Recent California Decision Addresses Whether Directors And Officers Can Be Liable For Unpaid Wages Of A Bankrupt Company

When insolvent companies are unable to make payroll or to pay accrued vacation or other amounts owed employees, the question often arises whether directors, officers, or shareholders face personal liability for these unpaid amounts. The California Court of Appeal recently addressed that issue, examining whether particular sections of the California Labor Code, as well as section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code (California's unfair competition law), impose personal liability.

The Court of Appeal Decision. In its April 2008 decision in Bradstreet v. Wong, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held that owners, officers, and managers of an insolvent company, which later filed bankruptcy, were not personally liable for unpaid wages, overtime, vacation pay, and other amounts based on a series of alleged California Labor Code violations. The Court also ruled that these individuals were not liable to pay restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17200. A copy of the Court of Appeal's opinion is available here.

Risks Remain. Although the decision is a favorable one for officers and directors, risks remain. Be sure to read the informative discussion written by my colleagues in the Employment & Labor Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP for a careful analysis of the decision. As they explain, despite this new decision, and the California Supreme Court's 2005 decision on similar issues in the Reynolds v. Bement case, it's possible that directors and officers may still face a risk of individual liability under other California Labor Code sections or based on different legal theories. Depending on the facts and statutes involved, there may also be individual liability under federal law or the laws of other states.

Get Advice. The issues presented when an insolvent company is, or might be, unable to pay wages are complicated. Directors and officers of a company facing this situation should be sure to get both insolvency and employment law advice to help guide them, and the company, through these difficult straits.

Leading Venture Capitalists Reflect On Business Failure

David Feinlieb of Mohr Davidow Ventures has an interesting post on his Tech, Startups, Capital, Ideas blog entitled "Why Startups Fail." David highlights four main reasons around his general theme of "they run out of money":

  • They spend too much on sales and marketing before they're ready.
  • The market outpaces the startup's ability to execute.
  • There is no entrepreneur.
  • The market takes too long to develop.

David's explanations behind each of these headlines are incisive and thought-provoking, and they underscore the challenging road startups must travel. I would add to the list the impact an industry or general economic slowdown can have on a particular startup, including when it comes to raising additional capital. (For more on the topic, you may find interesting an earlier post discussing the views of another VC on why early stage businesses fail and another one examining how a recession may affect investment decisions of VCs.)

On a similar theme is a post by Brad Feld of Foundry Ventures entitled "Do VCs Fund Entrepreneurs Who Have Failed At Previous Ventures?" over at the Ask The VC blog. Thanks to Brad as well for first blogging on David Feinlieb's post on startups, where Brad observes that "we are heading for another wave of failure as companies run out of gas after their Series B / Series C rounds and their investors lose patience with them."

Brad sums up his views this way on the topic of funding entrepreneurs with a prior failed business:

My favorite entrepreneurs to fund are those that have had at least one success and one failure.  While it is a cliche, failure teaches the big lessons.  Most importantly, entrepreneurs that have some failure under their belt have humility and perspective that I think is deeply useful in the creation of the company.

Startups are inherently risky, even in a strong economic climate. As the potentially recessionary economy produces more failed startups, it's especially valuable to have insights and perspectives like these from experienced VCs.

Assignments For The Benefit Of Creditors: Simple As ABC?

Companies in financial trouble are often forced to liquidate their assets to pay creditors. While a Chapter 11 bankruptcy sometimes makes the most sense, other times a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is required, and in still other situations a corporate dissolution may be best. This post examines another of the options, the assignment for the benefit of creditors, commonly known as an "ABC."

A Few Caveats. It's important to remember that determining which path an insolvent company should take depends on the specific facts and circumstances involved. As in many areas of the law, one size most definitely does not fit all for financially troubled companies. With those caveats in mind, let's consider one scenario sometimes seen when a venture-backed or other investor-funded company runs out of money.

One Scenario. After a number of rounds of investment, the investors of a privately held corporation have decided not to put in more money to fund the company's operations. The company will be out of cash within a few months and borrowing from the company's lender is no longer an option. The accounts payable list is growing (and aging) and some creditors have started to demand payment. A sale of the business may be possible, however, and a term sheet from a potential buyer is anticipated soon. The company's real property lease will expire in nine months, but it's possible that a buyer might want to take over the lease.

  • A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing is problematic because there is insufficient cash to fund operations going forward, no significant revenues are being generated, and debtor in possession financing seems highly unlikely unless the buyer itself would make a loan. 
  • The board prefers to avoid a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because it's concerned that a bankruptcy trustee, unfamiliar with the company's technology, would not be able to generate the best recovery for creditors.

The ABC Option. In many states, another option that may be available to companies in financial trouble is an assignment for the benefit of creditors (or "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" as it is sometimes called). The ABC is an insolvency proceeding governed by state law rather than federal bankruptcy law.

California ABCs. In California, where ABCs have been done for years, the primary governing law is found in California Code of Civil Procedure sections 493.010 to 493.060 and sections 1800 to 1802, among other provisions of California law. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1802 sets forth, in remarkably brief terms, the main procedural requirements for a company (or individual) making, and an assignee accepting, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors:

1802.  (a) In any general assignment for the benefit of creditors, as defined in Section 493.010, the assignee shall, within 30 days after the assignment has been accepted in writing, give written notice of the assignment to the assignor's creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest as set forth on the list provided by the assignor pursuant to subdivision (c).
   (b) In the notice given pursuant to subdivision (a), the assignee shall establish a date by which creditors must file their claims to be able to share in the distribution of proceeds of the liquidation of the assignor's assets.  That date shall be not less than 150 days and not greater than 180 days after the date of the first giving of the written notice to creditors and parties in interest.
   (c) The assignor shall provide to the assignee at the time of the making of the assignment a list of creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest, signed under penalty of  perjury, which shall include the names, addresses, cities, states, and ZIP Codes for each person together with the amount of that person's anticipated claim in the assignment proceedings.

In California, the company and the assignee enter into a formal "Assignment Agreement." The company must also provide the assignee with a list of creditors, equityholders, and other interested parties (names, addresses, and claim amounts). The assignee is required to give notice to creditors of the assignment, setting a bar date for filing claims with the assignee that is between five to six months later.

ABCs In Other States. Many other states have ABC statutes although in practice they have been used to varying degrees. For example, ABCs have been more common in California than in states on the East Coast, but important exceptions exist. Delaware corporations can generally avail themselves of Delaware's voluntary assignment statutes, and its procedures have both similarities and important differences from the approach taken in California. Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog has an interesting post discussing ABC's under Georgia law. Florida is another state in which ABCs are done under specific statutory procedures. For an excellent book that has information on how ABCs are conducted in various states, see Geoffrey Berman's General Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The ABCs of ABCs, published by the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Important Features Of ABCs. A full analysis of how ABCs function in a particular state and how one might affect a specific company requires legal advice from insolvency counsel. The following highlights some (but by no means all) of the key features of ABCs:

  • Court Filing Issue. In California, making an ABC does not require a public court filing. Some other states, however, do require a court filing to initiate or complete an ABC.
  • Select The Assignee. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, who is randomly appointed from those on an approved panel, a corporation making an assignment is generally able to choose the assignee.
  • Shareholder Approval. Most corporations require both board and shareholder approval for an ABC because it involves the transfer to the assignee of substantially all of the corporation's assets. This makes ABCs impractical for most publicly held corporations.
  • Liquidator As Fiduciary. The assignee is a fiduciary to the creditors and is typically a professional liquidator.
  • Assignee Fees. The fees charged by assignees often involve an upfront payment and a percentage based on the assets liquidated.
  • No Automatic Stay. In many states, including California, an ABC does not give rise to an automatic stay like bankruptcy, although an assignee can often block judgment creditors from attaching assets.
  • Event Of Default. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is typically a default under most contracts. As a result, contracts may be terminated upon the assignment under an ipso facto clause.
  • Proof Of Claim. For creditors, an ABC process generally involves the submission to the assignee of a proof of claim by a stated deadline or bar date, similar to bankruptcy. (Click on the link for an example of an ABC proof of claim form.)
  • Employee Priority. Employee and other claim priorities are governed by state law and may involve different amounts than apply under the Bankruptcy Code. In California, for example, the employee wage and salary priority is $4,300, not the $10,950 amount currently in force under the Bankruptcy Code.
  • 20 Day Goods. Generally, ABC statutes do not have a provision similar to that under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9), which gives an administrative claim priority to vendors who sold goods in the ordinary course of business to a debtor during the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing. As a result, these vendors may recover less in an ABC than in a bankruptcy case, subject to assertion of their reclamation rights.
  • Landlord Claim. Unlike bankruptcy, there generally is no cap imposed on a landlord's claim for breach of a real property lease in an ABC.
  • Sale Of Assets. In many states, including California, sales by the assignee of the company's assets are completed as a private transaction without approval of a court. However, unlike a bankruptcy Section 363 sale, there is usually no ability to sell assets "free and clear" of liens and security interests without the consent or full payoff of lienholders. Likewise, leases or executory contracts cannot be assigned without required consents from the other contracting party.
  • Avoidance Actions. Most states allow assignees to pursue preferences and fraudulent transfers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Bankruptcy Code pre-empts California's preference statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1800. Nevertheless, to date the California state courts have refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision and still permit assignees to sue for preferences in California state court. In February 2008, a Delaware state court followed the California state court decisions, refusing either to follow the Ninth Circuit position or to hold that the California preference statute was pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware court was required to apply California's ABC preference statute because the avoidance action arose out of an earlier California ABC.

The Scenario Revisited. With this overview in mind, let's return to our company in distress.

  • The prospect of a term sheet from a potential buyer may influence whether our hypothetical company should choose an ABC or another approach. Some buyers will refuse to purchase assets outside of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy or a Chapter 7 case. Others are comfortable with the ABC process and believe it provides an added level of protection from fraudulent transfer claims compared to purchasing the assets directly from the insolvent company. Depending on the value to be generated by a sale, these considerations may lead the company to select one approach over the other available options.
  • In states like California where no court approval is required for a sale, the ABC can also mean a much faster closing -- often within a day or two of the ABC itself provided that the assignee has had time to perform due diligence on the sale and any alternatives -- instead of the more typical 30-60 days required for bankruptcy court approval of a Section 363 sale. Given the speed at which they can be done, in the right situation an ABC can permit a "going concern" sale to be achieved.
  • Secured creditors with liens against the assets to be sold will either need to be paid off through the sale or will have to consent to release their liens; forced "free and clear" sales generally are not possible in an ABC.
  • If the buyer decides to take the real property lease, the landlord will need to consent to the lease assignment. Unlike bankruptcy, the ABC process generally cannot force a landlord or other third party to accept assignment of a lease or executory contract.
  • If the buyer decides not to take the lease, or no sale occurs, the fact that only nine months remains on the lease means that this company would not benefit from bankruptcy's cap on landlord claims. If the company's lease had years remaining, and if the landlord were unwilling to agree to a lease termination approximating the result under bankruptcy's landlord claim cap, the company would need to consider whether a bankruptcy filing was necessary to avoid substantial dilution to other unsecured creditor claims that a large, uncapped landlord claim would produce in an ABC.
  • If the potential buyer walks away, the assignee would be responsible for determining whether a sale of all or a part of the assets was still possible. In any event, assets would be liquidated by the assignee to the extent feasible and any proceeds would be distributed to creditors in order of their priority through the ABC's claims process.
  • While other options are available and should be explored, an ABC may make sense for this company depending upon the buyer's views, the value to creditors and other constituencies that a sale would produce, and a clear-eyed assessment of alternative insolvency methods. 

Conclusion. When weighing all of the relevant issues, an insolvent company's management and board would be well-served to seek the advice of counsel and other insolvency professionals as early as possible in the process. The old song may say that ABC is as "easy as 1-2-3," but assessing whether an assignment for the benefit of creditors is best for an insolvent company involves the analysis of a myriad of complex factors.

New Article Examines Latest Deepening Insolvency Trends

For a number of years, the concept of deepening insolvency has been one of the more hotly debated issues in the insolvency arena. Two of my colleagues in the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, Michael Klein and Ronald Sussman, have written an interesting article entitled "Tide Has Turned On Deepening Insolvency - Courts Now Rejecting Theory As Cause Of Action," published in the February 2008 issue of the Journal of Corporate Renewal by the Turnaround Management Association. You can read the article by clicking on its title above.

The article gives a succinct overview of the impact of last year's Delaware Supreme Court decisions in the North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla and Trenwick America cases (as well as the Chancery Court's Trenwick decision that was adopted by the Supreme Court). In particular, the article describes how the Gheewalla decision altered the "zone of insolvency" analysis and how Trenwick's rejection of deepening insolvency as a cause of action in Delaware has led courts in other jurisdictions to follow suit. Directors of financially troubled companies and their counsel will find the article an informative read.

For more information on the Gheewalla decision, including a copy of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion, click here. For more on the Trenwick decision, including copies of the Delaware Supreme Court order and Chancery Court opinion, click here.

Real Estate Workouts: Are Pre-Bankruptcy Waivers Of The Automatic Stay Enforceable?

This post examines a new decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida involving the enforceability of a pre-bankruptcy waiver of the automatic stay. Let's first set the stage by taking a look at a not so uncommon fact pattern involving a real estate project in financial trouble.

The Real Estate Workout: Forbearance With A Price. The owner of a troubled real estate development is about to default on a loan secured by the real property. On the eve of foreclosure, the lender agrees to forbear from foreclosing for two months to give the developer time to refinance and save the project.  However, in exchange the lender insists that the developer agree that, in the event of bankruptcy, the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. The developer agrees and the forbearance agreement is executed.

The Bankruptcy Aftermath. Unfortunately, the hoped-for financing falls through and the developer files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the project just before the rescheduled foreclosure sale. The lender quickly files a motion for relief from stay, asking the bankruptcy court to enforce the pre-bankruptcy relief from stay waiver included in the forbearance agreement. The motion is opposed by the developer, now a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, as well as the official committee of unsecured creditors and junior lienholders.

Is The Waiver Of The Automatic Stay Enforceable? This was the question answered by Bankruptcy Judge John K. Olson in an 18-page decision, issued on February 12, 2008, in the In re Bryan Road, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The facts were essentially as described above, but a few additional details help put the issue in context.

  • The real estate project involved a 210 unit "dry stack" boat storage facility in Dania Beach, Florida.
  • The lender, which commenced a judicial foreclosure proceeding against the 191 units still owned by the debtor, had been awarded final judgment setting a foreclosure sale.
  • On the morning of the foreclosure sale, the debtor and the lender entered into a forbearance agreement that was approved by the court in the foreclosure proceeding. The forbearance agreement provided for a two-month continuance of the foreclosure sale in exchange for the debtor's agreement that the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose in the event of a bankruptcy.
  • The day before the continued foreclosure sale was to take place, the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.

The Bankruptcy Court's Analysis. In his decision on the lender's stay relief motion, Judge Olson first noted that prepetition waivers of the stay will be given "no particular effect as part of initial loan documents" but the "greatest effect if entered into during the course of prior (and subsequently aborted) chapter 11 proceedings." After concluding that a confirmed chapter 11 plan was not required, the Bankruptcy Court looked to four non-exclusive factors, drawn from In re Desai, 282 B.R. 527 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002), in considering whether stay relief should be granted based on the prepetition waiver:

(1) the sophistication of the party making the waiver; (2) the consideration for the waiver, including the creditor's risk and the length of time the waiver covers; (3) whether other parties are affected including unsecured creditors and junior lienholders; and (4) the feasibility of the debtor's plan.

As to the first two factors, the Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor's counsel was very sophisticated and, although the forbearance period was short, it was sufficient consideration. On the third and fourth factors, the Bankruptcy Court first noted the existence of junior lienholders and approximately $1 million of disputed unsecured claims. However, the Bankruptcy Court then engaged in a detailed analysis leading to the conclusion that the debtor's plan simply was not feasible. As such, there likely was no value for unsecured creditors in the boat storage project beyond the secured debt and the junior lienholders could protect their own interests under state law. Putting these factors together, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the forbearance agreement -- including the waiver of the automatic stay -- should be enforced and the stay was lifted.

A Few Key Take-Aways. With economic conditions continuing to strain a variety of real estate developments, workouts in the shadow of foreclosure may become more common. The In re Bryan Road, LLC decision highlights that in the right case a bankruptcy court may be willing to enforce prepetition stay relief agreements if a bankruptcy is later filed.

  • This is particularly true when the debtor is a single asset real estate entity, it signs an agreement on the eve of foreclosure, and it has few unsecured creditors. In fact, the more the bankruptcy appears to be just a two-party dispute between the debtor and lender, the more likely the prepetition automatic stay waiver will be enforced.
  • On the other hand, when a troubled real estate project has a real chance of reorganizing, and substantial unsecured creditor claims are involved, these agreements more likely will be rejected in favor of traditional relief from stay analysis under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion. Prepetition stay relief agreements involve complex issues. As with most bankruptcy questions, real estate owners and lenders should get advice from bankruptcy counsel on their specific situation when considering whether to include such a waiver of the automatic stay in any forbearance agreement.

Licensing Intellectual Property From An Israeli Company: What Happens If There's A Bankruptcy?

Many technology companies are based in Israel and license intellectual property to companies in the United States and around the world. This raises an interesting question: what happens if the Israeli company, as licensor, goes into bankruptcy or liquidation in Israel? The latest edition of Cross Border Commentary, a publication by the International Business Practice of my firm, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, has just addressed that very question.

The U.S. Law Answer.  Before turning to Israeli law, let's look at how this issue plays out under the United States Bankruptcy Code. A licensor in bankruptcy or its bankruptcy trustee has the option of assuming (keeping) or rejecting (breaching) a license. Generally, a debtor licensor can assume a license if it meets the same tests (cures defaults and provides adequate assurance of future performance) required to assume other executory contracts.  Many licensees will not have a problem with assumption of their license as long as the debtor can actually continue to perform. Instead, the real concern for licensees is the fear of losing their rights to the licensed IP, which often can be mission critical technology, if the license is rejected.

  • Special protections. Recognizing this concern, the United States Bankruptcy Code, in Section 365(n), provides licensees with special protections.  If the debtor or trustee rejects a license, under Section 365(n) a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed intellectual property, including even a right to enforce an exclusivity provision. In return, the licensee must continue to make any required royalty payments. The licensee also can retain rights under any agreement supplementary to the license, which includes source code or other forms of technology escrow agreements.  Taken together, these provisions protect a licensee from being stripped of its rights to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.
  • Watch out for trademarks. While many people would expect intellectual property to include trademarks, the Bankruptcy Code has its own limited definition of "intellectual property." The bankruptcy definition includes trade secrets, patents and patent applications, copyrights, and mask works.  Importantly, however, it does not include trademarks. This distinction means that trademark licensees enjoy none of Section 365(n)'s special protections and those licensees are at risk of losing their trademark rights in a bankruptcy. 

For more on these subjects, you may find these earlier posts, "Intellectual Property Licenses: What Happens In Bankruptcy?" and "Trademark Licensor In Bankruptcy: Special Risk For Licensees" of interest.

The Israeli Perspective. An article in Cooley's Cross Border Commentary, prepared by Einat Meisel of the Israeli law firm of Gross, Kleinhendler, Hodak, Berkman and Co., discusses a Tel-Aviv District Court decision involving these issues. When an Israeli company known as Commodio Ltd. entered liquidation, two of its intellectual property licensees sought to retain rights under their license agreements with Commodio. In ruling on the effort, the Israeli court made several important holdings:

  • The licensees could continue to use the IP as long as they made required any royalty payments and complied with the terms of use in the agreements, with payments to be made to the liquidator.
  • The licensees could gain access to the underlying source code behind the object code covered by their licenses provided this did not impose substantial expense on the company in liquidation.
  • No transfer of ownership in the IP could occur due to the liquidation, as this would be contrary to Israeli bankruptcy law.
  • A right of first refusal covering certain of the intellectual property would be enforceable in the bankruptcy.

Comparison To A U.S. Bankruptcy. With a few key differences, the outcome in the Commodio case is similar to the treatment under U.S. law. Under Section 365(n)'s provisions, licensees would have the ability to retain their rights to the IP, with any royalty payments being made to the bankruptcy estate. If an agreement contained a source code license, the licensees could also access the source code under Section 365(n). However, absent a license grant to the source code, the outcome would likely be different in a U.S. bankruptcy.  Provisions purporting to transfer ownership of the IP upon a bankruptcy or liquidation would not be enforceable in a U.S. bankruptcy. Finally, the right of first refusal enforced in the Israeli case might not be enforced in a U.S. bankruptcy if the agreement were rejected but could if the license were assumed. 

Get Advice. Licensing intellectual property from a foreign corporation raises a number of issues, including what happens if the foreign licensor goes bankrupt or becomes insolvent. Potential licensees should be sure to get expert advice on the applicable foreign law, including the implications of bankruptcy, when licensing IP from a foreign company. Although licensees from Israeli companies can find some comfort in the Commodio decision, it remains important to get advice on Israeli law specific to your situation. 

How Venture Capitalists View An Economic Downturn

Recent posts from two thought-leading venture capitalists give insights into how VCs approach the impact of a possible recession. The first is from Will Price, a managing director at venture capital firm Hummer Winblad. In his post, titled "Downturn - Now What?" (hat tip: Ask The VC blog), Will offers some very interesting observations, including this one:

If I take the last downturn as my guide, I can say with confidence that venture investors would be well suited to continue to invest right through the downturn - in 2002 and 2003 terrific companies were formed and funded at very reasonable valuations and with business models that reflected the demand for capital efficiency and economic viability.

The second post comes from Jason Mendelson who, together with fellow Foundry Group managing director Brad Feld, publish the Ask The VC blog. This new post, titled "What Is The Effect Of The 'Pending' Recession On Venture Capital Financings Of Private Companies?," examines similar issues. Jason makes a number of thoughtful comments, including:

Now how does this all affect VC financings?  Well, history would tell us that VCs will put less money into funding companies, converse cash and wait until the acquisition and public markets open up a bit.  With a lack of good exits, why would a VC want to invest in a company?  However, that's never made much sense to me, especially if we limit investments to early-staged companies.  I've always thought the best time to invest in young startups is when things are choppy.  You usually can invest at lower prices, hire folks for less than you normally would, etc.  Also, I'd never expect an investment to exit in the near future (1-3 years, for sure) and therefore the company will be well positioned to exit at the end of the recession.  If you wait until the recession is over, you are already paying too much.

For anyone interested in how a recession could impact venture-backed companies, including insolvency professionals who work with the ones that fail, these new posts from two leading venture capitalists make for very informative reading.

When Startups Shut Down: A Venture Capitalist Reflects On Why Early Stage Businesses Fail

Fred Wilson, a managing director at New York-based venture capital firm Union Square Ventures, has an insightful post entitled "Why Early Stage Venture Investments Fail." It's a rare opportunity to get a venture capital investor's perspective on the reasons startup companies go bust. Fred cites two main reasons:

1) It was a dumb idea and we realized it early on and killed the investment. I've only been involved in one investment in this category personally although I've lived through a bunch like this over the years in the partnerships I've been in.
2) It was a decent idea but directionally incorrect, it was hugely overfunded, the burn rate was taken to levels way beyond reason, and it became impossible to adapt the business in a financially viable manner.

He notes that it's the second reason -- a failure to adapt the business in a way that makes financial sense -- that predominates. Fred highlights the danger caused by allowing companies to run with high burn rates, something my own experience teaches is a common affliction of distressed companies, particularly those in the early, developmental stages before they have substantial revenues to offset the burn.

This post followed another in which Fred discussed his overall early stage failure rate. Both make for interesting reading for anyone looking to understand why businesses fail -- and how to help them succeed.

(Hat tip to Erick Schonfeld for his post on the subject at TechCrunch.)

The Bull Rips A Hole In The Matador's Cape: New Ninth Circuit Decision Limits Reach Of Section 502(b)(6)'s Landlord Cap

A commercial real estate lease often represents the largest single liability of many debtors. For retailers, which typically have scores or even hundreds of store leases, the liability involved is orders of magnitude larger. It's fair to say that the management of lease obligations can be of enormous consequence to debtors, landlords, and other creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.

Rejected Leases And The Capped Claim. As explained in an earlier post on how commercial real estate leases are treated in bankruptcy, one of a debtor's options in a Chapter 11 case is to reject uneconomic or otherwise burdensome leases, terminating the debtor's obligation to pay rent and turning the landlord's claim for termination of the lease into a prepetition claim. Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code goes further and caps the landlord's prepetition rejection claim at an amount equal to the greater of (1) one year's rent or (2) fifteen percent of the remaining lease term, up to a maximum of three years' worth of rent. The starting date for calculating the claim is the earlier of the date when the bankruptcy petition was filed or when the landlord recovered possession of, or the tenant surrendered, the premises. A landlord with six years left on a rejected lease, for example, would have its claim capped at one year's worth of rent.

What's Covered By The Cap? This ability to cap a landlord's claim in bankruptcy can be a major benefit to debtor tenants. Ever since a 1995 decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit in In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), debtors have been successful in many cases in capping a variety of claims by landlords. In McSheridan, the BAP held that the cap applied to all damages for the lessee's nonperformance of the lease, not just to claims based on future rent. Landlords have challenged that analysis but, at least in the Ninth Circuit, have had little success -- until this week.

The Ninth Circuit's El Toro Decision. In an eight-page opinion (available here) issued on October 1, 2007 in the In re El Toro Materials Company, Inc. Chapter 11 case,, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a very different view of the landlord cap under Section 502(b)(6). In the El Toro case, the debtor was a mining company that leased property from the Saddleback Community Church, paying $28,000 per month in rent. After the lease was rejected, Saddleback brought an adversary proceeding against El Toro for $23 million in damages alleging that El Toro left a million tons of wet clay "goo," mining equipment, and other materials on the property.

  • The bankruptcy court held that Saddleback's claim, which asserted waste, nuisance, and other tort theories, would not be limited by the Section 502(b)(6) cap. 
  • Following its McSheridan precedent, the BAP reversed and held that any damages would be subject to the cap. 
  • Interestingly, two of the three judges on the BAP panel filed concurring opinions, voicing doubts about the wisdom of the McSheridan case. A copy of the BAP's unpublished El Toro decision from July 2005 is available here.

Judge Kozinski's Analysis. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP's decision, holding that the cap did not apply to the landlord's tort claims. Judge Alex Kozinski authored the opinion and analyzed the key issues this way:

The structure of the cap—measured as a fraction of the remaining term—suggests that damages other than those based on a loss of future rental income are not subject to the cap. It makes sense to cap damages for lost rental income based on the amount of expected rent: Landlords may have the ability to mitigate their damages by re-leasing or selling the premises, but will suffer injury in proportion to the value of their lost rent in the meantime. In contrast, collateral damages are likely to bear only a weak correlation to the amount of rent: A tenant may cause a lot of damage to a premises leased cheaply, or cause little damage to premises underlying an expensive leasehold.

One major purpose of bankruptcy law is to allow creditors to receive an aliquot share of the estate to settle their debts. Metering these collateral damages by the amount of the rent would be inconsistent with the goal of providing compensation to each creditor in proportion with what it is owed. Landlords in future cases may have significant claims for both lost rental income and for breach of other provisions of the lease. To limit their recovery for collateral damages only to a portion of their lost rent would leave landlords in a materially worse position than other creditors. In contrast, capping rent claims but allowing uncapped claims for collateral damage to the rented premises will follow congressional intent by preventing a potentially overwhelming claim for lost rent from draining the estate, while putting landlords on equal footing with other creditors for their collateral claims.

The statutory language supports this interpretation. The cap applies to damages “resulting from” the rejection of the lease. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). Saddleback’s claims for waste, nuisance and trespass do not result from the rejection of the lease—they result from the pile of dirt allegedly left on the property. Rejection of the lease may or may not have triggered Saddleback’s ability to sue for the alleged damages.But the harm to Saddleback’s property existed whether or not the lease was rejected. A simple test reveals whether the damages result from the rejection of the lease: Assuming all other conditions remain constant, would the landlord have the same claim against the tenant if the tenant were to assume the lease rather than rejecting it? Here, Saddleback would still have the same claim it brings today had El Toro accepted the lease and committed to finish its term: The pile of dirt would still be allegedly trespassing on Saddleback’s land and Saddleback still would have the same basis for its theories of nuisance, waste and breach of contract. The million-ton heap of dirt was not put there by the rejection of the lease—it was put there by the actions and inactions of El Toro in preparing to turn over the site.

(Footnotes omitted.)

McSheridan Holding Overruled. The Ninth Circuit opinion noted the two concurrences from the BAP decision questioning McSheridan and suggested that the BAP consider adopting an en banc procedure to reconsider such doubtful precedents. Given the Ninth Circuit's holding, it will come as no surprise that the Court of Appeals also explicitly overruled McSheridan:

To the extent that McSheridan holds section 502(b)(6) to be a limit on tort claims other than those based on lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant’s failure to complete a lease term, it is overruled.

The Ninth Circuit noted that McSheridan also holds that "damages flowing from the failure of a party that has rejected a lease to perform future routine repairs or pay utility bills are capped," but declined to address -- or overrule -- that holding.

Post-El Toro Ramifications.  At least in the Ninth Circuit, with McSheridan overruled landlords will work hard to characterize their damage claims as arising from tort theories or otherwise not being based on "lost rent, rent-like payments or other damages directly arising from a tenant's failure to complete the lease term." At the negotiation stage, when the market permits landlords may demand larger security deposits and letters of credit on the view that the Section 502(b)(6) cap no longer limits every type of damage recoverable against such security. They may also structure leases to separate claims for items such as clean-up costs, hazardous waste removal, property damage, and even tenant improvement repayments from rent claims, in an attempt to bolster the argument that these claims fall outside of the cap.

Conclusion. Like a bull charging a matador, the El Toro decision has ripped a hole in the Section 502(b)(6) cape previously used to turn away cap-busting landlord claims. Time will tell just how significant the decision turns out to be, but at first blush it seems that debtors and non-landlord creditors may be the ones who end up seeing red. 

Ordinary Course Preference Case Takes Extraordinary Turn: Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Local Bankruptcy Rule On Jury Trials

Preference lawsuits are filed all the time in bankruptcy cases and the ordinary course of business defense is frequently asserted. Still, it's the rare case that ends up with a federal court of appeals decision addressing jury trial rights and invalidating a bankruptcy court's local rule. This post is about just such a case.

The Bankruptcy Preference. As a quick refresher, preferences are payments or other transfers made in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing, on account of antecedent or pre-existing debt, at a time when the debtor was insolvent, that allow the transferee (the preference defendant) to be "preferred" by recovering more than it would have had the transfer not been made and the defendant instead had simply filed a proof of claim for the amount involved. The 90-day reachback period is extended to a full year prior to the bankruptcy petition for insiders such as officers, directors, and affiliates.

Jury Trials In Bankruptcy Cases? Preference defendants who do not file proofs of claim in the main bankruptcy case have the option to demand a trial by jury in the preference lawsuit. This is a right protected by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. The parties in the lawsuit can consent to having the bankruptcy court conduct the jury trial but this doesn't happen very often. Why would a preference defendant make a jury demand? Here are three common reasons:

  • The defendant believes a jury would be more inclined to find in its favor than a bankruptcy judge;
  • The defendant wants the case moved to federal district court from the bankruptcy court, which some defendants perceive as more debtor-friendly; and
  • Jury trials are more expensive and complex, a fact the preference defendant may hope will translate into settlement leverage.

The HealthCentral.com Case. In a recent case, Sigma Micro Corporation, a company sued for an alleged preference by debtor HealthCentral.com, made just such a jury trial demand. It then filed a motion for certification before the bankruptcy court seeking to have its case moved to the district court, in accordance with Local Rule 9015-2(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. That Local Rule, entitled "Certification to District Court," provides:

If the Bankruptcy Judge determines that [a] demand was timely made and the party has a right to a jury trial, and if all parties have not filed written consent to a jury trial before the Bankruptcy Judge, the Bankruptcy Judge shall certify to the District Court that the proceeding is to be tried by a jury and that the parties have not consented to a jury trial in the Bankruptcy Court. Upon such certification, [the jurisdictional] reference of the proceeding shall be automatically withdrawn, and the proceeding assigned to a Judge of the District . . . .

The Bankruptcy Court held that Sigma had a right to a jury trial but then stayed its order to retain jurisdiction for pre-trial matters. It later granted the debtor's motion for summary judgment in the preference case, finding no genuine issue of material fact and rejecting Sigma's ordinary course of business defense. On appeal, Sigma argued that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to enter summary judgment because it should have transferred the case to the District Court upon finding that Sigma was entitled to a jury trial. It also argued that it had raised genuine issues of material fact on its ordinary course of business defense, precluding summary judgment.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision. On September 21, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in the case (available here).  In addressing the jurisdiction question, the Ninth Circuit confronted "an issue of first impression in this circuit, that is, the validity of Local Rule 9015-2(b)." After reviewing the right of courts to promulgate local rules, it came to the core of the issue:

Considering these rules we hold Local Rule 9015-2(b) to be invalid as it establishes a procedure for withdrawing the district court’s jurisdictional reference inconsistent with the Acts of  Congress and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Cf. Coffey v. Marina Management Servs. (In re Kool, Mann, Coffee), 23 F.3d 66, 67-69 (3rd Cir. 1994) (finding local rule invalid because of inconsistency with Bankruptcy Code); In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 1983) (same).

The Ninth Circuit noted that 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides that a "district court" may withdraw the reference of all or a part of a case or proceeding and that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5011(a) expressly states that a "motion for withdrawal of a case or proceeding shall be heard by a district judge." Putting these two provisions together, the Court of Appeals held:

After careful review we find the procedure established by Local Rule 9105-2(b) cannot be squared with the procedure established by 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), an “Act of Congress,” and Rule 5011(a), a “Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 9029. At least two inconsistencies bear mentioning. First, Local Rule 9015-2(b) allows for the bankruptcy court to “withdraw[ ]” the jurisdictional reference, whereas 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule 5011(a) make it explicit that only a district court may “withdraw” the jurisdictional reference. See FTC v. First Alliance Mortg. Co. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 282 B.R. 894, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that “a motion [to withdrawal] is heard by the district court”) (emphasis added). Second, Local Rule 9015-2(b) permits a party to obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a “Motion for Certification,” while 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule 5011(a) make it clear that a party may only obtain a withdrawal of the reference upon a “Motion for Withdrawal.” See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc., 355 B.R. 214, 218 (D. Hi. 2006) (holding that “a litigant who believes that a certain [action] or portion of a [action] pending in the bankruptcy court should be litigated in the district court may make a motion to withdraw the reference”) (emphasis added).

Having invalidated the Local Rule, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the Bankruptcy Court's decision not to adhere to it or to withdraw the reference. The Court of Appeal then considered whether the Seventh Amendment jury trial right itself required immediate transfer to the District Court, even for pre-trial proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with courts outside the circuit that, it stated, had universally agreed that a jury trial right "does not mean that the bankruptcy court must instantly give up jurisdiction and that the case must be transferred to the district court."

Concluding that the Bankruptcy Court properly retained the case for pre-trial matters, the Ninth Circuit did ultimately reverse its grant of summary judgment. It found that Sigma had raised genuine issues of material fact on its ordinary course of business defense under the version of Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code in force prior to the amendments made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.

What About Local Rules In Other Courts? It appears that the Northern District of California's local bankruptcy rule on certification of a jury trial right and transfer to the District Court is unusual. Some bankruptcy courts, including the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, have no specific rule addressing withdrawal of the reference based on a jury demand. Others require a prompt motion for withdrawal of the reference to be filed with the District Court, as provided in Central District of California Local Bankruptcy Rule 9015-2(g)

Conclusion. Although it appears that the decision's direct impact is limited to the Northern District of California and its jury demand procedures, this case proves that even well-established local rules will be struck down if inconsistent with governing statutes. That's a pretty extraordinary outcome for an ordinary course of business preference case. 

The Best Of Both Worlds: Can A Secured Creditor Get A Section 503(b)(9) "20 Day Goods" Administrative Claim Too?

In a decision from August 17, 2007, just released for publication, the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) faced a previously unanswered question under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, the section enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA).  Is a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim available to secured creditors or only to unsecured creditors? You may find the BAP's answer surprising.

A Section 503(b)(9) Refresher. For those who haven't dealt with this relatively new section, here are the highlights. Section 503(b)(9) gives vendors an important right beyond the expanded reclamation claim also enacted as part of BAPCPA. Vendors are entitled to an administrative priority claim for "the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before" the date a bankruptcy petition was filed "in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 

  • In most cases, particularly Chapter 11 cases in which a plan of reorganization is confirmed, administrative claims are paid in full on the effective date of the plan. General unsecured claims, by contrast, often receive only cents on the dollar, and even secured creditors can be "crammed down" and forced to accept payments over a period of time. This new administrative claim is therefore a significant benefit, in effect putting vendors selling goods to a debtor in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing on par with vendors selling goods after the bankruptcy filing. It's available even if a seller of goods fails to provide the required notice to have a post-bankruptcy reclamation claim. 
  • For a more detailed analysis of Section 503(b)(9), you may find this earlier post entitled "20 Day Goods: New Administrative Claim For Goods Sold Just Before Bankruptcy" useful, as well as a later post giving an update on a few early court decisions on the section. 
  • For more on the changes BAPCPA made to reclamation, you may want to read an earlier post entitled "Reclamation: Can A Vendor "Get The Goods" From An Insolvent Customer" and this post on some of the limitations of reclamation.

The Brown & Cole Stores Case. It was against this backdrop that the BAP analyzed the question before it in the In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC case. Brown & Cole is a privately held grocery chain operating in Washington state. Its principal supplier and wholesaler, Associated Grocers, Incorporated (AGI), is a cooperative whose largest shareholder is Brown & Cole itself. In Brown & Cole's Chapter 11 case, AGI asserted a "20 day goods" claim of more than $6 million, and also asserted that it was a secured creditor with a pledge of AGI's own stock owned by Brown & Cole. Brown & Cole alleged a number of claims against AGI and argued that it had a right of setoff on those claims against any "20 day goods" claim.

When AGI moved for allowance of a Section 503(b)(9) claim, Brown & Cole argued that AGI was not eligible for that administrative claim because it was a secured creditor. The bankruptcy court rejected that argument and granted AGI's motion. It also denied Brown & Cole's request for a setoff of its own prepetition claims against the administrative claim, among other reasons because of what the bankruptcy court found to be Brown & Cole's inequitable conduct in ordering goods just prior to its bankruptcy filing.

The BAP's Decision. After hearing the appeal, the BAP issued its opinion and identified the first question presented as "Is a secured claim entitled to an administrative priority pursuant to section 503(b)(9)?" The opinion's introduction shows that the BAP was aware of the interest creditors would have in its decision:

This case presents us with an issue of first impression regarding new section 503(b)(9) (“§  503(b)(9)”) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 2005. We expect that the issue is of great importance to many sellers of goods to troubled companies. The new provision gives expense-of-administration priority (“administrative priority”) to a claim for the value of goods received by a debtor within 20 days before the commencement of the case and sold in the ordinary course of business (“twenty-day sales”). The bankruptcy court granted administrative priority to a claim that may also be secured and denied the debtor’s claim of setoff. We AFFIRM the grant of administrative priority; we REVERSE the denial of setoff.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Secured Creditors Are Entitled To Section 503(b)(9) Claims. In reaching its holding, the BAP majority rejected Brown & Cole's primary argument that the Court should interpret Section 503(b)(9) as applying only to unsecured claims. Brown & Cole argued that at the same time as it added Section 503(b)(9), BAPCPA amended another subsection of Section 503 dealing with tax claims, specifically Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i), to clarify that it was available to "secured or unsecured" creditors.  In contrast, Congress did not include the words "secured claim" in Section 503(b)(9). This difference, Brown & Cole argued, should lead the BAP to hold that the "20 day goods" administrative claim is not available to secured creditors. The BAP's response was clear:

We reject that invitation. The provision is not ambiguous; as such, we must enforce it according to its terms and should not inquire beyond its plain language. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. Apart from finding no ambiguity in § 503(b)(9), we note that Congress also declined to put the word  “unsecured” into the same statute. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that all claims arising  from twenty-day sales are entitled to administrative priority.

(Footnote omitted). The BAP majority also rejected a policy argument advanced by Brown & Cole (B&C), and adopted by Judge Alan Jaroslovsky in his dissent:

We can do nothing about B&C’s contention that giving priority to a secured creditor may be inequitable to other creditors. First, it is up to Congress to decide which creditors have leverage and which do not. More importantly, if AGI’s twenty-day sales claim is fully secured, then payment of it by B&C will free the value of the security for that claim for the benefit of other  creditors. If AGI’s claim proves to be undersecured or unsecured, then to deny administrative priority would be to ignore the statute, something we cannot do.

In a footnoted response to the dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis Montali, writing for himself and Judge Randall L. Dunn, expanded on the point:

The dissent is concerned that we are ignoring bankruptcy policy that permits a Chapter 11 debtor to “cramdown” a secured claim in full over time. Congress gave tremendous leverage to a twenty-day sales claimant such as AGI by permitting it to demand full payment as of confirmation, and in doing so, perhaps dramatically affecting the outcome of the case. The fact that the claim is also secured represents less leverage (albeit more than held by non-priority general unsecured claims) than having administrative priority. It is not our place to reallocate that leverage. In any event, if the dissent’s view were the law, the holder of a twenty-day sales claim could simply waive its security, obtain administrative priority, and have equally powerful influence over the outcome of the case.

Setoff May Be Proper. The BAP (the dissent joined in this part of the majority opinion) also reversed the denial of Brown & Cole's setoff request, holding that although prepetition unsecured claims (the kind Brown & Cole asserted against AGI) cannot generally be set off against administrative claims because of a lack of mutuality, here the administrative claim itself arose prepetition, specifically in the 20 days before the bankruptcy filing. On the finding of inequitable conduct in ordering goods and receiving just prior to bankruptcy, the BAP held that there was insufficient evidence of inequitable conduct and that a "debtor contemplating reorganization is under no legal obligation to inform suppliers that it is contemplating a bankruptcy filing." The BAP reversed and remanded that issue to the bankruptcy court.

A Dissenting Voice. Judge Jaroslovsky dissented from what he described as the majority's "overly-sterile conclusion that a fully secured creditor can also have rights under § 503(b)(9)," stating that "[n]ot only is my statutory analysis different, but I see compelling policy reasons for a different result." He found that the plain language of Section 503(b)(9) did not resolve the question of whether secured creditors could be entitled to the administrative priority in light of the change made to Section 503(b)(1)(B)(i). He then turned to the policy issues:

Moreover, some fundamental policy considerations are at stake in this case. While allowing a priority claim to a secured creditor may not have a big impact in most Chapter 7 cases, it can  make a huge difference in a Chapter 11 case like this one. If AGI’s $6 million claim is entitled to priority status, § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires that it must be paid in full in cash upon confirmation. If  it is treated as a secured claim, it still must be paid in full but is subject to cramdown pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A). If we incorporate by implication the “secured or unsecured” language into § 503(b)(9), we may be in effect giving a secured creditor veto power over a plan of reorganization when § 1129(b)(2)(A) and sound bankruptcy policy dictate that a secured creditor can be forced  to accept a plan which is fair and equitable to it, honors its secured status and pays its secured claim in full over time.

I would weave the new § 503(b)(9) into the tapestry of American bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization. I prefer this result to the crazy quilt patched together by my brethren.

In his footnote to the prior paragraph, Judge Jaroslovsky stated: "Specifically, I would hold that a creditor would not be entitled to priority status for its twenty-day sales claim to the extent the claim is indubitably secured, applying any security first to claims other than the twenty-day sales claim. I note that AGI might well end up with an allowed priority twenty-day sales claim under this rule."

More Leverage For Secured Vendors. As both the majority and dissent discussed, a secured creditor who has the benefit of a Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim will have considerable leverage in getting paid in full upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. Most secured creditors lend money instead of supplying goods, but a number of vendors do hold collateral for their claims. Even though BAP decisions (in contrast to Court of Appeals decisions) generally are not binding precedent, other courts may find this decision persuasive. If followed widely, secured creditors entitled to assert a Section 503(b)(9) claim will have a noticeable advantage in getting paid. In addition, as the dissent noted, this decision may also make it more difficult for debtors to confirm Chapter 11 plans unless they have the cash to pay all "20 day goods" administrative claims upon their exit from bankruptcy.

S&P Warns A Big Increase In Debt Defaults Is Coming

In an article entitled "Defaults wave to hit corporate US," the Financial Times reports that Standard & Poor's is predicting that $35 billion in corporate debt will go into default by the end of 2008. This is similar to the view taken by Moody's, reported in a recent post.

According to the Financial Times, S&P believes that the slowing economy, together with liquidity issues caused by credit market problems, puts approximately 75 issuers of junk debt at a high risk of default. These companies are primarily in the media, healthcare, and consumer products industries. Not surprisingly, S&P believes that the default rate could go up significantly if the economy were to decline more than currently predicted.

Struggling companies that took on substantial debt during the recent favorable credit environment “are highly reliant on financial market access to support operational cash needs, but the plentiful liquidity for high-yield borrowers is almost surely a thing of the past,” according to S&P.

Of course, debt defaults frequently lead to Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. With S&P joining Moody's in predicting a rise in defaults, the ride could get bumpy from here.

A UK Perspective On The Turmoil In The Credit Markets

On his Insolvency BlogChris Laughton, a recovery and insolvency partner at the UK's Mercer & Hole firm of chartered accountants, gives a UK and European perspective on the recent gyrations in the credit markets. His new post is entitled "The boom-bust cycle: where are we now?" and it chronicles the progression of the credit crunch from the United States to the UK and beyond. 

After providing links to a number of recent articles from the UK press on the subject, Chris sums up his views:

So what does all this mean? Yes the capital markets are in turmoil, banks are lending much more cautiously and some high risk investment vehicles are failing, but essentially this is only a liquidity problem. Its effect though is that stressed businesses will no longer be able to borrow their way out of trouble as they have become hard-wired to do over the last 3 years.

Crisis cash management and operational and corporate restructuring will come back into vogue as refinancing becomes passé. Only if stressed businesses fail to seek appropriate and timely assistance will the business insolvency statistics really start to rise.

His informative post, and the UK articles highlighted, underscores the interconnected nature of today's global credit markets. It makes for interesting reading -- wherever you are.

Are "Termination On Bankruptcy" Contract Clauses Enforceable?

Practically every contract has a provision that makes the bankruptcy or insolvency of one contracting party a trigger for the other party to terminate the contract. These are standard fare and rarely negotiated unless they also include a provision for the reversion back of ownership of property, often intellectual property, upon bankruptcy or insolvency. This post takes a look at these provisions and examines whether they are enforceable.

The Typical Ipso Facto Clause. Termination on bankruptcy provisions are often known as ipso facto clauses (the Latin phrase meaning "by the fact itself") because the language provides that the fact of bankruptcy itself is enough to trigger the termination of the agreement. Here's a common provision:

This Agreement shall terminate, without notice, (i) upon the institution by or against either party of insolvency, receivership or bankruptcy proceedings or any other proceedings for the settlement of either party's debts, (ii) upon either party making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or (iii) upon either party's dissolution or ceasing to do business.

Variants of this language are found in many types of contracts, including licenses, leases, and development agreements. Some provide that termination is automatic and others first require notice. Termination triggers may include:

  • Filing a voluntary bankruptcy;
  • Having an involuntary bankruptcy filed against a party;
  • Becoming insolvent (frequently the term is left undefined in the contract);
  • Admitting in writing that the party is insolvent;
  • Making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors (a liquidation alternative recognized under the laws of many states); or
  • Tripping a financial condition covenant.

The bankruptcy or insolvency of either party is frequently a termination trigger. However, when the financial condition of only one contracting party is in doubt, the more financially stable party may insist on a one-sided provision allowing it to get out of the agreement upon the weaker party's insolvency or bankruptcy. 

Notso Fasto: The Bankruptcy Code Stops The Clause In Its Tracks. These termination provisions may be common, but are they enforceable? The short answer, which may be surprising to some, is generally "no." Two key provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lead to this result. First, Section 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an interest of the debtor (the bankrupt company or person) in property becomes "property of the estate," meaning that the debtor does not lose the property or contract right, despite a provision in an agreement:

that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement, and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in property.

11 U.S.C. §541(c). Translated from bankruptcy-ese, this statute means that a clause that terminates a contract because of the "insolvency" or "financial condition" of the debtor, or due to the filing of a bankruptcy case, will be unenforceable once a bankruptcy case has been filed.

A second Bankruptcy Code provision, Section 365(e)(1), governs ipso facto clauses in executory contracts, which are agreements under which both sides still have important performance remaining (discussed in more detail in this earlier post). Section 365(e)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on—

(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement.

11 U.S.C. §365(e)(1). This statute generally makes ipso facto provisions in executory contracts and leases unenforceable.

Why Put Ipso Facto Clauses In Contracts In The First Place? If these termination provisions are generally unenforceable, why do parties seem to include them in almost every contract? There are three main reasons.

Force Of Habit. One reason is that under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898, replaced by the Bankruptcy Code in 1979, these ipso facto clauses were enforceable. Over the years, lawyers and businesses got used to including them in their contract forms and they have continued to write them into many agreements. Since it's always possible that the Bankruptcy Code could be changed to reinstate the old rule, lawyers often see little reason to take them out.

It Takes An Actual Bankruptcy. Another and perhaps more important reason is that the rule applies only if a bankruptcy is actually filed. If an ipso facto provision provides that the agreement terminates upon a party's insolvency, and no bankruptcy case is ever filed, it's possible that the solvent party could terminate the agreement using the ipso facto provision. But be forewarned: if a bankruptcy case is later filed, an insolvency-based termination made before the bankruptcy filing may not be enforced in the bankruptcy case. This means that the debtor may still have a chance to retain the rights under the contract, including assuming or assigning an executory contract during the bankruptcy case.

A Limited Exception In Bankruptcy. A third reason is that an important, albeit limited, exception to the rule applies even after a bankruptcy is filed. The exception stems less from the ipso facto clause itself and more from the rules governing assumption of certain types of executory contracts, including intellectual property licenses (at least in some circuits).

  • Section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with Section 365(c)(1), provides that an ipso facto clause can be enforceable if the debtor or trustee is not permitted by "applicable law" to assume or assign the executory contract. Simply put, if applicable law provides that an IP license or another executory contract cannot be assumed by the debtor or trustee without the other party's consent, then the non-debtor contracting party can force rejection of the license or seek relief from the automatic stay to terminate the agreement based on the ipso facto clause.
  • Although an analysis of the law governing assumption and assignment of IP licenses and related agreements is beyond the scope of this post, you can find a detailed discussion in an earlier one entitled "Assumption of IP Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?

A Word To The Wise. Parties include "termination on bankruptcy" provisions in contracts all the time, despite the general rule making them unenforceable in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, some do so without realizing that the provision may be ineffective, and that can lead to trouble. If enforcing an ipso facto clause is important to one of your agreements, especially if you also seek the highly problematic reversion of intellectual property or other rights upon such a termination, be sure to get specific legal advice on your situation, including whether alternative approaches may exist to help achieve your objectives.

Is The Default Rate On High-Yield Debt About To Double?

According to Moody's, the credit rating and investor service firm, the default rate on high-yield or junk bond debt is likely to increase substantially from the current level of 1.4%. Moody's predicts that the default rate will rise to 4.1% by August 2008 and then to 5.1% by August 2009. 

  • As reported by Credit, Moody's director of corporate default research believes that "higher spreads and diminished liquidity" have increased the default risk for distressed issuers.
  • Unless the U.S. economy falls into a recession, however, the default rate is predicted to stay below its long-term average of 5.0%, at least until 2009. Any real downturn in the economy could push the default rate higher.

The New York Times DealBook Blog has a similar story, pointing out that Moody's predicted in another report that the U.S. industries likely to have the highest default rate are packaging, construction, consumer durables, and automotive. Also, companies that need new financing will be more at risk than firms that already obtained financing on the favorable terms available in the credit markets until recently.

As The DealBook Blog points out, a rising default rate will likely lead to an increase in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. Stay tuned. 

Delaware Supreme Court Issues Long-Awaited Decision In Deepening Insolvency Case

On August 14, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en Banc and following oral argument, issued its decision in the Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Billet deepening insolvency case. Rather than write its own opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court released a two-page order affirming Vice Chancellor Strine's August 10, 2006 Chancery Court decision "on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by" the Chancery Court in its opinion. A copy of the Chancery Court opinion is available here

The End Of Deepening Insolvency In Delaware. By adopting the basis and reasoning of the lower court's opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court ratified Vice Chancellor Strine's decision that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Apparently concluding that no opinion of its own was necessary given the Chancery Court's clear opinion below, the Delaware Supreme Court has put to rest the cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. Prior to the lower court's decision in Trenwick, some bankruptcy and other federal courts had incorrectly predicted that Delaware would recognize this cause of action.

A Second Look At Vice Chancellor Strine's Trenwick Opinion. Now that the Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed the Chancery Court's decision and its reasons, the lower court's opinion merits further consideration. As discussed in this August 2006 post on the Chancery Court's decision, Vice Chancellor Strine held, in unequivocal terms, that there is no cause of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware law. To give context to the opinion's legal analysis, some of its more important sections are quoted below at length:

Delaware law does not recognize this catchy term as a cause of action, because catchy though the term may be, it does not express a coherent concept. Even when a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does not pan out, result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red. The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at that time are creditors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue the firm’s operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate pie such that the firm’s creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so, the directors do not become a guarantor of success.  Put simply, under Delaware law, 'deepening insolvency' is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause of action for 'shallowing profitability' would be when a firm is solvent. Existing equitable causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and existing legal causes of action for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, and breach of contract are the appropriate means by which to challenge the actions of boards of insolvent corporations.

Refusal to embrace deepening insolvency as a cause of action is required by settled principles of Delaware law. So, too, is a refusal to extend to creditors a solicitude not given to equityholders. Creditors are better placed than equityholders and other corporate constituencies (think employees) to protect themselves against the risk of firm failure.

The incantation of the word insolvency, or even more amorphously, the words zone of insolvency should not declare open season on corporate fiduciaries. Directors are expected to seek profit for stockholders, even at risk of failure.  With the prospect of profit often comes the potential for defeat.

The general rule embraced by Delaware is the sound one.  So long as directors are respectful of the corporation’s oblig