Business Bankruptcy Issues

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Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

Is The Default Rate On High-Yield Debt About To Double?

According to Moody’s, the credit rating and investor service firm, the default rate on high-yield or junk bond debt is likely to increase substantially from the current level of 1.4%. Moody’s predicts that the default rate will rise to 4.1% by August 2008 and then to 5.1% by August 2009. 

  • As reported by Credit, Moody’s director of corporate default research believes that "higher spreads and diminished liquidity" have increased the default risk for distressed issuers.
  • Unless the U.S. economy falls into a recession, however, the default rate is predicted to stay below its long-term average of 5.0%, at least until 2009. Any real downturn in the economy could push the default rate higher.

The New York Times DealBook Blog has a similar story, pointing out that Moody’s predicted in another report that the U.S. industries likely to have the highest default rate are packaging, construction, consumer durables, and automotive. Also, companies that need new financing will be more at risk than firms that already obtained financing on the favorable terms available in the credit markets until recently.

As The DealBook Blog points out, a rising default rate will likely lead to an increase in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. Stay tuned. 

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Another Court Follows The Footstar Decision On Assumption Of IP Licenses In Bankruptcy

Intellectual property licenses continue to be significant to companies across a wide range of industries. This fact makes their treatment in business bankruptcy cases a topic of keen interest. 

Can A Debtor Licensee Retain IP License Rights? When the debtor in possession is a licensee under a patent, copyright, or trademark license, a key question arises: Can the license be assumed (bankruptcy-speak for kept) or will the bankruptcy filing put the licensor in a position to force rejection of the license — resulting in the ultimate termination of the debtor’s right to use the licensed IP?  A new case, discussed below, recently sided with the debtor in possession.

One Statute, Three Tests. This issue has led to a significant split of authority among bankruptcy courts and courts of appeal around the country, stemming from different interpretations of the language in Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides as follows:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

Some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have sided with the licensor and interpret Section 365(c)(1) to prohibit both assignment and assumption. Other courts, including the First Circuit, have permitted such licenses to be assumed.

  • Despite the split, most courts agree that Section 365(c)(1) prohibits assignment of executory contracts without the non-debtor contracting party’s consent if "applicable law" requires such consent because that would require the non-debtor party to accept performance from a new party. 
  • A number of courts have held that when the "applicable law" is federal patent, copyright, or trademark law, such consent is required.
  • Courts diverge, however, on whether the statute’s language should be read to prohibit a debtor in possession from assuming such executory contracts or only from assigning them.

Rather than cover that ground here, if this topic is new to you I suggest reading an earlier post entitled "Assumption Of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?" It discusses in detail how different courts have interpreted Section 365(c)(1), leading to the licensor-favorable "hypothetical test," the debtor-favorable "actual test," and the newer, debtor-favorable Footstar analysis. 

A Word On Footstar. Before moving on to the new decision, a brief word about the Footstar case may be helpful. In In re Footstar, Inc,, 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), Judge Adlai Hardin of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York took a somewhat different approach in analyzing the statute. He concluded that Section 365(c)(1)’s use of the word "trustee" does not (as other courts had taken for granted) include the debtor or debtor in possession when assumption is sought because assumption does not require the non-debtor party to accept performance from a new party other than the debtor or debtor in possession. A trustee is a new party and the statute logically provides that a trustee may not "assume or assign" such an executory contract.

A Common Scenario. How does this issue come up in Chapter 11 cases? Well, here’s a typical situation. The debtor is the licensee under a prepetition patent license. The patent licensor files a motion to compel the debtor in possession to reject the patent license agreement or alternatively to have the automatic stay lifted to permit the licensor to cancel the agreement. The licensor argues that under the "hypothetical test" interpretation of Section 365(c)(1), the debtor in possession cannot assign the license and, as a result, cannot assume the license either. With neither option open, the licensor argues, the debtor in possession should be compelled to reject the license.

The Aerobox Decision. This was the situation that recently played out in the In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Ruling on just such a motion by a patent licensor, on July 27, 2007, Judge Mark B. McFeeley of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico issued an 11-page decision holding that the actual test, and Judge Hardin’s analysis in Footstar, was the correct interpretation of Section 365(c)(1). As such, he denied the licensor’s motion and held that the debtor in possession was not barred by Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code from assuming the prepetition patent license at issue in that case. The Bankruptcy Court summed up its holding as follows:

Similarly, the bankruptcy court in Footstar reasons that it makes perfect sense for the statute, which uses the term, “trustee,” to prohibit the trustee from assuming or assigning a contract, because the trustee is an “entity other than the debtor in possession” but it makes no sense to read “trustee” to mean “debtor in possession.” Footstar, 323 B.R. at 573. Doing so

would render the provision a virtual oxymoron, since mere assumption [by the debtor in possession] (without assignment) would not compel the counterparty to accept performance from or render it to “an entity other than” the debtor.

Id.

This Court agrees.

Thus, where the debtor-in-possession seeks to assume, or, as is the situation in the instant case, where the debtor-in-possession has neither sought to assume nor reject the executory contract but simply continues to operate post-petition under its terms, 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) does not prohibit assumption of the contract by the debtor-in-possession and cannot operate to allow the non-debtor party to the executory contract to compel the Debtor to reject the contract. In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds that the “actual test” articulated in Cambridge Biotech, and the reasoning of the court in Footstar, is the better approach to § 365(c)(1) when determining whether a debtor-in-possession is precluded from assuming an executory contract.

Venue Still Matters. The decision is interesting because it represents another bankruptcy court, this time outside of the Southern District of New York, endorsing the analysis in the Footstar decision. That said, Judge McFeeley wrote on something of a clean slate because the Tenth Circuit has not yet taken a view on whether the hypothetical test, the actual test, or the Footstar analysis controls. As this circuit-by-circuit chart of Section 365(c)(1) decisions shows (last updated in March 2007), many other circuits have staked out a position on the issue. Absent a Supreme Court decision or new legislation resolving the circuit split, where a debtor files bankruptcy will continue to make a big difference in the relative rights of licensors and debtors over intellectual property licenses in Chapter 11 cases.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Northern District Of California Bankruptcy Court Proposes Amendments To Local Rules

As bankruptcy lawyers know, complying with local rules is an essential part of appearing before a particular court. In response to the changes made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA), as well as the implementation of the electronic case filing system (called ECF), the Bankruptcy Judges for the Northern District of California have proposed a set of amendments to the Court’s local bankruptcy rules.

  • You can find a clean version and a redline version of the proposed amended local rules by clicking on the appropriate link in this sentence.
  • Attorneys or others wishing to comment on the local rules may do so by going to this website form or by sending those comments to the address indicated on that page. The deadline is September 27, 2007.

Among the amendments affecting Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy cases are those governing  replacement of a "responsible individual" for a Chapter 11 debtor or debtor in possession, entry of a final decree closing a case, and the general electronic case filing procedures. A number of other revisions are aimed at consumer bankruptcy cases.

Although the changes do not appear to be dramatic, attorneys who practice before the Northern District of California, and businesses with cases or adversary proceedings pending in that court, will want to stay up to date on these local rule amendments.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Lack Of Recognition: New Case Shows That Chapter 15 International Bankruptcy Protection Isn’t Automatic

On August 30, 2007, in twin decisions in recent cases involving two Bear Stearns hedge funds (available here and here), Judge Burton R. Lifland of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York made clear that recognizing a foreign insolvency proceeding in a Chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy case is not to be "rubber stamped by the courts."  The decision is of particular interest because Judge Lifland was one of the authors of Chapter 15 and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency on which it is based.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Ruling. In a nutshell, the Bankruptcy Court held that although the two hedge funds were organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, their business operations were in New York and not in the Cayman Islands. As such, the Bankruptcy Court would not recognize the Cayman Islands insolvency proceeding as either a "foreign main proceeding" or a "foreign nonmain proceeding." If you’re unfamiliar with this terminology, keep reading for an overview of Chapter 15 and more details on the decision.

A Chapter 15 Refresher. On October 17, 2005, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as BAPCPA), a new Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code went into effect governing ancillary and other cross-border cases. (For those already familiar with ancillary proceedings, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which previously governed those proceedings, was repealed although many of its concepts were retained in Chapter 15.)

  • The main purpose of enacting Chapter 15 was to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as part of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). My partner Adam Rogoff, who has significant experience with international insolvency matters, has prepared a very helpful chart comparing Chapter 15 and the Model Law’s provisions.
  • Chapter 15 is used principally by representatives of, or creditors in, foreign insolvency proceedings to obtain assistance in the United States, by a debtor or others seeking to obtain assistance in a foreign country regarding a bankruptcy case in the United States, or when both a foreign proceeding and a bankruptcy case in the United States are pending with respect to the same debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b). 

Several important terms involving the different types of foreign insolvency proceedings are key to understanding the scope of Chapter 15 and Judge Lifland’s ruling. 

  • A “foreign proceeding” means “a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debts in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). 
  • For purposes of Chapter 15, “debtor” means “an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 1502(1). 
  • A "foreign main proceeding" means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is presumed to be the location of the debtor’s registered office. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(4) and 1516(c). 
  • A "foreign nonmain proceeding" means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country in which the debtor has an “establishment,” defined as a place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(2) and (4). 

Chapter 15’s basic procedure is straightforward. A case is commenced when a foreign representative, often a liquidator or provisional liquidator, files a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504 and 1515(a). If properly filed, the bankruptcy court is entitled to presume that the facts stated in the petition are correct and the attached documents are authentic. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1516(a) and (b). As long as recognition would not be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States, the court must enter an order recognizing the foreign proceeding (here’s an example order). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1506 and 1517(a). 

Evidence Trumps Presumptions. With all this in mind, Judge Lifland held that the Cayman Islands proceeding could not be considered either a "foreign main" or a "foreign nonmain" proceeding. Despite Chapter 15’s presumption that the registered office or place of incorporation, here the Cayman Islands, would be a debtor’s "center of main interests" (known in the trade as the "COMI"), other evidence showed that the actual center of their activity was in New York. This, Judge Lifland held, precluded recognition of the Cayman Island proceeding as a foreign main proceeding. Also, without a true business presence there, the Bankruptcy Court could not conclude that the Cayman Islands was a place where the funds had "nontransitory economic activity," precluding foreign nonmain recognition. Judge Lifland held that even in the absence of objection, Chapter 15 places the burden of proof on these issues on the foreign representatives. Here, the facts in the petition and related papers showed that New York, and not the Cayman Islands, was the COMI for the funds.

Is Non-Recognition The End Of The Road? One of the most interesting aspects of Judge Lifland’s decision is the door he left open to the foreign representatives. Although the two hedge funds could not get protection under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code based on their filing in the Cayman Islands, they have the option of filing an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the United States.

  • Although Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, the old "ancillary proceedings" section, was repealed when Chapter 15 was enacted, Section 303 — and the ability of foreign representatives to file an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy case — was not repealed.
  • Judge Lifland noted that Section 303(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a foreign representative, such as the provisional liquidators appointed by the Cayman Islands court, to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the hedge funds and obtain bankruptcy protection in this manner.

Additional Reading In The Blogs. For more on the case, be sure to read Jordan Bublick’s informative post on his Miami Florida Bankruptcy Law blog and Chris Laughton’s commentary on his Insolvency Blog out of the UK. For the hedge fund industry’s perspective, you may find this post on the Hedgefunds Weblog of interest.

A Few Observations. With many offshore investment funds operating in the United States, Chapter 15 filings may become even more commonplace in the future, especially if we continue to encounter the kind of turbulence recently seen in the financial markets. Although the enactment of Chapter 15 made it easier for foreign representatives to get bankruptcy protection in the United States, the process is not automatic. As Judge Lifland’s decision shows, bankruptcy courts will scrutinize the facts — even in essentially unopposed cases — before agreeing to formally recognize a foreign proceeding. Without such recognition, foreign representatives will have to fall back on the more cumbersome involuntary bankruptcy process or find themselves with no U.S. bankruptcy protection at all.

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments The Financially Troubled Company

Delaware Supreme Court Issues Long-Awaited Decision In Deepening Insolvency Case

On August 14, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en Banc and following oral argument, issued its decision in the Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Billet deepening insolvency case. Rather than write its own opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court released a two-page order affirming Vice Chancellor Strine’s August 10, 2006 Chancery Court decision "on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by" the Chancery Court in its opinion. A copy of the Chancery Court opinion is available here. 

The End Of Deepening Insolvency In Delaware. By adopting the basis and reasoning of the lower court’s opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court ratified Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Apparently concluding that no opinion of its own was necessary given the Chancery Court’s clear opinion below, the Delaware Supreme Court has put to rest the cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Prior to the lower court’s decision in Trenwick, some bankruptcy and other federal courts had incorrectly predicted that Delaware would recognize this cause of action.

A Second Look At Vice Chancellor Strine’s Trenwick Opinion. Now that the Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision and its reasons, the lower court’s opinion merits further consideration. As discussed in this August 2006 post on the Chancery Court’s decision, Vice Chancellor Strine held, in unequivocal terms, that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. To give context to the opinion’s legal analysis, some of its more important sections are quoted below at length:

Delaware law does not recognize this catchy term as a cause of action, because catchy though the term may be, it does not express a coherent concept. Even when a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out, result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red. The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at that time are creditors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue the firm’s operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate pie such that the firm’s creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so, the directors do not become a guarantor of success.  Put simply, under Delaware law, ‘deepening insolvency’ is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of action for ‘shallowing profitability’ would be when a firm is solvent. Existing equitable causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and existing legal causes of action for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, and breach of contract are the appropriate means by which to challenge the actions of boards of insolvent corporations.

Refusal to embrace deepening insolvency as a cause of action is required by settled principles of Delaware law. So, too, is a refusal to extend to creditors a solicitude not given to equityholders. Creditors are better placed than equityholders and other corporate constituencies (think employees) to protect themselves against the risk of firm failure.

The incantation of the word insolvency, or even more amorphously, the words zone of insolvency should not declare open season on corporate fiduciaries. Directors are expected to seek profit for stockholders, even at risk of failure.  With the prospect of profit often comes the potential for defeat.

The general rule embraced by Delaware is the sound one.  So long as directors are respectful of the corporation’s obligation to honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in good faith profit for the corporation’s equityholders.  Even when the firm is insolvent, directors are free to pursue value maximizing strategies, while recognizing that the firm’s creditors have become its residual claimants and the advancement of their best interests has become the firm’s principal objective.

Delaware law imposes no absolute obligation on the board of a company that is unable to pay its bills to cease operations and to liquidate. Even when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith, strategies to maximize the value of the firm. As a thoughtful federal decision recognizes, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code expresses a societal recognition that an insolvent corporation’s creditors (and society as a whole) may benefit if the corporation continues to conduct operations in the hope of turning things around.

If the board of an insolvent corporation, acting with due diligence and good faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes will increase the corporation’s value, but that also involves the incurrence of additional debt, it does not become a guarantor of that strategy’s success. That the strategy results in continued insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a cause of action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the business judgment rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform Delaware law.

The rejection of an independent cause of action for deepening insolvency does not absolve directors of insolvent corporations of responsibility.  Rather, it remits plaintiffs to the contents of their traditional toolkit, which contains, among other things, causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and for fraud.  The contours of these causes of action have been carefully shaped by generations of experience, in order to balance the societal interests in protecting investors and creditors against exploitation by directors and in providing directors with sufficient insulation so that they can seek to create wealth through the good faith pursuit of business strategies that involve a risk of failure.  If a plaintiff cannot state a claim that the directors of an insolvent corporation acted disloyally or without due care in implementing a business strategy, it may not cure that deficiency simply by alleging that the corporation became more insolvent as a result of the failed strategy.

Moreover, the fact of insolvency does not render the concept of “deepening insolvency” a more logical one than the concept of “shallowing profitability.”  That is, the mere fact that a business in the red gets redder when a business decision goes wrong and a business in the black gets paler does not explain why the law should recognize an independent cause of action based on the decline in enterprise value in the crimson setting and not in the darker one.  If in either setting the directors remain responsible to exercise their business judgment considering the company’s business context, then the appropriate tool to examine the conduct of the directors is the traditional fiduciary duty ruler.  No doubt the fact of insolvency might weigh heavily in a court’s analysis of, for example, whether the board acted with fidelity and care in deciding to undertake more debt to continue the company’s operations, but that is the proper role of insolvency, to act as an important contextual fact in the fiduciary duty metric. In that context, our law already requires the directors of an insolvent corporation to consider, as fiduciaries, the interests of the corporation’s creditors who, by definition, are owed more than the corporation has the wallet to repay.

In so ruling, I reach a result consistent with a growing body of federal jurisprudence, which has recognized that those federal courts that became infatuated with the concept, did not look closely enough at the object of their ardor.  Among the earlier federal decisions embracing the notion – by way of a hopeful prediction of state law – that deepening insolvency should be recognized as a cause of action admittedly were three decisions from within the federal Circuit of which Delaware is a part.  None of those decisions explains the rationale for concluding that deepening insolvency should be recognized as a cause of action or how such recognition would be consistent with traditional concepts of fiduciary responsibility.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s adoption of the basis and reasoning of the Chancery Court’s strongly-worded opinion represents the end of the road for the deepening insolvency cause of action under Delaware law.

Hints In The Gheewalla Decision? Interestingly, in its brief order the Delaware Supreme Court dropped a footnote giving not only the citation for the Chancery Court’s decision, Trenwick America Litig, Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), but also an intriguing comment: "Accord North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705 (Del. Supr. 2007)." This was a reference to its own decision of May 18, 2007 (opinion available here) holding that creditors cannot bring a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are insolvent or in the zone of insolvency.

  • As discussed in an earlier post on the Gheewalla decision, the Delaware Supreme Court opinion cited the lower court decision in Trenwick favorably, as well as the earlier Chancery Court decision in Production Resources (opinion available here), discussed in another earlier post. 
  • The "Accord" reference in its Trenwick order suggests that the Delaware Supreme Court believed that its May 2007 Gheewalla decision foreshadowed this week’s affirmance of the Chancery Court’s Trenwick decision and reasoning.

More Clarity For Directors. With the adoption of the Chancery Court’s opinion in Trenwick, and its own opinion in Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court has effectively endorsed the trend in recent Chancery Court decisions to limit certain efforts to expand the liability of directors of insolvent or nearly insolvent corporations. Nearly sixteen years have passed since the Chancery Court’s decision in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991), introduced us to the terms "vicinity of insolvency" and "zone of insolvency." Although the Delaware Supreme Court has left some questions open, these new decisions help provide meaningful guidance on how directors of financially troubled Delaware corporations should discharge their fiduciary duties.  

Business Bankruptcy Issues Recent Developments

Have Section 363 Sale Orders Gone Too Far?

Concerned about the broad-reaching and complex forms of Section 363 asset orders being submitted for approval, this past week the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California issued a set of "Guidelines re Sale Orders" as well as a form of "Model Sale Order." (Each document is available by clicking on its respective title in the prior sentence.) The Bankruptcy Court’s opening discussion of the Guidelines expresses its reasons for issuing them now:

The bankruptcy judges of the Northern District of California have become increasingly concerned about the orders they are being asked to sign on motions to approve sales of property of the estate under section 363(b) and 363(f).  Many of the proposed orders submitted:  (a) seek relief beyond the scope of the motion before the court; (b) seek to affect parties not before the court; (c) seek advisory rulings where there is no case or controversy; (d) include findings of fact that should be stated orally or in a separate memorandum; and (e) are so wordy and complex that the court has difficulty determining their meaning. 

The crafting of orders is a judicial function. Accordingly, the judges have approved a model order for motions seeking authority to sell property of the estate and motions to sell such property free and clear of liens.  The following guidelines are intended to explain how to use the model order, and what provisions the court will and will not generally approve as additions to the model order or where the parties draft their own order.  These guidelines do not apply to any separate orders approving bidding procedures, break-up fees or other matters related to the sale of property.  In addition, these guidelines do not apply in Chapter 13 cases.

The model order is not mandatory, but the judges will use the model order on their own motion where parties vary from these guidelines without sufficient cause and explanation. 

In the event that a party submits a sale order that deviates from these guidelines, the party shall, unless otherwise instructed by the court, submit a declaration to the court in which the party identifies the provisions that vary from these guidelines and sets forth the justification therefore.

(Emphasis in original.) Many bankruptcy lawyers who practice regularly in the Northern District of California, with divisions in San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, and Santa Rosa (and courthouses in Eureka and Salinas), have already understood the prevailing view of the bankruptcy judges on these issues. However, the new guidelines help clarify matters for everyone facing these issues in the Northern District of California. 

The Section 363 Sale. As a reminder, a bankruptcy asset sale often happens in the first few weeks or months of a Chapter 11 case, rather than as part of a plan of reorganization. Frequently this will involve a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor’s business as a going concern. The sale is generally referred to as a "Section 363 sale" because Section 363 is the key Bankruptcy Code section that governs a debtor’s sale of assets in bankruptcy. The debtor must seek bankruptcy court approval of a sale that is not in the ordinary course of business and of any effort to transfer executory contracts, intellectual property licenses, or commercial real estate leases to the buyer.

The Sale Order. For a buyer of assets in a Section 363 bankruptcy sale, a big question is what type of factual findings and legal rulings will the bankruptcy court include — or refuse to include — in the order approving the sale. Buyers typically desire that the sale be ordered "free and clear" of all liens, claims, interests, and encumbrances, rather than only certain ones specifically identified in the notice of the sale motion. They also prefer to have findings added to the order on issues such as fair value paid and no successor liability, and often ask for an injunction against actions affecting the buyer that are inconsistent with the sale order’s findings and provisions.

Big Differences From District To District. As bankruptcy lawyers know, courts in different districts around the country have taken surprisingly divergent views on what is, and is not, appropriate in Section 363 sale orders.

  • It’s hard not to notice the striking differences between the new Model Sale Order from the Northern District of California and examples of sale orders entered over the past few years by bankruptcy courts in the District of Delaware (example here), the Southern District of New York (example here), and the Northern District of Illinois (example here), three courts where a number of large Chapter 11 cases have been filed. 
  • The new Guidelines issued by the Northern District of California appear to be in reaction to the submission of sale orders more in keeping with the accepted practice in Delaware and New York than in Northern California.

Although one wonders if the Northern District of California’s approach will spread to other courts, the more likely scenario is that each district will continue to follow its own path.

Business Bankruptcy Issues The Financially Troubled Company

Section 363 Sales: Interesting Article Takes A Further Look

David Powlen, Managing Director and Partner at Western Reserve Partners LLC, has an interesting article on the Turnaround Management Association website entitled "Bargains Await Buyers Skilled At Navigating Section 363 Minefields." It gives a good overview of the range of issues that arise in the context of a sale under Bankruptcy Code Section 363. Among the article’s observations:

  • Unlike traditional private company M&A deals, Section 363 sales take place in the "fishbowl" of a bankruptcy proceeding;
  • Although the bankruptcy process generally leads the debtor to seek an auction, some typical M&A bidders may not participate in a bankruptcy sale, potentially reducing the competition to a stalking horse bidder;
  • Compensating for the usual lack of representations and warranties in an asset purchase agreement with a bankrupt company is the court’s sale approval order, which generally approves a sale free and clear of liens, claims, and interests; and
  • A Section 363 sale may not be free of every claim or interest, however, as certain environmental and product liability claims may nevertheless pass to the buyer. 

The article also includes a helpful chart giving a graphic presentation of the relative risks and benefits of an out-of-court sale, a Section 363 sale, and the less common sale through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. For more on these issues, you may also be interested in this earlier post and linked article on buying assets from a financially distressed company.