The Financially Troubled Company

Showing: 22 - 28 of 55 Articles

Real Estate Workouts: Are Pre-Bankruptcy Waivers Of The Automatic Stay Enforceable?

This post examines a new decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida involving the enforceability of a pre-bankruptcy waiver of the automatic stay. Let’s first set the stage by taking a look at a not so uncommon fact pattern involving a real estate project in financial trouble.

The Real Estate Workout: Forbearance With A Price. The owner of a troubled real estate development is about to default on a loan secured by the real property. On the eve of foreclosure, the lender agrees to forbear from foreclosing for two months to give the developer time to refinance and save the project.  However, in exchange the lender insists that the developer agree that, in the event of bankruptcy, the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. The developer agrees and the forbearance agreement is executed.

The Bankruptcy Aftermath. Unfortunately, the hoped-for financing falls through and the developer files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the project just before the rescheduled foreclosure sale. The lender quickly files a motion for relief from stay, asking the bankruptcy court to enforce the pre-bankruptcy relief from stay waiver included in the forbearance agreement. The motion is opposed by the developer, now a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, as well as the official committee of unsecured creditors and junior lienholders.

Is The Waiver Of The Automatic Stay Enforceable? This was the question answered by Bankruptcy Judge John K. Olson in an 18-page decision, issued on February 12, 2008, in the In re Bryan Road, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The facts were essentially as described above, but a few additional details help put the issue in context.

  • The real estate project involved a 210 unit "dry stack" boat storage facility in Dania Beach, Florida.
  • The lender, which commenced a judicial foreclosure proceeding against the 191 units still owned by the debtor, had been awarded final judgment setting a foreclosure sale.
  • On the morning of the foreclosure sale, the debtor and the lender entered into a forbearance agreement that was approved by the court in the foreclosure proceeding. The forbearance agreement provided for a two-month continuance of the foreclosure sale in exchange for the debtor’s agreement that the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose in the event of a bankruptcy.
  • The day before the continued foreclosure sale was to take place, the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Analysis. In his decision on the lender’s stay relief motion, Judge Olson first noted that prepetition waivers of the stay will be given "no particular effect as part of initial loan documents" but the "greatest effect if entered into during the course of prior (and subsequently aborted) chapter 11 proceedings." After concluding that a confirmed chapter 11 plan was not required, the Bankruptcy Court looked to four non-exclusive factors, drawn from In re Desai, 282 B.R. 527 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002), in considering whether stay relief should be granted based on the prepetition waiver:

(1) the sophistication of the party making the waiver; (2) the consideration for the waiver, including the creditor’s risk and the length of time the waiver covers; (3) whether other parties are affected including unsecured creditors and junior lienholders; and (4) the feasibility of the debtor’s plan.

As to the first two factors, the Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor’s counsel was very sophisticated and, although the forbearance period was short, it was sufficient consideration. On the third and fourth factors, the Bankruptcy Court first noted the existence of junior lienholders and approximately $1 million of disputed unsecured claims. However, the Bankruptcy Court then engaged in a detailed analysis leading to the conclusion that the debtor’s plan simply was not feasible. As such, there likely was no value for unsecured creditors in the boat storage project beyond the secured debt and the junior lienholders could protect their own interests under state law. Putting these factors together, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the forbearance agreement — including the waiver of the automatic stay — should be enforced and the stay was lifted.

A Few Key Take-Aways. With economic conditions continuing to strain a variety of real estate developments, workouts in the shadow of foreclosure may become more common. The In re Bryan Road, LLC decision highlights that in the right case a bankruptcy court may be willing to enforce prepetition stay relief agreements if a bankruptcy is later filed.

  • This is particularly true when the debtor is a single asset real estate entity, it signs an agreement on the eve of foreclosure, and it has few unsecured creditors. In fact, the more the bankruptcy appears to be just a two-party dispute between the debtor and lender, the more likely the prepetition automatic stay waiver will be enforced.
  • On the other hand, when a troubled real estate project has a real chance of reorganizing, and substantial unsecured creditor claims are involved, these agreements more likely will be rejected in favor of traditional relief from stay analysis under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion. Prepetition stay relief agreements involve complex issues. As with most bankruptcy questions, real estate owners and lenders should get advice from bankruptcy counsel on their specific situation when considering whether to include such a waiver of the automatic stay in any forbearance agreement.

Licensing Intellectual Property From An Israeli Company: What Happens If There’s A Bankruptcy?

Many technology companies are based in Israel and license intellectual property to companies in the United States and around the world. This raises an interesting question: what happens if the Israeli company, as licensor, goes into bankruptcy or liquidation in Israel? The latest edition of Cross Border Commentary, a publication by the International Business Practice of my firm, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, has just addressed that very question.

The U.S. Law Answer.  Before turning to Israeli law, let’s look at how this issue plays out under the United States Bankruptcy Code. A licensor in bankruptcy or its bankruptcy trustee has the option of assuming (keeping) or rejecting (breaching) a license. Generally, a debtor licensor can assume a license if it meets the same tests (cures defaults and provides adequate assurance of future performance) required to assume other executory contracts.  Many licensees will not have a problem with assumption of their license as long as the debtor can actually continue to perform. Instead, the real concern for licensees is the fear of losing their rights to the licensed IP, which often can be mission critical technology, if the license is rejected.

  • Special protections. Recognizing this concern, the United States Bankruptcy Code, in Section 365(n), provides licensees with special protections.  If the debtor or trustee rejects a license, under Section 365(n) a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed intellectual property, including even a right to enforce an exclusivity provision. In return, the licensee must continue to make any required royalty payments. The licensee also can retain rights under any agreement supplementary to the license, which includes source code or other forms of technology escrow agreements.  Taken together, these provisions protect a licensee from being stripped of its rights to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.
  • Watch out for trademarks. While many people would expect intellectual property to include trademarks, the Bankruptcy Code has its own limited definition of "intellectual property." The bankruptcy definition includes trade secrets, patents and patent applications, copyrights, and mask works.  Importantly, however, it does not include trademarks. This distinction means that trademark licensees enjoy none of Section 365(n)’s special protections and those licensees are at risk of losing their trademark rights in a bankruptcy. 

For more on these subjects, you may find these earlier posts, "Intellectual Property Licenses: What Happens In Bankruptcy?" and "Trademark Licensor In Bankruptcy: Special Risk For Licensees" of interest.

The Israeli Perspective. An article in Cooley’s Cross Border Commentary, prepared by Einat Meisel of the Israeli law firm of Gross, Kleinhendler, Hodak, Berkman and Co., discusses a Tel-Aviv District Court decision involving these issues. When an Israeli company known as Commodio Ltd. entered liquidation, two of its intellectual property licensees sought to retain rights under their license agreements with Commodio. In ruling on the effort, the Israeli court made several important holdings:

  • The licensees could continue to use the IP as long as they made required any royalty payments and complied with the terms of use in the agreements, with payments to be made to the liquidator.
  • The licensees could gain access to the underlying source code behind the object code covered by their licenses provided this did not impose substantial expense on the company in liquidation.
  • No transfer of ownership in the IP could occur due to the liquidation, as this would be contrary to Israeli bankruptcy law.
  • A right of first refusal covering certain of the intellectual property would be enforceable in the bankruptcy.

Comparison To A U.S. Bankruptcy. With a few key differences, the outcome in the Commodio case is similar to the treatment under U.S. law. Under Section 365(n)’s provisions, licensees would have the ability to retain their rights to the IP, with any royalty payments being made to the bankruptcy estate. If an agreement contained a source code license, the licensees could also access the source code under Section 365(n). However, absent a license grant to the source code, the outcome would likely be different in a U.S. bankruptcy.  Provisions purporting to transfer ownership of the IP upon a bankruptcy or liquidation would not be enforceable in a U.S. bankruptcy. Finally, the right of first refusal enforced in the Israeli case might not be enforced in a U.S. bankruptcy if the agreement were rejected but could if the license were assumed. 

Get Advice. Licensing intellectual property from a foreign corporation raises a number of issues, including what happens if the foreign licensor goes bankrupt or becomes insolvent. Potential licensees should be sure to get expert advice on the applicable foreign law, including the implications of bankruptcy, when licensing IP from a foreign company. Although licensees from Israeli companies can find some comfort in the Commodio decision, it remains important to get advice on Israeli law specific to your situation. 

How Venture Capitalists View An Economic Downturn

Recent posts from two thought-leading venture capitalists give insights into how VCs approach the impact of a possible recession. The first is from Will Price, a managing director at venture capital firm Hummer Winblad. In his post, titled "Downturn – Now What?" (hat tip: Ask The VC blog), Will offers some very interesting observations, including this one:

If I take the last downturn as my guide, I can say with confidence that venture investors would be well suited to continue to invest right through the downturn – in 2002 and 2003 terrific companies were formed and funded at very reasonable valuations and with business models that reflected the demand for capital efficiency and economic viability.

The second post comes from Jason Mendelson who, together with fellow Foundry Group managing director Brad Feld, publish the Ask The VC blog. This new post, titled "What Is The Effect Of The ‘Pending’ Recession On Venture Capital Financings Of Private Companies?," examines similar issues. Jason makes a number of thoughtful comments, including:

Now how does this all affect VC financings?  Well, history would tell us that VCs will put less money into funding companies, converse cash and wait until the acquisition and public markets open up a bit.  With a lack of good exits, why would a VC want to invest in a company?  However, that’s never made much sense to me, especially if we limit investments to early-staged companies.  I’ve always thought the best time to invest in young startups is when things are choppy.  You usually can invest at lower prices, hire folks for less than you normally would, etc.  Also, I’d never expect an investment to exit in the near future (1-3 years, for sure) and therefore the company will be well positioned to exit at the end of the recession.  If you wait until the recession is over, you are already paying too much.

For anyone interested in how a recession could impact venture-backed companies, including insolvency professionals who work with the ones that fail, these new posts from two leading venture capitalists make for very informative reading.

When Startups Shut Down: A Venture Capitalist Reflects On Why Early Stage Businesses Fail

Fred Wilson, a managing director at New York-based venture capital firm Union Square Ventures, has an insightful post entitled "Why Early Stage Venture Investments Fail." It’s a rare opportunity to get a venture capital investor’s perspective on the reasons startup companies go bust. Fred cites two main reasons:

1) It was a dumb idea and we realized it early on and killed the investment. I’ve only been involved in one investment in this category personally although I’ve lived through a bunch like this over the years in the partnerships I’ve been in.
2) It was a decent idea but directionally incorrect, it was hugely overfunded, the burn rate was taken to levels way beyond reason, and it became impossible to adapt the business in a financially viable manner.

He notes that it’s the second reason — a failure to adapt the business in a way that makes financial sense — that predominates. Fred highlights the danger caused by allowing companies to run with high burn rates, something my own experience teaches is a common affliction of distressed companies, particularly those in the early, developmental stages before they have substantial revenues to offset the burn.

This post followed another in which Fred discussed his overall early stage failure rate. Both make for interesting reading for anyone looking to understand why businesses fail — and how to help them succeed.

(Hat tip to Erick Schonfeld for his post on the subject at TechCrunch.)

The Bull Rips A Hole In The Matador’s Cape: New Ninth Circuit Decision Limits Reach Of Section 502(b)(6)’s Landlord Cap

A commercial real estate lease often represents the largest single liability of many debtors. For retailers, which typically have scores or even hundreds of store leases, the liability involved is orders of magnitude larger. It’s fair to say that the management of lease obligations can be of enormous consequence to debtors, landlords, and other creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

Rejected Leases And The Capped Claim. As explained in an earlier post on how commercial real estate leases are treated in bankruptcy, one of a debtor’s options in a Chapter 11 case is to reject uneconomic or otherwise burdensome leases, terminating the debtor’s obligation to pay rent and turning the landlord’s claim for termination of the lease into a prepetition claim. Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code goes further and caps the landlord’s prepetition rejection claim at an amount equal to the greater of (1) one year’s rent or (2) fifteen percent of the remaining lease term, up to a maximum of three years’ worth of rent. The starting date for calculating the claim is the earlier of the date when the bankruptcy petition was filed or when the landlord recovered possession of, or the tenant surrendered, the premises. A landlord with six years left on a rejected lease, for example, would have its claim capped at one year’s worth of rent.

What’s Covered By The Cap? This ability to cap a landlord’s claim in bankruptcy can be a major benefit to debtor tenants. Ever since a 1995 decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit in In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), debtors have been successful in many cases in capping a variety of claims by landlords. In McSheridan, the BAP held that the cap applied to all damages for the lessee’s nonperformance of the lease, not just to claims based on future rent. Landlords have challenged that analysis but, at least in the Ninth Circuit, have had little success — until this week.

The Ninth Circuit’s El Toro Decision. In an eight-page opinion (available here) issued on October 1, 2007 in the In re El Toro Materials Company, Inc. Chapter 11 case,, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a very different view of the landlord cap under Section 502(b)(6). In the El Toro case, the debtor was a mining company that leased property from the Saddleback Community Church, paying $28,000 per month in rent. After the lease was rejected, Saddleback brought an adversary proceeding against El Toro for $23 million in damages alleging that El Toro left a million tons of wet clay "goo," mining equipment, and other materials on the property.

  • The bankruptcy court held that Saddleback’s claim, which asserted waste, nuisance, and other tort theories, would not be limited by the Section 502(b)(6) cap. 
  • Following its McSheridan precedent, the BAP reversed and held that any damages would be subject to the cap. 
  • Interestingly, two of the three judges on the BAP panel filed concurring opinions, voicing doubts about the wisdom of the McSheridan case. A copy of the BAP’s unpublished El Toro decision from July 2005 is available here.

Judge Kozinski’s Analysis. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP’s decision, holding that the cap did not apply to the landlord’s tort claims. Judge Alex Kozinski authored the opinion and analyzed the key issues this way:

The structure of the cap—measured as a fraction of the remaining term—suggests that damages other than those based on a loss of future rental income are not subject to the cap. It makes sense to cap damages for lost rental income based on the amount of expected rent: Landlords may have the ability to mitigate their damages by re-leasing or selling the premises, but will suffer injury in proportion to the value of their lost rent in the meantime. In contrast, collateral damages are likely to bear only a weak correlation to the amount of rent: A tenant may cause a lot of damage to a premises leased cheaply, or cause little damage to premises underlying an expensive leasehold.

One major purpose of bankruptcy law is to allow creditors to receive an aliquot share of the estate to settle their debts. Metering these collateral damages by the amount of the rent would be inconsistent with the goal of providing compensation to each creditor in proportion with what it is owed. Landlords in future cases may have significant claims for both lost rental income and for breach of other provisions of the lease. To limit their recovery for collateral damages only to a portion of their lost rent would leave landlords in a materially worse position than other creditors. In contrast, capping rent claims but allowing uncapped claims for collateral damage to the rented premises will follow congressional intent by preventing a potentially overwhelming claim for lost rent from draining the estate, while putting landlords on equal footing with other creditors for their collateral claims.

The statutory language supports this interpretation. The cap applies to damages “resulting from” the rejection of the lease. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Saddleback’s claims for waste, nuisance and trespass do not result from the rejection of the lease—they result from the pile of dirt allegedly left on the property. Rejection of the lease may or may not have triggered Saddleback’s ability to sue for the alleged damages.But the harm to Saddleback’s property existed whether or not the lease was rejected. A simple test reveals whether the damages result from the rejection of the lease: Assuming all other conditions remain constant, would the landlord have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant were to assume the lease rather than rejecting it? Here, Saddleback would still have the same claim it brings today had El Toro accepted the lease and committed to finish its term: The pile of dirt would still be allegedly trespassing on Saddleback’s land and Saddleback still would have the same basis for its theories of nuisance, waste and breach of contract. The million-ton heap of dirt was not put there by the rejection of the lease—it was put there by the actions and inactions of El Toro in preparing to turn over the site.

(Footnotes omitted.)

McSheridan Holding Overruled. The Ninth Circuit opinion noted the two concurrences from the BAP decision questioning McSheridan and suggested that the BAP consider adopting an en banc procedure to reconsider such doubtful precedents. Given the Ninth Circuit’s holding, it will come as no surprise that the Court of Appeals also explicitly overruled McSheridan:

To the extent that McSheridan holds section 502(b)(6) to be a limit on tort claims other than those based on lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete a lease term, it is overruled.

The Ninth Circuit noted that McSheridan also holds that "damages flowing from the failure of a party that has rejected a lease to perform future routine repairs or pay utility bills are capped," but declined to address — or overrule — that holding.

Post-El Toro Ramifications.  At least in the Ninth Circuit, with McSheridan overruled landlords will work hard to characterize their damage claims as arising from tort theories or otherwise not being based on "lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete the lease term." At the negotiation stage, when the market permits landlords may demand larger security deposits and letters of credit on the view that the Section 502(b)(6) cap no longer limits every type of damage recoverable against such security. They may also structure leases to separate claims for items such as clean-up costs, hazardous waste removal, property damage, and even tenant improvement repayments from rent claims, in an attempt to bolster the argument that these claims fall outside of the cap.

Conclusion. Like a bull charging a matador, the El Toro decision has ripped a hole in the Section 502(b)(6) cape previously used to turn away cap-busting landlord claims. Time will tell just how significant the decision turns out to be, but at first blush it seems that debtors and non-landlord creditors may be the ones who end up seeing red. 

Ordinary Course Preference Case Takes Extraordinary Turn: Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Local Bankruptcy Rule On Jury Trials

Preference lawsuits are filed all the time in bankruptcy cases and the ordinary course of business defense is frequently asserted. Still, it’s the rare case that ends up with a federal court of appeals decision addressing jury trial rights and invalidating a bankruptcy court’s local rule. This post is about just such a case.

The Bankruptcy Preference. As a quick refresher, preferences are payments or other transfers made in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing, on account of antecedent or pre-existing debt, at a time when the debtor was insolvent, that allow the transferee (the preference defendant) to be "preferred" by recovering more than it would have had the transfer not been made and the defendant instead had simply filed a proof of claim for the amount involved. The 90-day reachback period is extended to a full year prior to the bankruptcy petition for insiders such as officers, directors, and affiliates.

Jury Trials In Bankruptcy Cases? Preference defendants who do not file proofs of claim in the main bankruptcy case have the option to demand a trial by jury in the preference lawsuit. This is a right protected by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. The parties in the lawsuit can consent to having the bankruptcy court conduct the jury trial but this doesn’t happen very often. Why would a preference defendant make a jury demand? Here are three common reasons:

  • The defendant believes a jury would be more inclined to find in its favor than a bankruptcy judge;
  • The defendant wants the case moved to federal district court from the bankruptcy court, which some defendants perceive as more debtor-friendly; and
  • Jury trials are more expensive and complex, a fact the preference defendant may hope will translate into settlement leverage.

The HealthCentral.com Case. In a recent case, Sigma Micro Corporation, a company sued for an alleged preference by debtor HealthCentral.com, made just such a jury trial demand. It then filed a motion for certification before the bankruptcy court seeking to have its case moved to the district court, in accordance with Local Rule 9015-2(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. That Local Rule, entitled "Certification to District Court," provides:

If the Bankruptcy Judge determines that [a] demand was timely made and the party has a right to a jury trial, and if all parties have not filed written consent to a jury trial before the Bankruptcy Judge, the Bankruptcy Judge shall certify to the District Court that the proceeding is to be tried by a jury and that the parties have not consented to a jury trial in the Bankruptcy Court. Upon such certification, [the jurisdictional] reference of the proceeding shall be automatically withdrawn, and the proceeding assigned to a Judge of the District . . . .

The Bankruptcy Court held that Sigma had a right to a jury trial but then stayed its order to retain jurisdiction for pre-trial matters. It later granted the debtor’s motion for summary judgment in the preference case, finding no genuine issue of material fact and rejecting Sigma’s ordinary course of business defense. On appeal, Sigma argued that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to enter summary judgment because it should have transferred the case to the District Court upon finding that Sigma was entitled to a jury trial. It also argued that it had raised genuine issues of material fact on its ordinary course of business defense, precluding summary judgment.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision. On September 21, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in the case (available here).  In addressing the jurisdiction question, the Ninth Circuit confronted "an issue of first impression in this circuit, that is, the validity of Local Rule 9015-2(b)." After reviewing the right of courts to promulgate local rules, it came to the core of the issue:

Considering these rules we hold Local Rule 9015-2(b) to be invalid as it establishes a procedure for withdrawing the district court’s jurisdictional reference inconsistent with the Acts of  Congress and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Cf. Coffey v. Marina Management Servs. (In re Kool, Mann, Coffee), 23 F.3d 66, 67-69 (3rd Cir. 1994) (finding local rule invalid because of inconsistency with Bankruptcy Code); In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 1983) (same).

The Ninth Circuit noted that 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides that a "district court" may withdraw the reference of all or a part of a case or proceeding and that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5011(a) expressly states that a "motion for withdrawal of a case or proceeding shall be heard by a district judge." Putting these two provisions together, the Court of Appeals held:

After careful review we find the procedure established by Local Rule 9105-2(b) cannot be squared with the procedure established by 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), an “Act of Congress,” and Rule 5011(a), a “Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 9029. At least two inconsistencies bear mentioning. First, Local Rule 9015-2(b) allows for the bankruptcy court to “withdraw[ ]” the jurisdictional reference, whereas 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule 5011(a) make it explicit that only a district court may “withdraw” the jurisdictional reference. See FTC v. First Alliance Mortg. Co. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 282 B.R. 894, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that “a motion [to withdrawal] is heard by the district court”) (emphasis added). Second, Local Rule 9015-2(b) permits a party to obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a “Motion for Certification,” while 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule 5011(a) make it clear that a party may only obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a “Motion for Withdrawal.” See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc., 355 B.R. 214, 218 (D. Hi. 2006) (holding that “a litigant who believes that a certain [action] or portion of a [action] pending in the bankruptcy court should be litigated in the district court may make a motion to withdraw the reference”) (emphasis added).

Having invalidated the Local Rule, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision not to adhere to it or to withdraw the reference. The Court of Appeal then considered whether the Seventh Amendment jury trial right itself required immediate transfer to the District Court, even for pre-trial proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with courts outside the circuit that, it stated, had universally agreed that a jury trial right "does not mean that the bankruptcy court must instantly give up jurisdiction and that the case must be transferred to the district court."

Concluding that the Bankruptcy Court properly retained the case for pre-trial matters, the Ninth Circuit did ultimately reverse its grant of summary judgment. It found that Sigma had raised genuine issues of material fact on its ordinary course of business defense under the version of Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code in force prior to the amendments made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.

What About Local Rules In Other Courts? It appears that the Northern District of California’s local bankruptcy rule on certification of a jury trial right and transfer to the District Court is unusual. Some bankruptcy courts, including the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, have no specific rule addressing withdrawal of the reference based on a jury demand. Others require a prompt motion for withdrawal of the reference to be filed with the District Court, as provided in Central District of California Local Bankruptcy Rule 9015-2(g)

Conclusion. Although it appears that the decision’s direct impact is limited to the Northern District of California and its jury demand procedures, this case proves that even well-established local rules will be struck down if inconsistent with governing statutes. That’s a pretty extraordinary outcome for an ordinary course of business preference case. 

The Best Of Both Worlds: Can A Secured Creditor Get A Section 503(b)(9) “20 Day Goods” Administrative Claim Too?

In a decision from August 17, 2007, just released for publication, the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) faced a previously unanswered question under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, the section enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA).  Is a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim available to secured creditors or only to unsecured creditors? You may find the BAP’s answer surprising.

A Section 503(b)(9) Refresher. For those who haven’t dealt with this relatively new section, here are the highlights. Section 503(b)(9) gives vendors an important right beyond the expanded reclamation claim also enacted as part of BAPCPA. Vendors are entitled to an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor’s business." 

  • In most cases, particularly Chapter 11 cases in which a plan of reorganization is confirmed, administrative claims are paid in full on the effective date of the plan. General unsecured claims, by contrast, often receive only cents on the dollar, and even secured creditors can be "crammed down" and forced to accept payments over a period of time. This new administrative claim is therefore a significant benefit, in effect putting vendors selling goods to a debtor in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing on par with vendors selling goods after the bankruptcy filing. It’s available even if a seller of goods fails to provide the required notice to have a post-bankruptcy reclamation claim. 
  • For a more detailed analysis of Section 503(b)(9), you may find this earlier post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy" useful, as well as a later post giving an update on a few early court decisions on the section. 
  • For more on the changes BAPCPA made to reclamation, you may want to read an earlier post entitled "Reclamation: Can A Vendor "Get The Goods" From An Insolvent Customer" and this post on some of the limitations of reclamation.

The Brown & Cole Stores Case. It was against this backdrop that the BAP analyzed the question before it in the In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC case. Brown & Cole is a privately held grocery chain operating in Washington state. Its principal supplier and wholesaler, Associated Grocers, Incorporated (AGI), is a cooperative whose largest shareholder is Brown & Cole itself. In Brown & Cole’s Chapter 11 case, AGI asserted a "20 day goods" claim of more than $6 million, and also asserted that it was a secured creditor with a pledge of AGI’s own stock owned by Brown & Cole. Brown & Cole alleged a number of claims against AGI and argued that it had a right of setoff on those claims against any "20 day goods" claim.

When AGI moved for allowance of a Section 503(b)(9) claim, Brown & Cole argued that AGI was not eligible for that administrative claim because it was a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and granted AGI’s motion. It also denied Brown & Cole’s request for a setoff of its own prepetition claims against the administrative claim, among other reasons because of what the bankruptcy court found to be Brown & Cole’s inequitable conduct in ordering goods just prior to its bankruptcy filing.

The BAP’s Decision. After hearing the appeal, the BAP issued its opinion and identified the first question presented as "Is a secured claim entitled to an administrative priority pursuant to section 503(b)(9)?" The opinion’s introduction shows that the BAP was aware of the interest creditors would have in its decision:

This case presents us with an issue of first impression regarding new section 503(b)(9) (“§  503(b)(9)”) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 2005. We expect that the issue is of great importance to many sellers of goods to troubled companies. The new provision gives expense-of-administration priority (“administrative priority”) to a claim for the value of goods received by a debtor within 20 days before the commencement of the case and sold in the ordinary course of business (“twenty-day sales”). The bankruptcy court granted administrative priority to a claim that may also be secured and denied the debtor’s claim of setoff. We AFFIRM the grant of administrative priority; we REVERSE the denial of setoff.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Secured Creditors Are Entitled To Section 503(b)(9) Claims. In reaching its holding, the BAP majority rejected Brown & Cole’s primary argument that the Court should interpret Section 503(b)(9) as applying only to unsecured claims. Brown & Cole argued that at the same time as it added Section 503(b)(9), BAPCPA amended another subsection of Section 503 dealing with tax claims, specifically Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i), to clarify that it was available to "secured or unsecured" creditors.  In contrast, Congress did not include the words "secured claim" in Section 503(b)(9). This difference, Brown & Cole argued, should lead the BAP to hold that the "20 day goods" administrative claim is not available to secured creditors. The BAP’s response was clear:

We reject that invitation. The provision is not ambiguous; as such, we must enforce it according to its terms and should not inquire beyond its plain language. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. Apart from finding no ambiguity in § 503(b)(9), we note that Congress also declined to put the word  “unsecured” into the same statute. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that all claims arising  from twenty-day sales are entitled to administrative priority.

(Footnote omitted). The BAP majority also rejected a policy argument advanced by Brown & Cole (B&C), and adopted by Judge Alan Jaroslovsky in his dissent:

We can do nothing about B&C’s contention that giving priority to a secured creditor may be inequitable to other creditors. First, it is up to Congress to decide which creditors have leverage and which do not. More importantly, if AGI’s twenty-day sales claim is fully secured, then payment of it by B&C will free the value of the security for that claim for the benefit of other  creditors. If AGI’s claim proves to be undersecured or unsecured, then to deny administrative priority would be to ignore the statute, something we cannot do.

In a footnoted response to the dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis Montali, writing for himself and Judge Randall L. Dunn, expanded on the point:

The dissent is concerned that we are ignoring bankruptcy policy that permits a Chapter 11 debtor to “cramdown” a secured claim in full over time. Congress gave tremendous leverage to a twenty-day sales claimant such as AGI by permitting it to demand full payment as of confirmation, and in doing so, perhaps dramatically affecting the outcome of the case. The fact that the claim is also secured represents less leverage (albeit more than held by non-priority general unsecured claims) than having administrative priority. It is not our place to reallocate that leverage. In any event, if the dissent’s view were the law, the holder of a twenty-day sales claim could simply waive its security, obtain administrative priority, and have equally powerful influence over the outcome of the case.

Setoff May Be Proper. The BAP (the dissent joined in this part of the majority opinion) also reversed the denial of Brown & Cole’s setoff request, holding that although prepetition unsecured claims (the kind Brown & Cole asserted against AGI) cannot generally be set off against administrative claims because of a lack of mutuality, here the administrative claim itself arose prepetition, specifically in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing. On the finding of inequitable conduct in ordering goods and receiving just prior to bankruptcy, the BAP held that there was insufficient evidence of inequitable conduct and that a "debtor contemplating reorganization is under no legal obligation to inform suppliers that it is contemplating a bankruptcy filing." The BAP reversed and remanded that issue to the bankruptcy court.

A Dissenting Voice. Judge Jaroslovsky dissented from what he described as the majority’s "overly-sterile conclusion that a fully secured creditor can also have rights under § 503(b)(9)," stating that "[n]ot only is my statutory analysis different, but I see compelling policy reasons for a different result." He found that the plain language of Section 503(b)(9) did not resolve the question of whether secured creditors could be entitled to the administrative priority in light of the change made to Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i). He then turned to the policy issues:

Moreover, some fundamental policy considerations are at stake in this case. While allowing a priority claim to a secured creditor may not have a big impact in most Chapter 7 cases, it can  make a huge difference in a Chapter 11 case like this one. If AGI’s $6 million claim is entitled to priority status, § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that it must be paid in full in cash upon confirmation. If  it is treated as a secured claim, it still must be paid in full but is subject to cramdown pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A). If we incorporate by implication the “secured or unsecured” language into § 503(b)(9), we may be in effect giving a secured creditor veto power over a plan of reorganization when § 1129(b)(2)(A) and sound bankruptcy policy dictate that a secured creditor can be forced  to accept a plan which is fair and equitable to it, honors its secured status and pays its secured claim in full over time.

I would weave the new § 503(b)(9) into the tapestry of American bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization. I prefer this result to the crazy quilt patched together by my brethren.

In his footnote to the prior paragraph, Judge Jaroslovsky stated: "Specifically, I would hold that a creditor would not be entitled to priority status for its twenty-day sales claim to the extent the claim is indubitably secured, applying any security first to claims other than the twenty-day sales claim. I note that AGI might well end up with an allowed priority twenty-day sales claim under this rule."

More Leverage For Secured Vendors. As both the majority and dissent discussed, a secured creditor who has the benefit of a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim will have considerable leverage in getting paid in full upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Most secured creditors lend money instead of supplying goods, but a number of vendors do hold collateral for their claims. Even though BAP decisions (in contrast to Court of Appeals decisions) generally are not binding precedent, other courts may find this decision persuasive. If followed widely, secured creditors entitled to assert a Section 503(b)(9) claim will have a noticeable advantage in getting paid. In addition, as the dissent noted, this decision may also make it more difficult for debtors to confirm Chapter 11 plans unless they have the cash to pay all "20 day goods" administrative claims upon their exit from bankruptcy.