Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2013

It hasn't gotten much publicity yet, but certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code will be increased for new cases filed on or after April 1, 2013. Follow this link for a chart listing all of the changes on this Federal Register page, which printed this month's official notice from the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Among the most meaningful increases for Chapter 11 and other business bankruptcy cases:

  • The total amount of claims required to file an involuntary petition rises to $15,325 from $14,425;
  • The employee compensation and benefit plan contribution priorities under Sections 507(a)(4) and 507(a)(5) both increase to $12,475 from $11,725;
  • The consumer deposit priority under Section 507(a)(7) rises to $2,775 from $2,600;
  • The dollar amount in the bankruptcy venue provision, 28 U.S.C. Section 1409(b), which requires that actions to recover for non-consumer, non-insider debt be brought against defendants in the district in which they reside, has increased to $12,475 from $11,725;
  • The minimum amount required to bring a preference claim against a defendant in a non-consumer debtor case, specified in Section 547(c)(9), rises from $6,225 from $5,475; and
  • The total debt amount in the definition of small business debtor in Section 101(51D) will rise to $2,490,925.

Other adjustments will affect consumers more than business debtors. For example, the debt limit for an individual to be able to qualify to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case will rise to $1,149,525 of secured debt, and certain exemption amounts will also rise.

Although the changes aren't substantial, be sure to keep them in mind when assessing cases filed after April 1st.

Blast From The Past: Website Provides Quick Access To Older Bankruptcy Code Sections

Thanks to Professor Robert Lawless of the University of Illinois College of Law, also of the Credit Slips blog, you can now save yourself from combing through dusty old books to find the language of Bankruptcy Code provisions going back as far as 1980. Need to find how Section 547 was worded prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"), or interested in tracing the evolution of exceptions to the automatic stay of Section 362? Then navigate over to the BankrLaw Project site. Once there, select a date and the site will provide you with the Bankruptcy Code in effect at that time, free of charge. This promises to be a very useful research tool when the text of older Bankruptcy Code provisions is in issue.

Official Bankruptcy Forms Revised To Reflect April 1, 2010 Dollar Amount Adjustments

As discussed in an earlier post called "On The Rise: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2010," various dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code and related statutory provisions were increased for cases filed on or after April 1, 2010. Now several official bankruptcy forms have been revised to reflect these new dollar amounts.

Remember, the increased dollar amounts reflected on these forms apply only to cases filed on or after April 1st.

On The Rise: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2010

It hasn't gotten much publicity yet, but certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code will be increased for cases filed on or after April 1, 2010. You can find a chart listing all of the changes on this Federal Register page, which printed last month's official notice from the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Among the most meaningful increases for Chapter 11 and other business bankruptcy cases:

  • The total amount of claims required to file an involuntary petition rises to $14,425 from $13,475;
  • The employee compensation priority under Section 507(a)(4) increases to $11,725 from $10,950;
  • The consumer deposit priority under Section 507(a)(7) rises to $2,600 from $2,425;
  • The dollar amount in the bankruptcy venue provision, 28 U.S.C. Section 1409(b), that requires actions for non-consumer, non-insider debt to be brought against defendants in the district in which they reside, has increased to $11,725 from $10,950; and
  • The minimum amount required to bring a preference claim against a defendant in a non-consumer debtor case, specified in Section 547(c)(9), rises from $5,475 to $5,850.

Other adjustments will affect consumers more than business debtors. For example, the debt limit for an individual to qualify to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case will rise to $1,081,400 of secured debt, and certain exemption amounts will also rise.

Although the changes aren't substantial, be sure to keep them in mind when assessing cases filed after April 1st.

Who's SARE Now? Bankruptcy's Single Asset Real Estate Rules And Their Impact On Commercial Real Estate

Given the state of commercial real estate, the prospect for defaults by commercial borrowers has greatly increased. The last time there was a significant downturn in the commercial real estate sector in the early 1990s, owners of buildings and other real estate often turned to Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a method of buying time and, in some cases, lowering or at least restructuring the amount of secured debt against the real property through a plan of reorganization. This raises the question -- will the same story play out again in this downturn?

Major Bankruptcy Law Changes In 2005. As many readers of this blog know, major amendments were made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 -- formally known as the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) -- including ones that affect real estate. One of the better-known changes was the addition of strict limitations on the time bankrupt tenants could have to assume or reject commercial real estate leases.

However, there was another amendment that may have a significant impact on some owners of real estate in Chapter 11, and could complicate the prospects for using bankruptcy to restructure debt on certain distressed projects. This change was the elimination of a valuation cap that had previously limited the number of real estate debtors subject to the Bankruptcy Code's single asset real estate (“SARE”) rules, most notably provisions that impose special requirements on single asset real estate debtors to keep in place the benefits of bankruptcy's automatic stay

The Bankruptcy Code's SARE Definition. Prior to BAPCPA, there were relatively few SARE cases because the definition was limited to debtors with less than $4 million of secured debt against the real property. This meant that only smaller real estate cases were covered by the more restrictive SARE rules. BAPCPA, however, removed the $4 million secured debt ceiling. As a result, a real estate entity owing hundreds of millions of dollars in secured debt may be subject to the SARE rules. Consequently, the number of real estate cases potentially subject to the SARE provisions has increased dramatically.

The Bankruptcy Code's current definition of SARE provides:

The term 'single asset real estate' means real property constituting a single property or project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental.

11 U.S.C. §101 (51B).

Impact Of A SARE Designation. A SARE designation can have a big effect on the debtor. When a debtor states on its petition that it is a SARE, or a secured creditor files a motion and the Court rules that the debtor is in fact a SARE, the dynamics of the Chapter 11 case will change. As discussed below, a SARE debtor must either file a plan of reorganization with a reasonable chance of being confirmed within the later of (i) 90 days after the order for relief is entered in the case (in a voluntary bankruptcy case this is when the case is filed) or (ii) 30 days after the date the court determines that the debtor is subject to the provisions of SARE, or must start making monthly payments to the secured creditor at the loan's non-default interest rate. If a SARE debtor fails to satisfy these requirements, the court is likely to grant a secured creditor relief from stay to commence or continue with a foreclosure of the real property.

Who's A SARE? Not every owner of commercial real estate in bankruptcy will be a SARE debtor. To determine what types of commercial properties and developments qualify as a SARE case, courts focus on interpreting the meaning of “a single property or project.” In cases in which one debtor owns one piece of real property, this issue will likely be straightforward. In other cases, however, the question may be more difficult to determine. For example, a real estate business owning many interrelated projects through separate, multiple limited liability companies ("LLCs") or partnerships may be able to avoid a SARE ruling. On the other hand, an entity owning more than one property, if considered a single project, may be deemed to be a SARE. To read one court's analysis of these issues in a series of related bankruptcy cases involving multiple entities and properties, click here, here, and here.

If a single property or project is involved, courts then analyze whether the single real estate asset is used in the operation of a business or whether it is simply held for income. A SARE case usually involves passive rent collection without other active business activities that generate revenue for the debtor. The SARE standard is factually driven and generally looks to “whether [the debtors] conduct substantial business other than operating the real property.” In the Matter of Scotia Pacific Company, LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2007) (debtor’s substantial entrepreneurial business operations went beyond mere passive collection of money). As the Scotia Pacific court held:

In order to be single asset real estate, the revenues received by the owner must be passive in nature; the owner must not be conducting any active business, other than merely operating the real property and activities incidental thereto. Under the prior jurisprudence, those passive types of activities are the mere receipt of rent and truly incidental activities such as arranging for maintenance or perhaps some marketing activity, or ... mowing the grass and waiting for the market to turn.

A business would not be a SARE if a reasonable and prudent business person would expect to generate substantial revenues from the operation activities--separate and apart from the sale or lease of the underlying real estate.

For example, a golf club where the owners are actively engaged in activities such as employing third party workers, selling club memberships and merchandise, and charging green fees, has been held not to be a SARE. Likewise, a debtor in the hotel or marina business also may not be held to be a SARE.

Limited Automatic Stay Benefits For SAREs. A SARE debtor cannot count on the automatic stay remaining in force for an extended period of time. Instead, to maintain the benefit of the automatic stay, Section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a SARE debtor, within 90 days after filing bankruptcy, to file a plan that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed or commence regular payments to the secured creditor at the non-default interest rate.

  • A SARE debtor that is not in a position to file a plan will, in effect, have to pay for the continuation of the automatic stay. This can prove difficult for projects that are not producing significant cash flow.
  • If a plan is filed instead, the debtor does not have to establish that the proposed plan will in fact be confirmed but must show that the assumptions that underpin the plan are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable time to confirm a plan will vary from case to case.
  • If the debtor fails to satisfy either of these requirements, the secured creditor will likely be able to obtain relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the property.
  • These rules do not preclude a secured creditor from seeking relief from stay on other grounds, such as a lack of adequate protection or other cause.

Overall Impact On Commercial Real Estate. Owners of distressed commercial real estate projects that are SAREs may find Chapter 11 to be less useful than in past down cycles.

  • With careful planning, some SARE debtors will be able to restructure through bankruptcy. Yet as an interesting study shows, many SARE (and non-SARE) real estate cases in the past few years have ended with the secured creditor obtaining relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. Faced with this prospect, some owners have simply decided to turn over distressed real property to the lender, often through a deed in lieu of foreclosure before bankruptcy.
  • In today's environment, some lenders are willing to work with real property owners to extend loans and avoid foreclosure or taking back the property. However, if the SARE rules would apply in a potential bankruptcy, this fact may give the secured lender more leverage in those negotiations. 

What's likely to be the end result of the SARE rules and the 2005 removal of the valuation cap? As single asset real estate projects face default, although some will certainly be able to restructure their debts, many may end up in the hands of lenders as real estate owned ("REO") properties. With distressed borrowers working through hundreds of billions of dollars in commercial real estate loan problems across the country, the negative impact defaulting commercial real estate loans and resulting REO may have on banks and other lenders could end up being the bigger part of this SARE story. 

Fall 2009 Edition Of Absolute Priority Now Available

The Fall 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Developments in the General Growth Chapter 11 cases;
  • Updates on the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies;
  • Efforts in Congress to repeal certain of BAPCPA's business bankruptcy provisions; and
  • The "settlement payment" defense to fraudulent transfer claims against shareholders in leveraged buyouts.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including debtors Pacific Ethanol Holding Co. and Crabtree & Evelyn, Ltd., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. Recent committee cases include Eddie Bauer, Ritz Camera, Filene's Basement, BT Tires Group, Boscov's, Gottschalk's, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and G.I. Joe's, among others. Also discussed is our work for Levi Strauss & Co. in purchasing 73 outlet stores from the Anchor Blue Retail Group case and for Rackable Systems, Inc. (now known as Silicon Graphics International) in purchasing substantially all of the assets of Silicon Graphics, Inc. in its recent Chapter 11 case.

In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how Section 363 asset sales have become the chief means for companies to restructure in bankruptcy, and how the number of "going concern" sales has grown over the past few months compared to the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

I hope you find this Fall's edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Spring 2009 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

The Spring 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

  • Claim issues involving the Madoff SIPA proceeding;
  • How new Bankruptcy Code provisions involving swap agreements and swap participants are being interpreted;
  • The importance of the mutuality requirement in setoffs;
  • Post-petition rent and Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" claims; and
  • The use of a trademark after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn's, Boscov's, Gottschalk's, Lenox Sales, Goody's, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and Innovative Luggage, among others. In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses the current economic climate and the impact it continues to have on how debtors and creditors have been approaching bankruptcies and restructurings.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Text Of Legislation To Repeal Certain Of BAPCPA's Business Bankruptcy Changes Affecting Retailers Now Available

As reported in a post on the blog earlier this week, on April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." At that time the official text of the legislation was not available.

The bill would repeal changes made by BAPCPA relating to (1) the deadline to assume or reject non-residential real property leases, (2) utility deposits, (3) the Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim, and (4) reclamation. These BAPCPA provisions are among those that have had a significant impact on retailers. For a discussion of the bill's provisions, you can read this blog's earlier post on the legislation or the explanation of the bill by the NACM. It will be interesting to follow the bill as it makes its way through the legislative process in Congress.

Legislation Introduced To Repeal Certain Business Bankruptcy Changes Made By BAPCPA's 2005 Amendments

On April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." The bill has been co-sponsored by Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. As of the date of this post, the bill's official text has not been printed but the National Association of Credit Management has made available on its website what appears to be a final or near-final draft of the legislation, which you can access by clicking here. I plan to provide an update on the blog once the official version of the bill as introduced becomes available.

Introduction of the bill follows testimony before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law by a number of bankruptcy professionals and law professors, including my partner and the Chair of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP's Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, Lawrence Gottlieb. Click here for a prior post about his September 26, 2008 testimony, which focused on the disappearance of reorganizations of retailers since the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as "BAPCPA"). A link to Representative Nadler's press release on the bill's introduction can be found here.

The Legislation's Proposed Changes. The Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009, introduced as H.R. 1942, would make several major amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The common theme is that the proposed bill would repeal certain changes made by BAPCPA and restore the statutory language that was in place before BAPCPA was enacted in 2005. The four principal changes are as follows:

  • Real Estate Leases. The bill would change Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code by repealing the maximum 210-day period within which debtors could assume or reject non-residential real property leases. Instead of the current 120-day initial period and up to a 90-day extension, the statute would revert back to the initial 60-day period under the prior law but, more importantly, would allow the bankruptcy court, for cause, to grant further extensions without any time limit.
  • Utilities. Similarly, the bill would repeal Section 366(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which now requires a deposit of cash or certain cash equivalents to provide adequate assurance of payment to utilities. If enacted, the bill would allow debtors to establish adequate assurance of payment with something short of a monetary deposit, as had been the case under the pre-BAPCPA law.
  • 20-Day Goods Administrative Claim. The bill would also make changes to the law relating to shipments by vendors prior to a bankruptcy filing. It would repeal Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, added by BAPCPA, which gives an administrative claim to vendors for the value of goods received by a debtor in the ordinary course of business during the 20 days before the bankruptcy petition.
  • Reclamation. Another change the bill proposes to make is to go back to the pre-BAPCPA language in Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code governing reclamation claims, specifically to repeal language that had expanded the potential reclamation claim for vendors to the 45 days before a bankruptcy petition. The bill would reinstate the pre-BAPCPA provisions restricting reclamation to that provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code (generally only a 10 day period) and permitting an administrative claim or secured claim to be provided to a reclaiming vendor in lieu of a return of the goods pursuant to a valid reclamation claim.
  • Effective Date. Finally, the bill proposes that its changes would apply to cases commenced on or after the date of its enactment, meaning it would apply to cases filed after the bill became law but not to cases filed before it became law.

Conclusion. If the Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009 were enacted, it could have a major impact on Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, in particular those involving retailers. As explained in a recent article by several of my colleagues, the cumulative changes made by BAPCPA have had a profound impact on retail Chapter 11 cases. Repealing them could enable retailers the opportunity to emerge from Chapter 11 -- the way they often did in the years before the BAPCPA amendments were adopted. Otherwise, we are likely to continue to see more retailers forced into going of out business sales in Chapter 11.

New Article Looks At BAPCPA's Impact On Retailers In Chapter 11

My colleagues Lawrence C. Gottlieb, Michael Klein, and Ronald R. Sussman recently authored an article entitled "BAPCPA's Effects on Retail Chapter 11s Are Profound," in the February 2009 edition of the The Journal of Corporate Renewal, published by the Turnaround Management Association. You can access a copy of the article by clicking on its title in the prior sentence.

What's their assessment of the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA) on retailer Chapter 11 bankruptcies? Here's an excerpt:

BAPCPA’s numerous creditor-friendly amendments and modifications have profoundly impacted the Chapter 11 process, to the point that it is nearly impossible for retailers to reorganize, regardless of the prevailing national and international economic conditions.

Time and again in the three years since its enactment, BAPCPA has significantly impaired the ability of retailers to obtain the necessary post-petition financing and breathing room from creditors to test and implement a reorganization strategy, regardless of the debtor’s capital structure, the fluctuating state of the credit markets, or the extent to which they compete with large discount retailers like WalMart or online retailers like Amazon.

The article details several of the critical changes BAPCPA made, their effect on retailers, and how the timing of a bankruptcy filing is often critical for a retailer to have any chance of trying for a going concern sale to avoid complete liquidation through going out of business sales.

The Cooley Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, which Lawrence Gottlieb chairs, is representing official committees of unsecured creditors in many high-profile national and regional retail bankruptcies, including Steve & Barry’s, The Bombay Company, Hancock Fabrics, Lillian Vernon, The Sharper Image, Mervyns, Shoe Pavilion, Boscov’s and Goody’s. The article, drawn from these recent experiences, is important reading for retailers, creditors, and insolvency professionals alike.

Amendments To The Federal Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect December 1, 2008

Nearly every year, changes are made to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure -- the ones that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed -- to address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. This year's amendments to the national bankruptcy rules take effect on December 1, 2008. 

Business Bankruptcy Rule Changes. Unlike the more substantive modifications made last year (discussed here), this year's amendments make a host of relatively smaller, but still important, changes. The most notable ones for business bankruptcy cases involve privacy concerns. New rules have been put in place to protect patients when health care businesses file for bankruptcy while others govern the proposed sale or transfer of personally identifiable information by any type of business. Separate rule changes implement provisions of Chapter 15 (the Bankruptcy Code's cross-border and international insolvency chapter), address a range of issues in small business Chapter 11 cases, grant courts more flexibility in giving notice to foreign creditors, introduce various consumer bankruptcy procedural changes, and establish a process to allow some bankruptcy court decisions to be appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Interim Bankruptcy Rules Being Replaced. These rules also replace the interim bankruptcy rules that have been in place for the past few years following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). Some bankruptcy courts, such as the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, have already issued general orders retracting the effectiveness of the interim rules effective as of December 1, 2008.

Rules Of The Road. At a time when the financial crisis is likely to push more and more companies into Chapter 11, bankruptcy attorneys and other insolvency professionals will want to review the rule changes closely to make sure they are following the most current version of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. For debtors, creditors, and other parties, this year's rule amendments should help make management of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases more consistent with BAPCPA's changes and, potentially, a more efficient process.

The 2005 Bankruptcy Law Changes And Their Impact On Retail Reorganizations

On September 26, 2008, my partner Lawrence Gottlieb, the Chair of the Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, testified before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary.  Joining him at the hearing were Professor Jay Westbrook of the University of Texas Law School and Professor Barry Adler of the New York University School of Law. The subject of the hearing was "Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan's, and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Working?" You can access their testimony and watch the full hearing by clicking on the link in the prior sentence.

In his testimony, entitled "The Disappearance of Retail Reorganization In The Post-BAPCPA Era," (a copy of which is available by clicking on its title), he discussed the major impact the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") has had on retail reorganizations. One of his main observations involves the 2005 amendment limiting the time within which a debtor may assume or reject commercial real estate leases to a total of 210 days (if a 90-day extension is granted). He testified that this change, in combination with other BAPCPA provisions that reduce a retailer's liquidity, has had a devastating effect on a retailer's ability to reorganize. Among his comments are the following:

BAPCPA has left retailers without adequate time and money to effectuate operational initiatives and cost cutting measures needed to resuscitate their businesses. Retailers now enter the Chapter 11 arena with little choice but to narrowly tailor their strategy to ensure that their lenders are not deprived of the substantial benefits and protections conferred by section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the use, sale or lease of estate property outside the ordinary course of business upon court approval. Section 363(b) offers the unique ability to cleanse the assets of a distressed company by permitting debtors to convey assets “free and clear,” thereby maximizing value by removing the uncertainty of such stigmas as successor liability, fraudulent transfer claims and lien issues that often accompany asset purchases. Prepetition lenders, cognizant of this powerful liquidating tool and mindful of the numerous liquidity hurdles that the debtor must clear as a result of BAPCPA, have little to gain by risking their collateral in pursuit of a reorganization process now widely perceived as hopeless.

Indeed, the constricted time frames and liquidity problems created and imposed by BAPCPA have effectively eliminated the need for existing lenders to provide any more financing than necessary to position the debtor to liquidate its assets in the first few months of the case. Today, the debtor is no longer “in possession” of its assets or its future upon the commencement of its Chapter 11 case. BAPCPA’s constrictive liquidity provisions and the enormous leverage handed to secured lenders as a result thereof have eliminated the ability of retailers to control the Chapter 11 process as a “debtor-in-possession.” Rather, the process is now controlled almost exclusively by prepetition lenders, who have essentially assumed the role of "creditor-in-possession." 

The Cooley Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, which Lawrence Gottlieb chairs, is representing official committees of unsecured creditors in high-profile national and regional retail bankruptcies such as Steve & Barry’s, The Bombay Company, Hancock Fabrics, Lillian Vernon, The Sharper Image, Mervyns, Shoe Pavilion, Boscov’s and Goody’s. His testimony, drawing on experience in these recent cases as well as many others in the past, underscores how BAPCPA's key changes have transformed Chapter 11 bankruptcy from a process by which retailers could reorganize into one where almost all face an early liquidation. Retailers, creditors, and insolvency professionals will find his full testimony on the disappearing retail reorganization both timely and informative.

Northern District of California Bankruptcy Court Local Rule Amendments Take Effect May 1, 2008

As previously reported, in August 2007 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Local Rules designed to implement the changes made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). After taking comments, the final amendments are scheduled to take effect on May 1, 2008.

  • Follow the links for a clean set of the final amended Bankruptcy Local Rules and a redline version showing changes from the current local rules.

Business Bankruptcy Changes. Certain of the amended local rules will affect Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy cases. These include changes to the rules governing the investment of estate funds, the replacement of a "responsible individual" for a Chapter 11 debtor or debtor in possession, entry of a final decree closing a case, the procedures for bankruptcy appeals, and the general electronic case filing (ECF) procedures. A number of the other revisions are aimed primarily at consumer bankruptcy cases.

Jury Trial Rule Amended. In addition, however, the Bankruptcy Court took this opportunity to modify Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-2(b), governing jury trials, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down in its September 2007 decision in the In re HealthCentral.com case. An earlier post entitled "Ordinary Course Preference Case Takes Extraordinary Turn: Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Local Bankruptcy Rule On Jury Trials" gives more details on the decision and its impact.

Conclusion. The changes to the Northern District of California Bankruptcy Local Rules may not be as significant for Chapter 11 cases as those recently proposed in the Southern District of New York or adopted in Delaware, but attorneys practicing in the Northern District of California, and businesses with cases or adversary proceedings pending in that court, should be sure to follow them when they take effect on May 1, 2008.

Two Ways To Get The Updated Bankruptcy Code Online For Free

Looking for a free, online and updated version of the entire Bankruptcy Code, reflecting the amendments made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA")? Now there are two ways to access it.

These are handy resources for attorneys and others who need to find the up-to-date Bankruptcy Code online.

The Terrible Twos? A Look At BAPCPA's Impact On Business Bankruptcy Cases At Its Second Anniversary

Tomorrow, October 17, 2007, marks the second anniversary of the effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, known as BAPCPA.  BAPCPA was enacted primarily to make sweeping changes to the consumer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, BAPCPA also made significant revisions in the business bankruptcy arena.  When it was passed, bankruptcy lawyers, creditors, and potential debtors had many questions about how these changes would play out as new cases made their way through the system. Two years out, we now have answers to some of those questions.

In this post I'll look at a few of BAPCPA's more substantial revisions and how courts have addressed them so far. These include new rules governing real estate leases, reclamation, the "20 day goods" administrative claim, key employee retention plans, cross-border bankruptcy cases, and an important preference defense. As we walk down memory lane, I'll also point you to earlier posts where you can find more details on these issues.

Commercial Real Estate Leases. Under BAPCPA, if the debtor is the tenant under an unexpired commercial lease, it must either assume or reject the lease within 120 days of the filing of bankruptcy. The court can extend this time period without the landlord’s consent for 90 additional days, making a total of 210 days, but any further extensions require the landlord’s prior written consent. If the lease is not assumed (or assumed and assigned) within this period, the lease automatically will be deemed rejected and the debtor will have to move out. 

  • Before BAPCPA, debtors initially had only 60 days to assume or reject leases but there was no statutory limit on extensions of that period. Cumulative extensions of a year or more, over a landlord's objection, were not uncommon under the pre-BAPCPA version of the Bankruptcy Code. That is no longer possible under BAPCPA.
  • Below market leases can represent a significant asset, particularly for retailers with many store leases, and BAPCPA has forced these debtors to move very quickly to assume and assign leases or to sell designation rights to make the most of the 210 day maximum period. In a number of cases, this 210 day limit has depressed the value of the debtor's leases and the recovery for its creditors.
  • For more on real estate leases, you may want to read "Commercial Real Estate Leases: How Are They Treated In Bankruptcy?" previously posted on this blog.

Reclamation. When a debtor becomes insolvent or files bankruptcy, some vendors may be able to take advantage of a special, although limited, right to get back or "reclaim" certain of the goods. This reclamation right is part of both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code. BAPCPA made some changes in the reclamation area and post-BAPCPA cases have put some meat on the bones of those changes. A new, 45-day bankruptcy reclamation right was added to Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, expanding the Uniform Commercial Code's 10-day rule. Under BAPCPA, the goods must have been sold in the "ordinary course" of the vendor's business and the debtor must have received the goods while insolvent. The reclamation demand must be in writing and made within 45 days of the receipt of the goods by the customer (now the debtor in bankruptcy).  If the 45-day period expires after the bankruptcy case is filed, the vendor must make the reclamation demand within 20 days after the bankruptcy filing.

Two decisions from earlier this year have helped clarify the impact, and highlight the limitations, of BAPCPA's reclamation changes.

  • In January 2007, Judge Christopher S. Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to issue a temporary restraining order in favor of a reclamation claimant in the Advanced Marketing Services case who sought to prevent the sale of goods it was trying to reclaim. The Court cited the superior rights of the secured creditor, which had a lien on the goods. A discussion of the case and a copy of the Court's decision is available at this earlier post.
  • Then, in April 2007, Judge Burton R. Lifland of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York applied the "prior lien defense" in favor of a secured creditor by valuing all reclamation claims in the Dana Corporation case at zero. You can find a discussion of that case and a copy of the decision at this previous post.

The "20 Day Goods" Administrative Claim. Although the post-BAPCPA decisions have not been favorable to vendors in the reclamation area, recent developments have underscored the value of the new Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim. That new provision, added by BAPCPA, gives vendors an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business."  For an overview of the new provision, you may find the post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy," of interest.

Key Employee Retention Plans. One of BAPCPA's most notable changes was the significant restrictions imposed on key employee retention plans, known as KERPs. Prior to BAPCPA, KERPs were a very popular way of making sure that a company could retain its most important officers and employees to guide it through bankruptcy. Citing perceived abuses, however, Congress added language in BAPCPA that requires debtors to satisfy nearly impossible standards before courts would be permitted to approve payment of retention bonuses (or severance payments) as administrative claims to officers and other insiders of a bankrupt company. In short, a debtor would have to show that the individual was essential the the survival of the business and that he or she had a bona fide job offer from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation.

Debtors looking to compensate key officers have moved away from retention plans entirely and instead have turned to incentive plans. 

  • Several courts have approved incentive plans covering insiders but have applied certain factors to judge the reasonableness of the plan, including an assessment of the relationship between the plan and the results to be obtained, the cost of the plan, and whether the plan's overall scope is fair and reasonable.
  • In May 2007, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court even approved a downward adjustment to an incentive plan's targets, permitting a bonus to be paid to insiders, when the original plan's targets turned out to be unrealistic. 
  • For more on this topic, including copies of three significant decisions in the Dana Corporation, Global Home Products, and Nellson Nutraceuticals cases, follow the link to this earlier post on key employee incentive plans.

Chapter 15 On Cross-Border Bankruptcies. BAPCPA added a new chapter to the Bankruptcy Code to adopt an internationally drafted Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.  Chapter 15 is used principally by representatives of, or creditors in, foreign insolvency proceedings to obtain assistance in the United States, by a debtor or others seeking to obtain assistance in a foreign country regarding a bankruptcy case in the United States, or when both a foreign proceeding and a bankruptcy case in the United States are pending with respect to the same debtor. Follow the link in this sentence for a detailed overview of Chapter 15.

  • In a recent case involving two Bear Stearns hedge funds, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York refused to recognize proceedings pending in the Cayman Islands as either a foreign main or foreign nonmain proceeding, denying those entities Chapter 15 protection in the United States.
  • You can find the details on this case (and a copy of the original and amended decisions) here and here.

Preferences. Before it took effect, one of BAPCPA's most talked about changes was a revision to the "ordinary course of business" defense to preference claims. BAPCPA dropped the requirement that a preference defendant establish that a transfer was both (i) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs between the debtor and the defendant and (ii) made according to ordinary business terms.

  • BAPCPA's main change was to replace the "and" with an "or", meaning that a preference defendant now has to establish only one of the two prongs (instead of both) to prevail on the defense. When it was enacted, many bankruptcy lawyers believed this change would favor preference defendants. 
  • In something of a surprise, however, the first case interpreting the revised statute applied a brand new standard to the "ordinary business terms" provision. Unlike the prior analysis of that prong, the new standard examined the question from the perspective of both the creditor (as had been done pre-BAPCPA) and the debtor (the new BAPCPA twist). As a result, in that decision the preference defendant lost. For more on the decision, in the In re National Gas Distributors, LLC case, check out this post on David Rosendorf's BAPCPA Blog.
  • There have been surprisingly few cases interpreting this section, so it remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the National Gas Distributors interpretation.

Another Great BAPCPA Resource. In addition to the BAPCPA Blog, which has posts on many decisions from BAPCPA's first year, don't miss Steve Jakubowski's Bankruptcy Litigation Blog, in particular his BAPCPA and BAPCPA Outline topics. Steve has posted on a range of BAPCPA issues, including major consumer decisions and many business bankruptcy decisions.

Acting Like A Two Year Old? As we begin the third year under BAPCPA, the law is beginning to take early steps toward greater clarity in some areas but much remains to be decided. In particular, few appellate decisions have been issued on BAPCPA's key changes, giving us little guidance on how the Courts of Appeals will interpret the new law.  As always, stay tuned for more developments and feel free to subscribe to the blog by email or by RSS to your feedreader.

The Best Of Both Worlds: Can A Secured Creditor Get A Section 503(b)(9) "20 Day Goods" Administrative Claim Too?

In a decision from August 17, 2007, just released for publication, the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) faced a previously unanswered question under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, the section enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA).  Is a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim available to secured creditors or only to unsecured creditors? You may find the BAP's answer surprising.

A Section 503(b)(9) Refresher. For those who haven't dealt with this relatively new section, here are the highlights. Section 503(b)(9) gives vendors an important right beyond the expanded reclamation claim also enacted as part of BAPCPA. Vendors are entitled to an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 

  • In most cases, particularly Chapter 11 cases in which a plan of reorganization is confirmed, administrative claims are paid in full on the effective date of the plan. General unsecured claims, by contrast, often receive only cents on the dollar, and even secured creditors can be "crammed down" and forced to accept payments over a period of time. This new administrative claim is therefore a significant benefit, in effect putting vendors selling goods to a debtor in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing on par with vendors selling goods after the bankruptcy filing. It's available even if a seller of goods fails to provide the required notice to have a post-bankruptcy reclamation claim. 
  • For a more detailed analysis of Section 503(b)(9), you may find this earlier post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy" useful, as well as a later post giving an update on a few early court decisions on the section. 
  • For more on the changes BAPCPA made to reclamation, you may want to read an earlier post entitled "Reclamation: Can A Vendor "Get The Goods" From An Insolvent Customer" and this post on some of the limitations of reclamation.

The Brown & Cole Stores Case. It was against this backdrop that the BAP analyzed the question before it in the In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC case. Brown & Cole is a privately held grocery chain operating in Washington state. Its principal supplier and wholesaler, Associated Grocers, Incorporated (AGI), is a cooperative whose largest shareholder is Brown & Cole itself. In Brown & Cole's Chapter 11 case, AGI asserted a "20 day goods" claim of more than $6 million, and also asserted that it was a secured creditor with a pledge of AGI's own stock owned by Brown & Cole. Brown & Cole alleged a number of claims against AGI and argued that it had a right of setoff on those claims against any "20 day goods" claim.

When AGI moved for allowance of a Section 503(b)(9) claim, Brown & Cole argued that AGI was not eligible for that administrative claim because it was a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and granted AGI's motion. It also denied Brown & Cole's request for a setoff of its own prepetition claims against the administrative claim, among other reasons because of what the bankruptcy court found to be Brown & Cole's inequitable conduct in ordering goods just prior to its bankruptcy filing.

The BAP's Decision. After hearing the appeal, the BAP issued its opinion and identified the first question presented as "Is a secured claim entitled to an administrative priority pursuant to section 503(b)(9)?" The opinion's introduction shows that the BAP was aware of the interest creditors would have in its decision:

This case presents us with an issue of first impression regarding new section 503(b)(9) (“§  503(b)(9)”) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 2005. We expect that the issue is of great importance to many sellers of goods to troubled companies. The new provision gives expense-of-administration priority (“administrative priority”) to a claim for the value of goods received by a debtor within 20 days before the commencement of the case and sold in the ordinary course of business (“twenty-day sales”). The bankruptcy court granted administrative priority to a claim that may also be secured and denied the debtor’s claim of setoff. We AFFIRM the grant of administrative priority; we REVERSE the denial of setoff.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Secured Creditors Are Entitled To Section 503(b)(9) Claims. In reaching its holding, the BAP majority rejected Brown & Cole's primary argument that the Court should interpret Section 503(b)(9) as applying only to unsecured claims. Brown & Cole argued that at the same time as it added Section 503(b)(9), BAPCPA amended another subsection of Section 503 dealing with tax claims, specifically Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i), to clarify that it was available to "secured or unsecured" creditors.  In contrast, Congress did not include the words "secured claim" in Section 503(b)(9). This difference, Brown & Cole argued, should lead the BAP to hold that the "20 day goods" administrative claim is not available to secured creditors. The BAP's response was clear:

We reject that invitation. The provision is not ambiguous; as such, we must enforce it according to its terms and should not inquire beyond its plain language. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. Apart from finding no ambiguity in § 503(b)(9), we note that Congress also declined to put the word  “unsecured” into the same statute. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that all claims arising  from twenty-day sales are entitled to administrative priority.

(Footnote omitted). The BAP majority also rejected a policy argument advanced by Brown & Cole (B&C), and adopted by Judge Alan Jaroslovsky in his dissent:

We can do nothing about B&C’s contention that giving priority to a secured creditor may be inequitable to other creditors. First, it is up to Congress to decide which creditors have leverage and which do not. More importantly, if AGI’s twenty-day sales claim is fully secured, then payment of it by B&C will free the value of the security for that claim for the benefit of other  creditors. If AGI’s claim proves to be undersecured or unsecured, then to deny administrative priority would be to ignore the statute, something we cannot do.

In a footnoted response to the dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis Montali, writing for himself and Judge Randall L. Dunn, expanded on the point:

The dissent is concerned that we are ignoring bankruptcy policy that permits a Chapter 11 debtor to “cramdown” a secured claim in full over time. Congress gave tremendous leverage to a twenty-day sales claimant such as AGI by permitting it to demand full payment as of confirmation, and in doing so, perhaps dramatically affecting the outcome of the case. The fact that the claim is also secured represents less leverage (albeit more than held by non-priority general unsecured claims) than having administrative priority. It is not our place to reallocate that leverage. In any event, if the dissent’s view were the law, the holder of a twenty-day sales claim could simply waive its security, obtain administrative priority, and have equally powerful influence over the outcome of the case.

Setoff May Be Proper. The BAP (the dissent joined in this part of the majority opinion) also reversed the denial of Brown & Cole's setoff request, holding that although prepetition unsecured claims (the kind Brown & Cole asserted against AGI) cannot generally be set off against administrative claims because of a lack of mutuality, here the administrative claim itself arose prepetition, specifically in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing. On the finding of inequitable conduct in ordering goods and receiving just prior to bankruptcy, the BAP held that there was insufficient evidence of inequitable conduct and that a "debtor contemplating reorganization is under no legal obligation to inform suppliers that it is contemplating a bankruptcy filing." The BAP reversed and remanded that issue to the bankruptcy court.

A Dissenting Voice. Judge Jaroslovsky dissented from what he described as the majority's "overly-sterile conclusion that a fully secured creditor can also have rights under § 503(b)(9)," stating that "[n]ot only is my statutory analysis different, but I see compelling policy reasons for a different result." He found that the plain language of Section 503(b)(9) did not resolve the question of whether secured creditors could be entitled to the administrative priority in light of the change made to Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i). He then turned to the policy issues:

Moreover, some fundamental policy considerations are at stake in this case. While allowing a priority claim to a secured creditor may not have a big impact in most Chapter 7 cases, it can  make a huge difference in a Chapter 11 case like this one. If AGI’s $6 million claim is entitled to priority status, § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that it must be paid in full in cash upon confirmation. If  it is treated as a secured claim, it still must be paid in full but is subject to cramdown pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A). If we incorporate by implication the “secured or unsecured” language into § 503(b)(9), we may be in effect giving a secured creditor veto power over a plan of reorganization when § 1129(b)(2)(A) and sound bankruptcy policy dictate that a secured creditor can be forced  to accept a plan which is fair and equitable to it, honors its secured status and pays its secured claim in full over time.

I would weave the new § 503(b)(9) into the tapestry of American bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization. I prefer this result to the crazy quilt patched together by my brethren.

In his footnote to the prior paragraph, Judge Jaroslovsky stated: "Specifically, I would hold that a creditor would not be entitled to priority status for its twenty-day sales claim to the extent the claim is indubitably secured, applying any security first to claims other than the twenty-day sales claim. I note that AGI might well end up with an allowed priority twenty-day sales claim under this rule."

More Leverage For Secured Vendors. As both the majority and dissent discussed, a secured creditor who has the benefit of a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim will have considerable leverage in getting paid in full upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Most secured creditors lend money instead of supplying goods, but a number of vendors do hold collateral for their claims. Even though BAP decisions (in contrast to Court of Appeals decisions) generally are not binding precedent, other courts may find this decision persuasive. If followed widely, secured creditors entitled to assert a Section 503(b)(9) claim will have a noticeable advantage in getting paid. In addition, as the dissent noted, this decision may also make it more difficult for debtors to confirm Chapter 11 plans unless they have the cash to pay all "20 day goods" administrative claims upon their exit from bankruptcy.

Northern District Of California Bankruptcy Court Proposes Amendments To Local Rules

As bankruptcy lawyers know, complying with local rules is an essential part of appearing before a particular court. In response to the changes made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA), as well as the implementation of the electronic case filing system (called ECF), the Bankruptcy Judges for the Northern District of California have proposed a set of amendments to the Court's local bankruptcy rules.

  • You can find a clean version and a redline version of the proposed amended local rules by clicking on the appropriate link in this sentence.
  • Attorneys or others wishing to comment on the local rules may do so by going to this website form or by sending those comments to the address indicated on that page. The deadline is September 27, 2007.

Among the amendments affecting Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy cases are those governing  replacement of a "responsible individual" for a Chapter 11 debtor or debtor in possession, entry of a final decree closing a case, and the general electronic case filing procedures. A number of other revisions are aimed at consumer bankruptcy cases.

Although the changes do not appear to be dramatic, attorneys who practice before the Northern District of California, and businesses with cases or adversary proceedings pending in that court, will want to stay up to date on these local rule amendments.

Lack Of Recognition: New Case Shows That Chapter 15 International Bankruptcy Protection Isn't Automatic

On August 30, 2007, in twin decisions in recent cases involving two Bear Stearns hedge funds (available here and here), Judge Burton R. Lifland of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York made clear that recognizing a foreign insolvency proceeding in a Chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy case is not to be "rubber stamped by the courts."  The decision is of particular interest because Judge Lifland was one of the authors of Chapter 15 and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency on which it is based.

The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling. In a nutshell, the Bankruptcy Court held that although the two hedge funds were organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, their business operations were in New York and not in the Cayman Islands. As such, the Bankruptcy Court would not recognize the Cayman Islands insolvency proceeding as either a "foreign main proceeding" or a "foreign nonmain proceeding." If you're unfamiliar with this terminology, keep reading for an overview of Chapter 15 and more details on the decision.

A Chapter 15 Refresher. On October 17, 2005, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as BAPCPA), a new Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code went into effect governing ancillary and other cross-border cases. (For those already familiar with ancillary proceedings, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which previously governed those proceedings, was repealed although many of its concepts were retained in Chapter 15.)

  • The main purpose of enacting Chapter 15 was to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as part of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). My partner Adam Rogoff, who has significant experience with international insolvency matters, has prepared a very helpful chart comparing Chapter 15 and the Model Law's provisions.
  • Chapter 15 is used principally by representatives of, or creditors in, foreign insolvency proceedings to obtain assistance in the United States, by a debtor or others seeking to obtain assistance in a foreign country regarding a bankruptcy case in the United States, or when both a foreign proceeding and a bankruptcy case in the United States are pending with respect to the same debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b). 

Several important terms involving the different types of foreign insolvency proceedings are key to understanding the scope of Chapter 15 and Judge Lifland's ruling. 

  • A “foreign proceeding” means “a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debts in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). 
  • For purposes of Chapter 15, “debtor” means “an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 1502(1). 
  • A "foreign main proceeding" means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is presumed to be the location of the debtor’s registered office. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(4) and 1516(c). 
  • A "foreign nonmain proceeding" means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country in which the debtor has an “establishment,” defined as a place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(2) and (4). 

Chapter 15’s basic procedure is straightforward. A case is commenced when a foreign representative, often a liquidator or provisional liquidator, files a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504 and 1515(a). If properly filed, the bankruptcy court is entitled to presume that the facts stated in the petition are correct and the attached documents are authentic. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1516(a) and (b). As long as recognition would not be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States, the court must enter an order recognizing the foreign proceeding (here's an example order). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1506 and 1517(a). 

Evidence Trumps Presumptions. With all this in mind, Judge Lifland held that the Cayman Islands proceeding could not be considered either a "foreign main" or a "foreign nonmain" proceeding. Despite Chapter 15's presumption that the registered office or place of incorporation, here the Cayman Islands, would be a debtor's "center of main interests" (known in the trade as the "COMI"), other evidence showed that the actual center of their activity was in New York. This, Judge Lifland held, precluded recognition of the Cayman Island proceeding as a foreign main proceeding. Also, without a true business presence there, the Bankruptcy Court could not conclude that the Cayman Islands was a place where the funds had "nontransitory economic activity," precluding foreign nonmain recognition. Judge Lifland held that even in the absence of objection, Chapter 15 places the burden of proof on these issues on the foreign representatives. Here, the facts in the petition and related papers showed that New York, and not the Cayman Islands, was the COMI for the funds.

Is Non-Recognition The End Of The Road? One of the most interesting aspects of Judge Lifland's decision is the door he left open to the foreign representatives. Although the two hedge funds could not get protection under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code based on their filing in the Cayman Islands, they have the option of filing an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the United States.

  • Although Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, the old "ancillary proceedings" section, was repealed when Chapter 15 was enacted, Section 303 -- and the ability of foreign representatives to file an involuntary Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy case -- was not repealed.
  • Judge Lifland noted that Section 303(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a foreign representative, such as the provisional liquidators appointed by the Cayman Islands court, to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the hedge funds and obtain bankruptcy protection in this manner.

Additional Reading In The Blogs. For more on the case, be sure to read Jordan Bublick's informative post on his Miami Florida Bankruptcy Law blog and Chris Laughton's commentary on his Insolvency Blog out of the UK. For the hedge fund industry's perspective, you may find this post on the Hedgefunds Weblog of interest.

A Few Observations. With many offshore investment funds operating in the United States, Chapter 15 filings may become even more commonplace in the future, especially if we continue to encounter the kind of turbulence recently seen in the financial markets. Although the enactment of Chapter 15 made it easier for foreign representatives to get bankruptcy protection in the United States, the process is not automatic. As Judge Lifland's decision shows, bankruptcy courts will scrutinize the facts -- even in essentially unopposed cases -- before agreeing to formally recognize a foreign proceeding. Without such recognition, foreign representatives will have to fall back on the more cumbersome involuntary bankruptcy process or find themselves with no U.S. bankruptcy protection at all.

Delaware Bankruptcy Court Considers Whether Key Employee Incentive Plan Milestones Can Be Lowered Without Triggering The Restrictions On Retention Plans

One of the significant changes made by the Bankruptcy Code amendments that took effect in October 2005 was the imposition of severe restrictions on "key employee retention plans," known in the bankruptcy world as KERPs.  In this post I'll discuss how several courts have handled these issues in the year and a half since the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, known as BAPCPA, became effective. The most recent decision, issued late last week by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the Nellson Nutraceutical case, gives debtors added flexibility when trying to craft plans consistent with these new restrictions.

Changes Aimed At Curbing KERPs. Prior to BAPCPA, KERPs were a very popular way of making sure that a company could retain its most important officers and employees to guide it through bankruptcy. Citing perceived abuses, however, Congress added language in BAPCPA that requires debtors to satisfy nearly impossible standards before courts would be permitted to approve payment of retention bonuses (or severance payments) as administrative claims to officers and other insiders of a bankrupt company. The restrictions apply only to insiders; no similar limitations have been placed on payment of retention bonuses and severance to non-insiders.

The New Law's High Hurdles. To give you a flavor of the restrictions BAPCPA added to Section 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor company must now prove the following before it can gain approval for payment of a retention bonus to an insider:

  • the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of the person because the individual has a bona fide job offer from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation;
  • the services provided by the person are essential to the survival of the business; and
  • either

      • the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation incurred for the benefit of, the person is not greater than an amount equal to 10 times the amount of the mean transfer or obligation of a similar kind given to nonmanagement employees for any purpose during the calendar year in which the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred; or
      • if no such similar transfers were made to, or obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such nonmanagement employees during such calendar year, the amount of the transfer or obligation is not greater than an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount of any similar transfer or obligation made to or incurred for the benefit of such insider for any purpose during the calendar year before the year in which such transfer is made or obligation is incurred.

The requirement of a bona fide job offer in particular has led some to observe that if an officer of a company in Chapter 11 really had such an offer he or she would probably just take it, mooting the entire retention issue. In any event, these provisions have had their desired effect. It is now rare to find a debtor proposing a KERP that seeks to make retention payments to officers or other insiders.

Debtors Opt For Plan B. Despite these restrictions, debtors still usually want to keep their key officers and may worry that they will leave for more stable companies absent some incentives to remain with the debtor. So what are debtors doing? Since October 2005, they have shifted gears and are proposing not retention plans but incentive plans instead. To date, only a few decisions, discussed below, have addressed what is necessary for an incentive plan to pass muster. In other instances, incentive plans have been approved with little or no opposition. Perhaps the earliest such approval came in May 2006 when Judge Burton R. Lifland approved one in the Calpine Corporation Chapter 11 case.

The Dana Corporation Case. The first significant contested plan motion came shortly after the Calpine incentive plan's approval. Dana Corporation, whose Chapter 11 case was also pending before Judge Lifland, filed a motion seeking approval of a plan similar to that approved in the Calpine case. After considering objections filed by various creditors and others, however, in September 2006 Judge Lifland refused to approve Dana Corporation's proposed plan, finding that it was a prohibited retention plan. For an excellent and entertaining discussion of the circumstances leading to denial of that first effort in the Dana Corporation case, including why the Calpine plan was approved while the first Dana plan was not, be sure to read Steve Jakubowski's detailed post on the Bankruptcy Litigation Blog.

A few months later, on Dana Corporation's second try, Judge Lifland approved the revised incentive plan. In his second ruling, he found that with certain modifications the debtor's revised proposals met the sound business judgment test required for approval. In addition, he ruled that the new plan incentivized the key officers "to produce and increase the value of the estate" and, because the benchmarks in the plan were difficult targets to reach and not easy "lay-ups," the proposal was an actual incentive plan and not a retention plan in disguise.

Evaluating Incentive Plans. In evaluating whether the Dana plan represented the exercise of sound business judgment, Judge Lifland considered the following factors:

  • Is there a reasonable relationship between the plan proposed and the results to be obtained, i.e., will the key employee stay for as long as it takes for the debtor to reorganize or market its assets, or, in the case of a performance incentive, is the plan calculated to achieve the desired performance? (emphasis added)
  • Is the cost of the plan reasonable in the context of the debtor's assets, liabilities and earning potential?
  • Is the scope of the plan fair and reasonable; does it apply to all employees; does it discriminate unfairly?
  • Is the plan or proposal consistent with industry standards?
  • What were the due diligence efforts of the debtor in investigating the need for a plan; analyzing which key employees need to be incentivized; what is available; what is generally applicable in a particular industry?
  • Did the debtor receive independent counsel in performing due diligence and in creating and authorizing the incentive compensation?

These factors provide useful guidance not only to bankruptcy courts but also to boards of directors of financially troubled companies, whether in or out of bankruptcy, when considering proposals for retention or incentive plans.

The Global Home Products Decision. In March 2007, Judge Kevin Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court approved two incentive plans in the Global Home Products case. In that decision, as the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report described here, the court followed the analysis Judge Lifland used in the Dana Corporation case and approved the two incentive plans. Specifically, Judge Gross found that the plans were true incentive plans, which he called "pay for value" plans and were not KERPs, or "pay to stay" plans. For this reason, Judge Gross evaluated the plans under the business judgment standard of Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, holding that the strict Section 503(c) limitations simply did not apply.

The Nellson Nutraceutical Decision. On May 24, 2007, Judge Christopher S. Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued a decision in the Nellson Nutraceutical Chapter 11 case approving revisions to a previously-approved incentive plan. There, the debtors' first incentive plan provided for certain performance milestones based on target levels of EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Unfortunately, the debtors did not achieve those EBITDA milestones and sought to lower them to align with what they considered to be more realistic performance goals. After receiving testimony that the debtors had made similar reductions in bonus targets in the past, Judge Sontchi concluded that the debtors' current proposal was in the ordinary course of business and involved a good faith business judgment.

On the issue of whether Section 503(c)'s retention payment restrictions applied, Judge Sontchi found that the lowering of the incentive plan milestones did not turn the plans into retention plans. He held that if the primary purpose of a plan is to incentivize insiders and other employees, rather than merely retain them, it remains an incentive plan:

Under the facts of this case, although the modification of the 2006 bonus program has some retentive effect, it is for the primary purpose of motivating employees and, thus, the limitations of section 503(c)(1) are not applicable.

*     *    *

The [United States Trustee] argues with some force that if an incentive plan is based on achievement of EBITDA targets and those targets are not achieved, yet the bonus is still received, that the plan cannot be an incentive plan but must, in fact, be solely a retention plan.

*   *    *

While the Court agrees that the payment of bonuses under the modified 2006 [plan] has some retentive effect, the Court disagrees with the [United States Trustee's] argument that its sole or primary purpose is retention. Consistent with the Debtors’ pre-petition practice, the 2006 [plan] must be considered as a whole. It consists of two parts: the establishment of 'aspirational goals' in the early part of the year; and a review at the end of the year to consider whether those goals have been met and, if not, why. In this case, the Debtors did just that and determined that the 2006 [plan] served its purpose by motivating the employees to do a 'great job' in connection with the matters that those employees could reasonably be expected to influence. As such, the Debtors seek to award bonuses at a reduced level to compensate the employees for their success (albeit somewhat limited) in 2006 and to motivate the employees in 2007.

Finally, Judge Sontchi held that Section 503(c)(3)'s additional limitations, which among other things prohibit transfers to insiders that are "outside of the ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case," by its terms apply only to payments outside of the ordinary course of business. Given his earlier holding that the debtors' plans and their modifications were made in the ordinary course of business, Judge Sontchi concluded that Section 503(c)(3)'s requirements did not apply at all.

Conclusion. BAPCPA has effectively ended the use of KERPs for officers and other insiders of a debtor. However, more than a year and a half after BAPCPA became effective, bankruptcy courts in New York and Delaware, and perhaps elsewhere, are willing to approve incentive plans for insiders. The Nellson Nutraceutical decision goes further and, in the right circumstances, will allow the incentive plan's performance milestones themselves to be lowered without jeopardizing the "incentive" character of the plan. This area of the law is plainly evolving, so stay tuned for more developments.

In Important New Ruling, New York Bankruptcy Court Applies Prior Lien Defense To Post-BAPCPA Reclamation Claims

On Thursday, April 19, 2007, in perhaps only the second decision on reclamation since the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) took effect in October 2005, Judge Burton R. Lifland of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued this Memorandum Decision in the In re Dana Corporation Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Employing an analysis similar to that of Judge Sontchi in his January 2007 decision in In re Advanced Marketing Services, Inc. (discussed in this post), Judge Lifland valued all pending reclamation claims in the Dana Corporation case at zero, effectively denying them in their entirety.

A Quick Primer On Reclamation Under BAPCPA. Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended by BAPCPA, gives vendors the ability to assert a reclamation claim for goods received by a debtor in the 45 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. In addition to extending the reclamation period to 45 days, BAPCPA also added a provision in Section 546(c) making reclamation claims "subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof." This quoted language refers to a secured creditor with a prior senior lien in the same goods, a defense to reclamation often referred to as the "Prior Lien Defense." (For more details on reclamation claims, both before and after a bankruptcy is filed, you may find this earlier post on reclamation of interest.)

The Reclamation Claims Process. As is typical in large Chapter 11 cases, a reclamation procedure was established in the Dana Corporation case. After setting a deadline for the filing of reclamation claims, the following events unfolded:

  • As debtor and debtor in possession, Dana Corporation filed a motion seeking bifurcation of the Prior Lien Defense from the more fact-based defenses it also intended to advance.
  • The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion and entered this bifurcation order, which separated out the Prior Lien Defense for discovery, briefing, and decision while staying discovery and other efforts relating to the remaining defenses.
  • The debtor then filed an initial brief on the Prior Lien Defense and related arguments, asserting that the scores of reclamation claims filed by creditors all were "subject to" pre-existing liens on the goods in question, rendering the reclamation claims valueless. Relying on the pre-BAPCPA case of In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 302 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), the debtor argued that the use of DIP financing with liens on the goods in question to satisfy prepetition loans meant that those goods were effectively disposed of, were not subject to reclamation, and that reclamation claims based on them were valueless.
  • Many reclamation claimants filed objections to the debtor's motion (this objection is representative of the types of arguments advanced). They contended that reclamation claims are valueless only if the goods sought to be reclaimed are actually used to pay the lien of the secured creditor to which they are "subject." Relying on In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. 482, 497 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 2003), amended on rehearing, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 2009 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio Dec. 18, 2003), they argued that the prepetition loans were repaid with funds from the DIP loans, not from liquidation of the goods subject to the reclamation claims.
  • The debtor then filed this reply brief, again arguing that Dairy Mart is still good law and that its principles made all reclamation claims valueless in this case.

The Dana Corporation Decision. In his 21-page decision, Judge Lifland made two important rulings. First, he addressed whether amended Section 546(c) creates a new federal common law of reclamation or whether it still relies on the Uniform Commercial Code and other state law:

The Reclamation Claimants contend that the deletion of the reference to state law in the amended section 546(c) no longer incorporates the state law right of reclamation, and instead creates a brand new federal bankruptcy law right. I disagree.

*           *           *

It is not a section dedicated to granting an independent federal right of reclamation nor does it create a coherent comprehensive federal scheme for reclamation. First, Congress did not use the language of creation - Congress did not say that “a seller may reclaim goods when....”

*          *          *

Moreover, if amended section 546(c) was a new federal reclamation right arising under the Bankruptcy Code, it would not be subject to the avoiding powers. [footnote omitted]

Second, having concluded that amended Section 546(c) did not supplant existing reclamation law, Judge Lifland examined Phar-Mor, Dairy Mart, and related case law and ruled that the Prior Lien Defense made the reclamation claims valueless in this case:

Here, the prepetition collateral, including the reclaimed goods, was subject to the Prepetition Lien. Pursuant to the Interim DIP Order, the Debtors were authorized to use the Prepetition Lenders’ cash collateral, with the Replacement Lien providing a replacement security interest in all of the Debtors collateral subject to the DIP Lien, including the prepetition collateral and the proceeds thereof. The DIP Lien granted to the DIP Lenders pursuant to the Interim DIP Order and the Final DIP Order, provided a security interest in, and lien upon, all of the collateral constituting the prepetition collateral. Thus the lien chain continued unbroken. Cf. Dairy Mart, 302 B.R. at 184 (holding that the transaction of releasing the prepetition lien and simultaneously granting the lien to the post-petition lender, must be viewed as an integrated transaction). The grant of the DIP Lien was a necessary condition of the DIP Lenders’ agreement to enter into the DIP Facility. Pursuant to the Final DIP Order, the Prepetition Indebtedness was refinanced and paid off using the proceeds of the DIP Facility on the payoff date. Because the reclaimed goods or the proceeds thereof were either liquidated in satisfaction of the Prepetition Indebtedness or pledged to the DIP Lenders pursuant to the DIP Facility, the reclaimed goods effectively were disposed as part of the March 2006 repayment of the Prepetition Credit Facility. Accordingly, the Reclamation Claims are valueless as the goods remained subject to the Prior Lien Defense.

Recognizing Another BAPCPA Change: Section 503(b)(9)'s New Administrative Claim. Although the Bankruptcy Court was considering only BAPCPA's amended Section 546(c) and reclamation claims, the decision makes several comments about the impact of another of BAPCPA's changes, the new "20 day goods" administrative claim. (A February 2007 update post described the first few decisions on this new Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim.) These include the following: 

The issues before the Court today relate solely to the Prior Lien Defense to reclamation rights under section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and not to the rights to an administrative expense under the newly enacted section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. This new provision presents other issues concerning, inter alia, the valuing of the subject goods; what constitutes the actual receipt of the goods; how is the claim asserted; when is it to be paid; is it subject to the claims processing and omnibus bar date orders, etc.? These issues will not, and need not, be parsed here. Suffice it to say that in light of the section 503(b)(9) amendment, section 546(c) is no longer an exclusive remedy for a prepetition seller.

*         *          *

In addition, amended 546(c) provides for an administrative claim: "If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the manner described in paragraph (1), the seller still may assert the rights contained in section 503(b)(9)." 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2). New section 503(b)(9) in turn allows the seller an administrative expense claim equal to "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). There is no shortage of commentary on the interplay of sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).5

[Footnote 5]

With the introduction of section 503(b)(9) priority, reclamation claims under amended section 546(c) have decreased importance because goods delivered to a debtor in the 20 days prior to bankruptcy will have automatic priority. Thus, reclamation rights are now mainly beneficial for goods delivered in the 21 to 45 days prior to the bankruptcy filing under amended section 546(c). However, with the expansion of the reclamation period, the likelihood of early administrative insolvency will increase, and debtor companies will need greater financial resources to reorganize. See Charles J. Shaw and Brent Weisenberg, Effect of a Preexisting Security Interest in the Debtor’s Inventory on the Rights of Reclamation Creditors, 2005 Norton Ann. Surv. Of Bankr. Law Part I §15 (Sept. 2006) (hereinafter “Norton Survey”).

Where Does This Decision Leave Creditors And Debtors? While valuing all reclamation claims at zero, Judge Lifland was careful to mention the existence of the new administrative claim for goods delivered to the debtor in the 20 days prior to the bankruptcy. This comment is significant and reveals how BAPCPA has changed the old reclamation equation. While the jury is certainly still out, the early post-BAPCPA reclamation decisions in Advanced Marketing Services (Delaware) and Dana Corporation (Southern District of New York) suggest that creditors may have even more difficulty establishing reclamation claims. If so, instead of reclamation, the new 20 day goods administrative claim may turn out to be the more valuable right for creditors -- and the more costly obligation for debtors -- in this post-BAPCPA world.

Proof Of Claim And Other Bankruptcy Forms Revised To Reflect April 1, 2007 Dollar Amount Adjustments

As reported in this post last month, certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code were increased effective April 1, 2007. The dollar amount changes meant that some of the official bankruptcy forms, most notably the proof of claim form and the voluntary petition, had to be revised as well.

After I put up that post, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (known in the trade as "the AO") made the revised forms available and released a formal notice of the dollar amount adjustments. Copies of the revised forms -- with handy arrows pointing out each place where they were revised -- are attached to the notice.

Of course, you'll need to get the forms in blank to use in bankruptcy cases. If you don't have special bankruptcy form software, a number of the official bankruptcy forms have been designed to allow you to type in information or select choices from drop-down menus before printing the form. Printing is the only way to go because the form won't let you save your changes. 

If you follow the links above you'll be able to access blank copies of the revised forms from the AO's website. That way, you'll be sure to have the most up-to-date versions.

Defending A Preference: Ninth Circuit Holds That Even First Time Transactions Can Be In The "Ordinary Course"

In a decision issued on April 3, 2007 in the In re: Ahaza Systems, Inc. case, the Ninth Circuit held that even first time transactions can qualify for the "ordinary course of business" defense to preferences. A copy of the Court of Appeal's decision is available here.

The Bankruptcy Preference. As a quick refresher, preferences are payments or other transfers made in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing, on account of antecedent or pre-existing debt, at a time when the debtor was insolvent, that allow the transferee (the preference defendant) to be "preferred" by recovering more than it would have had the transfer not been made and the defendant instead had simply filed a proof of claim for the amount involved. The 90-day reachback period is extended to a full year prior to the bankruptcy petition for insiders such as officers, directors, and affiliates.

Pre-BAPCPA Statute. The ordinary course of business defense, designed to protect parties who engage in normal transactions with a financially troubled business, is one of the most common defenses available to preference recipients. The Ninth Circuit examined it under the version of the preference statute, Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, as it existed before the 2005 amendments made in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). This pre-BAPCPA statute, specifically Section 547(c)(2), provided that a trustee could not avoid a transfer as a preference

to the extent that such transfer was —

(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;

(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and

(C) made according to ordinary business terms.

The Court's focus was on subsection (A), the "debt" issue. Usually, parties have a series of contracts or purchase orders, as well as a payment history, that gives context to the ordinary course of business between them. In this case, however, the transaction that led to the allegedly preferential payments was their first one. The Court faced the question of whether a debt can be considered as having been incurred in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the preference defendant when there had been no other past transactions to which it could be compared.

Court Looks To Past Practices With Other Similar Parties. The Court's answer was yes, holding that a preference defendant can indeed assert the ordinary course of business defense involving a debt created by the first contract or transaction between the parties. However, the Ninth Circuit articulated a special rule when a "first time" debt is involved:

[W]hen we have no past debt between the parties with which to compare the challenged one, the instant debt should be compared to the debt agreements into which we would expect the debtor and creditor to enter as part of their ordinary business operations. Consistent with Food Catering [971 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1982)], however, this analysis should be as specific to the actual parties as possible. Thus, we hold that to fulfill § 547(c)(2)(A), a first-time debt must be ordinary in relation to this debtor’s and this creditor’s past practices when dealing with other, similarly situated parties. Only if a party has never engaged in similar transactions would we consider more generally whether the debt is similar to what we would expect of similarly situated parties, where the debtor is not sliding into bankruptcy.

Both Original And Restructured Agreements Are Relevant. On a related point, since the first transaction here was an agreement that was later restructured to give the debtor more time to pay, the Ninth Circuit also held that both the original and revised agreement should be evaluated for ordinariness.

Ruling Still Important Under BAPCPA. BAPCPA revised the ordinary course of business defense so that Section 547(c)(2) now provides that a payment or other transfer cannot be avoided

to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was—

(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or

(B) made according to ordinary business terms.

Although different, the current statute still makes the issue decided in the In re: Ahaza Systems case, whether the debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business, a requirement. The major change is that the statute now allows the defense to be established by additionally showing that payments were made either (A) in the ordinary course of business of the parties or (B) according to ordinary business terms, rather than both as under the pre-BAPCPA version.

How Hard To Meet? Having established the new test, the Court then reversed the granting of summary judgment to the defendant because it found the proof presented was inadequate. This suggests that although the Ninth Circuit will permit preference defendants to assert the ordinary course of business defense on first time transactions, some defendants may face a challenge in meeting that standard.

No Fooling: Bankruptcy Code Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1st

Although it hasn't gotten much publicity, certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code will be increased for cases filed on or after April 1, 2007. You can find a chart listing all of the changes on this Federal Register page, which printed last month's official notice from the Judicial Conference of the United States

Among the most meaningful for business bankruptcy cases:

  • The total amount of claims required to file an involuntary petition increases to $13,475 from $12,300;
  • The employee compensation priority under Section 507(a)(4) increases to $10,950 from the $10,000 level established by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as BAPCPA);
  • The consumer deposit priority under Section 507(a)(7) increases to $2,425 from $2,225;
  • The dollar amount in the bankruptcy venue provision, 28 U.S.C. Section 1409(b), that requires actions for non-consumer, non-insider debt to be brought against defendants in the district in which they reside, has increased to $10,950 from $10,000.

Other adjustments will affect consumers more than business debtors. For example, the debt limit for an individual to qualify to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case will top $1,000,000 of secured debt for the first time, and certain exemption amounts will also rise. 

Although the changes aren't large, be sure to keep them in mind when evaluating cases after April 1st. 

The Supreme Court's Recent Decision In Marrama: Any Insight Into Business Bankruptcy Issues?

On Wednesday the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court answered the question of whether an individual has an absolute right to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 13 "wage earner" bankruptcy case or whether that right can be conditioned on the absence of bad faith. This blog is focused on business bankruptcy issues, but knowing how the Supreme Court interprets the Bankruptcy Code on one issue can sometimes help in understanding how the Court may approach other issues.

The Core Issue. In Marrama, the Supreme Court interpreted the following language in Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code:

The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time, if the case has not be converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title. Any waiver of the right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable.

Many courts had read this language to give a debtor an absolute right to convert a case from Chapter 7 to another bankruptcy chapter, even if the case might thereafter be reconverted back to Chapter 7. (Grounds for such reconversion could include previous bad faith or other misconduct of the debtor while in Chapter 7.)  The ability to convert can make a big difference to debtors because Chapter 7 cases always involve the appointment of a trustee to take possession of the debtor's non-exempt assets for liquidation, unlike cases under Chapters 11, 12, and 13 in which the debtor can often retain property and pay creditors over time.  

The Court's Reasoning. The Supreme Court decided that another provision, Section 706(d), limited this right to convert by requiring that the debtor must be able to be a debtor under the other chapter of choice. Section 706(d) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a case may not be converted to a case under another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.” In Marrama, the Supreme Court held that a debtor who had acted in bad faith by concealing assets while in Chapter 7 could not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13 because the Chapter 13 case would be dismissed "for cause" under Section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court summarized its reasoning this way:

In practical effect, a ruling that an individual’s Chapter 13 case should be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 because of prepetition bad-faith conduct, including fraudulent acts committed in an earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, is tantamount to a ruling that the individual does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13. That individual, in other words, is not a member of the class of ‘honest but unfortunate debtor[s]’ that the bankruptcy laws were enacted to protect. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S., at 287. The text of §706(d) therefore provides adequate authority for the denial of his motion to convert.

A "Plain Language" Dissent. Interestingly, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. He found the majority's interpretation of these sections to be strained and inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language. As such, he believed that a debtor had an absolute right to convert out of Chapter 7 even if the case were subject to being reconverted after further proceedings.

Impact On Business Bankruptcy? It's hard to see much direct impact on business bankruptcy cases from the decision, except perhaps in the very rare circumstance when a corporate debtor files a Chapter 7 but later seeks to convert the case to Chapter 11. However, the fact that four justices dissented on a "plain language" basis may be noteworthy. Many of the changes made by the recent Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (also known as BAPCPA), including to business provisions, added language that appears to limit the exercise of discretion by bankruptcy judges. Perhaps the more interesting question, then, is whether the Marrama decision signals that the Supreme Court might consider loosening, if only slightly, the prevailing "plain language" interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and allow judges to exercise more discretion than might otherwise be indicated by the language of the statute alone. Given that BAPCPA is less than 18 months old, we'll probably have to wait a few years for an answer to that one.

Other Commentators On The Decision. Finally, when the Supreme Court issues a bankruptcy decision, a number of commentators write to share their perspectives. Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog was one of the first to report on the decision. Steve Jakubowski of The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog has an interesting post. In addition, John Pottow, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School, has an insightful post on the Credit Slips blog, as does Todd Zywicki, a professor at the George Mason University School of Law, over on The Volokh Conspiracy.

The New Section 503(b)(9) Administrative Claim: The Latest On What Courts And Debtors Have Been Doing

A couple of months ago I posted on the new "20 day goods" administrative claim enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"). BAPCPA, which took effect in October 2005, added Section 503(b)(9) to the Bankruptcy Code giving vendors an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, as long as "the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 

In my earlier post, I posed a number of unresolved questions about this new section and predicted that courts would soon start to address those issues. Well, in the past couple of months we have in fact seen decisions answering at least a few of the questions raised by Section 503(b)(9).

The First Court Decisions. In late December 2006, bankruptcy courts in the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued what appear to be the first two decisions on when and under what circumstances Section 503(b)(9) administrative claims must or should be paid. As explained below, in both decisions the bankruptcy court held that the administrative claimant was not necessarily entitled to payment prior to, in a Chapter 11 case, confirmation of a plan of reorganization.

  • In the first decision, issued December 21, 2006, Judge Kevin Gross of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware denied a creditor's motion for payment of a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim in the In re Global Home Products, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The court held that the timing of payment of administrative claims is left to the discretion of the court. In so doing the court quoted with approval from an article that described Section 503(b)(9) as a "rule of priority, rather than payment." The court relied on a non-Section 503(b)(9) decision for the three factors to assess when considering when an administrative claim should be paid, chiefly, (a) the prejudice to the debtor, (b) hardship to the claimant, and (c) potential detriment to other creditors. The court applied those factors and denied the creditor's request for immediate payment.
  • In the second decision, issued a week later on December 28, 2006, Judge Eric Frank of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion for immediate payment of Section 503(b)(9) claims filed by several creditors in the In re Bookbinders' Restaurant, Inc. Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Although the debtor agreed that the creditors were entitled to allowance of a "20 day goods" administrative claim, it opposed the immediate payment of those claims. The court held that the timing of payment was a matter of the court's discretion but agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider evidence to guide the exercise of that discretion.

A Few Early Take-Aways. In both of these decisions, the courts held that they have discretion to defer payment until the end of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, when a plan of reorganization is confirmed.

  • Creditors who can establish that failing to pay their Section 503(b)(9) claim would cause them hardship, but not prejudice the debtor or other creditors, may still be able to obtain immediate payment. As these cases show, however, creditors will find it challenging to meet that standard.
  • Interestingly, the Bookbinders court rejected what it called an "equal protection" argument by the creditors, who asserted that they should be paid immediately because vendors delivering goods to the debtor post-petition were being paid on their administrative claims. The court drew a distinction between the two claims, explaining that the creditors delivering goods post-petition were paid not under Section 503(b) but instead under Section 363(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That latter section allows a debtor in possession or trustee to enter into post-petition ordinary course of business transactions, and to pay for them, without court approval.
  • Finally, DIP financing orders can impact the timing of paying Section 503(b)(9) claims. In some cases the DIP budget may not include funds to pay these claims and in others the DIP order may expressly prohibit their payment. Section 503(b)(9) creditors may want to review proposed DIP financing motions carefully with this in mind.

What Debtors Have Been Doing. In an attempt to exert a degree of control over Section 503(b)(9) claims, some debtors have filed motions seeking to establish procedures to handle these claims, not unlike the procedures used in past cases for reclamation claims. In the Seattle case of In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, for example, the debtor filed a motion for an order establishing procedures for Section 503(b)(9) claims. The court granted the motion and entered a Section 503(b)(9) procedures order which, among other things:

  • Required creditors to file Section 503(b)(9) claims by a special bar date;
  • Required the debtor to file a report evaluating such claims 21 days after the special bar date;
  • Gave creditors 15 days thereafter to file a reply to the debtor's position;
  • Made the debtor's position binding in the event a creditor did not timely respond; and 
  • Reserved to the court the right to resolve any disputes. 

The order effectively reserved the issue of when valid Section 503(b)(9) claims would be paid but made the procedures the exclusive method for determining the validity and amount of such claims. I expect that other debtors will pursue similar procedures for handling these "20 day goods" claims.

Don't Touch That Dial. These early decisions are the first in what should be many future rulings on the questions posed by Section 503(b)(9). I'll continue to update you on how courts are interpreting this new administrative claim and, over time, we should begin to see more clarity on how debtors, vendors, and courts will address this new BAPCPA provision.

Chapter 15: The Bankruptcy Code's New Cross-Border Insolvency Rules

Chris Laughton, a UK insolvency practitioner and publisher of InsolvencyBlog.com, has a number of recent posts on the adoption in the UK of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”), a 1997 effort by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). That got me thinking that I should post something on the recent changes to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on cross-border insolvencies.

Chapter What? On October 17, 2005, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as "BAPCPA"), a new Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code went into effect governing ancillary and other cross-border cases. (For those already familiar with ancillary proceedings, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which previously governed those proceedings, was repealed although many of its concepts have been retained in Chapter 15.)

Where Did Chapter 15 Come From? The main purpose of enacting Chapter 15 was to incorporate the Model Law as part of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a). My partner Adam Rogoff, who has had significant experience with international insolvency matters, has prepared a very helpful chart comparing Chapter 15 and the Model Law's provisions. Also, because Chapter 15 so closely follows the Model Law, the Legislative Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, prepared by the Model Law’s authors, is one of the most helpful guides to understanding the meaning of Chapter 15's provisions.

Given that Chapter 15 is such a creature of statute, I've included more citations to the Bankruptcy Code than usual in this post. They are all in the format 11 U.S.C. § ___, which refers to Title 11 of the United States Code (the title of U.S. law that sets out the Bankruptcy Code) and then a particular section number. 

Who Uses Chapter 15? Chapter 15 is used principally by representatives of or creditors in foreign insolvency proceedings to obtain assistance in the United States, by a debtor or others seeking to obtain assistance in a foreign country regarding a bankruptcy case in the United States, or when both a foreign proceeding and a bankruptcy case in the United States are pending with respect to the same debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b). 

Learning A "Foreign" Language. Several important terms involving different types of foreign proceedings are key to understanding the scope of Chapter 15. 

  • A “foreign proceeding” means “a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debts in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). 
  • For purposes of Chapter 15, “debtor” means “an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 1502(1). 
  • A "foreign main proceeding" means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is presumed to be the location of the debtor’s registered office. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(4) and 1516(c). 
  • A "foreign nonmain proceeding" means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country in which the debtor has an “establishment,” defined as a place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(2) and (4). 

Getting Some Recognition:The Chapter 15 Process. Chapter 15’s basic procedure is straightforward. A case is commenced when a foreign representative files a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504 and 1515(a). If properly filed, the bankruptcy court is entitled to presume that the facts stated in the petition are correct and the attached documents are authentic. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1516(a) and (b). As long as recognition would not be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States, the court must enter an order recognizing the foreign proceeding (here's an example order). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1506 and 1517(a). 

Formal recognition is the key step that triggers the benefits of Chapter 15. If recognition is granted as a foreign main proceeding, the debtor receives important protections and rights similar to those available to U.S.-based debtors. Chief among these are the automatic stay provisions of Section 1520(a) of the Code, which invoke the automatic stay of Section 362 with respect to the debtor and its property within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a). Other sections invoked by Section 1520 (including Sections 363, 549, and 552) apply to transfers of interests of the debtor in property within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2). Unless the court orders otherwise, the foreign representative may also operate the debtor’s business consistent with Section 363 and 552. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(3). 

A Matter Of Discretion. Section 1521 gives the court discretion to grant other appropriate relief at the request of the foreign representative, including in foreign nonmain proceedings which, unlike foreign main proceedings, do not invoke Section 1520's automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a). Under Section 1521(a), the court may, among other things, stay actions or proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities, stay execution against the debtor’s assets, and suspend the right to transfer or dispose of assets of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1521(a)(1), (2), and (3). However, Chapter 15 contains certain limitations on the ability of a court to grant the discretionary relief provided by Section 1521:

  • Relief is available only “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a). 
  • Congress made such relief expressly subject to the “standards, procedures, and limitations applicable to an injunction.” 11 U.S.C. § 1521(e). The court has discretion to make any relief granted subject “to conditions it considers appropriate, including the giving of security or the filing of a bond.” 11 U.S.C. § 1522(b).
  • Section 1507 requires the court, in determining whether to give additional assistance to a foreign representative, to consider “whether such additional assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure” achievement of five specific objectives retained nearly verbatim from former Section 304(c). 
  • These objectives include “just treatment of all holders of claims,” “protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience,” “prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property,” “distributions of proceeds” substantially according to the Bankruptcy Code, and, where appropriate, the opportunity for a fresh start for an individual. 

Over There: Protection For U.S. Creditors And Debtors. The Model Law has been adopted in a number of other countries, including Japan, Mexico, Poland, Romania, South Africa, and the UK. According to this recent post on the InsolvencyBlog.com, foreign creditors (including U.S. creditors) are fully recognized in UK insolvency proceedings. Representatives of U.S. based debtors may also obtain protection in countries that have adopted the Model Law. The European Union, which has not yet adopted the Model Law, has its own cross-border insolvency regulation that applies to all EU countries except Denmark.

Check Your Local Listings. Although Chapter 15 and the Model Law have been designed to help coordinate cross-border bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, these restructurings and liquidations are complex and often require parties to navigate through multiple country-specific insolvency schemes. If you find yourself involved in a cross-border bankruptcy, whether as a debtor, creditor, or a member of a committee, it's usually critical to get legal advice from U.S. and appropriate foreign insolvency counsel. 

Delaware Bankruptcy Court Denies Reclamation Claimant's TRO Request To Stop Sale Of Goods

In a recent post, I discussed how Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, as revised by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), gives vendors the ability to assert a reclamation claim for goods received by a debtor in the 45 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. In addition to extending the reclamation period to 45 days, BAPCPA also added a provision in Section 546(c) making reclamation claims "subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof." This quoted language refers to a secured creditor with a senior lien in the same goods.

The Advanced Marketing Services case. Section 546(c)'s expanded reclamation rights, and how they may be impacted by the "prior rights" of a secured creditor, recently played out in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of In re Advanced Marketing Services, Inc. pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court in Delaware.

Simon & Schuster, Inc., a reclamation claimant, filed a complaint against the debtor, Advanced Marketing Services, Inc. ("AMS"), seeking to reclaim more than $5 million worth of goods that the debtor allegedly received in the 45 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. (You can access the pleadings from the Simon & Schuster litigation by clicking on the appropriate links in this post.)

  • In an effort to gain control over the goods at issue, Simon & Schuster filed an application for a temporary restraining order (known as a "TRO") seeking a court order to prevent AMS from selling the goods. 
  • The debtor opposed the TRO, challenging whether Simon & Schuster had the right to reclaim the goods.
  • The debtor's secured creditor, Wells Fargo Foothill, Inc., also filed an opposition to the TRO, arguing that the reclamation claim was subject to its prior rights as a prepetition secured creditor and as a debtor in possession ("DIP") lender. In this case, the DIP loan has been structured as a "creeping roll up" in which prepetition obligations are to be satisfied by the use of cash collateral and the DIP lender in turn receives a postpetition lien as that cash collateral is used.
  • Simon & Schuster filed a reply brief responding to the opposition papers filed by the debtor and the secured creditor.

The Court's Decision. In a decision issued by the Bankruptcy Court yesterday, Judge Sontchi denied Simon & Schuster's application for a TRO without prejudice, holding that Section 546(c) made Simon & Schuster's reclamation rights subject to the prior rights of the secured creditors. (The Bankruptcy Court also noted that it would have reached the same result under pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy and UCC law.)

  • The Bankruptcy Court held that the secured creditors had superior prepetition and postpetition liens in the goods Simon & Schuster sought to reclaim and that Simon & Schuster therefore could not establish that it was likely to prevail on the merits of its reclamation claim.
  • The Bankruptcy Court also rejected any attempt to require "marshaling" by the secured creditor, which if ordered could have required the secured creditor to satisfy its claim first from collateral other than the goods that Simon & Schuster sought to reclaim.

Stay Tuned. As one of the first decisions on this reclamation issue under BAPCPA, the Advanced Marketing Services decision is an important one. However, it's not the last word on how the respective rights of reclaiming vendors and secured creditors will be decided in Chapter 11 cases. Reclamation issues are often fact dependent and results may vary in different cases. Also, vendors unable to prevail on a reclamation claim may still have a "20 day goods" administrative claim, and this fact may influence how debtors treat vendors in future cases.  

New Bankruptcy Resource: The Absolute Priority Newsletter

As a member of the Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, I wanted to let you know that we have just launched a new quarterly newsletter called Absolute Priority. The newsletter give updates on current developments in bankruptcies and workouts with the goal of keeping you "ahead of the curve" on these issues. You can access a copy of the first edition here and can register to receive future editions.

The inaugural edition is focused on the first year of experience under the October 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (known as BAPCPA). It includes articles on:

A two-page chart on M&A transactions involving Chapter 11 cases and an update on some of the bankruptcy and workout matters we have handled recently are also included. The newsletter starts with a welcome from my partner, Lawrence Gottlieb, the Chair of our Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, and a note from another of my partners, Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority.

I hope you find Absolute Priority informative and helpful.

Bankruptcy Notices: New Rule Lets Creditors Choose A Preferred Address

You're a creditor in a bankruptcy case and a bankruptcy notice arrives on your desk setting a deadline to object to an important motion. The address on the notice is a P.O. box located a thousand miles away, one used only for customer payments and not for legal notices. As a result, the notice took a long time to be routed to you. When you look at it more closely, you realize that so much time has passed that the deadline to respond was last week and the hearing took place yesterday. The situation can be even worse if the late-arriving notice is about a deadline (also known as a "bar date") for filing a proof of claim or perhaps for responding to an objection to your claim

Sound familiar?

Ability To Designate An Address. Well, one of the lesser known changes made by the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), permits creditors to designate a preferred address for receiving bankruptcy notices. Section 342(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, added by BAPCPA, allows creditors to use one preferred address for cases in every bankruptcy court in the country or to designate different addresses for cases in specific bankruptcy courts.

National Creditor Registration Service. To implement this new rule, a National Creditor Registration Service ("NCRS") has been created. According to its website, the NCRS is "a free service provided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts to give creditors options to specify a preferred U.S. mail, e-mail address, or fax number to which bankruptcy notices should be sent." Creditors can choose to receive paper notices mailed to one or more designated addresses or faxed to specific fax numbers. Creditors also have the option of receiving bankruptcy court notices via email by registering for the Electronic Bankruptcy Noticing ("EBN") system.

  • A creditor's preferred address and delivery method will be substituted for any address used in a bankruptcy mailing matrix (the official list of addresses for its creditors that a debtor files with the bankruptcy court) within 30 days of the creditor's registration. (Although Section 342(f) itself mentions only Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, as implemented the system is being applied to all cases, including Chapter 11 cases.)
  • When registering, it's important to list all of the different versions of a creditor's name, including formal corporate names, a "doing business as" name, and even common misspellings of the creditor's name. The service's software will attempt to match the names the creditor supplied to the one listed in the debtor's mailing matrix. If a match cannot be made, the notice will be sent to the address listed by the debtor.
  • NCRS allows you to complete forms online or to print them and send them in. You can find the registration forms here, here, and here, but I suggest going to the NCRS registration website itself to make sure you are using the most up-to-date forms and procedure.
  • A creditor or its bankruptcy counsel can always file a request for special notice with the bankruptcy court in a particular case using a specific address for notices in that case. In that circumstance, the address listed in the case-specific notice request will be used instead of the NCRS-listed address.

Be Prepared. Regardless of which option creditors choose, they should be prepared to handle the volume of notices that may be directed to the physical or email address. If using a physical address, creditors should be sure to monitor that address regularly and be in a position to process the notices received. A dedicated P.O. box may make sense in some cases. If an email address is used, it may be helpful to use a special email address or account for notices, create email rules to direct notices to the right person, or use other software to monitor and process those notices. With good procedures in place, the NCRS and EBN services should help creditors receive important bankruptcy notices in time to protect their rights.

What If Something Goes Wrong? Another new provision, Section 342(g), governs the situation in which notice does not get to the right address. Although courts have not yet answered how it applies in various contexts, the section provides that a notice is not "effective notice" unless it's sent in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code's notice rules or it's actually brought to the creditor's attention.

  • This section allows a creditor to designate "a person or an organizational subdivision" to be responsible for receiving bankruptcy notices. If the creditor also establishes "reasonable procedures" so that notices are delivered to the designated person or subdivision, a notice sent to the creditor other than in accordance with Section 342's procedures "shall not be considered to have been brought to the attention of such creditor until such notice is received by such person or such subdivision."
  • In addition, a creditor that did not receive a notice of the bankruptcy filing complying with Section 342's provisions may have a defense to a claim that it violated the automatic stay.
  • While helpful to creditors, these provisions raise questions about how debtors and trustees can be sure to send out effective notice, especially if they are not aware of which person or subdivision a particular creditor has designated for notice. That problem will be reduced if many creditors register with the NCRS or EBN system.

Get Advice. As always, if you have questions about these procedures or how they may affect you as a debtor or creditor, be sure to get advice from your bankruptcy counsel.

Reclamation: Can A Vendor "Get The Goods" From An Insolvent Customer?

Although vendors sell goods to get paid, it doesn't always work out that way. If the customer is insolvent or files bankruptcy, the vendor may be stuck with an unpaid account. To make matters worse, some customers (especially those with limited prospects for financing) may even "load up" on inventory and then file bankruptcy without paying. Regardless of why it happens, no one wants to ship goods and not get paid.

Some vendors, however, may be able to take advantage of a special, although limited, right to get back or "reclaim" certain of the goods. This reclamation right is part of both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code. The recent 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy laws, known as the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (called "BAPCPA"), made some significant changes that have enhanced a vendor's rights in a bankruptcy. This post discusses how reclamation rights play out both before and after bankruptcy.

Reclamation before bankruptcy. If the customer has not filed for bankruptcy, a vendor's reclamation rights are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (known as the "UCC"). UCC Section 2-702 is the UCC"s reclamation statute. It provides a seller with the right to reclaim goods that a customer received on credit "while insolvent" if the seller makes a demand within ten days after the customer received the goods. This 10-day period means that, absent a bankruptcy, a vendor's reclamation right will be limited to reclaiming only those goods received by the customer in the ten days prior to the demand.

  • Under the UCC, "insolvent" means (A) having generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other than as a result of good faith dispute; (B) being unable to pay debts as they become due; or (C) being insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law.
  • Under the federal Bankruptcy Code, insolvent means that the entity's debts exceed the value of its assets at a fair valuation. This is essentially a balance sheet test but, importantly, one using market value and not financial reporting standards such as GAAP. Because they are prepared for a different purpose, GAAP balance sheets tend to overstate asset values and understate actual liabilities compared to the bankruptcy balance sheet test. Companies that might seem solvent under GAAP could be insolvent under the UCC or the Bankruptcy Code.
  • If the customer misrepresented its solvency in writing during the three months before the delivery of the goods in question, then the 10-day limitation does not apply.

The UCC reclamation demand. To exercise a reclamation right before bankruptcy, the vendor must make a demand. The demand should be in writing, directed to the customer, identify which goods are being reclaimed to the extent that information is available, include a general statement reclaiming all goods received by the customer from the vendor during the applicable time period, and demand that the goods be segregated. Vendors should consult with counsel to be sure the demand adequately protects their reclamation rights.

Reclamation after bankruptcy. Because of changes made in the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, applicable to all bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 17, 2005, the filing of a bankruptcy now actually expands a vendor's reclamation rights. These new provisions apply in both Chapter 11 reorganization cases and Chapter 7 liquidation cases. Some of the key changes include:

  • A new, 45-day bankruptcy reclamation right has been added to Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to this change, the Bankruptcy Code had merely incorporated the UCC's 10-day period. Now, once a bankruptcy is filed, a vendor can assert a reclamation demand for goods received within 45 days of the bankruptcy filing.
  • The goods must have been sold in the "ordinary course" of the vendor's business and the debtor must have received the goods while insolvent (using the Bankruptcy Code's definition of insolvent discussed above).
  • The reclamation demand must be in writing and made within 45 days of the receipt of the goods by the customer (now the debtor in bankruptcy).
  • If the 45-day period expires after the bankruptcy case is filed, the vendor must make the reclamation demand within 20 days after the bankruptcy filing.
  • As with pre-bankruptcy demands under the UCC, the demand should identify the goods being reclaimed, include a general statement reclaiming all goods received by the debtor from the vendor during the 45-day period, and demand that the goods be segregated. Vendors may also want to file a notice of reclamation with the bankruptcy court.

Sold goods and other issues. Whether before or after a bankruptcy filing, a vendor will lose its right to reclaim any goods that the customer sells before or after receiving the vendor's reclamation demand. 

  • Absent an agreement with the customer or a reclamation program approved by the bankruptcy court (see this example from the Delphi case, which was filed before the new BAPCPA rules took effect), a vendor may be forced to seek and obtain a court order preventing further sales of goods while its reclamation claim is pending. 
  • This "sold goods" problem has probably become more important because BAPCPA removed language from the prior version of Section 546(c) that had allowed a bankruptcy court to give a reclaiming vendor an administrative claim (with priority over unsecured claims and certain other claims) in lieu of a return of the goods.
  • Both the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code require that the debtor itself must have received the goods for them to be reclaimed. Thus, goods that are drop shipped or otherwise delivered first to the debtor's own customer likely will not be able to be reclaimed.
  • If the debtor made a misrepresentation of its solvency and then filed bankruptcy, it's unclear whether the 45-day rule in bankruptcy will govern or whether, like under the UCC, no time limit will apply. Keep in mind, however, that often goods shipped as far back as 45 days or longer, and sometimes even as few as 10 days for debtors with fast inventory turns, may already have been sold and thus will not be subject to reclamation. 

Rights of secured creditors. A vendor's reclamation right is further limited by the possibility that the debtor may have granted a bank or other creditor a security interest in the goods, which will be senior to the reclamation right.  As amended in 2005, Section 546(c) now expressly makes reclamation rights subject to the prior rights of a secured creditor with a security interest in goods or their proceeds.

New administrative claim for 20-day goods. Even if a vendor fails to make a reclamation demand, all may not be lost. A new Bankruptcy Code section, Section 503(b)(9), added by BAPCPA, gives vendors an administrative priority claim for the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days prior to the bankruptcy filing if the goods were sold in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. (I intend to discuss this new provision in a future post.) For now, note that it may be an important "fall back" right for vendors who fail to make a reclamation demand or who are unable to reclaim goods for other reasons.

Impact of new reclamation right on debtors and other creditors. With every new right also comes new burdens. Vendors certainly have greeted as good news the ability to reclaim goods received by a debtor as far back as 45 days. The impact of these changes on debtors, however, remains unclear. Some bankruptcy attorneys wonder whether this expanded reclamation right, together with the administrative claim for 20-day goods and certain other changes made by BAPCPA, will make it more difficult for debtors to reorganize or otherwise to pay unsecured creditors.

As always, get good legal advice. Reclamation can involve a number of twists and turns. Vendors who think they may have reclamation rights should be sure to get legal advice immediately upon learning of a customer's insolvency or bankruptcy to protect their interests, just as debtors should to know their own rights in response to reclamation demands.

Commercial Real Estate Leases: How Are They Treated In Bankruptcy?

Much like executory contracts, commercial real estate leases are governed by special rules in bankruptcy. If a lease's term has not yet expired, it is known as an “unexpired lease” (yet more clever bankruptcy terminology). This post explores how landlords and tenants are treated in bankruptcy, first in the more common situation of a tenant's bankruptcy and then briefly in the context of a landlord's bankruptcy.

Assumption and rejection. If the debtor is the tenant under an unexpired commercial lease, it must either assume or reject the lease within 120 days of the filing of bankruptcy. The court can extend this time period without the landlord’s consent for 90 additional days, making a total of 210 days, but any further extensions require the landlord’s prior written consent. If the lease is not assumed (or assumed and assigned) within this period, the lease automatically will be deemed rejected and the debtor will have to move out. 

  • Assumption of a lease requires the debtor to reaffirm the lease, cure all pre- and post-filing defaults, and show that it will be able to perform its obligations in the future. Additional restrictions must be met before a lease located in a shopping center can be assumed or assigned. 
  • Rejection of a lease means that the lease is breached, the debtor tenant has to vacate the property, and the landlord can file a claim against the debtor’s estate for the amount of any past or future rent. 

Capping a landlord's claim. If a lease is rejected, the landlord's damage claim for termination of the lease will be treated as a pre-filing unsecured claim.  In addition, the claim for future rent under the lease will be capped at an amount equal to the greater of one year's rent or fifteen percent of the remaining lease term, up to a maximum of three years' worth of rent, calculated from the earlier of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed or the date when the landlord recovered possession of, or the tenant surrendered, the premises. This ability to cap a landlord's claim in bankruptcy is often a major benefit to a debtor tenant, especially when the lease rejected is a long-term lease with rent obligations higher than current market rates. Landlords with security deposits, either in the form of cash or letters of credit, generally will be able to retain or draw on that security at least up to the amount of their capped bankruptcy claim.

Assignments of leases in bankruptcy. Although some leases contain restrictions or outright prohibitions on the tenant’s ability to assign the lease, many of these provisions will be unenforceable in bankruptcy. This can allow a debtor to “assume and assign” a lease to a third party over the landlord's objection. Since third parties will often pay substantial sums to take over a lease with rent obligations below current market rates, these below-market leases can be valuable assets for debtors.   

The recent bankruptcy law changes. The 210 day maximum lease decision period represents one of the major changes enacted with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), discussed in an earlier post. Before these amendments took effect in October 2005, although debtors initially had only 60 days to assume or reject leases, they were permitted to seek extensions of this period without any statutory limitation. Cumulative extensions of a year or more, over a landlord's objection, were not uncommon under the pre-BAPCPA version of the Bankruptcy Code. That is no longer possible under BAPCPA.

Impact on retailers. This change is particularly significant for retailers with dozens or even hundreds of leased stores. In the past, retailers usually evaluated sales at stores for at least one holiday shopping season, and sometimes two, before deciding whether to retain the store. Now a retailer has only seven months to make that decision. This shortened period also impacts a retailer's ability to sell off its unwanted leases, especially through a sale of "designation rights" (the right to designate the assignee of a lease), as the buyer of those rights now will have a limited time to find buyers for those leases.

Landlord as debtor. Sometimes the debtor is not a tenant but a landlord. In that situation, although the debtor can reject a lease and no longer perform any of its duties as landlord, it cannot use bankruptcy to evict a tenant that prefers to stay in possession of the premises. In Section 365(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a special provision reminiscent of the rights of a licensee of intellectual property under Section 365(n), a tenant may elect to remain in the premises for the remaining term of the lease, plus any renewal or extension of the term that may be provided in the lease if enforceable under applicable state law. If it so elects, the tenant must continue to pay the rent required under the lease but can offset against that rent any damages caused by the landlord's nonperformance. 

Sublandlord as debtor. When the debtor is a sublandlord (also known as a sublessor), these protections generally do not apply and the subtenant is at risk of losing possession of the premises.  Because a sublandlord is a tenant under a master lease (with the "real" landlord), if the debtor rejects the master lease it, and its subtenants, usually will not have any continuing rights to possession of the premises. Subtenants looking to protect themselves in such a situation often obtain, as part of their sublease, a non-disturbance agreement, direct lease right, or similar protection from the master landlord.

Get good advice. Whether the debtor is a tenant or a landlord (or both), bankruptcy can have a significant impact on commercial real estate leases and subleases. For this reason, it is important to get prompt legal advice on your particular lease, both at the time the lease is negotiated and in the event of bankruptcy, to protect your rights.

Will The New Bankruptcy Law Affect Your Business?

On October 17, 2005, the most significant revision to U.S. bankruptcy law in a generation took effect.  If you followed the media’s coverage of the new law before it became effective, you could easily have assumed that the changes were aimed only at consumers filing bankruptcy to get rid of credit card debt.  There is no question that the new law, called the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (bankruptcy lawyers just call it BAPCPA), was aimed at, and affects most significantly, individual consumers.  David L. Rosendorf of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., in conjunction with the American Bankruptcy Institute, maintains an entire blog devoted to the new law's changes and how it is being implemented.  His blog has a natural focus on those consumer changes.

However, the surprising news is that the new bankruptcy law changes also contained a host of provisions that will affect businesses.  Many bankruptcy lawyers (this one included) think the law will make it more difficult for some businesses to reorganize, which could end up reducing recoveries for unsecured creditors.  That said, other provisions in the new law benefit certain unsecured creditors.  For an overview of how the new law will affect businesses and their creditors, look here or here -- and stayed tuned.