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Amendments To The Federal Bankruptcy Rules, Plus A New “Free And Clear” Sale Motion Filing Fee, To Take Effect December 1, 2013

Almost every year, changes are made to the set of rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The changes address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others.

Rule Amendments. This year the rule amendments mainly affect bankruptcy cases filed by individuals. There are also some revisions to Rules 9006, 9013, and 9014, which govern motions in individual and business bankruptcy cases, but they are minor and not too exciting this time. So you can keep up-to-date, a copy of the amendments, in both clean and redline, is available by following the link in this sentence. The new amendments will take effect on December 1, 2013, barring unlikely action by Congress.

"Free And Clear" Motion Filing Fee. Also taking effect on December 1, 2013, is a new, $176 filing fee each time a motion is filed under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code to sell assets "free and clear" of liens, interests and other encumbrances. Given the frequent use of Section 363 asset sales in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, this new fee may well generate some much needed revenue for the courts.

DIP Financing: How Chapter 11’s Bankruptcy Loan Rules Can Be Used To Help A Business Access Liquidity

Cash Is King. An army may march on its stomach, but for companies, it’s liquidity that keeps the business going. For many companies, typical sources of liquidity, beyond cash flow from sales or other revenue, are (1) financing from banks or other secured lenders, (2) credit from vendors that can reduce immediate liquidity needs, and (3) when needed, loans from owners, investors, or other insiders.

When A Liquidity Crisis Hits. Companies in financial distress often find that their need for liquidity goes up just as the availability of traditional financing goes down. The borrowing base may shrink, the ability to get further advances may be cut off, and loans may go into default. Worse, new lenders may be unwilling to make loans given the distress. For many distressed businesses, revenues may also be declining and insufficient to cover expenses without additional financing. A liquidity crunch can quickly snowball into a liquidity crisis.

Insider Loans. Even if an owner, investor, or other insider might be open to making a loan, the company’s distress may raise a red flag because of the extra scrutiny often given to insider loans to a distressed company. Insiders may be concerned that if they make the loan, creditors or a bankruptcy trustee could later challenge it (and any security interest granted) in an attempt to recharacterize the loan as an equity contribution or have the debt equitably subordinated — and therefore never repaid — in a bankruptcy. 

A Potential Solution: DIP Financing. A company in financial distress is probably already looking at a workout, restructuring, or sale of the business. Out-of-court workouts should be considered and may succeed. However, in the right situation a Chapter 11 bankruptcy can provide powerful options, including the ability to facilitate financing. If a company needs a loan but a potential lender is unwilling to make it, including because of concern about a legal challenge, the Bankruptcy Code offers a way to give the lender comfort that the loan will not be challenged, even if the lender is an insider or a potential purchaser.

  • To explore this further, we first need to review a little bankruptcy terminology. When a company files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the company’s management and board of directors remain in possession of its business (unless a trustee is later appointed). For that reason, the company in Chapter 11 is called a "debtor in possession" or a "DIP" for short. The special Chapter 11 bankruptcy financing is known by this acronym: DIP financing.
  • When the debtor company has lined up a lender, it files a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of the DIP financing. Typical DIP financing terms include a first priority security interest, a market or even premium interest rate, an approved budget, and other lender protections. Creditors have a right to object to the DIP loan, and may do so if the proposed lender is an insider, and the Bankruptcy Court will ultimately decide whether to approve it.
  • If the company already has secured debt, to borrow funds secured by a lien equal or senior to the existing lender (often called "priming" the existing lender), the company either will need the existing lender to consent or will have to convince the Bankruptcy Court that the existing lender’s lien position will be "adequately protected" (essentially meaning that the existing lender will not be worse off if the DIP loan is approved).
  • An existing lender itself may be willing to make a DIP loan, even if it has refused to make further advances outside of bankruptcy. In fact, when DIP loans are made they often come from a company’s existing lender. That lender may have its own reasons to use the DIP financing process, for instance, to finance a sale process on specific timelines or otherwise to enhance its position.
  • Unlike a loan outside of bankruptcy, if the Bankruptcy Court gives final approval to a DIP loan and finds that the loan was made in good faith, the new DIP loan will no longer be subject to legal challenge. Put differently, with that approval in hand, a loan that could have been challenged outside of bankruptcy will not be subject to challenge inside of bankruptcy. That’s true even if the lender is an insider or a "stalking horse purchaser" seeking to buy the company’s assets. 
  • The takeaway is that while it isn’t easy, in the right case a distressed company may be able to use Chapter 11 bankruptcy’s DIP financing procedures to get the liquidity it needs, to run a sale process or finance a formal Chapter 11 restructuring, even if it could not get a new loan outside of bankruptcy.

Why Chapter 11? One of the key reasons companies file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy is because of the special legal protections it provides. For the company, those include the automatic stay and, in the right case, the ability to restructure its debts through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Chapter 11’s protections for purchasers of assets can sometimes allow the seller to achieve through Chapter 11 a sale price that it never could have realized without bankruptcy. Likewise, Chapter 11’s DIP financing process for lenders may help the company generate liquidity — including from an existing lender, investor, or stalking horse purchaser — even if it could not do so outside of bankruptcy. 

Conclusion.  A company facing a liquidity crisis should get legal advice from an experienced restructuring and bankruptcy attorney to make sure it considers all options. A workout or other out-of-court restructuring may be able to solve the problem and get the business back on track. However, there are times when a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, despite its costs and disruptions, is the best tool in the toolkit. That’s especially true if Chapter 11’s DIP financing rules help a business access liquidity that it could not get outside of bankruptcy.

Spring 2013 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

The Spring 2013 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has now been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision upholding a secured creditor’s right to credit bid;
  • Determining when a claim arises under the Bankruptcy Code;
  • How the assumption of an executory contract can protect a party from a preference claim; and
  • A recent Seventh Circuit decision applying the absolute priority rule in a Chapter 11 plan context.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others, and our work for Chapter 11 debtors. Recent committee cases include Mervyn’s Holdings, Appleseed’s Intermediate Holdings, Atari, Vertis Holdings, United Retail, and Urban Brands, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Seventh Circuit Decision Gives Support To Protecting Buyers In Bankruptcy Sales From Successor Liability

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a buyer of assets outside of bankruptcy (in this case, from a receivership), takes on successor liability for federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claims made by the employees of the company whose assets it purchases. Although the case arose in a receivership, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion provides important insights into how these issues play out in bankruptcy sales of substantially all assets of a debtor.

Successor Liability Imposed. In Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit held that the buyer took on successor liability for the FLSA claims, even though the sale was made "free and clear" of all liabilities generally and of the FLSA claims in particular. The Seventh Circuit ruled that although those provisions would have protected the buyer, Thomas & Betts, under applicable Wisconsin state law, the FLSA is a federal statute and under federal common law, the buyer had successor liability for the FLSA claims. You can read a copy of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, issued March 26, 2013, by clicking on the link in this sentence.

Contrast With Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales. As discussed in a recent post, when a debtor is facing major potential liabilities, the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the sale to the buyer "free and clear" of liabilities, including successor liability, can lead to a much higher price in a Section 363 sale. Cases discussing successor liability in bankruptcy therefore get the attention of those involved in distressed asset sales.

  • At first glance, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion seems to be troubling news for buyers of assets from distressed companies because the buyer in the Teed case was held to have successor liability for the FLSA claims at issue.
  • However, there appears to be more to the Seventh Circuit’s thinking. In its opinion, written by Judge Richard A. Posner, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "successor liability is appropriate in suits to enforce federal labor or employment laws–even where the successor disclaimed liability when it accepted the assets in question–unless there are good reasons to withhold such liability."  It was in examining possible "good reasons" not to impose successor liability that the Seventh Circuit specifically highlighted bankruptcy sales.

Seventh Circuit’s Analysis. Given that most bankrupt companies are insolvent, the Seventh Circuit noted that imposing successor liability on a buyer might allow unsecured FLSA claims against the seller (debtor) to become, effectively, senior to a secured creditor’s claim against the debtor if the buyer lowered its purchase price to account for such claims:

That is a good reason not to apply successor liability after an insolvent debtor’s default, whether its assets were sold in bankruptcy or outside (by a receiver, for example, as in this case): to apply the doctrine in such a case might upend the priorities of competing creditors. See In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283, 290, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2003); Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 227-28 (5th ed. 2010). It’s an example of a good reason not mentioned in conventional formulations of the federal standard for not imposing successor liability. But it doesn’t figure in this appeal. Thomas & Betts has not urged it. It says that it didn’t discount its bid for Packard because of the workers’ claims; this both suggests that it didn’t anticipate successor liability and may explain why the bank has not complained about the imposition of that liability.

                                                *          *          *

Thomas & Betts argues finally, with support in Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., supra, 760 F.2d at 751, that allowing the workers to enforce their FLSA claims against the successor, in a case such as this in which the predecessor cannot pay them, complicates the reorganization of a bankrupt. Seeing the handwriting on the wall and wanting to minimize the impact of the reorganization on them (in loss of employment or benefits), the workers might decide to file a flurry of lawsuits, whether or not well grounded, hoping to substitute a solvent acquirer for their employer as a defendant in the suits. The prospect thus created of increased liability might scare off prospective buyers of the assets. But there is no suggestion of such a tactic by workers in this case; if there were, it would be another good reason for denying successor liability. Still another concern is that an insolvent company, seeking to maximize its value, might decide not to sell itself as a going concern but instead to sell off its assets piecemeal, even if the company would be worth more as a going concern than as a pile of dismembered assets. In the latter case there would be as we said no successor liability, and successor liability depresses the going concern value of the predecessor, so the insolvent company might be better off even though it was destroying value by not selling itself as a going concern. Once a firm is in Chapter 7 bankruptcy (or in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in which a trustee is appointed), or receivership, it is “owned” by the trustee (or receiver), whose sole concern is with maximizing the net value of the debtor’s estate to creditors (and maybe to other claimants—including shareholders, if the estate is flush enough to enable all the creditors’ claims to be satisfied in full). In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). With immaterial exceptions, the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (or, we assume, a receiver) must sell the debtor’s assets for the highest price he can get. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1); In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 263 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Atlanta Packaging Products, Inc., 99 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). He may not cut the price so that some junior creditor can enforce a claim not against the debtor’s assets but against a third party, the successor, in this case Thomas & Betts. The trustee would be required to sell the assets piecemeal if that would yield more money for the creditors as a whole (to be allocated among them according to their priorities) than sale as a going concern would, even if some creditors would be harmed because successor liability would have been extinguished, and even if economic value would have been destroyed.

But this is a theoretical rather than a practical objection. Since most firms’ assets are worth much more as a going concern than dispersed, successor liability will affect the choice between the two forms of sale in only a small fraction of cases. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, “Bankruptcy Fire Sales,” 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2007).

Conclusion. Although the Court of Appeals did not find any of the potential "good reasons" applicable in the Teed case, its discussion of the problems with imposing successor liability in a bankruptcy sale is helpful.  Despite the holding, the decision’s analysis provides support for buyers seeking protection from successor liability in bankruptcy sales, even from liability under federal labor and employment statutes that might otherwise trump state law, and likewise for bankruptcy courts issuing orders granting buyers that protection. For that reason, it is an interesting and important opinion for buyers and sellers of distressed assets and the professionals that work with them.

Using Chapter 11 Bankruptcy’s Sale Process To Achieve An Exceptional Sale Price

A Difficult Problem. Imagine that your company is facing a government investigation, requiring you to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees and costs, while being threatened with substantially more legal expense. That financial burden is simultaneously starving the company of cash needed to grow the business, and cash balances are heading toward zero. Worse yet, the cloud over the company means it cannot raise additional investment or even find a buyer, as potential buyers fear being saddled with the government investigation and any underlying potential claims.

The Strategy. That was the trap confronting our client Cylex Inc., a Maryland-based life sciences company whose diagnostic test kit detects immune function in organ transplant patients, when they asked me for help. After considering alternatives, the strategy we crafted was to use Chapter 11 bankruptcy’s sale process to obtain a bankruptcy court order expressly permitting the buyer to purchase the company’s assets “free and clear” of the government investigation and underlying claims. 

 

The Stalking Horse Bidder. With the legal strategy in place, the next step was negotiating with a strategic buyer the company had identified.  Fortunately, Cylex recognized the need for a solution early enough that we had time to work through the challenges of implementing the strategy.

  • Given that the sale would be under Bankruptcy Code Section 363 – which allows a bankruptcy court to authorize an asset sale free and clear of liens, interests, claims and encumbrances – the buyer knew that its asset purchase agreement would be subject to “higher and better bids.” In effect, as seller, Cylex would have a chance to “shop” the buyer’s purchase agreement to try and find a better deal.
  • The buyer, known as a “stalking horse bidder” in bankruptcy parlance, wanted both a break-up fee (a percentage of the sale price) and an expense reimbursement (for legal and other direct expenses), in the event another bidder emerged and won the bidding. Those amounts also set the floor for a minimum “topping” or overbid price.
  • As is common, the stalking horse bidder also insisted on a no-shop provision until the bankruptcy was filed, meaning that Cylex would have a chance to shop the deal but only for a relatively short period after the bankruptcy was filed.
  • The pre-bankruptcy sale negotiations with the stalking horse bidder were challenging and took months. However, in November 2012, Cylex and the stalking horse bidder executed a formal asset purchase agreement calling for a $6 million purchase price, but also including a long list of closing conditions, an escrow holdback, and other non-economic terms unfavorable to Cylex.

The Bankruptcy Filing.  Cylex filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on December 3, 2012. Among the motions we filed on the first day of the case was one to approve the break-up fee, expense reimbursement, and bidding procedures, and the Bankruptcy Court approved them two weeks later. Given the company’s dwindling cash, the bidding procedures set a deadline of January 18, 2013 for any overbids, an auction on January 22, 2013 (if any overbids were made), and a hearing on approval of the sale on January 23, 2013. The schedule was accelerated to be sure Cylex could get the transaction closed before it ran out of cash.

 

The Sale And Auction Process. The company and its advisors only had about six weeks to shop the stalking horse bid, including over the holidays, but they made the most of the limited time.

  • On the day of the overbid deadline, two new strategic bidders submitted overbids, both in the $6.7 million minimum overbid amount. That set the stage for the auction four days later.
  • The auction made all of the efforts worthwhile. After 16 rounds of bidding, spanning more than 12 hours, the winning bid (from one of the two overbidders) was a stunning $14.425 million, all cash at closing. Through the auction, Cylex had increased the sale proceeds by more than $8 million over the stalking horse bid.
  • When faced with bidding competition at the auction, the stalking horse bidder and each of the overbidders made concession after concession on non-economic terms, dropping closing conditions and the escrow holdback, and agreeing to purchase price adjustments favorable to Cylex.
  • The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to the winning bidder on January 23, 2013, and entered an order expressly permitting the winning bidder to purchase Cylex’s assets “free and clear” of the government investigation and underlying claims. The sale closed in February.

Conclusion. Cylex, now known as Immunology Partners Inc., faced an extremely challenging set of problems caused by the government investigation, in turn triggered by a False Claims Act qui tam complaint. Although the government later declined to intervene in the qui tam case, that decision came too late for the company to have non-bankruptcy options.  As mentioned in the press release on the sale, despite the legal issues and financial distress it faced, the company was ultimately able to sell its assets for 2.6 times revenue, a multiple typically reserved for healthy companies in its industry. It never could have achieved that sale price, or perhaps any price, without a bankruptcy sale process given the cloud of the government investigation.  Chapter 11 bankruptcy may be considered a last resort, but there are times when it is simply the best way to address a company’s financial and legal problems.

Supreme Court Bids Adieu To Plans Denying Secured Creditors The Right To Credit Bid

On May 29, 2012, only a little more than a month after the April 23, 2012 oral argument in the case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank on the question of "credit bidding." You can get a copy of the opinion by following the link in this sentence. (You are also welcome to follow my Twitter feed @BobEisenbach for updates; I tweeted a link to the opinion the afternoon it was issued.)

The Circuit Split. The Supreme Court took the case to resolve a split between the circuits on this issue. In an earlier case, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit had confirmed a plan of reorganization that prevented credit bidding, and the Fifth Circuit had done so in a case involving an asset transfer under a plan, which was considered to be a sale. However, in the RadLAX case, decided as River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (2011), the Seventh Circuit took the opposite view. It rejected proposed bidding procedures that would have precluded the secured creditor from credit bidding at an auction contemplated by the plan of reorganization.  For more analysis of these issues and the split in the circuits, follow the link in this sentence to the Winter 2012 edition of Cooley’s Absolute Priority newsletter.

The Supreme Court’s Decision. By an 8-0 vote (Justice Kennedy did not participate), the Supreme Court held that a secured creditor has a right to credit bid its secured debt under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization that provides for a sale of its collateral. The decision affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision rejecting the bidding procedures in the RadLAX case.

  • The issue is important because with a "credit bid," a secured creditor is able to acquire the assets being sold by using its debt, up to the amount it’s owed, without having to pay cash upfront for the assets. It can be challenging for secured creditors to raise large amounts of cash, especially when a syndicate of lenders (or, as the Supreme Court noted, the Federal Government) is involved, even though presumably they will later be paid back out of the sale proceeds.
  • Secured creditors argue that, without the right to credit bid, for these reasons they would be unable to participate in the sale and their collateral could be sold for an unreasonably low price.
  • Debtors argue that a secured creditor’s credit bid could chill bidding by third parties, particularly if the secured creditor’s debt, and thus potential credit bid, is substantially higher than what a cash bidder would be likely to pay.

Indubitable What? The Bankruptcy Code requires that if a secured creditor objects to a plan, it must receive "fair and equitable" treatment, a term of art under Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that "fair and equitable" means that a secured creditor must either (i) retain its lien and be paid deferred cash payments, (ii) be entitled to credit bid at a sale of its collateral, or (iii) realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim. The RadLAX debtor was attempting to sell its assets (the secured creditor’s collateral) without permitting the secured creditor to credit bid, pay the resulting sale proceeds to the secured creditor, and "cram down" this treatment over the secured creditor’s objection, arguing that it constituted the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim. 

The legal issue at the core of the decision involved the interpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Bankruptcy Code. In RadLAX, although the Supreme Court did not decide what "indubitable equivalent" means, it held that even though Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) may appear to permit a plan to provide a secured creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim, when a plan provides for a sale of the secured creditor’s collateral, it must permit the secured creditor to credit bid under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).

  • Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides that when a plan of reorganization calls for a sale of a secured creditor’s collateral, the sale is "subject to Section 363(k)," which permits a credit bid as discussed below.
  • The Supreme Court held that the "indubitable equivalent" alternative may be available in some situations, but it’s not an option when the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization calls for a sale of the secured creditor’s collateral.
  • Although the RadLAX case involved a Chapter 11 plan sale, typical bankruptcy sales do not. Far more often, sales are conducted, separately from a plan, under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 363(k) specifically provides that a secured creditor has a right to credit bid and offset its secured claim at such a non-plan Section 363 sale, absent "cause" to take that right away. No such "cause" was present in the RadLAX case, and the Supreme Court held that Section 363(k)’s credit bid right applied.

An "Easy" Decision. Ultimately, as the unanimous decision reflects, the Supreme Court held that this was "an easy case," that the debtor’s reading of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) was "hyperliteral and contrary to common sense," and that the more specific provisions of subsection (ii) controlled over the general "indubitable equivalent" language of subsection (iii). The Supreme Court’s decision should put to rest efforts to sell a secured creditor’s collateral without allowing for credit bids, except in cases where there are issues with the validity of the secured creditor’s secured claim or cause exists under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Winter 2012 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

The Winter 2012 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has recently been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • The Supreme Court’s recent Stern v. Marshall decision and its impact on the ability of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in certain cases;
  • Recent decisions on the ability of secured creditors to credit bid their debt in bankruptcy asset sales;
  • Issues involving the recharacterization of debt as equity; and
  • The ability of directors and officers to obtain coverage under a D&O liability policy purchased by a bankrupt company.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, Alexander Gallo Holdings, Claim Jumper, Signature Styles, Urban Brands, and Mervyn’s Holdings, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.