Chapter 11

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Second Circuit Decides Whether Unsecured Creditors Can Recover Post-Petition Attorney’s Fees

On November 5, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became the second court of appeals to answer the question left open in the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007): Can unsecured creditors recover post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their unsecured claims? For more on the Travelers decision, follow the link to this earlier post.

The Ninth Circuit’s Earlier SNTL Corp. Decision. In June 2009, the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam decision in In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2009), held that post-petition attorney’s fees were allowable as part of an unsecured prepetition contract claim. The Ninth Circuit adopted the December 2007 opinion of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), which is available by following the link in this sentence. You may find this earlier post on the SNTL Corp. case of interest as well.

The Second Circuit’s New Decision. In its November 5, 2009 opinion in Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, the Second Circuit held — as the Ninth Circuit did in the SNTL Corp. case — that an unsecured creditor can include post-petition attorney’s fees authorized under a prepetition contract valid under state law. In Ogle, the Second Circuit extended its holding in United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982), a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, and concluded that United Merchants survived both the statutory revisions made by the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court’s Travelers decision.

In reaching this result, the Second Circuit analyzed the issues presented, in part, as follows:

All of the fees at issue in Travelers were incurred post-petition; so the amount was necessarily unknown when the bankruptcy petition was filed. It follows that if an unsecured claim for post-petition fees was for that reason unrecoverable, the Travelers Court could have disposed of the claim on that simple, available ground alone. Travelers, therefore, proceeds along lines that, reasonably extended, would suggest (notwithstanding the Court’s express disclaimer) that section 502(b)’s requirement–that the court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition”–does not bar recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees.

In the present appeal, as in Travelers: The underlying contract is valid as a matter of state substantive law; none of the section 502(b)(2)-(9) exceptions apply; and the Code is silent as to the particular question presented–in Travelers, whether the Code allows “unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law,” 549 U.S. at 453; and here, whether the Code allows unsecured claims for “fees incurred while litigating issues of” contract law more generally.

Accordingly, we hold that an unsecured claim for post-petition fees, authorized by a valid pre-petition contract, is allowable under section 502(b) and is deemed to have
arisen pre-petition.  Accord SNTL, 571 F.3d at 844 (“[W]e reject the position . . . that section 502(b) precludes such fees.”).
 

The Court then turned to the question of whether Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly disallows the recovery of attorney’s fees as part of an unsecured claim:

As Travelers makes clear, the question is whether the Code disallows post-petition attorneys’ fees, and does so expressly. It was therefore decisive in Travelers that “the Code says nothing about unsecured claims for contractual attorney’s fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law.” 459 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). And while Travelers declined to address section 506(b) (because the parties had not raised the issue below), see id. at 454-56, it is decisive here that the Code says nothing about such fees incurred litigating things other than issues of bankruptcy law. The teaching of Travelers is therefore fully consonant with our decision in United Merchants.

Accordingly, we hold that section 506(b) does not implicate unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees, and it therefore interposes no bar to recovery.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected arguments that (1) Section 502(b)(2)’s disallowance of unmatured interest bars claims for post-petition attorney’s fees, (2) Section 502(e)(2) regarding claims for reimbursement or contribution implicitly forecloses post-petition attorney’s fees, and (3) as a policy matter it would be unfair to allow contract creditors to recover post-petition attorney’s fees when tort claimants and many trade creditors cannot.

Conclusion. We now have two U.S. Court of Appeals decisions this year holding that, after Travelers, post-petition attorney’s fees are allowable as part of an unsecured claim if otherwise recoverable under a prepetition contract. Particularly given the major bankruptcy cases filed in the Southern District of New York, within the Second Circuit, unsecured creditors may make a point of including post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their claims when their contracts so provide. This decision raises questions as well:

  • Will the potential allowance of post-petition attorney’s fees for bankruptcy-related issues impact a debtor’s reorganization prospects?
  • What procedures will debtors propose for managing the process as unsecured creditors amend their claims to add attorney’s fees incurred in protecting their rights during the course of a bankruptcy case?
  • Will individual unsecured creditors become more active in Chapter 11 cases, particularly in those cases in which a large distribution is likely?
  • What standards will bankruptcy courts use to assess the reasonableness of an unsecured creditor’s post-petition attorney’s fees for bankruptcy-related issues?
  • Will claims buyers pay more for unsecured claims based on contracts providing for recovery of post-petition attorney’s fees now that bankruptcy-related fees are recoverable?
  • Will creditors be more insistent on including attorney’s fees provisions in contracts?

Not every unsecured creditor will have the right to attorney’s fees, and most may not incur significant fees after a bankruptcy is filed. However, those that do now have another important arrow in their quiver when seeking to add those fees to their unsecured claims. It will be interesting to see how these issues play out in the months ahead.

 

A Matter Of Time: Important Amendments To The Bankruptcy Rules Are Coming December 1st

Nearly every year, changes are made to the set of rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Normally, the changes address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. This year, the amendments to the national bankruptcy rules are mainly the result of statutory changes enacted by Congress. The new amendments will take effect on December 1, 2009.

Timing Changes Across The Board. For years, the standard time periods for many actions in bankruptcy cases have been measured in round numbers — 10 days for some, 20 days for others. Sometimes this has led to confusion about deadlines, especially when time periods straddle weekends or holidays. To simplify the calculation of bankruptcy time periods, and those in other non-bankruptcy laws, earlier this year Congress enacted the Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009. The main purpose of the Act is to switch to 7, 14, 21, and 28 day intervals for most bankruptcy procedures. Here’s how the changes will be implemented in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure:

  • 5 day periods become 7 day periods;
  • 10 day periods become 14 day periods;
  • 15 day periods become 14 day periods;
  • 20 day periods become 21 day periods;
  • 25 day periods become 28 day periods.

For example, a motion set for hearing on a Friday will now have objection and reply deadlines fall on Fridays. It also means that the era of the "20 day notice" in bankruptcy is over — but it’s just being replaced with the era of the "21 day notice." The change should make calculating due dates easier, although be aware that it will shorten or lengthen most of the previously standard notice periods under prior law. Rule 9006 is being revised extensively to reflect the new way of accounting for weekends and holidays. Periods that were 30 days or longer are essentially unchanged.

A Longer Appeal Period. So where is this going to have the biggest effect in the business bankruptcy realm? I think the impact will be felt most in the time to file an appeal from a bankruptcy court order. Amendments to Rule 8001 will extend the time for filing a notice of appeal by four days — from 10 days to 14 days. This means that an order approving a settlement under Rule 9019, authorizing a Section 363 sale of assets, or confirming a plan of reorganization, among others, will not become final and no longer appealable until the 15th day following entry compared to the 11th day following entry under current law. After years of counting on bankruptcy court orders being final after only 10 days, parties will need to adjust their expectations on the finality of orders.

How To Access The Amended Rules. Bankruptcy attorneys and other professionals should review the amended rules to see the full range of the changes.

Local Rule Changes Are Also Coming. Expect to see bankruptcy courts around the country adopt conforming changes to their local rules. Two examples: the Northern District of California has already done so and the Southern District of New York is proposing to do so.

Conclusion. Although these timing changes are not as significant as amendments made a few years ago, they will affect virtually all time periods in the national, and in time local, bankruptcy rules that are currently less than 30 days. With under a month to go before they take effect, now is a good time to get on top of these amendments.

Major Amendments To The CCAA, Canada’s Reorganization Law, Are Now In Force

In a post last year entitled "North Of The Border: Reorganization Under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act," I discussed the various types of bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings available under Canadian law. Included in the discussion was the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, known as the CCAA, used by many Canadian companies to reorganize. At that time, although significant amendments had been enacted to the CCAA and other Canadian bankruptcy laws, those amendments had not "come into force," the final act necessary under the Canadian system before the changes in the law would become effective.

That changed on September 18, 2009, when these revisions to the CCAA and to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or BIA, finally came into force (joining a few other changes that came into force in July 2008). Canadian bankruptcy law has now been modified in a number of important ways, applicable to cases filed going forward.

For more on the new law, and Canadian bankruptcy issues generally, be sure to check out the website of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada.

Fall 2009 Edition Of Absolute Priority Now Available

The Fall 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Developments in the General Growth Chapter 11 cases;
  • Updates on the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies;
  • Efforts in Congress to repeal certain of BAPCPA’s business bankruptcy provisions; and
  • The "settlement payment" defense to fraudulent transfer claims against shareholders in leveraged buyouts.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including debtors Pacific Ethanol Holding Co. and Crabtree & Evelyn, Ltd., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. Recent committee cases include Eddie Bauer, Ritz Camera, Filene’s Basement, BT Tires Group, Boscov’s, Gottschalk’s, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and G.I. Joe’s, among others. Also discussed is our work for Levi Strauss & Co. in purchasing 73 outlet stores from the Anchor Blue Retail Group case and for Rackable Systems, Inc. (now known as Silicon Graphics International) in purchasing substantially all of the assets of Silicon Graphics, Inc. in its recent Chapter 11 case.

In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how Section 363 asset sales have become the chief means for companies to restructure in bankruptcy, and how the number of "going concern" sales has grown over the past few months compared to the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

I hope you find this Fall’s edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

First Court Of Appeals Decision Addresses Question Left Open In The Supreme Court’s Travelers Opinion: Can Unsecured Creditors Recover Post-Petition Attorney’s Fees?

On June 23, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to answer the question left open in the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. — whether post-petition attorney’s fees can be added to unsecured claims.

The Travelers Case. Before turning to the SNTL Corp. case itself, let’s look back at the Supreme Court’s decision. In March 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s so-called Fobian rule in the Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. decision. However, it did not decide whether unsecured creditors could recover, as part of their unsecured claims, post-petition attorney’s fees incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case. For more on the Travelers decision, follow the link in this sentence.

The SNTL Corp. BAP Decision. In the December 2007 BAP decision, Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, writing for the unanimous BAP panel, held that that "claims for postpetition attorneys’ fees cannot be disallowed simply because the claim of the creditor is unsecured." On the unrelated issue, the BAP held that a guarantor’s liability was revived after a preference settlement.

The Ninth Circuit Rules In The SNTL Corp. Case. On June 23, 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal, issuing a brief, per curiam decision, stating as follows:

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons stated in its opinion in this case sub nom. We adopt the BAP opinion, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), as our own and attach it as an appendix to this opinion. See Appendix, infra.

A Second Look At The BAP’s Decision. Given that the Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted as its own the BAP opinion in its entirety, further review of the BAP’s analysis is merited. In reaching its decision, the BAP carefully reviewed two earlier decisions by bankruptcy courts that had taken up the open "Travelers" issue, In re Qmect, Inc. (see earlier post on the Qmect decision) and In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. (see prior post on the Electric Machinery decision), as well as pre-Travelers law, and first explained its analysis of the interplay between Sections 502 and 506(b):

We are not persuaded by the approach of the Electric Machinery court and, like Qmect, we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors. While we cannot predict how the Ninth Circuit will decide this issue in Travelers, we do find a clue in Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986), where the Ninth Circuit observed that section 506(b) defines secured claims and does not limit unsecured claims:

When read literally, subsection (b) arguably limits the fees available to the oversecured creditor. When read in conjunction with § 506(a), however, it may be understood to define the portion of the fees which shall be afforded secured status. We adopt the latter reading.

268 Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.

Next, the BAP discussed Section 502(b)(1)’s requirement that the court determine the amount of an unsecured claim as of the petition date:

The Electric Machinery court, like the bankruptcy court here and many of the pre-Travelers majority courts, disallowed the postpetition fees of an unsecured creditor because section 502(b)(1) provides that a bankruptcy court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition” and the postpetition fees did not exist as of that date. Elec. Mach., 371 B.R. at 551; Pride Cos., 285 B.R. at 373. Because the amount of fees incurred postpetition cannot be determined or calculated as of the petition date, section 502(b) purportedly precludes their allowance. Id. We disagree with this approach, as it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim,” which — as discussed previously — includes any right to payment, whether or not that right is contingent and unliquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A); Qmect, 368 B.R. at 884.

The BAP then held that the Supreme Court’s 1988 Timbers decision did not apply:

We believe that Electric Machinery’s reliance on Timbers is misplaced. Timbers provided that an undersecured creditor could not receive postpetition interest on the unsecured portion of its debt. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380. This holding is consistent with section 502(b)(2), which specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest. Inasmuch as section 502(b) does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees, the comparison between the current issue and that presented in Timbers is not persuasive.

Finally, the BAP held that it was unnecessary to reconcile the competing public policy considerations advanced by the Electric Machinery and Qmect decisions:

Because we find that the Bankruptcy Code itself provides the answer to this issue (by not specifically disallowing postpetition fees), we do not attempt to reconcile these policy concerns. In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.

For more on this decision, as well as the BAP’s discussion (now adopted by the Ninth Circuit) on the revival of a guarantor’s liability after a preference settlement, this earlier post on the BAP’s In re SNTL Corp. decision may be of interest.

On Remand From The Supreme Court’s Travelers Decision. One interesting side note involves the BAP’s December 2007 comment in the In re SNTL Corp. decision about being unable to predict how the Ninth Circuit would decide this issue in the Travelers case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. Months later, in May 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued this brief order in the Travelers case, effectively remanding the case for "consideration of the bankruptcy court in the first instance." The bankruptcy judge to whom the decision was remanded? Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, who wrote the BAP opinion in In re SNTL Corp.

Impact On Unsecured Creditors? As the first ruling by a U.S. Court of Appeals on this open issue, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may lead unsecured creditors to include post-petition attorney’s fees as part of their allowed unsecured claims when their contracts or a statute provides for them outside of bankruptcy. It will be interesting to see whether the decision has a significant impact on how unsecured creditors in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions pursue claims in bankruptcy cases, and how bankruptcy estates react to such claims for post-petition attorney’s fees.

Section 363 Sales And Beyond: An M&A Lawyer’s Perspective On Purchasing Assets From Distressed Companies

With the economy suffering through the longest recession since the 1930s, it’s little wonder that much of the merger and acquisition ("M&A") activity these days has been focused on distressed companies. The Chrysler and General Motors cases may be the best-known examples, but Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used by companies large and small to sell assets through Section 363 sales. The important intersection between bankruptcy and M&A deals in today’s business climate was recently made the focus of an article in the Wall Street Journal, aptly called "Barbarians in Bankruptcy Court."

Although Section 363 sales are quite common, some distressed companies are able to complete an asset sale outside of bankruptcy. The sale may be made directly by the company, or the seller may actually be a lender foreclosing on its collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. In still other situations, the seller may be an assignee acting through a general assignment for the benefit of creditors under state law.

Regardless of the path chosen, the landscape of distressed asset purchases can be significantly different from that traversed by many traditional M&A lawyers and, most importantly, their clients. Fortunately, one of my M&A partners at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP with significant experience in distressed acquisitions, Jennifer Fonner DiNucci, has recently written an insightful article on the subject. Entitled "Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Transactions Involving Distressed Companies," the article discusses the unique challenges — and opportunities — posed by distressed asset acquisitions. It also highlights some of the major issues that potential asset buyers encounter when dealing with a distressed seller, and points out key differences between distressed transactions and more traditional M&A deals with solvent companies.

The article makes for interesting — and timely — reading for anyone considering a purchase of assets from a distressed company.

General Motors Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy In New York

General Motors Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection this morning in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Robert E. Gerber has been assigned to preside over the case.

A copy of GM’s bankruptcy petition is available here. The petition listed approximately $82 billion in assets and $172 billion in liabilities. A copy of GM’s press release regarding its bankruptcy can be found at the link in this sentence. GM has also created a restructuring website where additional information for customers, suppliers, and others can be found.