asset purchase

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Fall 2009 Edition Of Absolute Priority Now Available

The Fall 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Developments in the General Growth Chapter 11 cases;
  • Updates on the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies;
  • Efforts in Congress to repeal certain of BAPCPA’s business bankruptcy provisions; and
  • The "settlement payment" defense to fraudulent transfer claims against shareholders in leveraged buyouts.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including debtors Pacific Ethanol Holding Co. and Crabtree & Evelyn, Ltd., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. Recent committee cases include Eddie Bauer, Ritz Camera, Filene’s Basement, BT Tires Group, Boscov’s, Gottschalk’s, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and G.I. Joe’s, among others. Also discussed is our work for Levi Strauss & Co. in purchasing 73 outlet stores from the Anchor Blue Retail Group case and for Rackable Systems, Inc. (now known as Silicon Graphics International) in purchasing substantially all of the assets of Silicon Graphics, Inc. in its recent Chapter 11 case.

In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how Section 363 asset sales have become the chief means for companies to restructure in bankruptcy, and how the number of "going concern" sales has grown over the past few months compared to the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

I hope you find this Fall’s edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Section 363 Sales And Beyond: An M&A Lawyer’s Perspective On Purchasing Assets From Distressed Companies

With the economy suffering through the longest recession since the 1930s, it’s little wonder that much of the merger and acquisition ("M&A") activity these days has been focused on distressed companies. The Chrysler and General Motors cases may be the best-known examples, but Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used by companies large and small to sell assets through Section 363 sales. The important intersection between bankruptcy and M&A deals in today’s business climate was recently made the focus of an article in the Wall Street Journal, aptly called "Barbarians in Bankruptcy Court."

Although Section 363 sales are quite common, some distressed companies are able to complete an asset sale outside of bankruptcy. The sale may be made directly by the company, or the seller may actually be a lender foreclosing on its collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. In still other situations, the seller may be an assignee acting through a general assignment for the benefit of creditors under state law.

Regardless of the path chosen, the landscape of distressed asset purchases can be significantly different from that traversed by many traditional M&A lawyers and, most importantly, their clients. Fortunately, one of my M&A partners at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP with significant experience in distressed acquisitions, Jennifer Fonner DiNucci, has recently written an insightful article on the subject. Entitled "Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Transactions Involving Distressed Companies," the article discusses the unique challenges — and opportunities — posed by distressed asset acquisitions. It also highlights some of the major issues that potential asset buyers encounter when dealing with a distressed seller, and points out key differences between distressed transactions and more traditional M&A deals with solvent companies.

The article makes for interesting — and timely — reading for anyone considering a purchase of assets from a distressed company.

Fall 2008 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

The Fall 2008 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Claims and defenses under the WARN Act;
  • The Supreme Court’s decision on transfer taxes and bankruptcy sales;
  • Section 363 "free and clear" sales in bankruptcy; and
  • The interplay between claim objections and the Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" administrative claim.

This edition also has information on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn’s, Boscov’s, Hancock Fabrics, Steve & Barry’s, Goody’s, Sharper Image, The Bombay Company, and Shoe Pavilion, among others. In addition, a note from my partner Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how the current economic problems will require lenders, unsecured creditors, and others to consider the impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy on their rights.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Will Section 363 “Free And Clear” Sale Orders Survive An Appeal? A Recent Appellate Decision Raises New Doubts

The primary objective of any buyer at a Section 363 sale, whether one purchasing for cash or an existing secured creditor making a credit bid, is to obtain good title to the purchased assets free and clear of any liens, claims, or interests. However, a recent decision on this subject by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is causing something of a stir in the bankruptcy world.

In Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), the Ninth Circuit BAP held that a senior secured creditor’s credit bid, in an amount less than the aggregate value of all liens against the property in question, did not satisfy the requirements of Section 365(f) and permit the sale to be “free and clear” of the existing junior liens on the property and reversed the bankruptcy court’s order on appeal. You can read the entire opinion by following the link in this sentence.

For an excellent discussion of the decision and the analysis employed by the BAP, be sure to read Steve Jakubowsi’s post on the case over at The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Instead of covering the same ground, I want to discuss some of the implications of the decision for Section 363 bankruptcy sales.

Credit Bid Or Foreclosure? First, the Clear Channel decision raises questions about how a senior secured creditor should proceed in a bankruptcy case.

  • On the one hand, the BAP’s decision that a sale will not be “free and clear” of junior liens is not that surprising. It has generally been accepted that for a “short sale” under Section 363 (one in which the purchase price is less than the amount of liens against the property) to be free and clear of liens, the secured creditors must consent or one of the other exceptions under Section 363(f) must be satisfied. Those other exceptions include a lien subject to “bona fide” dispute or a situation in which the lien holder can be forced to accept a cash payment in satisfaction of the lien.
  • What has surprised some about this new decision is the holding that a credit bid by a senior secured creditor also cannot be made free and clear of junior liens, even though the senior secured creditor could have wiped out the junior liens through a foreclosure under state law.
  • Section 363(f)’s focus on the “aggregate value of all liens on such property” makes the existence of junior liens the issue, regardless of whether they are in the money. Put differently, even if the junior liens are worthless, they exist and a Section 363 sale to a credit bidding senior secured creditor will not be free and clear of those junior liens.
  • With the enormous increase in second lien lending over the past several years, including many second lien loans made as part of private equity buyouts, expect to see more Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in which substantial junior liens are present.

This ruling seems to leave secured creditors seeking to take title to their collateral with two main choices. One is to seek relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on its collateral, avoiding the Section 363 sale and credit bid approach altogether. If the assets cannot be sold for cash in an amount greater than the senior secured creditor’s claim, and if a reorganization is not reasonably in prospect (the key factors in a bankruptcy court’s decision whether to lift the stay), this may be the preferred path. A second approach would be to complete the credit bid through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, something the Clear Channel court implied was also available. However, some secured creditors may find the delay and expense involved in being a plan proponent problematic. As a plan proponent, the secured creditor would take on the obligation to pay administrative expenses of the estate on the effective date of the reorganization plan, as well as satisfaction of all of the other requirements for confirming a plan.

The Risks Of An Appeal: The Limits Of Section 363(m) And The Mootness Doctrine. Second, perhaps the most important aspect of the Clear Channel decision is the risks it exposes even for “good faith” purchasers in Section 363 sales. Purchasers of assets under Section 363 regularly seek a finding that they are a good faith purchaser because a sale to such a buyer cannot be overturned on appeal. This protection is found in Section 363(m) and reads as follows:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

Here, the BAP held that although the sale itself to the senior secured creditor could not be overturned on appeal, the protection of Section 363(m) did not extend to the question of whether the sale was made “free and clear” of the junior liens. Instead, the BAP ruled that even in the absence of a stay pending appeal, the appellate court could reverse the “free and clear” determination because Section 363(m) is expressly limited to sale orders under Sections 363(b) and (c), which authorize the sale or lease of property, and does not extend to “free and clear” orders under Section 363(f).

Going hand in hand with the Section 363(m) ruling was the decision’s holding that the closing of the asset sale did not render the “free and clear” issue moot. Instead, even though no stay pending appeal was obtained, the BAP concluded that relief could still be granted on the “free and clear” question by ordering that the junior lien remained attached the property even after its sale.

When Should A Buyer Close The Sale? The Section 363(m) and mootness rulings raise issues about when a buyer of assets under Section 363 should close on the sale. The BAP’s views on Section 363(m) and mootness do not appear limited to the credit bid situation involved in the Clear Channel decision. Instead, if a good faith purchaser for cash pays less than the “aggregate value of all liens” against the purchased assets — or perhaps a question exists whether a lien or interest is really in “bona fide” dispute — the “free and clear” aspect of the sale may be outside the protection of Section 363(m) and an appeal by a secured creditor or other interest holder may not be moot.

  • Buyers usually prefer to close as soon as possible after entry of a bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale, especially if the value of the assets are declining or the debtor is running out of cash.
  • A buyer that closes with an appeal threatened runs the risk of having the “free and clear” decision overturned months or even years later and the purchased assets suddenly subject to the debtor’s liens.
  • While every sale objection or appeal will not raise these issues, if a serious objection to the “free and clear” aspect of the bankruptcy court’s sale order has been made, and the objector is likely to appeal, the buyer should consider whether to wait until the later of (a) the passage of the 10-day appeal period, or (b) a final appellate decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of the objection, before agreeing to close the sale.
  • Buyers may want to consider including provisions in the asset purchase agreement to permit this type of flexibility on when to close or to terminate the agreement if the closing is substantially delayed.

The Precedential Effect Of A BAP Decision. Unlike a U.S. Court of Appeals itself, a BAP is made up of bankruptcy judges, not federal circuit judges. Given a BAP’s place in the judicial system’s hierarchy, its decisions are not given the same precedential weigh as U.S. Court of Appeals decisions, and this means that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit might reach a different conclusion. Moreover, BAP decisions generally are not binding on bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit. That said, some bankruptcy judges make a practice of following BAP decisions and the BAP’s reasoning may influence other judges.

Conclusion. The BAP’s Clear Channel decision has important implications for Section 363 asset sales. Secured creditors intent on making a credit bid may now rethink that approach when junior liens are present. Cash buyers may be more cautious on when to close a sale if disputes exist over whether the sale should be “free and clear” of existing liens and interests. It will be interesting to see how other courts, in the Ninth Circuit and beyond, react to the decision, so stay tuned.

Supreme Court Decision Settles The Section 1146(a) Transfer Tax Exemption Issue

On June 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., the case involving whether Section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts from stamp or similar taxes any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of the Code,” applies to transfers of assets occurring prior to the actual confirmation of such a plan. The issue has taken on added importance in recent years because so many sales of assets in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases — including the one in the Piccadilly case — are made through Section 363, well before any plan of reorganization is confirmed.

(For more background on the issue, and the oral argument before the Supreme Court last March, you can read a prior post entitled "What Happened At the Supreme Court Oral Argument In The Section 1146(a) Transfer Tax Exemption Case?")

The Supreme Court’s Holding. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Section 1146(a) applies only to post-confirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan of reorganization. Follow the link for a copy of the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit (opinion below available here), which unlike the Third and Fourth Circuits, had held that pre-confirmation transfers could also be covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court summed up its holding as follows:

The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Code, and applicable substantive canons all lead to the same conclusion: Section 1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed. Because Piccadilly transferred its assets before its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, it may not rely on §1146(a) to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Keys To The Decision. In examining the statute and the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found Florida’s reading of the statute far more reasonable:

While both sides present credible interpretations of §1146(a), Florida has the better one. To be sure, Congress could have used more precise language—i.e., “under a plan that has been confirmed”—and thus removed all ambiguity. But the two readings of the language that Congress chose are not equally plausible: Of the two, Florida’s is clearly the more natural. The interpretation advanced by Piccadilly and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—that there must be “some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer and the confirmed plan” for §1146(a) to apply, 484 F. 3d, at 1304—places greater strain on the statutory text than the simpler construction advanced by Florida and adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuit.

Later, the Court added the following:

Even if we were to adopt Piccadilly’s broad definition of “under,” its interpretation of the statute faces  other obstacles. The asset transfer here can hardly be said to have been consummated “in accordance with” any confirmed plan because, as of the closing date, Piccadilly had not even submitted its plan to the Bankruptcy Court for confirmation. Piccadilly’s asset sale was thus not conducted “in accordance with” any plan confirmed under Chapter 11. Rather, it was conducted “in accordance with” the procedures set forth in Chapter 3—specifically, §363(b)(1). To read the statute as Piccadilly proposes would make §1146(a)’s exemption turn on whether a debtor-in-possession’s actions are consistent with a legal instrument that does not exist—and indeed may not even be conceived of—at the time of the sale. Reading §1146(a) in context with other relevant Code provisions, we find nothing justifying such a curious interpretation of what is a straightforward exemption.

In dismissing another of Piccadilly’s arguments, the Court had occasion to make an interesting comparison between the mechanics of assumption and rejection of executory contracts and the timing of a transfer for Section 1146(a) purposes:

We agree with Bildisco’s commonsense observation that the decision whether to reject a contract or lease must be made before confirmation. But that in no way undermines the fact that the rejection takes effect upon or after confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan (or before confirmation if  pursuant to §365(d)(2)). In the context of §1146(a), the decision whether to transfer a given asset “under a plan confirmed” must be made prior to submitting the Chapter 11 plan to the bankruptcy court, but the transfer itself cannot be “under a plan confirmed” until the court confirms the plan in question. Only at that point does the transfer become eligible for the stamp-tax exemption.

The Court also found that the placement of Section 1146(a) in a subchapter entitled "POSTCONFIMRATION MATTERS" was yet another factor which, while not decisive, helped to undermine Piccadilly’s arguments.

Canon Fodder. The Court next held that even if the statute were ambiguous, which the Court did not expressly decide, two canons of statutory interpretation would compel a decision in favor of Florida’s reading of the statute.

  • First, changes were made to Section 1146 as recently as the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress is generally presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of a statute (here decisions from the Third and Fourth Circuits refusing to apply the exemption to pre-confirmation transfers, both of which predated the Eleventh Circuit’s 2007 decision in Piccadilly) when the statute was revised.
  • Second, a federalism canon directs courts to proceed carefully before recognizing an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed. Given Piccadilly’s arguments that the statute was ambiguous, the Court found this canon to be "decisive in this case."
  • The Court rejected the canons advanced by Piccadilly, most notably viewing Chapter 11 (and Section 1146) as a remedial statute to be liberally construed to facilitate reorganizations.

The Dissent. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, focused on "whether the time of the transfer matters." Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, he looked to the policy Congress was trying to implement with the statute. He concluded that Congress would not have "insisted upon temporal limits" in Section 1146(a) since, in his view, "it makes no difference whether a transfer takes place before or after the plan is confirmed."

Other Bloggers Weigh In. For an excellent and entertaining review of the decision, be sure to read Steve Jakubowski’s post on his Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Hat tip as well to the SCOTUS Blog for first reporting on the decision (and updating its excellent wiki on the case) and to the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report for its post as well.

Minor Impact On Chapter 11 Cases? Of course, the most immediate impact of the decision is that pre-confirmation Section 363 sales will no longer be exempt from stamp or transfer taxes in any circuit, and those taxes will have to be paid.  What remains to be seen is whether sales will be delayed until plan confirmation in order to take advantage of the Section 1146(a) exemption. Given how many asset sales in Chapter 11 cases these days are conducted at the early stages of a case because of financing limitations and declining asset values, a move to delay those sales until plan confirmation seems unlikely. With an economic downturn upon us, the pressures that have led to the expanded use of Section 363 are not likely to abate, regardless of how attractive a stamp or transfer tax exemption may be.

What Happened At The Supreme Court Oral Argument In The Section 1146(a) Bankruptcy Transfer Tax Exemption Case?

On Wednesday, March 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. A link to the transcript of the oral argument can be found below. The case presents the following question:

Whether section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts from stamp or similar taxes any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of the Code,” applies to transfers of assets occurring prior to the actual confirmation of such a plan?

With so many asset transfers in Chapter 11 cases taking place through Section 363 asset sales before plan confirmation, rather than when plans are consummated after confirmation, how the Supreme Court answers the question presented will have a significant impact on the extent to which debtors end up paying stamp and other transfer taxes as a practical matter.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision And Aftermath. The Supreme Court case results from a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that pre-confirmation sales can be subject to the exemption under Section 1146(a) if followed by plan confirmation later in the case. Use the link in this sentence to read the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Piccadilly.

The Language of Section 1146(a). The one-sentence section, Section 1146(a), was previously numbered Section 1146(c) but its language has not changed. (Many court orders and opinions still use the old designation.) The statute provides as follows:

The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.

As discussed below, much of the dispute over the scope of this exemption is based on interpretation of the phrase "under a plan confirmed."

Section 363 Sales And Transfer Taxes. As bankruptcy professionals know, Section 363 asset sales often precede confirmation of a plan by months. When confirmed, the plan may simply distribute the cash generated from prior sales of the debtor’s assets or may enable a reorganized but smaller debtor to emerge from bankruptcy. Courts around the country have taken very different views on whether Section 1146(a)’s exemption should apply to these pre-confirmation transfers.

Some courts will include findings in Section 363 sale orders that the sale, even though prior to plan confirmation, is exempt from stamp and similar taxes. This sale order from the Southern District of New York illustrates that approach:

The sale of the Purchased Assets . . . is a prerequisite to the Debtors’ ability to confirm and consummate a plan or plans. The Sale Transaction is therefore an integral part of a plan or plans to be confirmed in the Debtors’ cases and, thereby, constitutes a transfer pursuant to section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shall not be taxed under any law imposing a transfer tax, a stamp tax or any similar tax.

Cases filed in Delaware will likely receive a very different response. In 2003, the Third Circuit in In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003) — unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Piccadilly — held that the Section 1146(a) exemption does not apply to pre-confirmation transfers. (The Third Circuit’s opinion was authored by then Circuit Judge, and now Associate Justice, Samuel Alito.) Delaware’s new local rule governing Section 363 sales requires sale motions to make express disclosure of an effort to obtain such a provision in a sale order:

Tax Exemption. The Sale Motion must highlight any provision seeking to have the sale declared exempt from taxes under section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the type of tax (e.g., recording tax, stamp tax, use tax, capital gains tax) for which the exemption is sought. It is not sufficient to refer simply to "transfer" taxes and the state or states in which the affected property is located.

Other courts have taken a similar view. The Section 363 sale guidelines adopted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California call out various provisions that the Bankruptcy Court generally will not approve in a sale order, including the following:

Any provision that purports to exempt the transaction from transfer taxes under section 1146(c). By its own terms, that section applies only to a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization, not a sale outside of a plan under section 363(b).

The Supreme Court Oral Argument And Transcript. Against this background, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Piccadilly case on March 26, 2008. A copy of the transcript of the oral argument is available by clicking on the link in this sentence.

It’s difficult to tell how the decision will come out based on the questions asked by the various Justices, but the questions are themselves quite interesting. Some focused on why Congress would want to exempt post-confirmation but not pre-confirmation transfers. Others implied that the plain language of the statute limited the reach of the exemption only to transfers made, literally, "under" a confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Still others inquired about the administrative impact on states if pre-confirmation transfers were initially exempt but subsequently could be taxed in the event that no plan was ever confirmed. An additional topic raised was whether, if the statute were held to exempt pre-confirmation transfers, the exemption should cover only those transfers "necessary" for a later plan confirmation or also transfers merely "instrumental" to a later plan confirmation. 

The State’s Arguments. During the argument, the State of Florida contended that the statute was unambiguous and that the word "under" meant a transfer made at or following confirmation of plan. Arguing for this bright-line rule, the State asserted that if pre-confirmation transfers could also be exempt taxing authorities would not know, at the time a transfer was recorded, whether a Chapter 11 plan would in fact later be confirmed to validate the exemption. From a policy perspective, the State argued that tax exemptions should be narrowly construed, that stamp and other transfer taxes generate millions of dollars in revenues, and that it would be an administrative burden to require states to monitor Chapter 11 cases to see if plans were later confirmed to validate exemptions claimed on earlier asset transfers.

The Debtor’s Arguments. The debtor made both policy and statutory interpretation arguments. On the policy side, Piccadilly argued that a debtor cannot get a Chapter 11 plan confirmed without cash, debtors often make Section 363 asset sales to preserve value and raise funds needed to confirm a Chapter 11 plan later in the case, the exemption was designed to save cash for the benefit of creditors, and these pre-confirmation sales should receive the same benefit from the exemption. The debtor also asserted that the key phrase in Section 1146(a), "under a plan confirmed" appears in Section 365(g)(1). Section 365 was interpreted by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco &. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), to require pre-confirmation, not post-confirmation, decisions on executory contracts. The debtor contended that because the phrase "under a plan confirmed" means before confirmation when used in Section 365(g)(1), it must mean before confirmation in Section 1146(a) as well. In contrast, the debtor argued, Congress used the different phrase "confirmed plan" in Sections 1142(b) or 511(b) when it intended to refer to a point after plan confirmation.

Conclusion. Whether Section 1146(a)’s exemption from transfer taxes applies to pre-confirmation transfers has split circuit and bankruptcy courts alike over the years. The questions asked during the Supreme Court’s oral argument in the Piccadilly case suggest a similar split among the Justices over how the statute should be interpreted. With the Supreme Court’s term ending in the next few months, however, debtors, creditors, and taxing authorities should not have to wait much longer for a definitive answer to this open issue.  

Assignments For The Benefit Of Creditors: Simple As ABC?

Companies in financial trouble are often forced to liquidate their assets to pay creditors. While a Chapter 11 bankruptcy sometimes makes the most sense, other times a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is required, and in still other situations a corporate dissolution may be best. This post examines another of the options, the assignment for the benefit of creditors, commonly known as an "ABC."

A Few Caveats. It’s important to remember that determining which path an insolvent company should take depends on the specific facts and circumstances involved. As in many areas of the law, one size most definitely does not fit all for financially troubled companies. With those caveats in mind, let’s consider one scenario sometimes seen when a venture-backed or other investor-funded company runs out of money.

One Scenario. After a number of rounds of investment, the investors of a privately held corporation have decided not to put in more money to fund the company’s operations. The company will be out of cash within a few months and borrowing from the company’s lender is no longer an option. The accounts payable list is growing (and aging) and some creditors have started to demand payment. A sale of the business may be possible, however, and a term sheet from a potential buyer is anticipated soon. The company’s real property lease will expire in nine months, but it’s possible that a buyer might want to take over the lease.

  • A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing is problematic because there is insufficient cash to fund operations going forward, no significant revenues are being generated, and debtor in possession financing seems highly unlikely unless the buyer itself would make a loan. 
  • The board prefers to avoid a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because it’s concerned that a bankruptcy trustee, unfamiliar with the company’s technology, would not be able to generate the best recovery for creditors.

The ABC Option. In many states, another option that may be available to companies in financial trouble is an assignment for the benefit of creditors (or "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" as it is sometimes called). The ABC is an insolvency proceeding governed by state law rather than federal bankruptcy law.

California ABCs. In California, where ABCs have been done for years, the primary governing law is found in California Code of Civil Procedure sections 493.010 to 493.060 and sections 1800 to 1802, among other provisions of California law. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1802 sets forth, in remarkably brief terms, the main procedural requirements for a company (or individual) making, and an assignee accepting, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors:

1802.  (a) In any general assignment for the benefit of creditors, as defined in Section 493.010, the assignee shall, within 30 days after the assignment has been accepted in writing, give written notice of the assignment to the assignor’s creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest as set forth on the list provided by the assignor pursuant to subdivision (c).
   (b) In the notice given pursuant to subdivision (a), the assignee shall establish a date by which creditors must file their claims to be able to share in the distribution of proceeds of the liquidation of the assignor’s assets.  That date shall be not less than 150 days and not greater than 180 days after the date of the first giving of the written notice to creditors and parties in interest.
   (c) The assignor shall provide to the assignee at the time of the making of the assignment a list of creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest, signed under penalty of  perjury, which shall include the names, addresses, cities, states, and ZIP Codes for each person together with the amount of that person’s anticipated claim in the assignment proceedings.

In California, the company and the assignee enter into a formal "Assignment Agreement." The company must also provide the assignee with a list of creditors, equityholders, and other interested parties (names, addresses, and claim amounts). The assignee is required to give notice to creditors of the assignment, setting a bar date for filing claims with the assignee that is between five to six months later.

ABCs In Other States. Many other states have ABC statutes although in practice they have been used to varying degrees. For example, ABCs have been more common in California than in states on the East Coast, but important exceptions exist. Delaware corporations can generally avail themselves of Delaware’s voluntary assignment statutes, and its procedures have both similarities and important differences from the approach taken in California. Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog has an interesting post discussing ABC’s under Georgia law. Florida is another state in which ABCs are done under specific statutory procedures. For an excellent book that has information on how ABCs are conducted in various states, see Geoffrey Berman’s General Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The ABCs of ABCs, published by the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Important Features Of ABCs. A full analysis of how ABCs function in a particular state and how one might affect a specific company requires legal advice from insolvency counsel. The following highlights some (but by no means all) of the key features of ABCs:

  • Court Filing Issue. In California, making an ABC does not require a public court filing. Some other states, however, do require a court filing to initiate or complete an ABC.
  • Select The Assignee. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, who is randomly appointed from those on an approved panel, a corporation making an assignment is generally able to choose the assignee.
  • Shareholder Approval. Most corporations require both board and shareholder approval for an ABC because it involves the transfer to the assignee of substantially all of the corporation’s assets. This makes ABCs impractical for most publicly held corporations.
  • Liquidator As Fiduciary. The assignee is a fiduciary to the creditors and is typically a professional liquidator.
  • Assignee Fees. The fees charged by assignees often involve an upfront payment and a percentage based on the assets liquidated.
  • No Automatic Stay. In many states, including California, an ABC does not give rise to an automatic stay like bankruptcy, although an assignee can often block judgment creditors from attaching assets.
  • Event Of Default. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is typically a default under most contracts. As a result, contracts may be terminated upon the assignment under an ipso facto clause.
  • Proof Of Claim. For creditors, an ABC process generally involves the submission to the assignee of a proof of claim by a stated deadline or bar date, similar to bankruptcy. (Click on the link for an example of an ABC proof of claim form.)
  • Employee Priority. Employee and other claim priorities are governed by state law and may involve different amounts than apply under the Bankruptcy Code. In California, for example, the employee wage and salary priority is $4,300, not the $10,950 amount currently in force under the Bankruptcy Code.
  • 20 Day Goods. Generally, ABC statutes do not have a provision similar to that under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9), which gives an administrative claim priority to vendors who sold goods in the ordinary course of business to a debtor during the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing. As a result, these vendors may recover less in an ABC than in a bankruptcy case, subject to assertion of their reclamation rights.
  • Landlord Claim. Unlike bankruptcy, there generally is no cap imposed on a landlord’s claim for breach of a real property lease in an ABC.
  • Sale Of Assets. In many states, including California, sales by the assignee of the company’s assets are completed as a private transaction without approval of a court. However, unlike a bankruptcy Section 363 sale, there is usually no ability to sell assets "free and clear" of liens and security interests without the consent or full payoff of lienholders. Likewise, leases or executory contracts cannot be assigned without required consents from the other contracting party.
  • Avoidance Actions. Most states allow assignees to pursue preferences and fraudulent transfers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Bankruptcy Code pre-empts California’s preference statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1800. Nevertheless, to date the California state courts have refused to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision and still permit assignees to sue for preferences in California state court. In February 2008, a Delaware state court followed the California state court decisions, refusing either to follow the Ninth Circuit position or to hold that the California preference statute was pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware court was required to apply California’s ABC preference statute because the avoidance action arose out of an earlier California ABC.

The Scenario Revisited. With this overview in mind, let’s return to our company in distress.

  • The prospect of a term sheet from a potential buyer may influence whether our hypothetical company should choose an ABC or another approach. Some buyers will refuse to purchase assets outside of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy or a Chapter 7 case. Others are comfortable with the ABC process and believe it provides an added level of protection from fraudulent transfer claims compared to purchasing the assets directly from the insolvent company. Depending on the value to be generated by a sale, these considerations may lead the company to select one approach over the other available options.
  • In states like California where no court approval is required for a sale, the ABC can also mean a much faster closing — often within a day or two of the ABC itself provided that the assignee has had time to perform due diligence on the sale and any alternatives — instead of the more typical 30-60 days required for bankruptcy court approval of a Section 363 sale. Given the speed at which they can be done, in the right situation an ABC can permit a "going concern" sale to be achieved.
  • Secured creditors with liens against the assets to be sold will either need to be paid off through the sale or will have to consent to release their liens; forced "free and clear" sales generally are not possible in an ABC.
  • If the buyer decides to take the real property lease, the landlord will need to consent to the lease assignment. Unlike bankruptcy, the ABC process generally cannot force a landlord or other third party to accept assignment of a lease or executory contract.
  • If the buyer decides not to take the lease, or no sale occurs, the fact that only nine months remains on the lease means that this company would not benefit from bankruptcy’s cap on landlord claims. If the company’s lease had years remaining, and if the landlord were unwilling to agree to a lease termination approximating the result under bankruptcy’s landlord claim cap, the company would need to consider whether a bankruptcy filing was necessary to avoid substantial dilution to other unsecured creditor claims that a large, uncapped landlord claim would produce in an ABC.
  • If the potential buyer walks away, the assignee would be responsible for determining whether a sale of all or a part of the assets was still possible. In any event, assets would be liquidated by the assignee to the extent feasible and any proceeds would be distributed to creditors in order of their priority through the ABC’s claims process.
  • While other options are available and should be explored, an ABC may make sense for this company depending upon the buyer’s views, the value to creditors and other constituencies that a sale would produce, and a clear-eyed assessment of alternative insolvency methods. 

Conclusion. When weighing all of the relevant issues, an insolvent company’s management and board would be well-served to seek the advice of counsel and other insolvency professionals as early as possible in the process. The old song may say that ABC is as "easy as 1-2-3," but assessing whether an assignment for the benefit of creditors is best for an insolvent company involves the analysis of a myriad of complex factors.