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Fiduciary Duties And Financial Distress In The Time Of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused unprecedented economic disruption, creating sudden financial distress across industries. Companies are now facing impacts ranging from a dramatic decline in revenue of uncertain duration, to potential setbacks to M&A transactions, to delayed or canceled financing rounds.

With even some previously well-performing companies potentially entering the so-called zone of insolvency, it’s important to review the fiduciary duties owed by directors and officers and how discharging those duties may change in the face of financial distress.

A Refresher On Fiduciary Duties. Let’s start with a high-level overview of the fiduciary duties of directors and officers of a Delaware corporation. This primer is not a substitute for specific legal advice but may help provide context for discussions with counsel.

  • The Key Duties. Under Delaware law, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty.
    • The duty of due care requires directors and officers to make informed decisions in good faith and in the best interests of the company.
    • The duty of loyalty requires directors and officers not to engage in self-dealing and to put the interests of the company ahead of their own.
  • Solvency. Under Delaware law, when a company is solvent, the directors and officers owe their fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the corporation and to the stockholders.
    • This remains true even for a company in the zone of insolvency (more on that concept below).
    • Stockholders of a solvent company have standing to bring derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors and officers.
  • Insolvency. When a company is insolvent, meaning it’s not able to pay its creditors in full, the directors and officers still owe their fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the corporation.
  • Zone of Insolvency. The zone of insolvency is a term used to describe a company that is still solvent but is approaching insolvency.
    • For a number of years the courts suggested that if a company entered the zone of insolvency, fiduciary duties expanded to include creditors (as well as shareholders).
    • That’s no longer the case. The Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the key inflection point for fiduciary duties is actual insolvency, not the zone of insolvency. Upon actual insolvency, fiduciary duties are still owed to the corporation (rather than being expanded to include creditors) but creditors gain the right to bring derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
    • However, it can be challenging to determine whether a company is still solvent or has already crossed into actual insolvency. The zone of insolvency concept therefore can serve as a useful “caution flag” for directors and officers assessing the issue.
  • Discharging Fiduciary Duties in Insolvency. With that refresher in mind, how should directors and officers best discharge fiduciary duties for a company that has become insolvent? This is a very fact-intensive analysis, and directors and officers should seek specific legal advice for their company’s particular situation, but here are some issues to consider.
    • Generally, the focus should be on maximizing enterprise value without taking undue risk, which will maximize recovery for creditors as the new residual rights holders.
    • Maximizing value may also benefit stockholders but care should be taken if pursuing an upside for stockholders puts creditor recoveries at greater risk.
    • Directors should assess all aspects of the company’s business, seek input from legal and financial advisers where helpful, hold Board meetings as often as needed, follow good corporate process, and continue to avoid conflicts of interest.
    • This will allow directors to enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, which provides that courts will not second guess a director’s good faith business judgment made with due care.
    • Many companies may have to make immediate or longer-term reductions in expenses and cash burn in an attempt to extend the runway for a turnaround, financing, or sale transaction.
    • If the company has borrowed money from a bank or other secured lender, it’s also critical to assess the lender’s rights, potential remedies, and prospects for a restructuring.
    • Even in difficult situations, maximizing value may mean continuing operations — even though that burns cash — for a limited period to allow the company to complete a sale that the directors believe is likely to close and produce significant value for creditors.
    • In other cases, it may mean winding down (or even shutting down) operations quickly to conserve cash, especially if any asset sale is not expected to generate more than the cash required to pursue it.
    • Restructuring and wind-down alternatives, including Chapter 11 bankruptcy and assignments for the benefit of creditors, may need to be considered as well.

The Unique Impact of COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic and government orders precluding non-essential business operations have produced widespread financial impacts.

  • Companies that have been performing well previously, but are now experiencing financial distress primarily because of COVID-19, may need to assess factors that go beyond those of a traditional distressed company.
  • These could include, among others: financial contingency planning based on the possible duration of the pandemic and stay-at-home or similar orders; negotiations with lenders for short or near-term debt service extensions, additional liquidity, or a restructuring of loan facilities; and potential changes in customer preferences or supplier availability once the pandemic eases.
  • In addition, COVID-19 has prompted federal, state, and local governments to consider assistance programs for specific industries and potentially for businesses across the economy.
  • If these programs are enacted, companies will have to assess whether they are eligible for financial assistance, the conditions placed on receiving assistance, and how long it could take before relief would actually be received.

Conclusion. The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted businesses across the economy and caused unexpected and immediate financial impacts. Directors and officers faced with managing through these issues will benefit from specific legal advice about their fiduciary duties and how best to discharge them in these newly uncertain times.

 

 

Photo by Drew Beamer on Unsplash

The Venture-Backed Company Running Out Of Cash: Fiduciary Duties And Wind Down Options

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Many start-up companies backed by venture capital financing, especially those still in the development phase or which otherwise are not cash flow breakeven, at some point may face the prospect of running out of cash. Although many will timely close another round of financing, others may not. This post focuses on options available to companies when investors have decided not to fund and the company needs to consider a wind down.

Fiduciary Duties And Maximizing Value. Let’s start with a refresher on the fiduciary duties of directors and officers of a Delaware corporation in financial distress. Please note that this high-level overview is no substitute for actual legal advice on a company’s specific situation.

  • Under Delaware law, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty. The duty of due care requires directors and officers to make fully-informed, good faith decisions in the best interests of the company. The duty of loyalty imposes on directors and officers the obligation not to engage in self-dealing and instead to put the interests of the company ahead of their own.
  • When a company is solvent, the directors and officers owe their fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders. That remains true even if the company is in the so-called “zone of insolvency.”
  • When a company is insolvent and will not be able to pay its creditors in full, the directors and officers still owe their fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to the corporation. However, upon insolvency, the creditors have the right to bring derivative (but not direct) claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors and officers.
  • Follow this link for more on the key Delaware decision discussing the fiduciary duties of directors and officers in the insolvency context.
  • Remember, it can be challenging to determine whether a company is just in the zone of insolvency (meaning still solvent but approaching insolvency) or whether it has crossed the line into actual insolvency.
  • Discharging fiduciary duties when a company is insolvent means a focus on maximizing enterprise value. This is a highly fact-dependent exercise with no one-size-fits-all approach. In some cases, maximizing value may mean continuing operations — even though that burns dwindling cash — to allow the company to complete a sale that the directors believe is likely to close and produce significant value for creditors. In other cases, it may mean winding down (or even shutting down) operations quickly to conserve cash, especially if any asset sale is not expected to generate more than the cash required to pursue it.
  • These complexities make it critical for directors and officers of a company in financial distress to get legal advice tailored to the specific facts and circumstances at hand.

Legal Options For A Wind Down. When the board decides that the company needs to wind down, options range from an informal approach all the way to a public bankruptcy filing. Note that if the company owes money to a bank or other secured creditor, the lender’s right to foreclose on the company’s assets could become a paramount consideration and affect how the wind down is accomplished. Although beyond the scope of this post to analyze each wind down option in detail, the following is a brief overview of different approaches, together with links giving more information.

  • Informal wind down: In an informal wind down, the company typically tries to find a buyer for its assets, eventually lays off its employees, and shuts down any unsold business operations, but does not complete a formal end to the corporate existence. This lack of finality can leave legal loose ends, so alternatives should be carefully considered.
  • Corporate dissolution: A corporate dissolution is a formal process under Delaware law, typically managed by a company officer, for winding up the affairs of the corporation, liquidating assets, and ending the company’s legal existence. A company may choose to do a corporate dissolution when it doesn’t need bankruptcy protection (and prefers not to file bankruptcy) but wants a formal, legal wind down of the corporate entity. Follow this link for more details on corporate dissolution.
  • Assignment for the benefit of creditors: Many states, notably including California and Delaware, recognize a formal process through which a company can hire a professional fiduciary and make a general assignment of the company’s assets and liabilities to that fiduciary, known as the Assignee. In California, no court filing is involved. The Assignee in turn is charged with liquidating the company’s assets for the benefit of creditors, who are notified of the ABC process and instructed to submit claims to the Assignee. If a buyer has been identified, an Assignee may be able to close an asset sale soon after the ABC is made. Follow this link for a an in-depth look at the ABC process.
  • Chapter 7 bankruptcy: A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a public filing with the United States Bankruptcy Court. A bankruptcy trustee is appointed to take control of all of the company’s assets, including the company’s attorney-client privilege, and the directors and officers no longer have any decision-making authority over the company or its assets. A Chapter 7 trustee rarely operates the business and instead typically terminates any remaining employees and liquidates all assets of the company. The filing triggers the bankruptcy automatic stay, which prevents secured creditors from foreclosing on the company’s assets and creditors from pursuing or continuing lawsuits. The trustee has authority to bring litigation claims on behalf of the corporation, often to recover preferential transfers but sometimes asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors or officers. Unlike a dissolution or an ABC, the bankruptcy trustee in charge of the liquidation process is not chosen by the company.
  • Chapter 11 bankruptcy: A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is also a public filing with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, and it similarly triggers the bankruptcy automatic stay. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in Chapter 11 — often known as a reorganization bankruptcy — the board and management remain in control of the company’s assets (at least initially) as a “debtor in possession” or DIP. Business operations often continue and funding them and the higher cost of the Chapter 11 process require DIP financing and/or use of a lender’s cash collateral. One primary use of Chapter 11 by a venture-backed company is to sell assets “free and clear” of liens, claims and interests through a Bankruptcy Court-approved sale process under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Follow this link for a discussion of how a Section 363 bankruptcy sale in the right circumstances can maximize value for creditors and shareholders.

Conclusion. When a company’s cash is running out and investors have decided not to provide additional financing, the board may conclude that a wind down is required to fulfill fiduciary duties and maximize value. The discussion above is a general description of certain wind down options. Determining whether any of these paths is best for a particular company is fact-specific and dependent on many factors. Be sure to get advice from experienced corporate and insolvency counsel when considering wind down or other restructuring options.

You Say You Want A Dissolution: An Overview Of The Formal Corporate Wind Down

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Winding Down. If a corporation’s board of directors decides that the business needs to be wound down, there are a number of legal paths to consider. Determining the best approach is fact-dependent, and the corporation and its board should get legal advice before making a decision. Sometimes a bankruptcy filing is needed, either a Chapter 11 reorganization (perhaps to complete a going-concern sale) or a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy (in which a trustee will be appointed to liquidate the business). In other cases, an assignment for the benefit of creditors might be a good choice.

A Delaware Corporate Dissolution. This post takes a high-level look at another, often simpler option: the corporate dissolution.  It assumes that the business is a Delaware corporation, since many corporations incorporate there. The laws of the state of incorporation govern the dissolution process, so it’s important to remember that the process described below will differ if the business is incorporated in another state.

Why A Corporate Dissolution? Corporations typically choose to do a corporate dissolution when they don’t need bankruptcy protection (and prefer to avoid filing bankruptcy) but want to have the corporation formally wound down. The dissolution process can be less expensive than other alternatives, particularly when litigation or disputes over claims is unlikely.

  • When properly conducted, a dissolution can bar late claims against the corporation and provide directors with protection from personal liability to claimants.
  • Unlike a bankruptcy filing (but similar to an assignment for the benefit of creditors), a dissolution requires shareholder approval; that often makes it a better fit for privately held corporations.
  • A dissolution typically requires at least one director to supervise the process and at least one officer to manage the wind down and liquidation, although some professional firms will step into those roles.
  • Corporations often elect to dissolve at a point when they anticipate being able to pay creditors in full and return some funds to shareholders or, if they are insolvent, find their creditors generally to be cooperative. If the corporation has a bank or other secured creditor, it helps if they are willing to work with the corporation to liquidate the assets without a foreclosure.

A Corporation In Dissolution. Under Delaware law, once the dissolution commences the corporation is no longer permitted to operate as a normal business. Instead, as the Delaware statute provides, the corporation continues only “gradually to settle and close their business, to dispose of and convey their property, to discharge their liabilities and to distribute to their stockholders any remaining assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which the corporation was organized.” The corporation is allowed up to three years to complete the dissolution process; if more time is required, a request has to be made to the Delaware Court of Chancery (although a corporation in dissolution remains in existence, without having to go to the Chancery Court, to complete lawsuits that are pending when the three year period expires).

Key Aspects Of A Dissolution. To give you a sense of the process involved, below is a list of some of the main steps in a dissolution. However, please note that important details go beyond the scope of this post. Examples include special voting procedures that may be required if preferred stock has been issued, possible alternatives to the claims process, establishing reserves for claims, payment of the costs of the liquidation, winding down subsidiaries, and the impact of foreign affiliates. It bears repeating: a corporation considering a dissolution should get legal advice on all aspects of the process.

With that caveat, a dissolution generally involves the following:

  • Board approval of a decision to dissolve and adoption of a plan of liquidation;
  • Shareholder approval of the dissolution and plan of liquidation in requisite majorities as provided under the corporation’s then-current Certificate of Incorporation;
  • Filing of a Delaware Annual Franchise Tax Report and payment of franchise taxes, including a partial-year final franchise tax report;
  • Filing a Certificate of Dissolution with the Delaware Secretary of State’s office;
  • Timely reporting to the Internal Revenue Service of the dissolution;
  • A formal claims process, with at least 60 days notice to potential claimants of the dissolution and deadline to file claims, together with publication of the notice in required newspapers;
  • Review of filed claims, with appropriate offers to claimants or rejections of claims;
  • Resolution of any lawsuits, including any timely-filed by claimants whose claims the corporation rejected;
  • Liquidation of remaining corporate assets in accordance with the plan of liquidation;
  • Preparation and filing of all final tax returns;
  • Withdrawals or surrender of qualifications to do business in other states; and
  • Final distributions to creditors and, if funds remain, to applicable shareholders.

Conclusion. In the right situation, a dissolution can be the best approach to formally wind down a corporation’s business and corporate existence. As with all corporate governance matters, however, the corporation’s board and management should get legal advice tailored to the corporation, its business, and creditors, and guidance throughout the dissolution process.

 

Image courtesy of Flickr by JBrazito

Winter 2012 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

The Winter 2012 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has recently been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • The Supreme Court’s recent Stern v. Marshall decision and its impact on the ability of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in certain cases;
  • Recent decisions on the ability of secured creditors to credit bid their debt in bankruptcy asset sales;
  • Issues involving the recharacterization of debt as equity; and
  • The ability of directors and officers to obtain coverage under a D&O liability policy purchased by a bankrupt company.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, Alexander Gallo Holdings, Claim Jumper, Signature Styles, Urban Brands, and Mervyn’s Holdings, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Ruling Protecting Managers Of Insolvent LLCs

Creditor Derivative Claims Against Fiduciaries Of Insolvent Corporate Entities. In a 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency." 

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation’s directors. That led many to wonder whether the same ruling would be extended to managers of Delaware limited liability companies ("LLCs"), the LLC equivalent of a corporation’s directors. 

The Chancery Court’s Decision. In November 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no." In CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del.Ch. 2010), the Chancery Court held that creditors could not bring derivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty against managers of insolvent LLCs, chiefly because the relevant Delaware LLC Act provision limited standing to bring such suits only to LLC members and their assignees. For a discussion of the Chancery Court decision, follow the link to a November 2010 post on the blog entitled "New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs."

The Delaware Supreme Court Decision. The decision was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. On September 2, 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion analyzing the Delaware LLC Act and affirming the Chancery Court’s decision. A copy of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion is available through this link.

  • The Delaware Supreme Court held that the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, limits standing to bring derivative claims only to LLC members and their assignees because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The Delaware Supreme Court held that this statute was unambiguous and expressly limits standing only to LLC members and their assignees. The creditor plaintiff argued that it was "absurd" for the result to be different as between a corporation and LLC, but the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware General Assembly "was well suited to make that policy choice and we must honor that choice." 
  • The plaintiff also claimed that by limiting standing, the statute violated the Delaware Constitution’s prohibition against curtailing the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed in 1792, when Delaware ratified its first constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument holding that, among other reasons, Delaware limited liability companies, unlike corporations, came into existence only in 1992 and therefore did not exist in 1792. In addition, the LLC statute was properly able to both grant and limit derivative standing.

Creditor Options. Recognizing that this standing provision could limit creditor remedies in the event of insolvency, the Delaware Supreme Court discussed one remedial option available to creditors. In footnote 20 of the opinion, the Court stated:

Admittedly, this approach is not the only option the General Assembly had, and we make no normative comment on the General Assembly’s policy choice. Our only purpose here is to explain that limiting derivative standing to members and assignees in a contractual entity like an LLC is not absurd because other interest holders–like creditors–have other options–as, for example, negotiating automatic assignment of membership interests upon insolvency clauses into the credit agreement and requiring the members and governing board to amend the LLC agreement accordingly.

Key Observations. As the Delaware Supreme Court noted, certain creditors may require that the LLC agreement be amended to provide for automatic assignment of membership interests to the creditors upon insolvency. If so, those creditors would then have standing to bring derivative claims. However, absent such provisions, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision:

  • Managers of a Delaware LLC will not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent, although it is far less certain that the standing statute would preclude a bankruptcy trustee from bringing claims on behalf of the LLC itself;
  • An insolvent LLC’s creditors will not have derivative standing to bring potential D&O type claims; and
  • These creditors will be limited to contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves. 

Although Delaware LLCs and corporations share many common features, this new Delaware Supreme Court decision makes clear that the automatic derivative standing of creditors upon insolvency is one important distinction.

New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs

Derivative Claims Against Directors Of An Insolvent Delaware Corporation. With its 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. To read that decision, click on the case name in the prior sentence. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation’s directors, but a question remained: Would that same ruling extend to managers of Delaware limited liability companies, the LLC equivalent of a corporation’s directors. Although a number of commentators and some court decisions assumed that it would, a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision has answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no."

New Chancery Court Ruling. In the new decision, CML V, LLC v. Bax, C.A. No. 5373-VCL (Del.Ch. Nov. 3, 2010), the Delaware Chancery Court undertook an extensive analysis of the Delaware LLC Act and also examined the issue more broadly.

  • The Court held that under the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, only LLC members and their assignees have standing to bring derivative claims because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The LLC Act does not give an insolvent LLC’s creditors standing to bring derivative claims. The situation is different for creditors of insolvent corporations because the governing Delaware corporation statutes do not impose exclusive derivative standing provisions.
  • Although the Chancery Court acknowledged that arguments could be made for allowing creditors to bring derivative actions against managers of an insolvent LLC, the Court saw no reason to set aside the literal reading of the LLC Act’s standing provision. The Court also noted that the Delaware Limited Partnership Act has a similar exclusive standing provision.

For a full discussion of the decision, including a link to the opinion itself, be sure to read Francis G.X. Pileggi’s excellent post entitled "Chancery Bars Derivative Claim of Creditor Against Insolvent LLC, Based on LLC Act."  

Impact On An Insolvent LLC’s Creditors. So where does this new decision leave creditors of an insolvent Delaware LLC?

  • Under the Chancery Court decision, unlike directors of a Delaware corporation, managers of a Delaware LLC are not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent. 
  • If the decision is followed by other courts — specifically including bankruptcy courts where claims involving managers of bankrupt LLCs may more often be litigated — then an insolvent LLC’s creditors will not have access to potential D&O type claims. Instead, those creditors will have to rely on contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves. 

Stay Tuned. As noted, the bankruptcy court is often the forum where insolvency-related matters are litigated. Should these claims be pursued outside of the Chancery Court, it will be interesting to see how other courts interpret the Delaware LLC Act’s provisions. 

California Court of Appeal Provides Guidance For Directors Of Financially Distressed California Corporations

As I have reported over the past several years, Delaware courts, including the Delaware Supreme Court, have addressed the nature of a director’s fiduciary duties when a Delaware corporation is insolvent or in the "zone of insolvency," most notably with the 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). To read that decision, click on the case name in the prior sentence. For a discussion of that case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

California courts, however, did not have occasion to consider fiduciary duty issues involving directors of financially distressed California corporations until recently. In a decision called Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District has provided directors of California corporations facing potential insolvency with meaningful guidance on the scope of their fiduciary duties, including the application of California’s "trust fund doctrine." 

It will be interesting to see whether other California courts, perhaps eventually including the California Supreme Court, will have opportunity in the months and years ahead to consider these important issues to directors and officers.