California Creditor's Rights & Business Bankruptcy Lawyer & Attorney : Robert Eisenbach : Business Bankruptcy Blog

Last November I reported on the status of the Ninth Circuit appeal in In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., a case addressing whether a debtor can assume a trademark license over the trademark owner's objection. Back in 2005 the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here to read an earlier post on the case.

The N.C.P. Marketing Court's Analysis. In reaching its conclusion, the District Court held that under the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, a trademark owner has a right and duty to control the quality of goods sold under the mark:

Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely assignable to a third party.  

The trademark owner in that case, Billy Blanks of the Billy Blanks® Tae Bo® fitness program, successfully moved the court to compel rejection of the trademark license because under the "hypothetical test" analysis of Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contracts that cannot be assigned by the debtor without the nondebtor party's consent cannot be assumed by the debtor either. (For a full discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?")  

The Ninth Circuit Appeal. N.C.P. Marketing appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, the appeal was fully briefed, and oral argument had been scheduled for November 5, 2007. Prior to the oral argument, the Chapter 7 trustee for N.C.P. Marketing reached a settlement in the case. At the trustee's request, the Ninth Circuit took the oral argument off calendar and directed the parties to move to dismiss the appeal if the settlement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court. At the time, I commented that it appeared that no Ninth Circuit decision would be issued in the case due to the settlement.

The Settlement Is Rejected. Back in the Bankruptcy Court, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion for approval of the settlement, but N.C.P. Marketing and certain other parties filed an objection and offered a competing bid for the appeal rights. In something of a surprise, on February 28, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court issued a brief order denying the trustee's motion for approval of the settlement and instead approved a sale of the appeal rights and certain other assets to the objecting parties. The objecting parties thereafter posted the undertaking required by the Bankruptcy Court's order.

Appeal May Go Forward. As a result, the Ninth Circuit appeal may be revived, although no new oral argument has been scheduled yet. Barring further developments, trademark licensors and licensees may end up seeing a Ninth Circuit decision after all on the important issue of whether trademark licenses can be assumed in bankruptcy. Stay tuned.

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Over a year ago, I posted on a first of its kind decision in In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), in which the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada held that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here to read the earlier post on the case.

The N.C.P. Marketing Court's Analysis. In reaching its conclusion, the District Court held that under the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, a trademark owner has a right and duty to control the quality of goods sold under the mark:

Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely assignable to a third party.  

The trademark owner in that case, Billy Blanks of the Billy Blanks® Tae Bo® fitness program, successfully moved the court to compel rejection of the trademark license because under the "hypothetical test" analysis of Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contracts that cannot be assigned by the debtor without the nondebtor party's consent cannot be assumed by the debtor either. (For a full discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?")  

The Ninth Circuit Appeal. In December 2005, the parties appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was fully briefed and had been scheduled for oral argument on November 5, 2007.

• In July 2007, however, the N.C.P. Marketing Chapter 11 case was converted to Chapter 7. 
• On October 24, 2007, the Chapter 7 trustee asked the Ninth Circuit to reschedule the oral argument because of a pending settlement in the case.
• In response, the Ninth Circuit took the oral argument off calendar and directed the parties to move to dismiss the appeal if the settlement is approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

Still No Court Of Appeals Decision. If the settlement is approved, no Ninth Circuit decision will be issued. Instead, this case seems to be headed to an ending similar to that in In re Wellington Vision, Inc. (see this earlier post on the Wellington Vision case for more details), perhaps the only other bankruptcy decision to date to address this trademark issue. There, conversion of the case to Chapter 7 also led to a settlement without an appellate decision. With these recent developments in the In re N.C.P. Marketing case, trademark licensors and licensees will have to wait longer still for an appeals court decision on this important issue at the intersection of trademark and bankruptcy law.

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over, among other areas, patent appeals, so it's not every day that a Federal Circuit decision appears on this business bankruptcy blog. (Actually, it's been about a year since this post discussing another Federal Circuit decision.) However, a September 19, 2007 opinion (available here) of the Federal Circuit rested largely on the intersection of patent law and the terms of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Since the decision denied a trust created under the plan standing to bring the debtor's patent infringement claims, it's a significant one for debtors and creditors alike. After discussing the court's decision I'll conclude with my suggested take-away from the case.

The At Home Corporation Plan And Liquidation Trusts. The litigation arose in the At Home Corporation Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, which was filed in September 2001. As part of the confirmed plan of liquidation, a general unsecured creditor liquidation trust (called GUCLT) was created to pursue various claims for the benefit of creditors, including certain patent infringement claims against Microsoft Corporation. A separate liquidation trust (called AHLT) received ownership of the At Home patent at issue in the litigation, among other assets. GUCLT was not granted a license to the patent.

The Patent Litigation And Federal Circuit Decision. The patent litigation reached the Federal Circuit in 2006. Although the plan and related documents granted GUCLT the express right to pursue the patent litigation claims at issue, the Federal Circuit found that to be insufficient to confer standing. It held that the patent statutes provide protection to the party with a right to exclude, not the party with a right to sue. Because the right to exclude others from practicing the patent (part of AHLT's rights) had been separated from the right to sue for infringement (GUCLT's rights), GUCLT was not protected under the patent statutes. The Federal Circuit summed up the situation this way:

The problem for GUCLT and AHLT is that the exclusionary rights have been separated from the right to sue for infringement. The liquidation plan contractually separated the right to sue from the underlying legally protected interests created by the patent statutes—the right to exclude. For any suit that GUCLT brings, its grievance is that the exclusionary interests held by AHLT are being violated. GUCLT is not the party to which the statutes grant judicial relief. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. GUCLT suffers no legal injury in fact to the patent’s exclusionary rights. As the Supreme Court stated in Independent Wireless, the right to bring an infringement suit is “to obtain damages for the injury to his exclusive right by an infringer.” 269 U.S. at 469; see also Sicom, 222 F.3d at 1381 (“Standing to sue for infringement depends entirely on the putative plaintiff’s proprietary interest in the patent, not on any contractual arrangements among the parties regarding who may sue…”); Ortho, 52 F.3d at 1034 (“[A] right to sue clause cannot negate the requirement that, for co-plaintiff standing, a licensee must have beneficial ownership of some of the patentee’s proprietary rights.”).

Since GUCLT had the right to sue but not the right to exclude others from practicing the patent, and since AHLT had the right to exclude others but not the right to sue for infringement, neither liquidating trust could sue for the infringement alleged in the GUCLT's underlying lawsuit. The Federal Circuit ruled that the problem could not be solved by the typical practice of joining the legal title holder, here AHLT, to the patent litigation as a party. Although such joinder solves prudential standing requirements, the court held that it does not solve the constitutional standing requirement of actual legal injury. GUCLT did not suffer legal injury because it had no right to exclude others from practicing the patent.

The Federal Circuit's majority opinion prompted an interesting dissent, which ended with the following:

While I do not read any precedent as directly governing the peculiar circumstances of this case, I also do not read any as precluding co-plaintiff standing for GUCLT. I believe that, in denying all possibility for enforcing the patent, the majority opinion extends limitations on co-plaintiff standing without a reasoned basis. Accordingly, while neither GUCLT nor AHLT individually may pursue infringement litigation, I would not deprive the patent of all value. Because I would allow GUCLT and AHLT, as co-plaintiffs, standing to sue Microsoft, I respectfully dissent.

The View From IP Bloggers. Dennis Crouch of the Patently-O patent law blog has an interesting post on the case, and he gets special thanks for first reporting on the decision. For another view, you may find this post from the Patry Copyright Blog published by William Patry, Google's Senior Copyright Counsel, of interest.

Important Lessons. On his patent law blog, Dennis Crouch gives the practice pointer that he believes patent lawyers should learn from the decision: "A non-title-holder must be granted an exclusive license as well as full litigation rights in order to have standing to sue for patent infringement." That is helpful advice for patent lawyers, but I have a suggestion of my own.

• When intellectual property such as patents, copyrights, or trademarks is involved in a bankruptcy case, get expert advice from IP counsel, in addition to bankruptcy advice. The problem may be separating exclusionary rights from the right to sue for patent infringement one day and transferring a trademark without its goodwill the next.
• This suggestion applies when dealing with, for example, the transfer of IP in a bankruptcy case, whether by liquidation trusts, Section 363 asset sales, or something else, or assessing the risk of continuing patent infringement when purchasing IP assets.
• As the Federal Circuit's decision shows, the interplay between IP issues and bankruptcy cases can be complex and the possible outcomes surprising. Getting expert advice can help you avoid these and other traps for the unwary.

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Practically every contract has a provision that makes the bankruptcy or insolvency of one contracting party a trigger for the other party to terminate the contract. These are standard fare and rarely negotiated unless they also include a provision for the reversion back of ownership of property, often intellectual property, upon bankruptcy or insolvency. This post takes a look at these provisions and examines whether they are enforceable.

The Typical Ipso Facto Clause. Termination on bankruptcy provisions are often known as ipso facto clauses (the Latin phrase meaning "by the fact itself") because the language provides that the fact of bankruptcy itself is enough to trigger the termination of the agreement. Here's a common provision:

This Agreement shall terminate, without notice, (i) upon the institution by or against either party of insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy proceedings or any other proceedings for the settlement of either party's debts, (ii) upon either party making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or (iii) upon either party's dissolution or ceasing to do business.

Variants of this language are found in many types of contracts, including licenses, leases, and development agreements. Some provide that termination is automatic and others first require notice. Termination triggers may include:

• Filing a voluntary bankruptcy;
• Having an involuntary bankruptcy filed against a party;
• Becoming insolvent (frequently the term is left undefined in the contract);
• Admitting in writing that the party is insolvent;
• Making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors (a liquidation alternative recognized under the laws of many states); or
• Tripping a financial condition covenant.

The bankruptcy or insolvency of either party is frequently a termination trigger. However, when the financial condition of only one contracting party is in doubt, the more financially stable party may insist on a one-sided provision allowing it to get out of the agreement upon the weaker party's insolvency or bankruptcy. 

Notso Fasto: The Bankruptcy Code Stops The Clause In Its Tracks. These termination provisions may be common, but are they enforceable? The short answer, which may be surprising to some, is generally "no." Two key provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lead to this result. First, Section 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an interest of the debtor (the bankrupt company or person) in property becomes "property of the estate," meaning that the debtor does not lose the property or contract right, despite a provision in an agreement:

that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in property.

11 U.S.C. §541(c). Translated from bankruptcy-ese, this statute means that a clause that terminates a contract because of the "insolvency" or "financial condition" of the debtor, or due to the filing of a bankruptcy case, will be unenforceable once a bankruptcy case has been filed.

A second Bankruptcy Code provision, Section 365(e)(1), governs ipso facto clauses in executory contracts, which are agreements under which both sides still have important performance remaining (discussed in more detail in this earlier post). Section 365(e)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on—

(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of the case;

(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or

(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.

Why Put Ipso Facto Clauses In Contracts In The First Place? If these termination provisions are generally unenforceable, why do parties seem to include them in almost every contract? There are three main reasons.

Force Of Habit. One reason is that under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898, replaced by the Bankruptcy Code in 1979, these ipso facto clauses were enforceable. Over the years, lawyers and businesses got used to including them in their contract forms and they have continued to write them into many agreements. Since it's always possible that the Bankruptcy Code could be changed to reinstate the old rule, lawyers often see little reason to take them out.

It Takes An Actual Bankruptcy. Another and perhaps more important reason is that the rule applies only if a bankruptcy is actually filed. If an ipso facto provision provides that the agreement terminates upon a party's insolvency, and no bankruptcy case is ever filed, it's possible that the solvent party could terminate the agreement using the ipso facto provision. But be forewarned: if a bankruptcy case is later filed, an insolvency-based termination made before the bankruptcy filing may not be enforced in the bankruptcy case. This means that the debtor may still have a chance to retain the rights under the contract, including assuming or assigning an executory contract during the bankruptcy case.

A Limited Exception In Bankruptcy. A third reason is that an important, albeit limited, exception to the rule applies even after a bankruptcy is filed. The exception stems less from the ipso facto clause itself and more from the rules governing assumption of certain types of executory contracts, including intellectual property licenses (at least in some circuits).

• Section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with Section 365(c)(1), provides that an ipso facto clause can be enforceable if the debtor or trustee is not permitted by "applicable law" to assume or assign the executory contract. Simply put, if applicable law provides that an IP license or another executory contract cannot be assumed by the debtor or trustee without the other party's consent, then the non-debtor contracting party can force rejection of the license or seek relief from the automatic stay to terminate the agreement based on the ipso facto clause.
• Although an analysis of the law governing assumption and assignment of IP licenses and related agreements is beyond the scope of this post, you can find a detailed discussion in an earlier one entitled "Assumption of IP Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?" 

A Word To The Wise. Parties include "termination on bankruptcy" provisions in contracts all the time, despite the general rule making them unenforceable in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, some do so without realizing that the provision may be ineffective, and that can lead to trouble. If enforcing an ipso facto clause is important to one of your agreements, especially if you also seek the highly problematic reversion of intellectual property or other rights upon such a termination, be sure to get specific legal advice on your situation, including whether alternative approaches may exist to help achieve your objectives.

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Intellectual property licenses continue to be significant to companies across a wide range of industries. This fact makes their treatment in business bankruptcy cases a topic of keen interest. 

Can A Debtor Licensee Retain IP License Rights? When the debtor in possession is a licensee under a patent, copyright, or trademark license, a key question arises: Can the license be assumed (bankruptcy-speak for kept) or will the bankruptcy filing put the licensor in a position to force rejection of the license -- resulting in the ultimate termination of the debtor's right to use the licensed IP?  A new case, discussed below, recently sided with the debtor in possession.

One Statute, Three Tests. This issue has led to a significant split of authority among bankruptcy courts and courts of appeal around the country, stemming from different interpretations of the language in Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides as follows:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

Some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have sided with the licensor and interpret Section 365(c)(1) to prohibit both assignment and assumption. Other courts, including the First Circuit, have permitted such licenses to be assumed.

• Despite the split, most courts agree that Section 365(c)(1) prohibits assignment of executory contracts without the non-debtor contracting party's consent if "applicable law" requires such consent because that would require the non-debtor party to accept performance from a new party. 
• A number of courts have held that when the "applicable law" is federal patent, copyright, or trademark law, such consent is required.
• Courts diverge, however, on whether the statute's language should be read to prohibit a debtor in possession from assuming such executory contracts or only from assigning them.

Rather than cover that ground here, if this topic is new to you I suggest reading an earlier post entitled "Assumption Of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?" It discusses in detail how different courts have interpreted Section 365(c)(1), leading to the licensor-favorable "hypothetical test," the debtor-favorable "actual test," and the newer, debtor-favorable Footstar analysis. 

A Word On Footstar. Before moving on to the new decision, a brief word about the Footstar case may be helpful. In In re Footstar, Inc,, 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), Judge Adlai Hardin of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York took a somewhat different approach in analyzing the statute. He concluded that Section 365(c)(1)'s use of the word "trustee" does not (as other courts had taken for granted) include the debtor or debtor in possession when assumption is sought because assumption does not require the non-debtor party to accept performance from a new party other than the debtor or debtor in possession. A trustee is a new party and the statute logically provides that a trustee may not "assume or assign" such an executory contract.

A Common Scenario. How does this issue come up in Chapter 11 cases? Well, here's a typical situation. The debtor is the licensee under a prepetition patent license. The patent licensor files a motion to compel the debtor in possession to reject the patent license agreement or alternatively to have the automatic stay lifted to permit the licensor to cancel the agreement. The licensor argues that under the "hypothetical test" interpretation of Section 365(c)(1), the debtor in possession cannot assign the license and, as a result, cannot assume the license either. With neither option open, the licensor argues, the debtor in possession should be compelled to reject the license.

The Aerobox Decision. This was the situation that recently played out in the In re Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Ruling on just such a motion by a patent licensor, on July 27, 2007, Judge Mark B. McFeeley of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico issued an 11-page decision holding that the actual test, and Judge Hardin's analysis in Footstar, was the correct interpretation of Section 365(c)(1). As such, he denied the licensor's motion and held that the debtor in possession was not barred by Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code from assuming the prepetition patent license at issue in that case. The Bankruptcy Court summed up its holding as follows:

Similarly, the bankruptcy court in Footstar reasons that it makes perfect sense for the statute, which uses the term, “trustee,” to prohibit the trustee from assuming or assigning a contract, because the trustee is an “entity other than the debtor in possession” but it makes no sense to read “trustee” to mean “debtor in possession.” Footstar, 323 B.R. at 573. Doing so

would render the provision a virtual oxymoron, since mere assumption [by the debtor in possession] (without assignment) would not compel the counterparty to accept performance from or render it to “an entity other than” the debtor.

Id.

This Court agrees.

Thus, where the debtor-in-possession seeks to assume, or, as is the situation in the instant case, where the debtor-in-possession has neither sought to assume nor reject the executory contract but simply continues to operate post-petition under its terms, 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) does not prohibit assumption of the contract by the debtor-in-possession and cannot operate to allow the non-debtor party to the executory contract to compel the Debtor to reject the contract. In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds that the “actual test” articulated in Cambridge Biotech, and the reasoning of the court in Footstar, is the better approach to § 365(c)(1) when determining whether a debtor-in-possession is precluded from assuming an executory contract.

Venue Still Matters. The decision is interesting because it represents another bankruptcy court, this time outside of the Southern District of New York, endorsing the analysis in the Footstar decision. That said, Judge McFeeley wrote on something of a clean slate because the Tenth Circuit has not yet taken a view on whether the hypothetical test, the actual test, or the Footstar analysis controls. As this circuit-by-circuit chart of Section 365(c)(1) decisions shows (last updated in March 2007), many other circuits have staked out a position on the issue. Absent a Supreme Court decision or new legislation resolving the circuit split, where a debtor files bankruptcy will continue to make a big difference in the relative rights of licensors and debtors over intellectual property licenses in Chapter 11 cases.

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In a June 18, 2007 decision in In re J.Z. L.L.C. (available here), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced an interesting question: Did the so-called "ride through" doctrine from the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898 survive enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978? The BAP's introduction to the decision sums up its answer:

We confront the puzzle of the status of an executory contract that was neither assumed nor rejected during a chapter 11 case in which there was a confirmed plan that did not involve transfers of property of the estate or creation of new entities. We conclude that the “ride through” doctrine developed under the former Bankruptcy Act retains vitality in chapter 11 cases when the debtor continues operating and does not change form.

After a chapter 11 case was closed, the reorganized debtor sued in state court to enforce a license that it had granted prepetition regarding the use of its manufacturing technology. The state court declined to act without a bankruptcy court ruling that the license, which had been neither assumed nor rejected during the chapter 11 case, remained in effect. The bankruptcy court ruled that the license contract survives under the “ride through” doctrine, that the debtor has standing to enforce the contract because all property of the estate vested in the debtor on confirmation, and that the reorganized debtor should not be judicially estopped. We AFFIRM.

Executory Contracts And Bankruptcy. I have previously discussed the importance of executory contracts in bankruptcy, and specifically how licenses of intellectual property are treated. Both of those posts were premised on the bankruptcy court being asked to decide whether an intellectual property license could be assumed, assumed and assigned, or rejected during the bankruptcy. This case, however, presented a very different situation in which the Chapter 11 debtor did not take any action during the Chapter 11 case to assume or reject the executory contract (here a license agreement permitting the non-debtor party to manufacture, promote, and sell a horizontal grinder on an exclusive basis for five years). In addition, although aware of the bankruptcy case, the non-debtor party to the contract also did not seek to force a decision on assumption or rejection pursuant to Section 365(d)(2).

The BAP's Reasoning. The BAP's 28-page decision carefully analyzes the issues raised in the case and makes a number of interesting conclusions.

• First, not only did the debtor neither assume nor reject the license agreement, it also failed to list it on its bankruptcy schedules (specifically Schedule G). Nevertheless, the BAP held that the non-debtor licensee's failure to disclose it to the Bankruptcy Court or creditors left it "in the grandstand and not on the playing field" on its argument that the debtor should lose the right to enforce the agreement.
• Second, even though the license agreement was unscheduled, once the debtor's Chapter 11 plan was confirmed, all property of the estate -- including this unscheduled asset -- revested in the reorganized debtor under Section 1141(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
• Third, while judicial estoppel can sometimes apply to limit the debtor's ability to sue on an unscheduled asset,  the BAP decided against applying judicial estoppel here, noting that when creditors could be harmed by such limits one "should not become so angry at a debtor that a creditor is taken out and shot." The BAP did acknowledge that the state court hearing the debtor's lawsuit against the licensee could reach a different conclusion.
• Fourth, under the language and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, an "executory contract that is not assumed in a chapter 11 case is not 'deemed rejected.' As a matter of straightforward statutory construction, it follows that some other alternative, i.e., 'ride through,' must be available."
• Fifth, the "ride through" or "pass through" doctrine was well established under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 requires a conclusion that Congress intended to disturb that existing doctrine. In addition, the lack of clarity over which contracts are executory and which are non-executory (and thus not subject to assumption or rejection) bolsters the view that a "ride through" alternative exists for contracts.

For more background on the Bankruptcy Court's decision below (available here), affirmed by the BAP, be sure to read Warren Agin's December 2006 post on his Tech Bankruptcy Blog, which gives his always insightful perspective on these IP and bankruptcy issues. 

Significance Of A BAP Decision. It's worth noting that unlike a U.S. Court of Appeals, the BAP is made up of bankruptcy judges only, not federal circuit judges. Given a BAP's place in the judicial system's hierarchy, its decisions are not given the same precedential weigh as U.S. Court of Appeals decisions. This means that it's possible that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could reach a different, and overruling, conclusion. However, the BAP's decision in this case is well-reasoned and three other circuits (the First, Second, and Fifth) have also ruled that the ride through doctrine still applies today. This makes the BAP's decision of special interest.

A Strategic Use Of The "Ride Through" Doctrine? As discussed in an earlier post on assumption of IP licenses, in several circuits a debtor cannot even assume many in-licenses of intellectual property without the licensor's consent.

• In those circuits, a debtor may consider whether it could retain licenses simply by choosing to have them "ride through" the Chapter 11 case, neither moving to assume the license nor (the debtor hopes) having the licensors move to compel rejection. This scenario makes the old "ride through" doctrine of particular interest, especially if the debtor licensee has not defaulted under the agreement and is seeking only to keep the license agreement after reorganizing in Chapter 11.
• While it's true that the occasional executory contract may slip through without a formal decision to assume or reject, it's the prospect of a debtor being able to use the doctrine as alternative way of preserving valuable intellectual property licenses that has bankruptcy lawyers giving the "ride through" doctrine a closer look.

Stay tuned, but the BAP's decision in In re JZ L.L.C. may encourage more such efforts in the future.

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Once again, a district court has faced the issue of whether a non-exclusive trademark license can be assumed by a debtor in possession. Before the November 2005 decision in In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), no court had directly addressed that question. The decision in the N.C.P. Marketing case, now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, held that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable, absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary, and in a hypothetical test jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit, they cannot be assumed by the debtor in possession. For a more detailed discussion on the N.C.P. Marketing case, you may find this post of interest. For an analysis of some recent trends on the broader topic of assumption of IP licenses, try this post.

The Wellington Vision Case. Earlier this year, a second district court, this time the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, faced the same question in an appeal in the In re Wellington Vision, Inc. Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

• Pearle Vision sought relief from the automatic stay to terminate a franchise agreement with Wellington Vision, arguing that Wellington could not assume the agreement because it Included a non-exclusive license of Pearle Vision trademarks.
• The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the motion for stay relief by this two-page order, holding that the inclusion in the franchise agreement of a trademark license made the agreement, under federal trademark law, non-assignable absent consent by Pearle Vision.

Appeal To The District Court. Wellington Vision filed an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's decision.

• In its opening brief, Wellington argued that (1) Pearle Vision had failed to establish that the franchise agreement included a trademark license, (2) a provision in the franchise agreement allowing for assignments on consent that cannot be unreasonably withheld meant that the parties had opted out of applicable law, and (3) Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code only prohibits assumption or assignment by a trustee, not by a debtor in possession, citing the Footstar case.
• Pearle Vision argued in its answer brief that "applicable law" is the federal Lanham Act, which makes trademark licenses personal and non-assignable, and that Section 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test and precludes assignment or assumption of the license.
• Wellington's reply brief asserted that the District Court should not apply Section 365(c)(1) to debtors in possession and further that it should hold that this license was assignable by its terms.

The District Court's Decision On Appeal. On February 20, 2007, Judge Alan S. Gold of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision in this 14-page decision. The District Court first held that the franchise agreement expressly included a non-exclusive license to certain Pearle Vision trademarks, making the Lanham Act the "applicable law" to be considered under Section 365(c)(1). It then held that the agreement's provisions contemplating assignment under certain conditions did not constitute consent to any specific assignment or an "opt out" of the Lanham Act's general restrictions on assignment, distinguishing In re Quantegy, 326 B.R. 467 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2005), relied on by Wellington. Finally, the District Court held that Section 365(c)(1) did apply to debtors in possession and not just to trustees, citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994).

No Further Appeal Has Been Filed. Unlike the N.C.P. Marketing case, the District Court's decision in this case will not be appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Wellington case was converted to a Chapter 7 case. Also, within the past two months litigation between Pearle, Wellington, and a guarantor of certain debt owed to Pearle was settled, resolving the issues decided by the District Court.

Trademark Owners Win Another One. Although it did not cite the N.C.P. Marketing decision, the Wellington Vision court becomes only the second district court to address the assumability of trademark licenses -- and the second to hold that they are not assumable when the hypothetical test applies. This is more good news for trademark owners, who typically want as much control as possible over licenses to their marks, but bad news for debtors, who face the prospect of losing valuable trademark licenses (and franchise agreements including them) if they file bankruptcy. Stay tuned for more developments on this issue, including the Ninth Circuit's decision in N.C.P. Marketing, which is likely still months away.

Special thanks to Warren Agin of the Tech Bankruptcy blog, whose post entitled The Descent Into Darkness Continues, first discussed the Wellington Vision case. The title of that post also gives you a sense of how many bankruptcy lawyers feel about the hypothetical test, its application to IP licenses, and its impact on debtors. 

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Executory contracts present a host of interesting issues in bankruptcy cases. This is especially true when the executory contract involves a license of intellectual property (or "IP"). In the past I've devoted several posts to the topic, including how IP licenses are treated in bankruptcy and the unique issues presented when a trademark licensee or trademark licensor files bankruptcy. 

In this post, I'll drill down a bit deeper into the question of how courts have analyzed whether a Chapter 11 debtor can assume or assign an IP license to a third party over the IP licensor's objection. If you're new to the topic, be forewarned: the courts are all over the map on the issue. For those who'd like a scorecard, you'll find a link to a circuit-by-circuit chart in the "Where Does Your Court Stand?" section toward the end of this post.

Assumption And Assignment. In bankruptcy parlance, assumption means that the debtor gets to keep the license. Usually, debtors are allowed to exercise their business judgment when deciding whether to assume or reject (read: breach and stop performing) an executory contract, as well as to assume and assign one to a third party. However, Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code puts a limit on a debtor's ability to assign executory contracts, and perhaps even to assume them, when "applicable law" gives the non-debtor party to the contract the right to refuse to deal with someone else.

The Key Bankruptcy Code Section. Since Section 365(c)(1) is so important to this debate, it bears careful review. Here's what it says:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

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Peter S. Menell, a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall) and the Director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, is a highly regarded expert on intellectual property law. I wanted to let you know that he's just posted a very interesting and comprehensive article on the Social Science Research Network (known as SSRN) reviewing how intellectual property assets are affected by bankruptcy. Having served on a panel with Professor Menell a few years ago, I can attest to his deep knowledge of these issues.

Entitled "Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: an Economic Analysis," the article begins with an extensive discussion of patent, copyright, and trademark law and then analyzes the complex interplay between IP and bankruptcy law. Covering a broad range of topics, the article discusses Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, how assumption and assignment of exclusive and non-exclusive licenses have been treated by the courts, and the issues surrounding the perfection of security interests in intellectual property.

If you're familiar with bankruptcy, you'll find the article's overview of intellectual property law particularly helpful. If you're familiar with IP law, you'll benefit from the article's discussion of how bankruptcy impacts IP rights. If you're new to both, the article will give you a serious introduction to these legal issues. I recommend the article to anyone looking for a top-flight review and analysis of what happens when intellectual property finds its way into bankruptcy court.

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I've posted in the past about bankruptcy asset sales and how parties with executory contracts need to keep track of bankruptcy cases to protect their rights. Steve Jakubowski of The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog has an entertaining and informative post about a recent Court of Appeals decision involving rappers, recording companies, copyrights, and bankruptcy that raises some similar issues.

It's a cautionary tale about the importance of monitoring bankruptcy cases and acting to protect rights when copyrights are involved. (So you don't get complacent, the same message applies for patents, trademarks, and other intellectual property, and especially when licenses are involved.) After describing the case briefly, I discuss some points to keep in mind when IP crosses the bankruptcy court's door.

Setting The Stage. Some background on the facts of the case will help put things in perspective.

• Act One: In 1989, Jeffrey Thompkins, a rap artist known as JT Money, entered into an exclusive recording agreement with the debtor (a recording company). In the agreement, Thompkins sold his sound recording copyrights in various songs in exchange for the debtor's agreement to pay royalties on the records released. (A later agreement made the debtor a half owner in the musical composition copyrights as well.)
• Act Two: Six years later, the debtor ended up in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The copyrights were sold "free and clear" to another recording company for $800,000 as part of the debtor's plan of reorganization, which the bankruptcy court confirmed. The recording agreement was ultimately rejected as an executory contract. Apparently, Tompkins neither objected to the sale nor defended his claim for damages after the recording agreement was rejected.

The Curtain Falls. Almost six years after the bankruptcy sale, Tompkins sued the purchaser of the copyrights in federal court, alleging copyright infringement and other claims. The district court granted the purchaser's motion for summary judgment and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that even though the debtor had rejected the original recording agreement, under bankruptcy law that rejection acted only as a breach and not as a rescission of the contract. Quoting from earlier decisions, the Court of Appeals commented that rejection does not "vaporize" a debtor's rights under a rejected contract. Here the debtor retained ownership of the copyrights transferred under the recording agreement even though it breached the obligation to pay royalties. Because the purchaser was the actual owner of the copyrights, the infringement claim failed.

Encore: Lessons For The Audience. What can intellectual property owners and debtors learn from this decision?

• A transfer of IP under an executory contract will not be rescinded if the buyer later files bankruptcy and rejects the agreement.
• An IP owner looking for more control over its IP should consider granting a license instead of making an outright sale subject only to a royalty obligation. In some industries this may not be a realistic alternative, but when possible it can give IP owners more control. 
• In many jurisdictions, IP owners who have granted only non-exclusive licenses prohibiting assignment will have the equivalent of a veto right in bankruptcy over proposed assignments of the license. This is generally true for copyrights, patents, and possibly trademarks, and can have a big impact on a debtor's ability to transfer license rights.
• When a licensee or other debtor with rights related to IP files bankruptcy, it's critical for IP owners to monitor the bankruptcy case and be prepared to take action to defend their rights. Among the issues that can come up: asset sales involving a sale of the IP or an assignment of license rights, breaches of license terms, and infringement issues.
• Likewise, debtors and creditors committees need to understand what IP rights the debtor has, what consents may be required to assign or transfer those rights, and how the rights of third party licensors and other IP owners may impact asset sales and reorganization prospects.

Conclusion. The intersection between intellectual property and bankruptcy law can be complex. Whether you are an IP owner, a debtor, or a committee, getting good legal advice before and after a bankruptcy is filed can be critical in protecting your rights.

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In many corporate bankruptcy cases, the debtor will use the bankruptcy process to sell its assets and to assume and assign valuable leases, executory contracts, and licenses (see earlier posts on what happens to leases in bankruptcy, to executory contracts, and to intellectual property licenses, a special type of executory contract). 

This post discusses some mechanics of the bankruptcy sale process and points out how parties to executory contracts and leases can protect their rights. (A discussion of the sale process from the buyer's perspective can be found here.)

The Section 363 sale.  A bankruptcy asset sale often will happen in the first few weeks or months of a Chapter 11 case, rather than as part of a plan of reorganization. Frequently this will involve a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's business as a going concern. You may hear the sale referred to as a "Section 363 sale" because Section 363 is the key Bankruptcy Code section that governs a debtor's sale of assets in bankruptcy. Regardless of what is being sold, the debtor must seek bankruptcy court approval of the sale and of any effort to transfer executory contracts, licenses, and leases to the buyer. 

Sales "free and clear" of liens. When the debtor files a motion seeking to sell its assets, it usually will ask to do so free and clear of liens. The term "lien" includes everything from UCC security interests filed by banks or other secured lenders taking the debtor's assets as collateral for loans to judgment and other types of liens. In a Section 363 sale, a debtor may propose to sell the assets and hold the sale proceeds in a separate account, with the secured creditors’ liens being transferred over to those funds. Debtors ask for authority to sell the assets "free and clear" of liens because the buyer wants clear title to the assets, unencumbered with any of the debtor's old debts and liens.

Motion to assume and assign executory contracts and leases. The debtor will typically file another motion (or may combine it with the motion to sell free and clear) seeking authority to assume and assign to the buyer certain executory contracts and leases.  If you are a party to an executory contract or lease, you should follow the sale process closely because your rights could well be affected. 

• The debtor will likely send out a notice to parties to executory contracts and to landlords with a list of the contracts and leases proposed to be assumed and assigned. This is a very important document and you or your counsel should review every page carefully. 
• The notice typically will list the amount the debtor proposes to pay to “cure” any defaults. The debtor must cure any defaults in cash before the contract or lease can be assumed and assigned to the buyer. Very often the notice will indicate that the proposed cure amount for some contracts or leases is zero or it may leave the amount blank with an asterisk stating that the debtor believes that no cure amount is owed. 
• Here's an example of a notice, with a fairly typical multi-page chart listing scores of contracts to be assumed and assigned as part of the sale and indicating proposed cure amounts. 

Scream or die. This isn't a warning in a horror film but a phrase bankruptcy lawyers have coined to describe a creditor's requirement to file an objection by the stated deadline or face the loss of your rights. (You have to admit it's catchy.) To put it in less vivid terms, if you want to object (1) to the assignment of your executory contract, license, or lease at all, (2) to its assignment to the particular buyer proposed, or (3) even to the amount proposed to be paid to cure defaults, you have to file a written objection by the deadline listed in the notice. If you don't, the debtor will ask the bankruptcy court for an order approving the transfer of your contract, license, or lease, and that may well involve no cure payment at all. Because bankruptcy cases move quickly by necessity, "screaming" after the deadline will generally be too late.

Got counsel?  If you have an important executory contract, intellectual property license, or commercial lease with a debtor, having your counsel monitor the bankruptcy case and review any sale motions and assumption and assignment notices is the best way to protect your rights. Otherwise, you may miss an opportunity to receive a cure payment, to object to an assignment of an intellectual property license, or otherwise to exercise your rights in the bankruptcy case.

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In an earlier post I discussed how a recent district court case gave trademark owners a leg up when a licensee files for bankruptcy. This begs the question: Does the advantage switch back to the licensee if the trademark owner files for bankruptcy? The answer generally, and perhaps surprisingly, is no. 

Limited protection of Section 365(n). Of course, it can be devastating for a licensee to lose access to licensed intellectual property. Often a licensee will build in licensed technology into its products or develop an entire business line or brand around a licensed trademark.  Recognizing how important in-licensed IP can be, in 1988 Congress added Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, giving licensees of certain types of intellectual property special protections in bankruptcy. These protections allow licensees to retain their rights to the licensed intellectual property – but there’s a catch. The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “intellectual property” includes, among other things, patents, patent applications, copyrights, and trade secrets, but unfortunately for trademark licensees, it does not include trademarks.

Trademark licensee's special risk. With no special protection, the trademark licensee faces the risk of having its license, a form of executory contract, rejected by the trademark owner in bankruptcy. If the trademark owner decides that the license is now unfavorable and a better deal can be had under a new license agreement with someone else, the trademark owner likely will reject the existing trademark license agreement and terminate the licensee’s rights to use the mark. The enforceability of phase-out provisions, which allow a licensee to continue to use a mark for a limited time period after a license is terminated, is unclear. Regardless, the trademark licensee eventually will lose its rights to the trademark following rejection. In some cases the ability to re-license can be of great value to a trademark owner in bankruptcy, and thus to its creditors, but it puts the licensee at substantial risk.

The bundled license. What about a license covering both trademarks and other intellectual property that is protected by Section 365(n)? Often a license of software or other products that involve copyrights or patents will include a license to use an associated trademark. In that case, even if the license were rejected, the licensee would have Section 365(n) rights to retain the "bankruptcy intellectual property" -- in this example the rights to the copyrighted or patented IP -- but would still lose the trademark license.  One case so holding is In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).  You can read that interesting decision here.

How can trademark licensees protect themselves? There are a few, albeit limited, strategies available for trademark licensees to protect themselves. Whether you are a trademark licensee or licensor, be sure to get advice from a bankruptcy attorney on your specific situation.

• Unbundle the payments. In negotiating bundled licenses, the licensee should anticipate the prospect of losing rights to the trademark if a bankruptcy is filed. One approach would be to separate out any royalty or license payments for the trademark from those related to the other intellectual property being licensed. This way, the licensee can avoid having to pay amounts allocable to the rejected trademark license in order to retain its other IP license rights under Section 365(n). 
• Take ownership of the mark. Would-be licensees with enough leverage sometimes demand that the trademark and its goodwill be transferred to them, coupled with a license back to the now-former trademark owner. This is perhaps the most effective method, but also the least likely to be achieved.
• Get a security interest. Another strategy involves taking a security interest in the mark or the licensor's other assets to secure the damage claim that the licensee would have if the trademark owner rejects the license. Licensees pressing for a security interest do so in part hoping that a debtor licensor faced with a secured claim for rejection damages may decide against rejecting the license in the first place.
• Oppose a rejection motion. Once a bankruptcy is filed, a trademark licensee should engage counsel right away and consider challenging a debtor or trustee's decision to reject the trademark license. If little good would come of the rejection for the debtor or its creditors, the licensee could oppose the motion arguing that the decision to reject is an inappropriate exercise of the debtor's business judgment. Although such objections are rarely sustained, if successful this strategy could allow the licensee to continue to use the trademark without facing the consequences of a rejected license.

Short of these approaches, there is precious little trademark licensees can do to protect themselves from this bankruptcy risk. It is a fact that gives debtor licensors clear advantages and sometimes keeps trademark licensees up at night.

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Apparently, until last November, no court had been called upon to resolve whether a trademark licensee in bankruptcy can assume, or assume and assign, a non-exclusive trademark license without the trademark owner's consent.  

The decision. We got the first answer to that question in a case called In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), when the U.S. District Court in Nevada held that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable, absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision. In reaching its conclusion, the court held that under the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, a trademark owner has a right and duty to control the quality of goods sold under the mark:

Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely assignable to a third party.  

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (which includes Nevada, California, and other western states) had previously interpreted the key Bankruptcy Code provision involved, Section 365(c)(1), to prevent a debtor from assuming an agreement when it does not have the right to assign it. (For a discussion about how bankruptcy can affect intellectual property licenses, including the impact of this earlier Ninth Circuit case, you may want to read my earlier post on the topic.) 

Building on this Ninth Circuit law, the trademark owner in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case argued that under trademark law the debtor could neither assume nor assign the non-exclusive trademark license at issue. The district court agreed, holding that the bankruptcy court correctly granted the trademark owner’s motion to compel the debtor to reject the trademark license, forcing the debtor to give up its license rights. 

Good news for trademark owners.  The decision is good news for trademark owners. Many have have long worried that if a licensee files bankruptcy it might be able to use the Bankruptcy Code’s general power to assume and assign executory contracts to assign trademark licenses to third parties over the trademark owner’s objection. The N.C.P. Marketing Group decision extends to trademark owners protections already recognized by many courts for patent and copyright holders. The case does not address whether the same rule would apply to exclusive trademark licenses, but given the trademark owner's similar rights and duties to control the quality of goods sold under a licensed mark, the result could be the same. 

Bad news for debtor licensees. The decision, of course, is bad news for trademark licensees that file bankruptcy.  If the decision is followed by other courts, trademark licensees in bankruptcy will be unable to assign their rights to third parties or even to keep those rights for themselves without the trademark owner's consent.  The value of these debtors, and their ability to repay creditors, could suffer as well.

On appeal. The district court's decision may not be the last word. The debtor has appealed to the Ninth Circuit, although a ruling could be a number of months away.  I will report on the Ninth Circuit's decision when it comes down.  In the meantime, this is only one district court decision, applying Ninth Circuit law, so its full impact has yet to be determined.

Just for kicks. Finally, for those interested, the trademarks involve the Billy Blanks® Tae Bo® fitness program.  At least until the Ninth Circuit rules on appeal, the district court's decision will give trademark owners like Billy Blanks a "leg up" in their efforts to control their marks. 

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The major role intellectual property, or "IP," plays in our economy makes intellectual property licenses an especially significant type of executory contract.  Whether you are a licensor or licensee, it's important to know what can happen to IP licenses when a bankruptcy is filed.

Licensor in bankruptcy.  A licensor in bankruptcy (or its bankruptcy trustee) has the option of assuming or rejecting a license. Generally, a debtor licensor can assume a license if it meets the same tests (cures defaults and provides adequate assurance of future performance) required to assume other executory contracts.  Many licensees will not have a problem with assumption of their license as long as the debtor can actually continue to perform. Instead, the real concern for licensees is the fear of losing their rights to the licensed IP, which often can be mission critical technology, if the license is rejected.

• Special protections. Recognizing this concern, the Bankruptcy Code, in Section 365(n), provides licensees with special protections.  If the debtor or trustee rejects a license, under Section 365(n) a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed intellectual property, including even a right to enforce an exclusivity provision. In return, the licensee must continue to make any required royalty payments. The licensee also can retain rights under any agreement supplementary to the license, which includes source code or other forms of technology escrow agreements.  Taken together, these provisions protect a licensee from being stripped of its rights to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.
• Watch out for trademarks. While many people would expect intellectual property to include trademarks, the Bankruptcy Code has its own limited definition of "intellectual property." The bankruptcy definition includes trade secrets, patents and patent applications, copyrights, and mask works.  Importantly, however, it does not include trademarks. This distinction means that trademark licensees enjoy none of Section 365(n)'s special protections and those licensees are at risk of losing their trademark rights in a bankruptcy.

Licensee in bankruptcy.  The law is different when an IP licensee files bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Code, in Section 365(c)(1), contains an exception to the general rule that executory contracts can be assumed and assigned to third parties if defaults are cured and adequate assurance of future performance is demonstrated. The exception kicks in when "applicable law" precludes such an assignment absent consent of the nondebtor party. 

• Restrictions on assignment. Case law from several United States Courts of Appeals holds that "applicable law" -- here patent and copyright law (and perhaps trademark law) -- in fact precludes an assignment of rights under an intellectual property license unless the IP owner has consented.  These courts have ruled that non-exclusive patent and copyright licenses are personal and nonassignable. As a result, a patent or copyright holder can prevent a debtor licensee from assuming and assigning a non-exclusive license to a third party without the licensor's consent. 
• License at risk. In the Ninth Circuit, which includes California, a licensor not only can stop a debtor from assigning the license to a third party, it can even prevent a debtor from keeping the license for itself.  Although the reason is technical, stemming from how the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the impact can be very real. For those interested, the landmark Ninth Circuit decision on this point is In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc.,165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Get advice. The interplay between bankruptcy and intellectual property law is complex.  Whether you are a licensor or licensee, you should get legal advice about your specific license agreement and the ways you may be able to protect your rights if a bankruptcy is filed.  Likewise, companies that anticipate having to file bankruptcy should pay careful attention to their IP licenses before they file.

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If you start talking to a bankruptcy lawyer, before long you'll probably hear them use the term “executory contract.” Often they'll act as though people use the term everyday.  The truth is that bankruptcy lawyers are just about the only lawyers – much less business people -- who ever talk about executory contracts.  (I confess I do it too, but there's a really good reason.)

So what is an executory contract? The concept is fairly simple. It's a contract between a debtor and another party under which both sides still have important performance remaining.  Put another way, if either side stopped performing the contract it would be an actual breach of contract. 

Examples of executory contracts (and some common reasons why they might be executory) include:

• Real estate leases (tenant has to pay rent/landlord has to provide space)
• Equipment leases (lessee has to pay rent/lessor has to provide equipment)
• Development contracts (development work required/payment required on milestones), and
• Licenses to intellectual property (licensee can use only within scope of license/licensor must refrain from suing for licensed uses).

Having cleared up the definition, the next question is why executory contracts seem to matter so much in bankruptcy.  (The debtor even has to list them separately in its bankruptcy schedules.)

The short answer is that they are treated differently from general unsecured claims in three important ways. 

• First, a debtor (or a bankruptcy trustee) gets to decide whether to agree to perform or refuse to perform its obligations under an executory co