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Who’s SARE Now? Bankruptcy’s Single Asset Real Estate Rules And Their Impact On Commercial Real Estate

Given the state of commercial real estate, the prospect for defaults by commercial borrowers has greatly increased. The last time there was a significant downturn in the commercial real estate sector in the early 1990s, owners of buildings and other real estate often turned to Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a method of buying time and, in some cases, lowering or at least restructuring the amount of secured debt against the real property through a plan of reorganization. This raises the question — will the same story play out again in this downturn?

Major Bankruptcy Law Changes In 2005. As many readers of this blog know, major amendments were made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 — formally known as the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) — including ones that affect real estate. One of the better-known changes was the addition of strict limitations on the time bankrupt tenants could have to assume or reject commercial real estate leases.

However, there was another amendment that may have a significant impact on some owners of real estate in Chapter 11, and could complicate the prospects for using bankruptcy to restructure debt on certain distressed projects. This change was the elimination of a valuation cap that had previously limited the number of real estate debtors subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s single asset real estate (“SARE”) rules, most notably provisions that impose special requirements on single asset real estate debtors to keep in place the benefits of bankruptcy’s automatic stay

The Bankruptcy Code’s SARE Definition. Prior to BAPCPA, there were relatively few SARE cases because the definition was limited to debtors with less than $4 million of secured debt against the real property. This meant that only smaller real estate cases were covered by the more restrictive SARE rules. BAPCPA, however, removed the $4 million secured debt ceiling. As a result, a real estate entity owing hundreds of millions of dollars in secured debt may be subject to the SARE rules. Consequently, the number of real estate cases potentially subject to the SARE provisions has increased dramatically.

The Bankruptcy Code’s current definition of SARE provides:

The term ‘single asset real estate’ means real property constituting a single property or project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental.

11 U.S.C. §101 (51B).

Impact Of A SARE Designation. A SARE designation can have a big effect on the debtor. When a debtor states on its petition that it is a SARE, or a secured creditor files a motion and the Court rules that the debtor is in fact a SARE, the dynamics of the Chapter 11 case will change. As discussed below, a SARE debtor must either file a plan of reorganization with a reasonable chance of being confirmed within the later of (i) 90 days after the order for relief is entered in the case (in a voluntary bankruptcy case this is when the case is filed) or (ii) 30 days after the date the court determines that the debtor is subject to the provisions of SARE, or must start making monthly payments to the secured creditor at the loan’s non-default interest rate. If a SARE debtor fails to satisfy these requirements, the court is likely to grant a secured creditor relief from stay to commence or continue with a foreclosure of the real property.

Who’s A SARE? Not every owner of commercial real estate in bankruptcy will be a SARE debtor. To determine what types of commercial properties and developments qualify as a SARE case, courts focus on interpreting the meaning of “a single property or project.” In cases in which one debtor owns one piece of real property, this issue will likely be straightforward. In other cases, however, the question may be more difficult to determine. For example, a real estate business owning many interrelated projects through separate, multiple limited liability companies ("LLCs") or partnerships may be able to avoid a SARE ruling. On the other hand, an entity owning more than one property, if considered a single project, may be deemed to be a SARE. To read one court’s analysis of these issues in a series of related bankruptcy cases involving multiple entities and properties, click here, here, and here.

If a single property or project is involved, courts then analyze whether the single real estate asset is used in the operation of a business or whether it is simply held for income. A SARE case usually involves passive rent collection without other active business activities that generate revenue for the debtor. The SARE standard is factually driven and generally looks to “whether [the debtors] conduct substantial business other than operating the real property.” In the Matter of Scotia Pacific Company, LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2007) (debtor’s substantial entrepreneurial business operations went beyond mere passive collection of money). As the Scotia Pacific court held:

In order to be single asset real estate, the revenues received by the owner must be passive in nature; the owner must not be conducting any active business, other than merely operating the real property and activities incidental thereto. Under the prior jurisprudence, those passive types of activities are the mere receipt of rent and truly incidental activities such as arranging for maintenance or perhaps some marketing activity, or … mowing the grass and waiting for the market to turn.

A business would not be a SARE if a reasonable and prudent business person would expect to generate substantial revenues from the operation activities–separate and apart from the sale or lease of the underlying real estate.

For example, a golf club where the owners are actively engaged in activities such as employing third party workers, selling club memberships and merchandise, and charging green fees, has been held not to be a SARE. Likewise, a debtor in the hotel or marina business also may not be held to be a SARE.

Limited Automatic Stay Benefits For SAREs. A SARE debtor cannot count on the automatic stay remaining in force for an extended period of time. Instead, to maintain the benefit of the automatic stay, Section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a SARE debtor, within 90 days after filing bankruptcy, to file a plan that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed or commence regular payments to the secured creditor at the non-default interest rate.

  • A SARE debtor that is not in a position to file a plan will, in effect, have to pay for the continuation of the automatic stay. This can prove difficult for projects that are not producing significant cash flow.
  • If a plan is filed instead, the debtor does not have to establish that the proposed plan will in fact be confirmed but must show that the assumptions that underpin the plan are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable time to confirm a plan will vary from case to case.
  • If the debtor fails to satisfy either of these requirements, the secured creditor will likely be able to obtain relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the property.
  • These rules do not preclude a secured creditor from seeking relief from stay on other grounds, such as a lack of adequate protection or other cause.

Overall Impact On Commercial Real Estate. Owners of distressed commercial real estate projects that are SAREs may find Chapter 11 to be less useful than in past down cycles.

  • With careful planning, some SARE debtors will be able to restructure through bankruptcy. Yet as an interesting study shows, many SARE (and non-SARE) real estate cases in the past few years have ended with the secured creditor obtaining relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. Faced with this prospect, some owners have simply decided to turn over distressed real property to the lender, often through a deed in lieu of foreclosure before bankruptcy.
  • In today’s environment, some lenders are willing to work with real property owners to extend loans and avoid foreclosure or taking back the property. However, if the SARE rules would apply in a potential bankruptcy, this fact may give the secured lender more leverage in those negotiations. 

What’s likely to be the end result of the SARE rules and the 2005 removal of the valuation cap? As single asset real estate projects face default, although some will certainly be able to restructure their debts, many may end up in the hands of lenders as real estate owned ("REO") properties. With distressed borrowers working through hundreds of billions of dollars in commercial real estate loan problems across the country, the negative impact defaulting commercial real estate loans and resulting REO may have on banks and other lenders could end up being the bigger part of this SARE story. 

Two More Decisions Issued On Whether Bankruptcy Rule 2019 Requires Informal Groups To Disclose Their Trades

The First Two Delaware Decisions. In the past two months, I have reported on decisions by two Delaware bankruptcy judges in the In re Washington Mutual, Inc. case and in In re Premier International Holdings, Inc. (aka, the Six Flags case), taking opposing views on whether Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 requires ad hoc committees and informal groups to disclose their trading activities. The Court in the Washington Mutual case held that it does, while the Court in the Six Flags case came out strongly with the opposite view. Follow the links in the prior sentence for more on both decisions, including copies of the respective opinions, as well as the earlier Northwest Airlines and Scotia Pacific decisions from the Southern Districts of New York and Texas, respectively.

A Third Delaware Decision. Two days after the Six Flags opinion was issued, Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Brendan L. Shannon issued a short order granting a motion to compel an Ad Hoc Noteholder Group in the In re Accuride Corporation Chapter 11 case to disclose details of their trades. A copy of Judge Shannon’s two-page order is available by clicking on the link in this sentence. The ruling reflects the Court’s comments from the bench agreeing with the conclusions in the Northwest Airlines and Washington Mutual decisions, although Judge Shannon stated that he did not necessarily concur that fiduciary obligations arise in this context, as the Washington Mutual opinion had stated.

The Philadelphia Newspapers Court Weighs In. Then last week, on February 4, 2010, Judge Stephen Raslavich, Chief Judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, issued another opinion on the issue, this time involving a "Steering Group of Pre-petition Lenders" in the In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. After reviewing the analysis in each of the prior decisions from the Delaware, New York, and Texas courts, Chief Judge Raslavich held that Rule 2019 does not require such disclosure by the Steering Committee, essentially agreeing with the reasoning of Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Sontchi in the Six Flags case. Follow the link in this sentence for a copy of Chief Judge Raslavich’s 28-page opinion in the Philadelphia Newspapers case.

More To Come? We have now had six opinions or orders on the Rule 2019 issue involving ad hoc committees or informal groups, with three judges holding disclosure is required (Northwest Airlines, Washington Mutual, and Accuride Corporation) and three holding it is not (Scotia Pacific, Six Flags, and Philadelphia Newspapers). Although the issue may gain more clarity on appeal or the question may be superseded by an amended version of Rule 2019, now under consideration by the Advisory Committee, in the meantime more courts will likely be asked to decide this thorny Rule 2019 issue. Given the split in authority — with each judge finding that the "plain meaning" of Rule 2019 supports its view — it has become even more difficult to predict how the next court will rule.

With Revisions To Bankruptcy Rule 2019 Under Review, A Second Delaware Bankruptcy Decision Goes The Other Way On Whether The Rule Requires Informal Committees To Disclose Their Trades

Last month, I reported on a decision from Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Mary Walrath in the In re Washington Mutual, Inc. case ("WaMu") holding that informal creditor groups must disclose details of their trades under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019. The WaMu ruling, a first from Delaware, came nearly three years after rulings from the Southern District of New York in the Northwest Airlines case, and the Southern District of Texas in the Scotia Pacific case, took different sides on the issue.

A New Decision And Proposed Revision To Rule 2019. Now, little more than a month later, a second Delaware Bankruptcy Court judge has issued an opinion on the same issue — and has forcefully come out the other way. These decisions are playing out against the backdrop of a proposed revision of Rule 2019 which, if adopted, would expand disclosures by ad hoc committees and other groups of creditors and equity security holders as discussed in more detail near the end of this post.

Before turning to the new decision, here are several links to follow for more about the earlier Rule 2019 decisions and the overall context:

The New Delaware Decision. On January 20, 2010, Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Sontchi issued an opinion in In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., more commonly known as the Six Flags case, explaining his reasons for denying a motion to compel an informal committee of noteholders, known as the SFO Noteholders Informal Committee, from complying with Rule 2019. Follow the link in this sentence for a copy of Judge Sontchi’s new 34-page Six Flags opinion.

The Six Flag Court’s Plain Meaning Analysis. In his opinion, Judge Sontchi discussed but respectfully declined to follow the Northwest Airlines and WaMu decisions referenced above. Instead, he held that under the plain meaning of Rule 2019, an informal committee of noteholders was not a "committee representing more than one creditor" described in the current Rule 2019. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Sontchi explained as follows:

    The question here is whether the SFO Noteholders Informal Committee is ‘a committee representing more than one creditor.’ If so, its members are subject to Rule 2019. The starting point of the analysis or ‘default entrance’ is plain meaning.

    A committee” is a ‘body of two or more people appointed for some special function by, and usu. out of a (usu. larger) body.’ The use of the word ‘appointed’ clearly contemplates some action be taken by the larger body. Thus, a self-appointed subset of a larger group – whether it calls itself an informal committee, an ad hoc committee, or by some other name – simply does not constitute a committee under the plain meaning of the word. In order for a group to constitute a committee under Rule 2019 it would need to be formed by a larger group either by consent, contract or applicable law — not by ‘self-help.’ This construct is supported by the rule’s applicability to indenture trustees, which are delegated with certain rights and obligations on behalf of all holders of the debt by operation of contract, i.e., the indenture. Similarly, official committees under section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code (although exempted from Rule 2019) receive their authority from federal law, i.e., the Bankruptcy Code.

    The meaning of ‘represent’ is: ‘take the place of (another); be a substitute in some capacity for; act or speak for another by a deputed right.’ A deputed right is one that is assigned to another person. Thus, the plain meaning of ‘represent’ contemplates an active appointment of an agent to assert deputed rights. It is black letter law that a person cannot establish itself as another’s agent such that it may bind the purported principal without that principal’s consent unless the principal ratifies the agent’s actions. Thus, under the plain meaning of the phrase ‘a committee representing more than one creditor,’ a committee must consist of a group representing the interests of a larger group with that larger group’s consent or by operation of law. As the SFO Noteholders Informal Committee does not represent any persons other than its members either by consent or operation of law, it is not a ‘committee’ under Rule 2019 and, thus, its members need not make the disclosures required under the rule.

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.)

The Six Flag Court’s Review Of Legislative History. After concluding that the plain meaning of Rule 2019 did not require disclosures by the SFO Noteholders Informal Committee, the Court then examined the legislative history of the rule at some length as a "reality check" on the plain meaning decision. In this part of the opinion, Judge Sontchi traced the legislative history back to the Chandler Act of 1938 and subsequent rule making creating Rule 10-211, which later became Rule 2019. The Court then placed the Chandler Act in context by reviewing the perceived abuses of "protective committees" and "reorganization committees" involved in pre-1930s railroad reorganizations through equity receiverships. Judge Sontchi then concluded that the purposes for which Rule 2019 was adopted do not apply to today’s informal committees:

    The nub of the question is how the legislative history of Rules 10-211 and 2019 applies to the informal and ad hoc committees of today and, more specifically, the Informal Committee of SFO Noteholders. Certainly there are parallels between the ‘protective committees’ under equity receivership and the informal committees of today. For example, both are usually composed of Wall Street banks and institutional investors. Both are formed for the purpose of obtaining leverage in the reorganization that would not be available to disparate creditors. Both are involved in the negotiation and formulation of a plan of reorganization.

    The differences, however, far outweigh the similarities. The ‘protective committees’ that were the target of the reforms under the Chandler Act were able to control completely the entire reorganization – from inception to formulation to solicitation to implementation. They were granted the authority to negotiate on behalf of and to bind creditors through the use of deposit agreements. They were so intimately involved with management so as to be virtually in control of the business. They could force disparate treatment of similarly situated creditors. Finally, they were able ‘to steal’ the company for an inadequate ‘upset price’ at a foreclosure sale by credit bidding their debt.

 

    The informal and ad hoc committees of today have none of these expansive powers. Indeed, the Chandler Act so effectively curbed the power of protective committees that they virtually ceased to exist within a few years of the Act’s passage. Rule 10-211 was, for all intents and purposes, superfluous almost immediately after its passage. There was nothing left to regulate.

    The Bankruptcy Code continues to limit the powers of committees, albeit in other ways. For example, the debtor is given exclusive authority to propose and to solicit a plan of reorganization; claims and interests may only be classified with substantially similar creditors; creditors in the same class must be treated equally; a trustee or examiner can be appointed for cause. Even if an informal committee were to try to exercise the powers formerly available to protective committees, it would be prevented by the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, Rule 2019 is also, for all intents and purpose, superfluous – the problem it was designed to address by requiring certain disclosures simply no longer exists.

    In any event, the Informal Committee of SFO Noteholders has not attempted to invoke the powers previously wielded by protective committees. Certainly, the committee has actively participated in the reorganization process both pre-petition and post-petition. The committee vigorously opposed the Debtors’ Initial Plan and now vigorously supports the Revised Plan that it negotiated post-petition. But, the Informal Committee of SFO Noteholders has gone no farther. It doesn’t have the ability to bind its members – they can vote any way they please. It cannot force disparate treatment of the SFO creditors. The list goes on. Based upon the legislative history, Rule 2019 is not intended to nor does it apply to the Informal Committee of SFO Noteholders in this case.

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.)  Finally, Judge Sontchi considered the analysis in the Northwest Airlines and WaMu decisions and declined to follow those rulings for a number of reasons detailed in the Six Flags opinion.

The Proposed Revisions To Rule 2019. The core holding of the Six Flags opinion — that under the plain meaning of Rule 2019 the term "committee" applies only to a committee that is appointed by or represents a larger group — could be rendered moot by a proposed revision to Rule 2019 now under consideration by the Advisory Committee.

  • The proposed amendment to Rule 2019 would change the language of the rule to include not only representative committees but also "every entity, group, or committee that consists of or represents more than one creditor or equity security holder." (Emphasis added.)
  • Follow the link in this sentence for a copy of the proposed Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure amendments under active consideration by the Advisory Committee, including proposed Rule 2019.
  • The proposed version of Rule 2019 would require these newly defined groups or committees to disclose each "disclosable economic interest." That term would be defined to mean "any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right that grants the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value, acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest."
  • The bankruptcy court would also have the authority to order the disclosure of amounts paid for these positions, but pricing disclosure would not be required absent a court order.
  • The proposed rule has now gotten the attention of the financial media, and it will be the subject of a hearing in early February with testimony expected from various interested parties.

Conclusion. To say the least, a lot is going on in the world of Rule 2019, informal committees and creditor groups, and the potential for disclosure of trading data by hedge funds and other distressed investors. It’s likely that more courts will be asked to decide these issues in the months ahead, and advocates on both sides of the issue now have new Delaware opinions to cite for their position. On top of that, if ultimately adopted, a proposed — and significantly revised — Rule 2019 could resolve some of these questions.  For now, however, the final language of any revised Rule 2019, like the application of the current Rule 2019, remains unclear. 

When Worlds Collide: Do Section 365(n) IP Licensee Rights Work In A Chapter 15 Cross-Border Bankruptcy?

Section 365(n) And Licensee Rights. I have discussed in the past how Section 365(n) was added to the Bankruptcy Code to protect licensees of intellectual property in the event the licensor files bankruptcy.

  • Under Section 365(n), if the debtor or trustee rejects a license, a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed intellectual property, including a right to enforce an exclusivity provision. In return, the licensee must continue to make any required royalty payment.
  • The licensee also can retain rights under any agreement supplementary to the license, which should include source code or other forms of technology escrow agreements.
  • Taken together, these provisions protect a licensee from being stripped of its rights to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.
  • To read more about Section 365(n)’s benefits and protections, follow the link in this sentence.

Limits Of Section 365(n). These protections, however, have their limits. One limitation comes from the fact that the Bankruptcy Code’s special definition of "intellectual property" excludes trademarks from the scope of Section 365(n)’s protections. Another major limitation is that since Section 365(n) is a U.S. Bankruptcy Code provision, it only applies in a U.S. bankruptcy case.

What Happens To Section 365(n) In Chapter 15 Cases? One issue that was less clear was what would happen if a foreign licensor were the subject of a case under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Would Section 365(n) apply to protect licensees in a Chapter 15 proceeding?

  • Chapter 15 allows an entity’s foreign representative to obtain U.S. bankruptcy protection for assets and interests in the United States. It was was added to the Bankruptcy Code a few years ago to implement certain cross-border insolvency procedures when corporations had assets and interests in more than one country. To read more on Chapter 15 bankruptcy, follow the link in this sentence. 
  • Section 365(n) and Chapter 15 recently collided in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG, and led to a decision by Judge Robert G. Mayer of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on that very issue. 
  • The Bankruptcy Court’s decision, discussed below, is available by following the link in this sentence.

The Qimonda Chapter 15 Case. In the Qimonda AG Chapter 15 case, the Bankruptcy Court had previously recognized the pending German insolvency proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As part of the Chapter 15 proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court had entered a supplemental order providing, among other things, that Section 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code would apply to the Chapter 15 case.

U.S. Licensees Invoke Section 365(n). Following the Bankruptcy Court’s supplemental order, certain U.S. licensees asserted Section 365(n) rights in an attempt to retain their rights to intellectual property that Qimonda AG had licensed them.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision. After considering the motion and opposition, Judge Mayer issued a decision agreeing with Qimonda AG’s foreign representative and he modified the prior supplemental order to exclude the effect of Section 365(n) by providing that it would apply only if the foreign representative "rejects an executory contract pursuant to Section 365 (rather than simply exercising the rights granted to the Foreign Representative pursuant to the German Insolvency Code)." In reaching this decision, the Bankruptcy Court considered the effect of its recognition of the German insolvency proceeding given the purpose of Chapter 15:

The principal idea behind chapter 15 is that the bankruptcy proceeding be governed in accordance with the bankruptcy laws of the nation in which the main case is pending. In this case, that would be the German Insolvency Code. Ancillary proceedings such as the chapter 15 proceeding pending in this court should supplement, but not supplant, the German proceeding.

That objective is particularly relevant in this case where there are many international patents.  The patents themselves are issued under the laws of various nations. While there may be multiple international patents, the multiple international patents protect the same idea, process or invention in the country that issued the patent. If the patents and patent licenses are dealt with in accordance with the bankruptcy laws of the various nations in which the licensees or licensors may be located or operating, there will be many inconsistent results. In fact, the same idea, process or invention may be dealt with differently depending on which country the particular ancillary proceeding is brought. Rather than having a coherent resolution to Qimonda’s patent portfolio, the portfolio may be shattered into many pieces that can never be reconstructed. In this case, Qimonda licensed its patents to companies that are operating in various nations. It is clear that the patent rights are not being exploited solely, and even possibly principally, in the United States. In fact, they are being utilized throughout the world. If the laws of the various nations in which the patents are being used would be applicable, there will be many different treatments of the patents that have been licensed by Qimonda AG and many different and inconsistent results throughout the world. This is detrimental to a systematic bankruptcy proceeding and detrimental to the resolution of the German bankruptcy proceeding itself. It diminishes the value of these assets. It results in an inefficient insolvency administration. It may well be detrimental to parties who are or wish to license the patents. It is not difficult to envision that if the patent portfolio is splintered without overall administration or control, some parties may be left with incomplete patent protection. Holding an American patent without holding a patent enforceable in the Europe may significantly restrict its use and utility. This is at odds with the Congressionally stated purposes in §1501.

                                          *       *        *

All the patents should be treated the same. There should not be disparate results simply because of the location of a factory or research facility or corporate office. This would be the result if the supplemental order were left in place. It is clear that the inclusion of §365 in the supplemental order was improvident. It had unintended consequences that significantly and adversely affect the main proceeding in Germany.

Conclusion. The Qimonda AG decision underscores that although Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code offers significant protection to licensees, its benefits frequently stop at the water’s edge. When the licensor is based outside of the United States, Section 365(n) will be of little help, even if the license covers U.S. issued patents and the foreign licensor obtains protection for its U.S. assets and interests under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. Licensees must continue to keep the limits of Section 365(n) in mind when negotiating licenses of intellectual property from foreign licensors.

The Return Of The Rule 2019 Question: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Weighs In On Whether Creditor Groups Must Disclose Trading Data

It’s been a few years since decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the Southern District of New York, and later from the Southern District of Texas, examined whether hedge funds and other investors could be required to disclose the details of their trades when they form an ad hoc committee or group in a Chapter 11 case.  Last week, Judge Mary Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision in the Washington Mutual, Inc. Chapter 11 case, for the first time giving us a Delaware bankruptcy judge’s views on the subject. Before turning to the new decision, a copy of which is available below, let’s first put the issue in context.

Ad Hoc Committees and Groups. In recent years, hedge funds and other investors in distressed debt or the equity securities of bankrupt companies have taken active roles in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Often, these investors form unofficial or "ad hoc" committees.

  • Much like official committees of unsecured creditors, equity security holders, retirees, or other constituencies, unofficial or ad hoc committees typically hire counsel and file motions and other pleadings during the course of a bankruptcy case.
  • Sometimes these creditors call themselves a committee but more recently the more informal term "group" has been used.
  • By acting as a committee or group, the creditors not only share the costs of participating in the bankruptcy case but also have the ability to wield greater influence by acting collectively instead of on an individual basis.

The Rule 2019(a) Statement. After making an appearance in a bankruptcy case, these groups or committees, their counsel, or both will typically file what’s known as a "Rule 2019(a) Statement." This is a public filing required by Rule 2019(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the set of procedural rules which, together with the United States Bankruptcy Code itself, govern the conduct of bankruptcy cases. Rule 2019(a) provides, in part, as follows:

[E]very entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder . . . shall file a verified statement setting forth (1) the name and address of the creditor or equity security holder; (2) the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the employment of the entity . . . ; and (4) . . . the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the members of the committee or the indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof. 

The Northwest Airlines And Scotia Pacific Decisions. In early 2007, first in the Northwest Airlines case, and then in the Scotia Pacific Company LLC ("Scotia Development") case, two bankruptcy judges reached opposite conclusions on the question of whether groups of investors had to comply with Rule 2019.

  • In February and March of 2007, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, presiding over the Northwest Airlines Chapter 11 case, required an ad hoc committee of hedge funds and other stockholders to disclose publicly full details of their trades in Northwest Airlines claims and stock. This was big news because hedge funds and other distressed debt investors carefully guard their trading data. Follow the links in this sentence for copies of Judge Gropper’s first decision requiring the disclosure and second decision ordering that the trading data not be filed under seal. You can find earlier posts on these decisions and their aftermath here, here, here, here, and here.
  • Then in April 2007, Judge Richard S. Schmidt of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued an order denying Scopac’s motion to compel disclosure of the details of trades in Scotia Development’s secured timber notes. In his two-page order, Judge Schmidt ruled that a noteholder group that had formed in the Scopac case was not a "committee" within the meaning of Rule 2019 and, as such, the disclosure requirements of that rule did not apply. Following the links in this sentence will lead you to a copy of Judge Schmidt’s two-page order in the Scotia Development case and to an earlier post on the case.

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s Decision In The Washington Mutual Case. On December 2, 2009, more than two and a half years since the Scotia Development decision, Judge Walrath of the Delaware bankruptcy court faced the same issue in the Washington Mutual, Inc. case.  J. P. Morgan Chase Bank moved to compel a group of creditors calling themselves the "Washington Mutual, Inc. Noteholders Group" ("WMI Noteholders Group") to provide trading and other information required by Rule 2019. The WMI Noteholders Group argued, among other points, that they were not an ad hoc committee but only a loose affiliation of creditors who came together on at at-will basis to share the cost of advisory services as a matter of efficiency.

In her decision, Judge Walrath rejected that argument, siding with Judge Gropper’s analysis in Northwest Airlines and declining to follow the two-page order issued by Judge Schmidt in the Scotia Development case. Specifically, she held:

Here, the WMI Noteholders Group possesses virtually all the characteristics typically found in an ad hoc committee, save the name. The WMI Noteholders Group consists of multiple creditors holding similar claims. The members of the WMI Noteholders Group filed pleadings and appeared in these chapter 11 cases collectively, not individually. The WMI Noteholders Group retained counsel, which takes its instructions from the Group as a whole. While counsel contends that it speaks only for the members of the WMI Noteholders Group that agree with the filing of each pleading or position taken in each appearance, counsel for the Group has never advised this Court that it is representing less than all the Group. Rather the pleadings and appearances by counsel demonstrate that the Group and counsel represent not each individual member in its individual capacity, but rather the Group as a whole. In fact, it is the collective $1.1 billion in holdings of the members of the Group that counsel uses to argue in favor of the Group’s position, not each individual’s separate holding.

Under the plain language of Rule 2019, therefore, the Court finds that although the WMI Noteholders Group call themselves a Group, they are in fact acting as an ad hoc committee or entity representing more than one creditor. The WMI Noteholders Group, therefore, must comply with Rule 2019.

Follow the link for a copy of Judge Walrath’s 20 page Washington Mutual decision.

Another Issue: Do Groups Owe Fiduciary Duties? One of the most interesting parts of Judge Walrath’s decision came in response to the WMI Noteholders Group’s argument that Rule 2019 was not intended to apply to the Group because it does not speak for other noteholders. Judge Walrath not only rejected this argument but in doing so also suggested that creditor or shareholder groups may owe fiduciary duties to others in the same class:

The WMI Noteholders Group contends, however, that the Rule was only intended to apply to ‘a body that purports to speak on behalf of an entire class or broader group of stakeholders in a fiduciary capacity with the power to bind the stakeholders that are members of such a committee.’ The WMI Noteholders Group’s argument is premised on the erroneous assumption that the Group owes no fiduciary duties to other similarly situated creditors, either in or outside the Group. The case law, however, suggests that members of a class of creditors may, in fact, owe fiduciary duties to other members of the class.

Judge Walrath, however, deferred any further decision on the issue, noting:

It is not necessary, at this stage, to determine the precise extent of fiduciary duties owed but only to recognize that collective action by creditors in a class implies some obligation to other members of that class.
 

With this decision, ad hoc committees and other groups are on notice that, at least in Delaware, they may be found to owe duties to other members of their respective class of creditors or investors.

Conclusion. This new decision means that Delaware now joins the Southern District of New York in holding that ad hoc committees and investor groups will be required to comply fully with Rule 2019, including the requirement to disclose details of their trades in the debtor’s claims or interests. In addition, the Washington Mutual decision goes another step and suggests that these groups may be held to owe fiduciary duties to other members of their class, whether or not they have joined the group or ad hoc committee. With judges in the two most active jurisdictions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases now applying Rule 2019 more broadly, it will be interesting to see how creditors, investors, and debtors react in future cases.

Bankruptcy Judge’s Research Binder Now Updated And Available

I have posted in the past about the helpful research binder that Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California makes available to bankruptcy professionals and the public. Fortunately, Chief Judge Newsome has again updated his binder as of December 1, 2009, covering cases through Volume 410 of Bankruptcy Reports. Follow the links in this sentence to access the entire binder in PDF format and the HTML version organized by topic. The PDF version is capable of being searched using a key word or phrase.

The primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law, as Chief Judge Newsome presides in the Northern District of California, but some out-of-circuit law is also included. The disclaimer Chief Judge Newsome includes puts the binder’s use in context:

The following list of cases and supplemental information is presented for informational and educational purposes only. Though it represents the aggregation of 19 years of research, the Court makes no claims as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases set forth may very well have been superseded, reversed, or otherwise may no longer be good law. The Court has posted it with the intention to educate and assist those who may find it helpful. Accordingly, users should consider it a first, but by no means final, research tool, and should cite check all cases listed herein for continued viability prior to relying on such cases in practice.

With those caveats, and especially when used in combination with the new Google Scholar legal research tool, the binder is a helpful place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

Powerful, Free Legal Research Tool Now Available

Last week, Google launched a new feature on its Google Scholar specialized search engine that enables full-text searching of published federal and state court opinions, as well as articles in certain legal journals. Users can access the new features by selecting the "Legal opinions and journals" bullet on the Google Scholar main search page. The cases in the Google Scholar database generally include official reporter citation page numbers throughout the decision. The other main search category available is "Articles," including or excluding patents.

By using the Advanced Scholar Search feature, you can engage in more tailored searches, such as within just federal court decisions, decisions from one or more individual states, or articles by specific authors, or in designated journals, date ranges, or subject matter fields. Google’s official blog post on the new search feature gives additional information.

At the moment, it appears that not all unpublished decisions are available in Google Scholar search results, and Google’s disclaimer states that it does not represent that results are complete or accurate. In addition, among other features, Google Scholar lacks the key number system, headnotes, cite-checking ability (although the "How Cited" link gives some information on follow-on citations), and access to a full range of legal journals available from long-standing legal search services such as LexisNexis and Westlaw. Still, as a supplement to Google’s standard web search, the Google Scholar legal opinion and journal search engine is a powerful new — and free — place to start when doing bankruptcy or other legal research.