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Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

U.S. Supreme Court Shows Interest In Deciding Whether The Hypothetical Test Or The Actual Test Should Be Used To Determine If IP Licenses Can Be Assumed In Bankruptcy

It looks like the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least two of the Justices, is interested in deciding whether the "hypothetical test" or the "actual test" should be used in determining whether an intellectual property license can be assumed by a debtor in possession under Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That was the clear message from the somewhat unusual statement by Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Breyer joined, issued on March 23, 2009, in connection with the Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari in the N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. case. You can read a copy of the entire statement by following the link in the prior sentence.

The N.C.P. Marketing Case. As a refresher, in 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here, here, and here to read earlier posts on the case. Last May, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment "for the reasons provided by that court" in an order designed as "not for publication."

Assumption And Assignment. A key basis for the District Court’s decision in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case was the way the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 365(c)(1), specifically on the question of whether a debtor in possession can assume an intellectual property license. In bankruptcy parlance, assumption means that the debtor gets to keep the license. Usually, debtors are allowed to exercise their business judgment when deciding whether to assume or reject (read: breach and stop performing) an executory contract, as well as to assume and assign one to a third party. However, Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code puts a limit on a debtor’s ability to assign executory contracts, and perhaps even to assume them, when "applicable law" gives the non-debtor party to the contract the right to refuse to deal with someone else. In the N.C.P. Marketing Group decision, the District Court held that federal trademark law under the Lanham Act was such "applicable law" and rendered non-exclusive trademark licenses nonassignable.

The Key Bankruptcy Code Section. Section 365(c)(1) is so important to this debate that it bears careful review. Here’s what it says:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

Hypothetical Versus Actual Test. If a debtor cannot assign an IP license without consent of the licensor, can it at least assume the license? That question has led courts to examine ever so closely the first seven words of Section 365(c): "The trustee may not assume or assign…"

  • When the statute says that the trustee may not assume or assign an IP license, does the word "or" really mean "and" too?
  • Put differently, what happens when a debtor is only trying to assume (keep) an IP license and is not actually trying to assign it? Does the Bankruptcy Code language mean that it can neither assume nor assign the license or does it only mean that the debtor cannot assign the license?
  • That, in a nutshell, is the difference between the so-called "hypothetical test" (which reads Section 365(c)(1)’s language as asking whether the debtor hypothetically could assign the license even if it’s only proposing to assume it) and the "actual test" (which interprets the statute’s language as asking only what the debtor is actually proposing to do).
  • The U.S. Courts of Appeals for at least three circuits have adopted the hypothetical test. The Ninth Circuit (covering California, Nevada, Arizona, and a number of other Western states), the Third Circuit (which includes Delaware, the venue of many Chapter 11 cases), and the Fourth Circuit (covering Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and North and South Carolina), have held that Section 365(c)(1) gives most IP licensors a veto right over proposals by a Chapter 11 debtor to assign — and even to assume — IP licenses.
  • For a more complete discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post, entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?"

Justice Kennedy’s Statement. N.C.P. Marketing Group petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the decision denying it the ability to assume the trademark license. Although also voting to deny review, Justice Kennedy issued a three-page statement on that decision to express his view, joined in by Justice Breyer, that the Supreme Court should considering granting certiorari in a future case on the "significant question" of whether the hypothetical test or the actual test should be applied in interpreting Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Kennedy summed up his analysis this way:

The division in the courts over the meaning of §365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable case for our resolution of the conflict. Addressing the issue here might first require us to resolve issues that may turn on the correct interpretation of antecedent questions under state law and trademark-protection principles. For those and other reasons, I reluctantly agree with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. In a different case the Court should consider granting certiorari on this significant question.

Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the two tests suggests that he (and perhaps Justice Breyer) may be leaning toward the actual test. Although noting that the actual test "may present problems of its own," including that it aligns Section 365 "with sound bankruptcy policy only at the cost of departing from at least one interpretation of the plain text of the law," Justice Kennedy aimed most of his criticism in the statement at the hypothetical test.

  • Specifically, Justice Kennedy commented that one "arguable criticism of the hypothetical approach is that it purchases fidelity to the Bankruptcy Code’s text by sacrificing sound bankruptcy policy." He stated that the hypothetical test "may prevent debtors-in-possession from continuing to exercise their rights under nonassignable contracts, such as patent and copyright licenses." Continuing, he noted that without these licenses, "some debtors-in-possession may be unable to effect the successful reorganization that Chapter 11 was designed to promote."
  • He also remarked on what he perceived as a "windfall" to nondebtor parties to valuable executory contracts. While outside of bankruptcy the nondebtor cannot renege on its agreement, if the debtor files bankruptcy "then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim–and resell at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate–the rights it sold to the debtor." Although most non-exclusive licenses are not treated as a sale of intellectual property, Justice Kennedy appears to view the potential loss of IP license rights due to a bankruptcy filing as an unfair result.

Conclusion. In denying review in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case, the Supreme Court has let stand the decision of the courts below that, where the hypothetical test applies as it does in the Ninth Circuit, a non-exclusive trademark license cannot be assumed by a debtor in possession. However, given the detailed statement issued by Justice Kennedy, and joined in by Justice Breyer, it appears that the chances of the Supreme Court granting certiorari in a future IP license assumption case have increased. If such a case reaches the Supreme Court, the current split in the circuits on this important intersection between bankruptcy and intellectual property law may finally be resolved.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

If Madoff Investors Are Sued By The SIPA Trustee And Pay Money Back, Can They File Proofs Of Claim After The Bar Date?

Recently, I posted about SIPA liquidations of brokerage firms, prompted by the Securities Investor Protection Act (known as SIPA) liquidations of Lehman Brothers, Inc. and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. An interesting issue has come up in the Madoff case involving investors who redeemed their accounts before the Madoff bankruptcy was filed. In other alleged Ponzi scheme cases, trustees have sued such investors asserting fraudulent transfer or other claims. The investors in turn often raise defenses, including that they redeemed their accounts in good faith and without any knowledge of the alleged fraud, and lengthy and complex litigation usually results.

Resolution of such litigation can come long after the deadline set for filing proofs of claim (known as a "bar date"). This raises a question: if investors end up paying money back to the estate as a result of the trustee’s litigation, will they be able to file proofs of claim — after the bar date — for the amounts they have to return? Before turning to that question, let’s take a look at how such post-bar date claims are dealt with in non-SIPA bankruptcy cases.

Section 502(h) Of The Bankruptcy Code. Under the Bankruptcy Code, if a person or entity is sued by the bankruptcy estate (usually by a trustee, the debtor in possession, or a creditors’ committee) for receipt of an alleged preference or fraudulent transfer, they will be able to file a proof of claim if they end up paying money back to the bankruptcy estate in settlement or as a result of a judgment. Bankruptcy Code section 502(h) expressly covers this situation:

(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

Section 502(h) recognizes that resolution of avoidance actions may come long after the original bar date for filing proofs of claim has past and allows holders of these later-arising claims to share in the estate along with other creditors. The Bankruptcy Code treats these claims as having arisen at the time of the payment back to the bankruptcy estate and allows proofs of claim to be filed months or even years after the bar date. 

The Claims Bar Date In SIPA Liquidations. In a SIPA liquidation, there are generally two claims bar dates. The first bar date set is for customer claims, in which customers of the failed brokerage firm seek to recover the securities in their accounts (or more likely in the Madoff case, the securities that were supposed to have been in their accounts). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation insurance of up to $500,000 applies to customer claims. A second bar date, usually a few months later, is for general claims. General creditors may include customers with claims in excess of the $500,000 SIPC protection or those who have more traditional trade creditor or other claims. 

The Madoff Case. In the Madoff case, last month several investors filed a motion seeking to have the bar date order clarified with regard to their potential claims in the event that the Madoff trustee later sued them and they were forced to return funds under a fraudulent transfer or other avoidance (sometimes called a  "clawback") cause of action after the general claims bar date.

  • These investors had previously redeemed some or all of their investments, and were seeking an order holding that claims arising from avoidance actions could be filed within 30 days after the judgment giving rise to the claim became final, a provision common in non-SIPA bankruptcy bar date orders due to Bankruptcy Code section 502(h).
  • The moving parties were concerned that without this clarification, any such claims they filed after the bar date might be held to be barred. On the other hand, if they were forced to file a protective claim before the bar date, they would submit to the court’s equitable jurisdiction and may be held to have waived their right to a jury trial in any avoidance action brought against them.
  • The Madoff trustee filed an opposition to the motion (copy available at the prior link) arguing, among other things, that these investors were not creditors, had not been sued, and as a result did not present an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication. In addition, the trustee argued that Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was inapplicable, contending that it was inconsistent with an absolute bar date provision under SIPA. (The SIPA statute provides that Bankruptcy Code provisions are generally applicable in SIPA cases to the extent consistent with SIPA.)
  • The SIPC also filed a response to the motion (copy available at the prior link) making arguments similar to those advanced by the trustee. In particular, the SIPC argued that Section 502(h) was inconsistent with what the SIPC called SIPA’s "immutable" bar date.

The Court’s Decision. In a five-page decision issued on February 24, 2009, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Burton R. Lifland denied the motion, first holding that the Court did not have the discretion to extend the bar dates involved. (A copy of the decision is available by clicking on the link in the prior sentence.) The Court then stated that the motion essentially sought a determination of whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable in SIPA liquidations. Because no avoidance action had yet been filed, the Court held that the requested relief, if granted, would amount to an improper advisory opinion.

  • As a result, the Court refused to decide whether Bankruptcy Code Section 502(h) applies in SIPA cases, commenting as follows: "Although section 78fff(b) of SIPA specifies that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code shall apply in SIPA liquidation proceedings, to the extent that they are consistent with SIPA, it is unclear whether section 502(h) of the Code would apply. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1981)."
  • The Court concluded by noting that the investors could file a protective proof of claim before the general claims bar date, although that would subject them to the Court’s equitable jurisdiction.

An Open Question. Although the Court denied the motion, it left open the ultimate issue involved — whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code applies in SIPA liquidations and permits parties to file proofs of claim after the bar date if they are sued by a trustee and later have to return funds or other property. With the issue undecided for now, some investors may choose to file a protective proof of claim before the bar date passes.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

New Article Looks At BAPCPA’s Impact On Retailers In Chapter 11

My colleagues Lawrence C. Gottlieb, Michael Klein, and Ronald R. Sussman recently authored an article entitled "BAPCPA’s Effects on Retail Chapter 11s Are Profound," in the February 2009 edition of the The Journal of Corporate Renewal, published by the Turnaround Management Association. You can access a copy of the article by clicking on its title in the prior sentence.

What’s their assessment of the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA) on retailer Chapter 11 bankruptcies? Here’s an excerpt:

BAPCPA’s numerous creditor-friendly amendments and modifications have profoundly impacted the Chapter 11 process, to the point that it is nearly impossible for retailers to reorganize, regardless of the prevailing national and international economic conditions.

Time and again in the three years since its enactment, BAPCPA has significantly impaired the ability of retailers to obtain the necessary post-petition financing and breathing room from creditors to test and implement a reorganization strategy, regardless of the debtor’s capital structure, the fluctuating state of the credit markets, or the extent to which they compete with large discount retailers like WalMart or online retailers like Amazon.

The article details several of the critical changes BAPCPA made, their effect on retailers, and how the timing of a bankruptcy filing is often critical for a retailer to have any chance of trying for a going concern sale to avoid complete liquidation through going out of business sales.

The Cooley Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, which Lawrence Gottlieb chairs, is representing official committees of unsecured creditors in many high-profile national and regional retail bankruptcies, including Steve & Barry’s, The Bombay Company, Hancock Fabrics, Lillian Vernon, The Sharper Image, Mervyns, Shoe Pavilion, Boscov’s and Goody’s. The article, drawn from these recent experiences, is important reading for retailers, creditors, and insolvency professionals alike.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Free Online Bankruptcy Research Tool Now Updated

Last year I posted about the research binder that Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California makes available to bankruptcy professionals and the public. Well, Chief Judge Newsome has now updated his binder as of February 5, 2009, covering cases through Volume 395 of Bankruptcy Reports. Follow the links in this sentence to access the entire binder in PDF format and the HTML version organized by topic. The PDF version is capable of being searched using a key word or phrase.

The primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law given that Chief Judge Newsome presides in the Northern District of California, but some out-of-circuit law is also included. The disclaimer Chief Judge Newsome includes puts the binder’s use in context:

The following list of cases and supplemental information is presented for informational and educational purposes only. Though it represents the aggregation of 19 years of research, the Court makes no claims as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases set forth may very well have been superseded, reversed, or otherwise may no longer be good law. The Court has posted it with the intention to educate and assist those who may find it helpful. Accordingly, users should consider it a first, but by no means final, research tool, and should cite check all cases listed herein for continued viability prior to relying on such cases in practice.

With those comments in mind, the binder can be a very helpful place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

Business Bankruptcy Issues

The SIPC And SIPA Liquidations: When A Brokerage Firm Goes Bankrupt

It’s an organization that can go for years without ever making the news. Then along comes a financial crisis — and Lehman Brothers and Madoff — and suddenly the SIPC finds itself at the center of some very big stories. This post takes a look at the SIPC, its role in broker-dealer liquidations, how a SIPA liquidation differs from Chapter 7 liquidation, and how it affects businesses and individuals with accounts at a failed brokerage firm.

What Is The SIPC? SIPC stands for the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. This federally-created nonprofit corporation describes its mission as follows:

When a brokerage firm is closed due to bankruptcy or other financial difficulties and customer assets are missing, SIPC steps in as quickly as possible and, within certain limits, works to return customers’ cash, stock and other securities. Without SIPC, investors at financially troubled brokerage firms might lose their securities or money forever or wait for years while their assets are tied up in court.

The SIPC and its activities are governed by the Securities Investor Protection Act, known as SIPA, which was enacted in 1970. The SIPA is not in Title 11 of the United States Code where the Bankruptcy Code is found, but in Title 15, together with other securities laws. That said, the SIPA incorporates many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

When Does The SIPC Get Involved? When a SIPC-member brokerage fails, the SIPC has the authority to step in. If the brokerage has filed a bankruptcy — and notwithstanding the automatic stay — the SIPC can file a lawsuit in the district court seeking a protective decree. Once granted, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding is put on hold and the case becomes a SIPA liquidation instead.  Here’s how the SIPC explains its role:

The [SIPC] either acts as trustee or works with an independent court-appointed trustee in a missing asset case to recover funds. The statute that created SIPC provides that customers of a failed brokerage firm receive all non-negotiable securities that are already registered in their names or in the process of being registered. All other so-called "street name" securities are distributed on a pro rata basis. At the same time, funds from the SIPC reserve are available to satisfy the remaining claims of each customer up to a maximum of $500,000. This figure includes a maximum of $100,000 on claims for cash. Recovered funds are used to pay investors whose claims exceed SIPC’s protection limit of $500,000. SIPC often draws down its reserve to aid investors.  

As this explanation notes, there is a $500,000 per customer limit to SIPC protection, including a $100,000 limit on claims for cash held in an account. These apply to both businesses and individuals. Some brokerage firms also have private insurance in addition to the SIPC protection.

How Is A SIPA Liquidation Different From A Chapter 7 Bankruptcy? Although Chapter 7 bankruptcy and SIPA liquidations both involve the liquidation of a brokerage firm, there is an enormous difference in terms of what happens to each customer’s securities.

In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a brokerage firm, the bankruptcy trustee is required to liquidate — that means sell — all of the securities held in "street name" by the failed brokerage. Section 748 of the Bankruptcy Code, part of Chapter 7’s special stockbroker liquidation provisions, spells it out:

As soon as practicable after the date of the order for relief, the trustee shall reduce to money, consistent with good market practice, all securities held as property of the estate, except for customer name securities delivered or reclaimed under section 751 of this title.

Subject to certain exceptions, in Chapter 7 customers receive a pro rata share of the proceeds from the sale of the securities, not the securities themselves. The only securities that are not sold are "customer name securities," which are handed back to their owners. (More on the difference between street name and customer name securities below.)

In a SIPA liquidation, the trustee’s goal is exactly the opposite. Instead of being required to sell the securities, a SIPA trustee works to return to customers the securities in their accounts, often through a transfer of the accounts to a financially healthy brokerage firm.  When that isn’t possible, the SIPA trustee has the authority to purchase securities to replace any that were missing, tapping into the SIPC’s reserve fund when necessary to cover the acquisition costs. If securities are missing or the SIPA trustee is otherwise unable to return a customer’s "street name" securities, then the brokerage’s firms remaining customer assets are divided up and funds distributed on a pro rata basis based on the total size of "net equity claims" of customers (generally, net of any margin loans owed by the customer). As in a Chapter 7, "customer name securities" are returned to the customer, including those in the process of being registered in the customer’s name.

Customers generally prefer SIPA liquidations over Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (Stockbrokers and commodity brokers are not permitted to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.) Most SIPC member brokerages that file bankruptcy end up either in a SIPA liquidation or with the SIPC directly involved.

What Are Customer Name Securities? As an aside, there is a big distinction between street name and customer name securities.

  • As the term implies, customer name securities are a typically limited group of securities held by a brokerage firm that are literally registered with the issuer in the customer’s name, such as an actual stock certificate registered in and bearing the customer’s own name.
  • These days most securities are registered in "street name," with the actual legal owner being Cede & Co., the Depository Trust Corporation’s nominee name.
  • Each brokerage has its own DTC participant account holding the securities for all of its customers, and the brokerage in turn keeps records of which customer owns which securities in the DTC account.
  • Street name securities are far easier to trade than customer name securities because the trade can be accomplished via DTC instead of having to make a physical transfer of a stock certificate.

The Customer Claim Bar Date. In both a Chapter 7 and a SIPA liquidation, a deadline, known as a bar date, will be established by which creditors claims must be filed. However, in a SIPA liquidation a separate "customer claim" bar date is also set. Customers seeking SIPC protection must file their claims by that date using a special customer claim form, which asks for details on the securities in the customer’s account, dates of trades, and other information. Follow the link for an example of the SIPC claim form used in the Lehman Brothers SIPA liquidation. If the customer’s account has not already been transferred to a solvent brokerage firm, a customer with an allowed claim will receive back the securities that were held in their account at the failed brokerage firm, together with any cash held, up to the SIPC protection limits.

Where To Learn More About SIPA Liquidations. For additional information on SIPA liquidations and their Chapter 7 counterparts, you may find this discussion on the U.S. Court system’s website of interest. In addition, SIPA trustees appointed in brokerage cases frequently establish a case-specific website. These links will take you to the websites created by the Lehman Brothers SIPA trustee and the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities SIPA trustee.

Conclusion. They may not be common, and the SIPC does not provide the same type of protection as the FDIC, but SIPA liquidations can play an important role in protecting investors when brokerage firms fail. However, the SIPC is generally able to intervene only when one of its member firms fails, making that little-noticed "Member SIPC" designation more significant that most investors realize. 

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Amendments To The Federal Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect December 1, 2008

Nearly every year, changes are made to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure — the ones that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — to address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. This year’s amendments to the national bankruptcy rules take effect on December 1, 2008. 

Business Bankruptcy Rule Changes. Unlike the more substantive modifications made last year (discussed here), this year’s amendments make a host of relatively smaller, but still important, changes. The most notable ones for business bankruptcy cases involve privacy concerns. New rules have been put in place to protect patients when health care businesses file for bankruptcy while others govern the proposed sale or transfer of personally identifiable information by any type of business. Separate rule changes implement provisions of Chapter 15 (the Bankruptcy Code’s cross-border and international insolvency chapter), address a range of issues in small business Chapter 11 cases, grant courts more flexibility in giving notice to foreign creditors, introduce various consumer bankruptcy procedural changes, and establish a process to allow some bankruptcy court decisions to be appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Interim Bankruptcy Rules Being Replaced. These rules also replace the interim bankruptcy rules that have been in place for the past few years following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). Some bankruptcy courts, such as the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, have already issued general orders retracting the effectiveness of the interim rules effective as of December 1, 2008.

Rules Of The Road. At a time when the financial crisis is likely to push more and more companies into Chapter 11, bankruptcy attorneys and other insolvency professionals will want to review the rule changes closely to make sure they are following the most current version of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. For debtors, creditors, and other parties, this year’s rule amendments should help make management of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases more consistent with BAPCPA’s changes and, potentially, a more efficient process.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

Fall 2008 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

The Fall 2008 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Claims and defenses under the WARN Act;
  • The Supreme Court’s decision on transfer taxes and bankruptcy sales;
  • Section 363 "free and clear" sales in bankruptcy; and
  • The interplay between claim objections and the Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" administrative claim.

This edition also has information on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn’s, Boscov’s, Hancock Fabrics, Steve & Barry’s, Goody’s, Sharper Image, The Bombay Company, and Shoe Pavilion, among others. In addition, a note from my partner Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how the current economic problems will require lenders, unsecured creditors, and others to consider the impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy on their rights.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.