California Creditor's Rights & Business Bankruptcy Lawyer & Attorney : Robert Eisenbach : Business Bankruptcy Blog

The primary objective of any buyer at a Section 363 sale, whether one purchasing for cash or an existing secured creditor making a credit bid, is to obtain good title to the purchased assets free and clear of any liens, claims, or interests. However, a recent decision on this subject by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is causing something of a stir in the bankruptcy world.

In Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), the Ninth Circuit BAP held that a senior secured creditor's credit bid, in an amount less than the aggregate value of all liens against the property in question, did not satisfy the requirements of Section 365(f) and permit the sale to be "free and clear" of the existing junior liens on the property and reversed the bankruptcy court's order on appeal. You can read the entire opinion by following the link in this sentence.

For an excellent discussion of the decision and the analysis employed by the BAP, be sure to read Steve Jakubowsi's post on the case over at The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Instead of covering the same ground, I want to discuss some of the implications of the decision for Section 363 bankruptcy sales.

Credit Bid Or Foreclosure? First, the Clear Channel decision raises questions about how a senior secured creditor should proceed in a bankruptcy case.

• On the one hand, the BAP's decision that a sale will not be "free and clear" of junior liens is not that surprising. It has generally been accepted that for a "short sale" under Section 363 (one in which the purchase price is less than the amount of liens against the property) to be free and clear of liens, the secured creditors must consent or one of the other exceptions under Section 363(f) must be satisfied. Those other exceptions include a lien subject to "bona fide" dispute or a situation in which the lien holder can be forced to accept a cash payment in satisfaction of the lien.
• What has surprised some about this new decision is the holding that a credit bid by a senior secured creditor also cannot be made free and clear of junior liens, even though the senior secured creditor could have wiped out the junior liens through a foreclosure under state law.
• Section 363(f)'s focus on the "aggregate value of all liens on such property" makes the existence of junior liens the issue, regardless of whether they are in the money. Put differently, even if the junior liens are worthless, they exist and a Section 363 sale to a credit bidding senior secured creditor will not be free and clear of those junior liens.  
• With the enormous increase in second lien lending over the past several years, including many second lien loans made as part of private equity buyouts, expect to see more Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in which substantial junior liens are present.

This ruling seems to leave secured creditors seeking to take title to their collateral with two main choices. One is to seek relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on its collateral, avoiding the Section 363 sale and credit bid approach altogether. If the assets cannot be sold for cash in an amount greater than the senior secured creditor's claim, and if a reorganization is not reasonably in prospect (the key factors in a bankruptcy court's decision whether to lift the stay), this may be the preferred path. A second approach would be to complete the credit bid through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, something the Clear Channel court implied was also available. However, some secured creditors may find the delay and expense involved in being a plan proponent problematic. As a plan proponent, the secured creditor would take on the obligation to pay administrative expenses of the estate on the effective date of the reorganization plan, as well as satisfaction of all of the other requirements for confirming a plan.

The Risks Of An Appeal: The Limits Of Section 363(m) And The Mootness Doctrine. Second, perhaps the most important aspect of the Clear Channel decision is the risks it exposes even for "good faith" purchasers in Section 363 sales. Purchasers of assets under Section 363 regularly seek a finding that they are a good faith purchaser because a sale to such a buyer cannot be overturned on appeal. This protection is found in Section 363(m) and reads as follows:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

Here, the BAP held that although the sale itself to the senior secured creditor could not be overturned on appeal, the protection of Section 363(m) did not extend to the question of whether the sale was made "free and clear" of the junior liens. Instead, the BAP ruled that even in the absence of a stay pending appeal, the appellate court could reverse the "free and clear" determination because Section 363(m) is expressly limited to sale orders under Sections 363(b) and (c), which authorize the sale or lease of property, and does not extend to "free and clear" orders under Section 363(f).

Going hand in hand with the Section 363(m) ruling was the decision's holding that the closing of the asset sale did not render the "free and clear" issue moot. Instead, even though no stay pending appeal was obtained, the BAP concluded that relief could still be granted on the "free and clear" question by ordering that the junior lien remained attached the property even after its sale. 

When Should A Buyer Close The Sale? The Section 363(m) and mootness rulings raise issues about when a buyer of assets under Section 363 should close on the sale. The BAP's views on Section 363(m) and mootness do not appear limited to the credit bid situation involved in the Clear Channel decision. Instead, if a good faith purchaser for cash pays less than the "aggregate value of all liens" against the purchased assets -- or perhaps a question exists whether a lien or interest is really in "bona fide" dispute -- the "free and clear" aspect of the sale may be outside the protection of Section 363(m) and an appeal by a secured creditor or other interest holder may not be moot.

• Buyers usually prefer to close as soon as possible after entry of a bankruptcy court's order approving the sale, especially if the value of the assets are declining or the debtor is running out of cash.
• A buyer that closes with an appeal threatened runs the risk of having the "free and clear" decision overturned months or even years later and the purchased assets suddenly subject to the debtor's liens.
• While every sale objection or appeal will not raise these issues, if a serious objection to the "free and clear" aspect of the bankruptcy court's sale order has been made, and the objector is likely to appeal, the buyer should consider whether to wait until the later of (a) the passage of the 10-day appeal period, or (b) a final appellate decision affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of the objection, before agreeing to close the sale. 
• Buyers may want to consider including provisions in the asset purchase agreement to permit this type of flexibility on when to close or to terminate the agreement if the closing is substantially delayed.

The Precedential Effect Of A BAP Decision. Unlike a U.S. Court of Appeals itself, a BAP is made up of bankruptcy judges, not federal circuit judges. Given a BAP's place in the judicial system's hierarchy, its decisions are not given the same precedential weigh as U.S. Court of Appeals decisions, and this means that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit might reach a different conclusion. Moreover, BAP decisions generally are not binding on bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit. That said, some bankruptcy judges make a practice of following BAP decisions and the BAP's reasoning may influence other judges.

Conclusion. The BAP's Clear Channel decision has important implications for Section 363 asset sales. Secured creditors intent on making a credit bid may now rethink that approach when junior liens are present. Cash buyers may be more cautious on when to close a sale if disputes exist over whether the sale should be "free and clear" of existing liens and interests. It will be interesting to see how other courts, in the Ninth Circuit and beyond, react to the decision, so stay tuned.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

In a decision from August 17, 2007, just released for publication, the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) faced a previously unanswered question under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, the section enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA).  Is a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim available to secured creditors or only to unsecured creditors? You may find the BAP's answer surprising.

A Section 503(b)(9) Refresher. For those who haven't dealt with this relatively new section, here are the highlights. Section 503(b)(9) gives vendors an important right beyond the expanded reclamation claim also enacted as part of BAPCPA. Vendors are entitled to an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 

• In most cases, particularly Chapter 11 cases in which a plan of reorganization is confirmed, administrative claims are paid in full on the effective date of the plan. General unsecured claims, by contrast, often receive only cents on the dollar, and even secured creditors can be "crammed down" and forced to accept payments over a period of time. This new administrative claim is therefore a significant benefit, in effect putting vendors selling goods to a debtor in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing on par with vendors selling goods after the bankruptcy filing. It's available even if a seller of goods fails to provide the required notice to have a post-bankruptcy reclamation claim. 
• For a more detailed analysis of Section 503(b)(9), you may find this earlier post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy" useful, as well as a later post giving an update on a few early court decisions on the section. 
• For more on the changes BAPCPA made to reclamation, you may want to read an earlier post entitled "Reclamation: Can A Vendor "Get The Goods" From An Insolvent Customer" and this post on some of the limitations of reclamation.

The Brown & Cole Stores Case. It was against this backdrop that the BAP analyzed the question before it in the In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC case. Brown & Cole is a privately held grocery chain operating in Washington state. Its principal supplier and wholesaler, Associated Grocers, Incorporated (AGI), is a cooperative whose largest shareholder is Brown & Cole itself. In Brown & Cole's Chapter 11 case, AGI asserted a "20 day goods" claim of more than $6 million, and also asserted that it was a secured creditor with a pledge of AGI's own stock owned by Brown & Cole. Brown & Cole alleged a number of claims against AGI and argued that it had a right of setoff on those claims against any "20 day goods" claim.

When AGI moved for allowance of a Section 503(b)(9) claim, Brown & Cole argued that AGI was not eligible for that administrative claim because it was a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and granted AGI's motion. It also denied Brown & Cole's request for a setoff of its own prepetition claims against the administrative claim, among other reasons because of what the bankruptcy court found to be Brown & Cole's inequitable conduct in ordering goods just prior to its bankruptcy filing.

The BAP's Decision. After hearing the appeal, the BAP issued its opinion and identified the first question presented as "Is a secured claim entitled to an administrative priority pursuant to section 503(b)(9)?" The opinion's introduction shows that the BAP was aware of the interest creditors would have in its decision:

This case presents us with an issue of first impression regarding new section 503(b)(9) (“§  503(b)(9)”) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 2005. We expect that the issue is of great importance to many sellers of goods to troubled companies. The new provision gives expense-of-administration priority (“administrative priority”) to a claim for the value of goods received by a debtor within 20 days before the commencement of the case and sold in the ordinary course of business (“twenty-day sales”). The bankruptcy court granted administrative priority to a claim that may also be secured and denied the debtor’s claim of setoff. We AFFIRM the grant of administrative priority; we REVERSE the denial of setoff.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Secured Creditors Are Entitled To Section 503(b)(9) Claims. In reaching its holding, the BAP majority rejected Brown & Cole's primary argument that the Court should interpret Section 503(b)(9) as applying only to unsecured claims. Brown & Cole argued that at the same time as it added Section 503(b)(9), BAPCPA amended another subsection of Section 503 dealing with tax claims, specifically Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i), to clarify that it was available to "secured or unsecured" creditors.  In contrast, Congress did not include the words "secured claim" in Section 503(b)(9). This difference, Brown & Cole argued, should lead the BAP to hold that the "20 day goods" administrative claim is not available to secured creditors. The BAP's response was clear:

We reject that invitation. The provision is not ambiguous; as such, we must enforce it according to its terms and should not inquire beyond its plain language. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. Apart from finding no ambiguity in § 503(b)(9), we note that Congress also declined to put the word  “unsecured” into the same statute. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that all claims arising  from twenty-day sales are entitled to administrative priority.

(Footnote omitted). The BAP majority also rejected a policy argument advanced by Brown & Cole (B&C), and adopted by Judge Alan Jaroslovsky in his dissent:

We can do nothing about B&C’s contention that giving priority to a secured creditor may be inequitable to other creditors. First, it is up to Congress to decide which creditors have leverage and which do not. More importantly, if AGI’s twenty-day sales claim is fully secured, then payment of it by B&C will free the value of the security for that claim for the benefit of other  creditors. If AGI’s claim proves to be undersecured or unsecured, then to deny administrative priority would be to ignore the statute, something we cannot do.

In a footnoted response to the dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis Montali, writing for himself and Judge Randall L. Dunn, expanded on the point:

The dissent is concerned that we are ignoring bankruptcy policy that permits a Chapter 11 debtor to “cramdown” a secured claim in full over time. Congress gave tremendous leverage to a twenty-day sales claimant such as AGI by permitting it to demand full payment as of confirmation, and in doing so, perhaps dramatically affecting the outcome of the case. The fact that the claim is also secured represents less leverage (albeit more than held by non-priority general unsecured claims) than having administrative priority. It is not our place to reallocate that leverage. In any event, if the dissent’s view were the law, the holder of a twenty-day sales claim could simply waive its security, obtain administrative priority, and have equally powerful influence over the outcome of the case.

Setoff May Be Proper. The BAP (the dissent joined in this part of the majority opinion) also reversed the denial of Brown & Cole's setoff request, holding that although prepetition unsecured claims (the kind Brown & Cole asserted against AGI) cannot generally be set off against administrative claims because of a lack of mutuality, here the administrative claim itself arose prepetition, specifically in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing. On the finding of inequitable conduct in ordering goods and receiving just prior to bankruptcy, the BAP held that there was insufficient evidence of inequitable conduct and that a "debtor contemplating reorganization is under no legal obligation to inform suppliers that it is contemplating a bankruptcy filing." The BAP reversed and remanded that issue to the bankruptcy court.

A Dissenting Voice. Judge Jaroslovsky dissented from what he described as the majority's "overly-sterile conclusion that a fully secured creditor can also have rights under § 503(b)(9)," stating that "[n]ot only is my statutory analysis different, but I see compelling policy reasons for a different result." He found that the plain language of Section 503(b)(9) did not resolve the question of whether secured creditors could be entitled to the administrative priority in light of the change made to Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i). He then turned to the policy issues:

Moreover, some fundamental policy considerations are at stake in this case. While allowing a priority claim to a secured creditor may not have a big impact in most Chapter 7 cases, it can  make a huge difference in a Chapter 11 case like this one. If AGI’s $6 million claim is entitled to priority status, § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that it must be paid in full in cash upon confirmation. If  it is treated as a secured claim, it still must be paid in full but is subject to cramdown pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A). If we incorporate by implication the “secured or unsecured” language into § 503(b)(9), we may be in effect giving a secured creditor veto power over a plan of reorganization when § 1129(b)(2)(A) and sound bankruptcy policy dictate that a secured creditor can be forced  to accept a plan which is fair and equitable to it, honors its secured status and pays its secured claim in full over time.

I would weave the new § 503(b)(9) into the tapestry of American bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization. I prefer this result to the crazy quilt patched together by my brethren.

In his footnote to the prior paragraph, Judge Jaroslovsky stated: "Specifically, I would hold that a creditor would not be entitled to priority status for its twenty-day sales claim to the extent the claim is indubitably secured, applying any security first to claims other than the twenty-day sales claim. I note that AGI might well end up with an allowed priority twenty-day sales claim under this rule."

More Leverage For Secured Vendors. As both the majority and dissent discussed, a secured creditor who has the benefit of a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim will have considerable leverage in getting paid in full upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Most secured creditors lend money instead of supplying goods, but a number of vendors do hold collateral for their claims. Even though BAP decisions (in contrast to Court of Appeals decisions) generally are not binding precedent, other courts may find this decision persuasive. If followed widely, secured creditors entitled to assert a Section 503(b)(9) claim will have a noticeable advantage in getting paid. In addition, as the dissent noted, this decision may also make it more difficult for debtors to confirm Chapter 11 plans unless they have the cash to pay all "20 day goods" administrative claims upon their exit from bankruptcy.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

When a debtor grants a security interest in a patent issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the creditor must take steps to perfect that security interest. Given that the PTO issues patents but the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) generally governs perfection of security interests, creditors have often filed both a UCC-1 financing statement and made a filing in the PTO to cover all the bases.

Perfection By UCC Filing. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit held that a creditor who filed a UCC-1 financing statement properly perfected a security interest in a patent even if it did not also make a filing with the PTO. The decision in the In re Cybernetic Services, Inc. case, officially Moldo v. Matsco, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001), rested on the Ninth Circuit's determination that the federal Patent Act does not cover liens on patents and does not preempt the UCC with respect to perfection of security interests. This seemed to settle the question of whether a UCC filing alone was enough to perfect a security interest in a patent, at least in the Ninth Circuit.

Does A PTO Filing Alone Perfect? Judge William C. Hillman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts faced the opposite question in the In re Coldwave Systems, LLC case. There the creditor sought to rely on a PTO filing alone to perfect its security interest in a patent because the Bankruptcy Court avoided as a preference a tardy UCC filing made long after the security interest was granted but within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition. The creditor's much earlier PTO filing of a Recordation Form Cover Sheet, recording the conveyance of the security agreement between the debtor and the creditor, was not subject to avoidance as a preference. The creditor argued that the PTO filing was sufficient to perfect its security interest, even in the absence of a UCC filing.

UCC Perfection Or Bust. In his 14-page decision issued on May 15, 2007, Judge Hillman held that the PTO filing was insufficient to perfect the creditor's security interest because the Patent Act (specifically Section 261 of Title 35), did not create a system for the perfection of security interests in patents. After first concluding that "[t]he Federal statute does not protect holders of security interests," Judge Hillman held as follows:

There is nothing in §261 that addresses in any way the conflict between one who is not a holder of an interest by way of assignment, grant, or conveyance and a bankruptcy trustee. We must look to other law for the answer. 

That other law was the UCC. Holding that a patent is a general intangible, the Court ruled that nothing in the UCC excepts general intangibles from the rule requiring perfection by a UCC filing. Since no valid UCC filing perfected the creditor's security interest, it was unperfected and the Chapter 7 trustee prevailed.

The Bottom Line. The Coldwave Systems decision is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's earlier Cybernetic Services ruling. Together they teach creditors that the only way to perfect a security interest in a patent is by an unavoidable and proper UCC filing. Any creditor relying on a PTO filing alone will end up unperfected and unsecured. While there may be other reasons for a creditor to make a PTO filing, such as potentially protecting against an improper assignment of the patent, perfection of a security interest is not one of them.

Want More? For more on the Coldwave Systems and Cybernetic Services decisions, be sure to read Warren Agin's excellent post on the Tech Bankruptcy blog, entitled "An Expert Builds On Cybernetic Services." Warren also gets special thanks for first posting on Judge Hillman's interesting decision.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks