court, will have opportunity in the months and years ahead to consider these important issues to directors and officers.

Business Bankruptcy Issues The Financially Troubled Company

Assignments For The Benefit Of Creditors: Simple As ABC?

Companies in financial trouble are often forced to liquidate their assets to pay creditors. While a Chapter 11 bankruptcy sometimes makes the most sense, other times a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is required, and in still other situations a corporate dissolution may be best. This post examines another of the options, the assignment for the benefit of creditors, commonly known as an "ABC."

A Few Caveats. It’s important to remember that determining which path an insolvent company should take depends on the specific facts and circumstances involved. As in many areas of the law, one size most definitely does not fit all for financially troubled companies. With those caveats in mind, let’s consider one scenario sometimes seen when a venture-backed or other investor-funded company runs out of money.

One Scenario. After a number of rounds of investment, the investors of a privately held corporation have decided not to put in more money to fund the company’s operations. The company will be out of cash within a few months and borrowing from the company’s lender is no longer an option. The accounts payable list is growing (and aging) and some creditors have started to demand payment. A sale of the business may be possible, however, and a term sheet from a potential buyer is anticipated soon. The company’s real property lease will expire in nine months, but it’s possible that a buyer might want to take over the lease.

  • A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing is problematic because there is insufficient cash to fund operations going forward, no significant revenues are being generated, and debtor in possession financing seems highly unlikely unless the buyer itself would make a loan. 
  • The board prefers to avoid a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because it’s concerned that a bankruptcy trustee, unfamiliar with the company’s technology, would not be able to generate the best recovery for creditors.

The ABC Option. In many states, another option that may be available to companies in financial trouble is an assignment for the benefit of creditors (or "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" as it is sometimes called). The ABC is an insolvency proceeding governed by state law rather than federal bankruptcy law.

California ABCs. In California, where ABCs have been done for years, the primary governing law is found in California Code of Civil Procedure sections 493.010 to 493.060 and sections 1800 to 1802, among other provisions of California law. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1802 sets forth, in remarkably brief terms, the main procedural requirements for a company (or individual) making, and an assignee accepting, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors:

1802.  (a) In any general assignment for the benefit of creditors, as defined in Section 493.010, the assignee shall, within 30 days after the assignment has been accepted in writing, give written notice of the assignment to the assignor’s creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest as set forth on the list provided by the assignor pursuant to subdivision (c).
   (b) In the notice given pursuant to subdivision (a), the assignee shall establish a date by which creditors must file their claims to be able to share in the distribution of proceeds of the liquidation of the assignor’s assets.  That date shall be not less than 150 days and not greater than 180 days after the date of the first giving of the written notice to creditors and parties in interest.
   (c) The assignor shall provide to the assignee at the time of the making of the assignment a list of creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest, signed under penalty of  perjury, which shall include the names, addresses, cities, states, and ZIP Codes for each person together with the amount of that person’s anticipated claim in the assignment proceedings.

In California, the company and the assignee enter into a formal "Assignment Agreement." The company must also provide the assignee with a list of creditors, equityholders, and other interested parties (names, addresses, and claim amounts). The assignee is required to give notice to creditors of the assignment, setting a bar date for filing claims with the assignee that is between five to six months later.

ABCs In Other States. Many other states have ABC statutes although in practice they have been used to varying degrees. For example, ABCs have been more common in California than in states on the East Coast, but important exceptions exist. Delaware corporations can generally avail themselves of Delaware’s voluntary assignment statutes, and its procedures have both similarities and important differences from the approach taken in California. Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog has an interesting post discussing ABC’s under Georgia law. Florida is another state in which ABCs are done under specific statutory procedures. For an excellent book that has information on how ABCs are conducted in various states, see Geoffrey Berman’s General Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The ABCs of ABCs, published by the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Important Features Of ABCs. A full analysis of how ABCs function in a particular state and how one might affect a specific company requires legal advice from insolvency counsel. The following highlights some (but by no means all) of the key features of ABCs:

  • Court Filing Issue. In California, making an ABC does not require a public court filing. Some other states, however, do require a court filing to initiate or complete an ABC.
  • Select The Assignee. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, who is randomly appointed from those on an approved panel, a corporation making an assignment is generally able to choose the assignee.
  • Shareholder Approval. Most corporations require both board and shareholder approval for an ABC because it involves the transfer to the assignee of substantially all of the corporation’s assets. This makes ABCs impractical for most publicly held corporations.
  • Liquidator As Fiduciary. The assignee is a fiduciary to the creditors and is typically a professional liquidator.
  • Assignee Fees. The fees charged by assignees often involve an upfront payment and a percentage based on the assets liquidated.
  • No Automatic Stay. In many states, including California, an ABC does not give rise to an automatic stay like bankruptcy, although an assignee can often block judgment creditors from attaching assets.
  • Event Of Default. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is typically a default under most contracts. As a result, contracts may be terminated upon the assignment under an ipso facto clause.
  • Proof Of Claim. For creditors, an ABC process generally involves the submission to the assignee of a proof of claim by a stated deadline or bar date, similar to bankruptcy. (Click on the link for an example of an ABC proof of claim form.)
  • Employee Priority. Employee and other claim priorities are governed by state law and may involve different amounts than apply under the Bankruptcy Code. In California, for example, the employee wage and salary priority is $4,300, not the $10,950 amount currently in force under the Bankruptcy Code.
  • 20 Day Goods. Generally, ABC statutes do not have a provision similar to that under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9), which gives an administrative claim priority to vendors who sold goods in the ordinary course of business to a debtor during the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing. As a result, these vendors may recover less in an ABC than in a bankruptcy case, subject to assertion of their reclamation rights.
  • Landlord Claim. Unlike bankruptcy, there generally is no cap imposed on a landlord’s claim for breach of a real property lease in an ABC.
  • Sale Of Assets. In many states, including California, sales by the assignee of the company’s assets are completed as a private transaction without approval of a court. However, unlike a bankruptcy Section 363 sale, there is usually no ability to sell assets "free and clear" of liens and security interests without the consent or full payoff of lienholders. Likewise, leases or executory contracts cannot be assigned without required consents from the other contracting party.
  • Avoidance Actions. Most states allow assignees to pursue preferences and fraudulent transfers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Bankruptcy Code pre-empts California’s preference statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1800. Nevertheless, to date the California state courts have refused to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision and still permit assignees to sue for preferences in California state court. In February 2008, a Delaware state court followed the California state court decisions, refusing either to follow the Ninth Circuit position or to hold that the California preference statute was pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware court was required to apply California’s ABC preference statute because the avoidance action arose out of an earlier California ABC.

The Scenario Revisited. With this overview in mind, let’s return to our company in distress.

  • The prospect of a term sheet from a potential buyer may influence whether our hypothetical company should choose an ABC or another approach. Some buyers will refuse to purchase assets outside of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy or a Chapter 7 case. Others are comfortable with the ABC process and believe it provides an added level of protection from fraudulent transfer claims compared to purchasing the assets directly from the insolvent company. Depending on the value to be generated by a sale, these considerations may lead the company to select one approach over the other available options.
  • In states like California where no court approval is required for a sale, the ABC can also mean a much faster closing — often within a day or two of the ABC itself provided that the assignee has had time to perform due diligence on the sale and any alternatives — instead of the more typical 30-60 days required for bankruptcy court approval of a Section 363 sale. Given the speed at which they can be done, in the right situation an ABC can permit a "going concern" sale to be achieved.
  • Secured creditors with liens against the assets to be sold will either need to be paid off through the sale or will have to consent to release their liens; forced "free and clear" sales generally are not possible in an ABC.
  • If the buyer decides to take the real property lease, the landlord will need to consent to the lease assignment. Unlike bankruptcy, the ABC process generally cannot force a landlord or other third party to accept assignment of a lease or executory contract.
  • If the buyer decides not to take the lease, or no sale occurs, the fact that only nine months remains on the lease means that this company would not benefit from bankruptcy’s cap on landlord claims. If the company’s lease had years remaining, and if the landlord were unwilling to agree to a lease termination approximating the result under bankruptcy’s landlord claim cap, the company would need to consider whether a bankruptcy filing was necessary to avoid substantial dilution to other unsecured creditor claims that a large, uncapped landlord claim would produce in an ABC.
  • If the potential buyer walks away, the assignee would be responsible for determining whether a sale of all or a part of the assets was still possible. In any event, assets would be liquidated by the assignee to the extent feasible and any proceeds would be distributed to creditors in order of their priority through the ABC’s claims process.
  • While other options are available and should be explored, an ABC may make sense for this company depending upon the buyer’s views, the value to creditors and other constituencies that a sale would produce, and a clear-eyed assessment of alternative insolvency methods. 

Conclusion. When weighing all of the relevant issues, an insolvent company’s management and board would be well-served to seek the advice of counsel and other insolvency professionals as early as possible in the process. The old song may say that ABC is as "easy as 1-2-3," but assessing whether an assignment for the benefit of creditors is best for an insolvent company involves the analysis of a myriad of complex factors.

Business Bankruptcy Issues The Financially Troubled Company

Are “Termination On Bankruptcy” Contract Clauses Enforceable?

Practically every contract has a provision that makes the bankruptcy or insolvency of one contracting party a trigger for the other party to terminate the contract. These are standard fare and rarely negotiated unless they also include a provision for the reversion back of ownership of property, often intellectual property, upon bankruptcy or insolvency. This post takes a look at these provisions and examines whether they are enforceable.

The Typical Ipso Facto Clause. Termination on bankruptcy provisions are often known as ipso facto clauses (the Latin phrase meaning "by the fact itself") because the language provides that the fact of bankruptcy itself is enough to trigger the termination of the agreement. Here’s a common provision:

This Agreement shall terminate, without notice, (i) upon the institution by or against either party of insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy proceedings or any other proceedings for the settlement of either party’s debts, (ii) upon either party making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or (iii) upon either party’s dissolution or ceasing to do business.

Variants of this language are found in many types of contracts, including licenses, leases, and development agreements. Some provide that termination is automatic and others first require notice. Termination triggers may include:

  • Filing a voluntary bankruptcy;
  • Having an involuntary bankruptcy filed against a party;
  • Becoming insolvent (frequently the term is left undefined in the contract);
  • Admitting in writing that the party is insolvent;
  • Making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors (a liquidation alternative recognized under the laws of many states); or
  • Tripping a financial condition covenant.

The bankruptcy or insolvency of either party is frequently a termination trigger. However, when the financial condition of only one contracting party is in doubt, the more financially stable party may insist on a one-sided provision allowing it to get out of the agreement upon the weaker party’s insolvency or bankruptcy. 

Notso Fasto: The Bankruptcy Code Stops The Clause In Its Tracks. These termination provisions may be common, but are they enforceable? The short answer, which may be surprising to some, is generally "no." Two key provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lead to this result. First, Section 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an interest of the debtor (the bankrupt company or person) in property becomes "property of the estate," meaning that the debtor does not lose the property or contract right, despite a provision in an agreement:

that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in property.

11 U.S.C. §541(c). Translated from bankruptcy-ese, this statute means that a clause that terminates a contract because of the "insolvency" or "financial condition" of the debtor, or due to the filing of a bankruptcy case, will be unenforceable once a bankruptcy case has been filed.

A second Bankruptcy Code provision, Section 365(e)(1), governs ipso facto clauses in executory contracts, which are agreements under which both sides still have important performance remaining (discussed in more detail in this earlier post). Section 365(e)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on—

(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. §365(e)(1). This statute generally makes ipso facto provisions in executory contracts and leases unenforceable.

Why Put Ipso Facto Clauses In Contracts In The First Place? If these termination provisions are generally unenforceable, why do parties seem to include them in almost every contract? There are three main reasons.

Force Of Habit. One reason is that under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898, replaced by the Bankruptcy Code in 1979, these ipso facto clauses were enforceable. Over the years, lawyers and businesses got used to including them in their contract forms and they have continued to write them into many agreements. Since it’s always possible that the Bankruptcy Code could be changed to reinstate the old rule, lawyers often see little reason to take them out.

It Takes An Actual Bankruptcy. Another and perhaps more important reason is that the rule applies only if a bankruptcy is actually filed. If an ipso facto provision provides that the agreement terminates upon a party’s insolvency, and no bankruptcy case is ever filed, it’s possible that the solvent party could terminate the agreement using the ipso facto provision. But be forewarned: if a bankruptcy case is later filed, an insolvency-based termination made before the bankruptcy filing may not be enforced in the bankruptcy case. This means that the debtor may still have a chance to retain the rights under the contract, including assuming or assigning an executory contract during the bankruptcy case.

A Limited Exception In Bankruptcy. A third reason is that an important, albeit limited, exception to the rule applies even after a bankruptcy is filed. The exception stems less from the ipso facto clause itself and more from the rules governing assumption of certain types of executory contracts, including intellectual property licenses (at least in some circuits).

  • Section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with Section 365(c)(1), provides that an ipso facto clause can be enforceable if the debtor or trustee is not permitted by "applicable law" to assume or assign the executory contract. Simply put, if applicable law provides that an IP license or another executory contract cannot be assumed by the debtor or trustee without the other party’s consent, then the non-debtor contracting party can force rejection of the license or seek relief from the automatic stay to terminate the agreement based on the ipso facto clause.
  • Although an analysis of the law governing assumption and assignment of IP licenses and related agreements is beyond the scope of this post, you can find a detailed discussion in an earlier one entitled "Assumption of IP Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?" 

A Word To The Wise. Parties include "termination on bankruptcy" provisions in contracts all the time, despite the general rule making them unenforceable in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, some do so without realizing that the provision may be ineffective, and that can lead to trouble. If enforcing an ipso facto clause is important to one of your agreements, especially if you also seek the highly problematic reversion of intellectual property or other rights upon such a termination, be sure to get specific legal advice on your situation, including whether alternative approaches may exist to help achieve your objectives.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

Delaware Supreme Court Issues Long-Awaited Decision In Deepening Insolvency Case

On August 14, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en Banc and following oral argument, issued its decision in the Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Billet deepening insolvency case. Rather than write its own opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court released a two-page order affirming Vice Chancellor Strine’s August 10, 2006 Chancery Court decision "on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by" the Chancery Court in its opinion. A copy of the Chancery Court opinion is available here. 

The End Of Deepening Insolvency In Delaware. By adopting the basis and reasoning of the lower court’s opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court ratified Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Apparently concluding that no opinion of its own was necessary given the Chancery Court’s clear opinion below, the Delaware Supreme Court has put to rest the cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Prior to the lower court’s decision in Trenwick, some bankruptcy and other federal courts had incorrectly predicted that Delaware would recognize this cause of action.

A Second Look At Vice Chancellor Strine’s Trenwick Opinion. Now that the Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision and its reasons, the lower court’s opinion merits further consideration. As discussed in this August 2006 post on the Chancery Court’s decision, Vice Chancellor Strine held, in unequivocal terms, that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. To give context to the opinion’s legal analysis, some of its more important sections are quoted below at length:

Delaware law does not recognize this catchy term as a cause of action, because catchy though the term may be, it does not express a coherent concept. Even when a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out, result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red. The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at that time are creditors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue the firm’s operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate pie such that the firm’s creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so, the directors do not become a guarantor of success.  Put simply, under Delaware law, ‘deepening insolvency’ is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of action for ‘shallowing profitability’ would be when a firm is solvent. Existing equitable causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and existing legal causes of action for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, and breach of contract are the appropriate means by which to challenge the actions of boards of insolvent corporations.

Refusal to embrace deepening insolvency as a cause of action is required by settled principles of Delaware law. So, too, is a refusal to extend to creditors a solicitude not given to equityholders. Creditors are better placed than equityholders and other corporate constituencies (think employees) to protect themselves against the risk of firm failure.

The incantation of the word insolvency, or even more amorphously, the words zone of insolvency should not declare open season on corporate fiduciaries. Directors are expected to seek profit for stockholders, even at risk of failure.  With the prospect of profit often comes the potential for defeat.

The general rule embraced by Delaware is the sound one.  So long as directors are respectful of the corporation’s obligation to honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in good faith profit for the corporation’s equityholders.  Even when the firm is insolvent, directors are free to pursue value maximizing strategies, while recognizing that the firm’s creditors have become its residual claimants and the advancement of their best interests has become the firm’s principal objective.

Delaware law imposes no absolute obligation on the board of a company that is unable to pay its bills to cease operations and to liquidate. Even when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith, strategies to maximize the value of the firm. As a thoughtful federal decision recognizes, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code expresses a societal recognition that an insolvent corporation’s creditors (and society as a whole) may benefit if the corporation continues to conduct operations in the hope of turning things around.

If the board of an insolvent corporation, acting with due diligence and good faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes will increase the corporation’s value, but that also involves the incurrence of additional debt, it does not become a guarantor of that strategy’s success. That the strategy results in continued insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a cause of action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the business judgment rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform Delaware law.

The rejection of an independent cause of action for deepening insolvency does not absolve directors of insolvent corporations of responsibility.  Rather, it remits plaintiffs to the contents of their traditional toolkit, which contains, among other things, causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and for fraud.  The contours of these causes of action have been carefully shaped by generations of experience, in order to balance the societal interests in protecting investors and creditors against exploitation by directors and in providing directors with sufficient insulation so that they can seek to create wealth through the good faith pursuit of business strategies that involve a risk of failure.  If a plaintiff cannot state a claim that the directors of an insolvent corporation acted disloyally or without due care in implementing a business strategy, it may not cure that deficiency simply by alleging that the corporation became more insolvent as a result of the failed strategy.

Moreover, the fact of insolvency does not render the concept of “deepening insolvency” a more logical one than the concept of “shallowing profitability.”  That is, the mere fact that a business in the red gets redder when a business decision goes wrong and a business in the black gets paler does not explain why the law should recognize an independent cause of action based on the decline in enterprise value in the crimson setting and not in the darker one.  If in either setting the directors remain responsible to exercise their business judgment considering the company’s business context, then the appropriate tool to examine the conduct of the directors is the traditional fiduciary duty ruler.  No doubt the fact of insolvency might weigh heavily in a court’s analysis of, for example, whether the board acted with fidelity and care in deciding to undertake more debt to continue the company’s operations, but that is the proper role of insolvency, to act as an important contextual fact in the fiduciary duty metric. In that context, our law already requires the directors of an insolvent corporation to consider, as fiduciaries, the interests of the corporation’s creditors who, by definition, are owed more than the corporation has the wallet to repay.

In so ruling, I reach a result consistent with a growing body of federal jurisprudence, which has recognized that those federal courts that became infatuated with the concept, did not look closely enough at the object of their ardor.  Among the earlier federal decisions embracing the notion – by way of a hopeful prediction of state law – that deepening insolvency should be recognized as a cause of action admittedly were three decisions from within the federal Circuit of which Delaware is a part.  None of those decisions explains the rationale for concluding that deepening insolvency should be recognized as a cause of action or how such recognition would be consistent with traditional concepts of fiduciary responsibility.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s adoption of the basis and reasoning of the Chancery Court’s strongly-worded opinion represents the end of the road for the deepening insolvency cause of action under Delaware law.

Hints In The Gheewalla Decision? Interestingly, in its brief order the Delaware Supreme Court dropped a footnote giving not only the citation for the Chancery Court’s decision, Trenwick America Litig, Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), but also an intriguing comment: "Accord North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705 (Del. Supr. 2007)." This was a reference to its own decision of May 18, 2007 (opinion available here) holding that creditors cannot bring a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are insolvent or in the zone of insolvency.

  • As discussed in an earlier post on the Gheewalla decision, the Delaware Supreme Court opinion cited the lower court decision in Trenwick favorably, as well as the earlier Chancery Court decision in Production Resources (opinion available here), discussed in another earlier post. 
  • The "Accord" reference in its Trenwick order suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court believed that its May 2007 Gheewalla decision foreshadowed this week’s affirmance of the Chancery Court’s Trenwick decision and reasoning.

More Clarity For Directors. With the adoption of the Chancery Court’s opinion in Trenwick, and its own opinion in Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court has effectively endorsed the trend in recent Chancery Court decisions to limit certain efforts to expand the liability of directors of insolvent or nearly insolvent corporations. Nearly sixteen years have passed since the Chancery Court’s decision in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991), introduced us to the terms "vicinity of insolvency" and "zone of insolvency." Although the Delaware Supreme Court has left some questions open, these new decisions help provide meaningful guidance on how directors of financially troubled Delaware corporations should discharge their fiduciary duties.