California Creditor's Rights & Business Bankruptcy Lawyer & Attorney : Robert Eisenbach : Business Bankruptcy Blog

On June 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., the case involving whether Section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts from stamp or similar taxes any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of the Code,” applies to transfers of assets occurring prior to the actual confirmation of such a plan. The issue has taken on added importance in recent years because so many sales of assets in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases -- including the one in the Piccadilly case -- are made through Section 363, well before any plan of reorganization is confirmed.

(For more background on the issue, and the oral argument before the Supreme Court last March, you can read a prior post entitled "What Happened At the Supreme Court Oral Argument In The Section 1146(a) Transfer Tax Exemption Case?")

The Supreme Court's Holding. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Section 1146(a) applies only to post-confirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan of reorganization. Follow the link for a copy of the Supreme Court's decision. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit (opinion below available here), which unlike the Third and Fourth Circuits, had held that pre-confirmation transfers could also be covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court summed up its holding as follows:

The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Code, and applicable substantive canons all lead to the same conclusion: Section 1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed. Because Piccadilly transferred its assets before its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, it may not rely on §1146(a) to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Keys To The Decision. In examining the statute and the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court found Florida's reading of the statute far more reasonable:

While both sides present credible interpretations of §1146(a), Florida has the better one. To be sure, Congress could have used more precise language—i.e., “under a plan that has been confirmed”—and thus removed all ambiguity. But the two readings of the language that Congress chose are not equally plausible: Of the two, Florida’s is clearly the more natural. The interpretation advanced by Piccadilly and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—that there must be “some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer and the confirmed plan” for §1146(a) to apply, 484 F. 3d, at 1304—places greater strain on the statutory text than the simpler construction advanced by Florida and adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuit.

Later, the Court added the following:

Even if we were to adopt Piccadilly’s broad definition of “under,” its interpretation of the statute faces  other obstacles. The asset transfer here can hardly be said to have been consummated “in accordance with” any confirmed plan because, as of the closing date, Piccadilly had not even submitted its plan to the Bankruptcy Court for confirmation. Piccadilly’s asset sale was thus not conducted “in accordance with” any plan confirmed under Chapter 11. Rather, it was conducted “in accordance with” the procedures set forth in Chapter 3—specifically, §363(b)(1). To read the statute as Piccadilly proposes would make §1146(a)’s exemption turn on whether a debtor-in-possession’s actions are consistent with a legal instrument that does not exist—and indeed may not even be conceived of—at the time of the sale. Reading §1146(a) in context with other relevant Code provisions, we find nothing justifying such a curious interpretation of what is a straightforward exemption.

In dismissing another of Piccadilly's arguments, the Court had occasion to make an interesting comparison between the mechanics of assumption and rejection of executory contracts and the timing of a transfer for Section 1146(a) purposes:

We agree with Bildisco’s commonsense observation that the decision whether to reject a contract or lease must be made before confirmation. But that in no way undermines the fact that the rejection takes effect upon or after confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan (or before confirmation if  pursuant to §365(d)(2)). In the context of §1146(a), the decision whether to transfer a given asset “under a plan confirmed” must be made prior to submitting the Chapter 11 plan to the bankruptcy court, but the transfer itself cannot be “under a plan confirmed” until the court confirms the plan in question. Only at that point does the transfer become eligible for the stamp-tax exemption.

The Court also found that the placement of Section 1146(a) in a subchapter entitled "POSTCONFIMRATION MATTERS" was yet another factor which, while not decisive, helped to undermine Piccadilly's arguments.

Canon Fodder. The Court next held that even if the statute were ambiguous, which the Court did not expressly decide, two canons of statutory interpretation would compel a decision in favor of Florida's reading of the statute.

• First, changes were made to Section 1146 as recently as the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress is generally presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of a statute (here decisions from the Third and Fourth Circuits refusing to apply the exemption to pre-confirmation transfers, both of which predated the Eleventh Circuit's 2007 decision in Piccadilly) when the statute was revised.
• Second, a federalism canon directs courts to proceed carefully before recognizing an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed. Given Piccadilly's arguments that the statute was ambiguous, the Court found this canon to be "decisive in this case."
• The Court rejected the canons advanced by Piccadilly, most notably viewing Chapter 11 (and Section 1146) as a remedial statute to be liberally construed to facilitate reorganizations.

The Dissent. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, focused on "whether the time of the transfer matters." Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, he looked to the policy Congress was trying to implement with the statute. He concluded that Congress would not have "insisted upon temporal limits" in Section 1146(a) since, in his view, "it makes no difference whether a transfer takes place before or after the plan is confirmed."

Other Bloggers Weigh In. For an excellent and entertaining review of the decision, be sure to read Steve Jakubowski's post on his Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Hat tip as well to the SCOTUS Blog for first reporting on the decision (and updating its excellent wiki on the case) and to the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report for its post as well.

Minor Impact On Chapter 11 Cases? Of course, the most immediate impact of the decision is that pre-confirmation Section 363 sales will no longer be exempt from stamp or transfer taxes in any circuit, and those taxes will have to be paid.  What remains to be seen is whether sales will be delayed until plan confirmation in order to take advantage of the Section 1146(a) exemption. Given how many asset sales in Chapter 11 cases these days are conducted at the early stages of a case because of financing limitations and declining asset values, a move to delay those sales until plan confirmation seems unlikely. With an economic downturn upon us, the pressures that have led to the expanded use of Section 363 are not likely to abate, regardless of how attractive a stamp or transfer tax exemption may be.

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The Spring 2008 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter give updates on current developments in bankruptcies and workouts with the goal of keeping you "ahead of the curve" on these issues. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions.

The latest edition covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

• The ability of unsecured creditors to recover post-petition attorney's fees;
• Key issues when selling claims in bankruptcy;
• Jury trials and proofs of claim;
• Assignments for the benefit of creditors; and
• The impact of post-petition performance on executory contracts.

We have also included information on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, and unofficial committees in out-of-court workouts, involving major retailers. These include Sharper Image, Lillian Vernon, CompUSA, Wickes Furniture, and The Bombay Company, among others. In addition, a note from my partner Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses the increasing number of bankruptcy filings nationwide and our representation of Bayonne Medical Center in its Chapter 11 reorganization.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

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Leveraged buyouts, known as LBOs, have frequently been the subject of fraudulent transfer challenges when the target company later files bankruptcy. As its name implies, the classic LBO involves the use of leverage -- debt -- to finance the acquisition of the target company's stock. Often that new debt is secured by the assets of the target company. This post highlights a new article that addresses one of the hot issues in LBO fraudulent transfer litigation, but before doing that it may help to give some context to the discussion.

What Is A Fraudulent Transfer? There are two types of fraudulent transfers. The first is a transfer made with an actual intent to hinder, defraud, or delay creditors. However, transfers may be considered fraudulent, even in the absence of actual fraud, if the transfer has a similar effect on creditors. This second type of fraudulent transfer involves what is known as "constructive fraud." A court may find that a transfer involves constructive fraud if a company, at a time when it is already financially impaired or is made so by the transaction itself, does not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in return for the transfer in question. Section 548, the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer statute, and state fraudulent transfer laws, cover both actual and constructive fraudulent transfers.

The LBO Fraudulent Transfer Lawsuit. When an LBO is followed sometime later by a bankruptcy, a fraudulent transfer lawsuit may be filed to challenge the LBO itself. Although actual fraud may be asserted, more often the case involves a constructive fraud claim.

• The argument usually made is that the use of the target company's assets to secure loans (the leverage), the proceeds of which were then paid to selling shareholders (the buyout), rendered the company insolvent, made it otherwise unable to pay its debts when they became due, or left it with an unreasonably small capital with which to conduct its business. Since the target company does not receive anything in exchange for the payment to the selling shareholders, the lack of reasonably equivalent value element is usually present.
• The plaintiff in a fraudulent transfer lawsuit may be the company itself as Chapter 11 debtor in possession, the official committee of unsecured creditors, or a bankruptcy trustee or post-confirmation plan trustee.
• The defendants may include the new shareholders, the lenders who obtained security interests in the target company's assets, and the shareholders who sold their stock for cash to the acquirer.

The Settlement Payment Defense. When selling shareholders are sued, they often assert a defense based on the "settlement payment" exception to certain fraudulent transfer claims found in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. This exception was added to the Bankruptcy Code to prevent disruptions to the functioning of capital markets that might occur if long-settled trades were able to be unraveled by a fraudulent transfer action years down the road. Some courts, interpreting the term "settlement payment" to include payments made from a financial institution, have held that payments to selling shareholders, made by means of wire transfers using a bank or other financial institution, qualify as just such a "settlement payment" protected from avoidance as a fraudulent transfer under Section 546(e). Those courts, in effect, hold that the fact that a bank made wire transfers rendered an otherwise potentially fraudulent transfer immune from challenge.

Two Recent Articles Tackle This Issue. Two articles, including one published last week, take a look at how courts have been addressing the reach of the Section 546(e) defense in the context of these wire transfer payments.

• My Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group colleagues Michael Klein and Ronald R. Sussman wrote an article for the May 2008 edition of the Turnaround Management Association's The Journal of Corporate Renewal examining that issue. Their article is entitled "Do Wire Transfers Really Protect Shareholders in Private LBOs?  Not in the 2d -- and Perhaps Other -- Circuits." 
• An earlier article, written by Faye B. Feinstein and Lauren N. Nachinson, is entitled "Wire Transfers May Protect Shareholders in LBOs: 3d Circuit Says Payments by Financial Institutions Are Unavoidable" and focuses on Third Circuit law. 

How Far Does The Defense Go? The new article discusses case law from outside of the Third Circuit. In particular, it examines a recent decision from a New York bankruptcy court that rejected the Section 546(e) defense in a situation involving an LBO of a private, rather than publicly traded, target company. The article sums up the differences this way:

The application of the settlement payment defense in the context of an LBO has been far from uniform. While courts in the 3d Circuit have utilized Section 546(e) to shield virtually all LBO payments from avoidance, even in the context of private transactions, a significant number of courts have limited the scope of this safe harbor provision.           

Accordingly, the extent to which wire transfers may insulate LBO payments from attack under fraudulent transfer laws will likely be determined as much by the venue of the bankruptcy proceedings as much as the facts of the transaction at issue.

Worth Reading. Anyone involved in LBOs, including acquirers, target company directors or management, selling shareholders, and of course their professionals, will find these articles very interesting reading.

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Bankruptcy professionals and the public rarely get a chance to read a judge's own research binder. Fortunately, however, Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California has made his very helpful 348-page research binder available on the Court's website. Follow the links in this sentence to access the entire binder in pdf format and this HTML version organized by topic. I've found the binder to be an excellent way to identify leading cases on a particular topic quickly. The pdf version can also be searched using a key word or phrase. 

Updated as of February 8, 2008, and covering cases through Volume 378 of Bankruptcy Reports, the research binder collects a vast range of cases on business bankruptcy and other topics under the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Chief Judge Newsome presides in the Northern District of California so the primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law, but some out-of-circuit law is listed as well.

Chief Judge Newsome's disclaimer puts this helpful tool's function in perspective:

The following list of cases and supplemental information is presented for informational and educational purposes only. Though it represents the aggregation of 19 years of research, the Court makes no claims as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases set forth may very well have been superseded, reversed, or otherwise may no longer be good law. The Court has posted it with the intention to educate and assist those who may find it helpful. Accordingly, users should consider it a first, but by no means final, research tool, and should cite check all cases listed herein for continued viability prior to relying on such cases in practice.

With those caveats in mind, it can be a great place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

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As previously reported, in August 2007 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Local Rules designed to implement the changes made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). After taking comments, the final amendments are scheduled to take effect on May 1, 2008.

• Follow the links for a clean set of the final amended Bankruptcy Local Rules and a redline version showing changes from the current local rules.

Business Bankruptcy Changes. Certain of the amended local rules will affect Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy cases. These include changes to the rules governing the investment of estate funds, the replacement of a "responsible individual" for a Chapter 11 debtor or debtor in possession, entry of a final decree closing a case, the procedures for bankruptcy appeals, and the general electronic case filing (ECF) procedures. A number of the other revisions are aimed primarily at consumer bankruptcy cases.

Jury Trial Rule Amended. In addition, however, the Bankruptcy Court took this opportunity to modify Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-2(b), governing jury trials, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down in its September 2007 decision in the In re HealthCentral.com case. An earlier post entitled "Ordinary Course Preference Case Takes Extraordinary Turn: Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Local Bankruptcy Rule On Jury Trials" gives more details on the decision and its impact.

Conclusion. The changes to the Northern District of California Bankruptcy Local Rules may not be as significant for Chapter 11 cases as those recently proposed in the Southern District of New York or adopted in Delaware, but attorneys practicing in the Northern District of California, and businesses with cases or adversary proceedings pending in that court, should be sure to follow them when they take effect on May 1, 2008.

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On Wednesday, March 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. A link to the transcript of the oral argument can be found below. The case presents the following question:

Whether section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts from stamp or similar taxes any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of the Code,” applies to transfers of assets occurring prior to the actual confirmation of such a plan?

With so many asset transfers in Chapter 11 cases taking place through Section 363 asset sales before plan confirmation, rather than when plans are consummated after confirmation, how the Supreme Court answers the question presented will have a significant impact on the extent to which debtors end up paying stamp and other transfer taxes as a practical matter.

The Eleventh Circuit's Decision And Aftermath. The Supreme Court case results from a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that pre-confirmation sales can be subject to the exemption under Section 1146(a) if followed by plan confirmation later in the case. Use the link in this sentence to read the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Piccadilly.

• For additional background on the Piccadilly case, be sure to read Steve Jakubowski's excellent post on his Bankruptcy Litigation Blog from December 2007 when the Supreme Court accepted the case for consideration.
• The Cornell University Law School has also prepared a helpful analysis and overview of the case.
• You can find the various briefs and other papers at this Supreme Court of the United States Wiki page maintained by the Supreme Court of the United States Blog.

The Language of Section 1146(a). The one-sentence section, Section 1146(a), was previously numbered Section 1146(c) but its language has not changed. (Many court orders and opinions still use the old designation.) The statute provides as follows:

The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.

As discussed below, much of the dispute over the scope of this exemption is based on interpretation of the phrase "under a plan confirmed."

Section 363 Sales And Transfer Taxes. As bankruptcy professionals know, Section 363 asset sales often precede confirmation of a plan by months. When confirmed, the plan may simply distribute the cash generated from prior sales of the debtor's assets or may enable a reorganized but smaller debtor to emerge from bankruptcy. Courts around the country have taken very different views on whether Section 1146(a)'s exemption should apply to these pre-confirmation transfers.

Some courts will include findings in Section 363 sale orders that the sale, even though prior to plan confirmation, is exempt from stamp and similar taxes. This sale order from the Southern District of New York illustrates that approach:

The sale of the Purchased Assets . . . is a prerequisite to the Debtors’ ability to confirm and consummate a plan or plans. The Sale Transaction is therefore an integral part of a plan or plans to be confirmed in the Debtors’ cases and, thereby, constitutes a transfer pursuant to section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which shall not be taxed under any law imposing a transfer tax, a stamp tax or any similar tax.

Cases filed in Delaware will likely receive a very different response. In 2003, the Third Circuit in In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003) -- unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Piccadilly -- held that the Section 1146(a) exemption does not apply to pre-confirmation transfers. (The Third Circuit's opinion was authored by then Circuit Judge, and now Associate Justice, Samuel Alito.) Delaware's new local rule governing Section 363 sales requires sale motions to make express disclosure of an effort to obtain such a provision in a sale order:

Tax Exemption. The Sale Motion must highlight any provision seeking to have the sale declared exempt from taxes under section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the type of tax (e.g., recording tax, stamp tax, use tax, capital gains tax) for which the exemption is sought. It is not sufficient to refer simply to "transfer" taxes and the state or states in which the affected property is located.

Other courts have taken a similar view. The Section 363 sale guidelines adopted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California call out various provisions that the Bankruptcy Court generally will not approve in a sale order, including the following:

Any provision that purports to exempt the transaction from transfer taxes under section 1146(c). By its own terms, that section applies only to a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization, not a sale outside of a plan under section 363(b).

The Supreme Court Oral Argument And Transcript. Against this background, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Piccadilly case on March 26, 2008. A copy of the transcript of the oral argument is available by clicking on the link in this sentence.

It's difficult to tell how the decision will come out based on the questions asked by the various Justices, but the questions are themselves quite interesting. Some focused on why Congress would want to exempt post-confirmation but not pre-confirmation transfers. Others implied that the plain language of the statute limited the reach of the exemption only to transfers made, literally, "under" a confirmed Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Still others inquired about the administrative impact on states if pre-confirmation transfers were initially exempt but subsequently could be taxed in the event that no plan was ever confirmed. An additional topic raised was whether, if the statute were held to exempt pre-confirmation transfers, the exemption should cover only those transfers "necessary" for a later plan confirmation or also transfers merely "instrumental" to a later plan confirmation. 

The State's Arguments. During the argument, the State of Florida contended that the statute was unambiguous and that the word "under" meant a transfer made at or following confirmation of plan. Arguing for this bright-line rule, the State asserted that if pre-confirmation transfers could also be exempt taxing authorities would not know, at the time a transfer was recorded, whether a Chapter 11 plan would in fact later be confirmed to validate the exemption. From a policy perspective, the State argued that tax exemptions should be narrowly construed, that stamp and other transfer taxes generate millions of dollars in revenues, and that it would be an administrative burden to require states to monitor Chapter 11 cases to see if plans were later confirmed to validate exemptions claimed on earlier asset transfers.

The Debtor's Arguments. The debtor made both policy and statutory interpretation arguments. On the policy side, Piccadilly argued that a debtor cannot get a Chapter 11 plan confirmed without cash, debtors often make Section 363 asset sales to preserve value and raise funds needed to confirm a Chapter 11 plan later in the case, the exemption was designed to save cash for the benefit of creditors, and these pre-confirmation sales should receive the same benefit from the exemption. The debtor also asserted that the key phrase in Section 1146(a), "under a plan confirmed" appears in Section 365(g)(1). Section 365 was interpreted by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco &. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), to require pre-confirmation, not post-confirmation, decisions on executory contracts. The debtor contended that because the phrase "under a plan confirmed" means before confirmation when used in Section 365(g)(1), it must mean before confirmation in Section 1146(a) as well. In contrast, the debtor argued, Congress used the different phrase "confirmed plan" in Sections 1142(b) or 511(b) when it intended to refer to a point after plan confirmation.

Conclusion. Whether Section 1146(a)'s exemption from transfer taxes applies to pre-confirmation transfers has split circuit and bankruptcy courts alike over the years. The questions asked during the Supreme Court's oral argument in the Piccadilly case suggest a similar split among the Justices over how the statute should be interpreted. With the Supreme Court's term ending in the next few months, however, debtors, creditors, and taxing authorities should not have to wait much longer for a definitive answer to this open issue.  

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Last November I reported on the status of the Ninth Circuit appeal in In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., a case addressing whether a debtor can assume a trademark license over the trademark owner's objection. Back in 2005 the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here to read an earlier post on the case.

The N.C.P. Marketing Court's Analysis. In reaching its conclusion, the District Court held that under the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, a trademark owner has a right and duty to control the quality of goods sold under the mark:

Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely assignable to a third party.  

The trademark owner in that case, Billy Blanks of the Billy Blanks® Tae Bo® fitness program, successfully moved the court to compel rejection of the trademark license because under the "hypothetical test" analysis of Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contracts that cannot be assigned by the debtor without the nondebtor party's consent cannot be assumed by the debtor either. (For a full discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?")  

The Ninth Circuit Appeal. N.C.P. Marketing appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, the appeal was fully briefed, and oral argument had been scheduled for November 5, 2007. Prior to the oral argument, the Chapter 7 trustee for N.C.P. Marketing reached a settlement in the case. At the trustee's request, the Ninth Circuit took the oral argument off calendar and directed the parties to move to dismiss the appeal if the settlement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court. At the time, I commented that it appeared that no Ninth Circuit decision would be issued in the case due to the settlement.

The Settlement Is Rejected. Back in the Bankruptcy Court, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion for approval of the settlement, but N.C.P. Marketing and certain other parties filed an objection and offered a competing bid for the appeal rights. In something of a surprise, on February 28, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court issued a brief order denying the trustee's motion for approval of the settlement and instead approved a sale of the appeal rights and certain other assets to the objecting parties. The objecting parties thereafter posted the undertaking required by the Bankruptcy Court's order.

Appeal May Go Forward. As a result, the Ninth Circuit appeal may be revived, although no new oral argument has been scheduled yet. Barring further developments, trademark licensors and licensees may end up seeing a Ninth Circuit decision after all on the important issue of whether trademark licenses can be assumed in bankruptcy. Stay tuned.

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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has announced proposed changes to its Local Bankruptcy Rules in light of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2007. Many of the largest business bankruptcy cases are filed in the Southern District of New York, which includes Manhattan, making these proposed amendments to the Local Bankruptcy Rules of particular interest.

• A redline version showing the proposed local rule changes is available by clicking on the link in this sentence.
• For more on the national bankruptcy rule amendments that prompted these proposed local rule changes, you can read this article, entitled "Important Changes To Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect," or view the redlined national bankruptcy rule changes directly, by clicking on their respective links in this sentence.

Cash Collateral And DIP Financing Disclosures. The most significant proposed changes for Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases address cash collateral and DIP financing motions and, if adopted, the local rule amendments would supplement the disclosures required by amended Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001. Proposed Local Bankruptcy Rule 4001-2 would require at least fifteen material provisions to be disclosed in cash collateral and DIP financing motions. These include the following:

• the amount of cash to be used or borrowed, including any borrowing base formula and availability;
• material conditions to closing, including budget provisions;
• pricing and economic terms, including various fees;
• any effect on existing liens;
• any carve-outs from liens or superpriorities;
• any cross-collateralization;
• any roll-up provisions;
• any provisions that would materially limit the Court's power or discretion or the fiduciary duties of a trustee, debtor in possession, or committee;
• any limitation on the lender's obligation to fund activities of a trustee, debtor in possession, or committee;
• termination or default provisions;
• any change of control provisions;
• any deadline for sale of property;
• any prepayment penalty or other restriction on repayment;
• terms governing joint liability of debtors; and
• any funding of non-debtor affiliates.

Additional Proposed Financing Changes. Other provisions would require (1) disclosure regarding efforts to obtain financing, (2) adequate notice after an event of default and before a lender could exercise remedies, (3) disclosure regarding carve-outs and allocations of carve-outs, (4) investigation periods for committees, and (5) appearances at preliminary and final hearings. In addition, the proposed local rule would mandate certain provisions in proposed orders, including a reservation of the Court's right to unwind roll-ups if a successful challenge is later made. 

Other Proposed Amendments. The remaining proposed amendments are mainly technical. They would repeal local rules that have become unnecessary, drop the requirement that attorneys use an identifier that includes the last four digits of their social security number, conform attorney signature rules to current practice, and dispense with the need for a separate memorandum of law if a discussion of the law is included in the motion itself.

Opportunity For Comments. The Bankruptcy Court has not yet promulgated these local rule amendments and it is accepting comments on the proposed changes until April 23, 2008. Information on how to submit comments is available on the Court's website at the Local Rule page.

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Companies in financial trouble are often forced to liquidate their assets to pay creditors. While a Chapter 11 bankruptcy sometimes makes the most sense, other times a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is required, and in still other situations a corporate dissolution may be best. This post examines another of the options, the assignment for the benefit of creditors, commonly known as an "ABC."

A Few Caveats. It's important to remember that determining which path an insolvent company should take depends on the specific facts and circumstances involved. As in many areas of the law, one size most definitely does not fit all for financially troubled companies. With those caveats in mind, let's consider one scenario sometimes seen when a venture-backed or other investor-funded company runs out of money.

One Scenario. After a number of rounds of investment, the investors of a privately held corporation have decided not to put in more money to fund the company's operations. The company will be out of cash within a few months and borrowing from the company's lender is no longer an option. The accounts payable list is growing (and aging) and some creditors have started to demand payment. A sale of the business may be possible, however, and a term sheet from a potential buyer is anticipated soon. The company's real property lease will expire in nine months, but it's possible that a buyer might want to take over the lease.

• A Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing is problematic because there is insufficient cash to fund operations going forward, no significant revenues are being generated, and debtor in possession financing seems highly unlikely unless the buyer itself would make a loan. 
• The board prefers to avoid a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because it's concerned that a bankruptcy trustee, unfamiliar with the company's technology, would not be able to generate the best recovery for creditors.

The ABC Option. In many states, another option that may be available to companies in financial trouble is an assignment for the benefit of creditors (or "general assignment for the benefit of creditors" as it is sometimes called). The ABC is an insolvency proceeding governed by state law rather than federal bankruptcy law.

California ABCs. In California, where ABCs have been done for years, the primary governing law is found in California Code of Civil Procedure sections 493.010 to 493.060 and sections 1800 to 1802, among other provisions of California law. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1802 sets forth, in remarkably brief terms, the main procedural requirements for a company (or individual) making, and an assignee accepting, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors:

1802.  (a) In any general assignment for the benefit of creditors, as defined in Section 493.010, the assignee shall, within 30 days after the assignment has been accepted in writing, give written notice of the assignment to the assignor's creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest as set forth on the list provided by the assignor pursuant to subdivision (c).
   (b) In the notice given pursuant to subdivision (a), the assignee shall establish a date by which creditors must file their claims to be able to share in the distribution of proceeds of the liquidation of the assignor's assets.  That date shall be not less than 150 days and not greater than 180 days after the date of the first giving of the written notice to creditors and parties in interest.
   (c) The assignor shall provide to the assignee at the time of the making of the assignment a list of creditors, equityholders, and other parties in interest, signed under penalty of  perjury, which shall include the names, addresses, cities, states, and ZIP Codes for each person together with the amount of that person's anticipated claim in the assignment proceedings.

In California, the company and the assignee enter into a formal "Assignment Agreement." The company must also provide the assignee with a list of creditors, equityholders, and other interested parties (names, addresses, and claim amounts). The assignee is required to give notice to creditors of the assignment, setting a bar date for filing claims with the assignee that is between five to six months later.

ABCs In Other States. Many other states have ABC statutes although in practice they have been used to varying degrees. For example, ABCs have been more common in California than in states on the East Coast, but important exceptions exist. Delaware corporations can generally avail themselves of Delaware's voluntary assignment statutes, and its procedures have both similarities and important differences from the approach taken in California. Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog has an interesting post discussing ABC's under Georgia law. Florida is another state in which ABCs are done under specific statutory procedures. For an excellent book that has information on how ABCs are conducted in various states, see Geoffrey Berman's General Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The ABCs of ABCs, published by the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Important Features Of ABCs. A full analysis of how ABCs function in a particular state and how one might affect a specific company requires legal advice from insolvency counsel. The following highlights some (but by no means all) of the key features of ABCs:

• Court Filing Issue. In California, making an ABC does not require a public court filing. Some other states, however, do require a court filing to initiate or complete an ABC.
• Select The Assignee. Unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, who is randomly appointed from those on an approved panel, a corporation making an assignment is generally able to choose the assignee.
• Shareholder Approval. Most corporations require both board and shareholder approval for an ABC because it involves the transfer to the assignee of substantially all of the corporation's assets. This makes ABCs impractical for most publicly held corporations.
• Liquidator As Fiduciary. The assignee is a fiduciary to the creditors and is typically a professional liquidator.
• Assignee Fees. The fees charged by assignees often involve an upfront payment and a percentage based on the assets liquidated.
• No Automatic Stay. In many states, including California, an ABC does not give rise to an automatic stay like bankruptcy, although an assignee can often block judgment creditors from attaching assets.
• Event Of Default. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is typically a default under most contracts. As a result, contracts may be terminated upon the assignment under an ipso facto clause.
• Proof Of Claim. For creditors, an ABC process generally involves the submission to the assignee of a proof of claim by a stated deadline or bar date, similar to bankruptcy. (Click on the link for an example of an ABC proof of claim form.)
• Employee Priority. Employee and other claim priorities are governed by state law and may involve different amounts than apply under the Bankruptcy Code. In California, for example, the employee wage and salary priority is $4,300, not the $10,950 amount currently in force under the Bankruptcy Code.
• 20 Day Goods. Generally, ABC statutes do not have a provision similar to that under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9), which gives an administrative claim priority to vendors who sold goods in the ordinary course of business to a debtor during the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing. As a result, these vendors may recover less in an ABC than in a bankruptcy case, subject to assertion of their reclamation rights.
• Landlord Claim. Unlike bankruptcy, there generally is no cap imposed on a landlord's claim for breach of a real property lease in an ABC.
• Sale Of Assets. In many states, including California, sales by the assignee of the company's assets are completed as a private transaction without approval of a court. However, unlike a bankruptcy Section 363 sale, there is usually no ability to sell assets "free and clear" of liens and security interests without the consent or full payoff of lienholders. Likewise, leases or executory contracts cannot be assigned without required consents from the other contracting party.
• Avoidance Actions. Most states allow assignees to pursue preferences and fraudulent transfers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Bankruptcy Code pre-empts California's preference statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1800. Nevertheless, to date the California state courts have refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision and still permit assignees to sue for preferences in California state court. In February 2008, a Delaware state court followed the California state court decisions, refusing either to follow the Ninth Circuit position or to hold that the California preference statute was pre-empted by the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware court was required to apply California's ABC preference statute because the avoidance action arose out of an earlier California ABC.

The Scenario Revisited. With this overview in mind, let's return to our company in distress.

• The prospect of a term sheet from a potential buyer may influence whether our hypothetical company should choose an ABC or another approach. Some buyers will refuse to purchase assets outside of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy or a Chapter 7 case. Others are comfortable with the ABC process and believe it provides an added level of protection from fraudulent transfer claims compared to purchasing the assets directly from the insolvent company. Depending on the value to be generated by a sale, these considerations may lead the company to select one approach over the other available options.
• In states like California where no court approval is required for a sale, the ABC can also mean a much faster closing -- often within a day or two of the ABC itself provided that the assignee has had time to perform due diligence on the sale and any alternatives -- instead of the more typical 30-60 days required for bankruptcy court approval of a Section 363 sale. Given the speed at which they can be done, in the right situation an ABC can permit a "going concern" sale to be achieved.
• Secured creditors with liens against the assets to be sold will either need to be paid off through the sale or will have to consent to release their liens; forced "free and clear" sales generally are not possible in an ABC.
• If the buyer decides to take the real property lease, the landlord will need to consent to the lease assignment. Unlike bankruptcy, the ABC process generally cannot force a landlord or other third party to accept assignment of a lease or executory contract.
• If the buyer decides not to take the lease, or no sale occurs, the fact that only nine months remains on the lease means that this company would not benefit from bankruptcy's cap on landlord claims. If the company's lease had years remaining, and if the landlord were unwilling to agree to a lease termination approximating the result under bankruptcy's landlord claim cap, the company would need to consider whether a bankruptcy filing was necessary to avoid substantial dilution to other unsecured creditor claims that a large, uncapped landlord claim would produce in an ABC.
• If the potential buyer walks away, the assignee would be responsible for determining whether a sale of all or a part of the assets was still possible. In any event, assets would be liquidated by the assignee to the extent feasible and any proceeds would be distributed to creditors in order of their priority through the ABC's claims process.
• While other options are available and should be explored, an ABC may make sense for this company depending upon the buyer's views, the value to creditors and other constituencies that a sale would produce, and a clear-eyed assessment of alternative insolvency methods. 

Conclusion. When weighing all of the relevant issues, an insolvent company's management and board would be well-served to seek the advice of counsel and other insolvency professionals as early as possible in the process. The old song may say that ABC is as "easy as 1-2-3," but assessing whether an assignment for the benefit of creditors is best for an insolvent company involves the analysis of a myriad of complex factors.

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With the enormous amount of business between the United States and Canada these days, it's little wonder that from time to time U.S. companies find themselves affected by a Canadian insolvency proceeding. A better understanding of Canada's approach to bankruptcy and insolvency law can be helpful when sizing up how such a filing might affect your rights.

The Lay Of The Land. Canada has two primary federal insolvency acts, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, known as the BIA, and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, known as the CCAA. (A third statute, the Winding-up and Restructuring Act, is less frequently invoked.) You can access the text of each of three acts by clicking on the preceding links. These national statutes also operate in conjunction with applicable provincial law.

Canada's Reorganization Law. When larger Canadian companies need protection from creditors they often seek relief under Canada's CCAA. The CCAA is the Canadian insolvency law most analogous to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Company management generally remains in charge as a debtor in possession, although a monitor is appointed and has certain oversight authority. Unlike the much longer U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA currently has only 22 sections, leaving it to the courts to fill in the gaps. Courts generally do so, including issuance of an early "initial order" that commonly implements a stay similar to the automatic stay of U.S. bankruptcy  law. (Click on the link for an example of an initial order.) Other court orders permit contracts and leases to be disclaimed (rejected), assets to be sold, and a restructuring to be implemented through a plan of arrangement after voting by creditors.

• There are, however, many important differences between the CCAA and Chapter 11. Although describing those differences is beyond the scope of this post, fortunately Sheryl E. Seigel, chair of the Business Restructuring & Insolvency Group at Lang Michener LLP in Toronto, has written an excellent overview of the CCAA that includes a comparison to Chapter 11.
• Entitled "Distinctions with a Difference: Comparison of Restructuring Under the CCAA with Chapter 11 Law and Practice," the paper is available by clicking on its title.

Cross-Border Issues. Canada has not yet adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which the U.S. did in 2005 as Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. At least for now, Canada continues to use its own cross-border procedures under Section 18.6 of the CCAA and cross-border protocols used to coordinate proceedings in different countries. (For more on Chapter 15, you may find this prior post entitled "Chapter 15: The Bankruptcy Code's New Cross-Border Insolvency Rules," of interest.)

Important Changes May Be Coming. Canada is currently working on adoption of significant revisions to its bankruptcy and insolvency laws. The legislation was originally proposed in 2005 as Bill C-55, and more recently was approved in legislation known as Bill C-12.  If it comes into force, this law would make a number of changes, including one of interest to licensees of intellectual property. The legislation would add to the CCAA a formal provision akin to Section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, protecting the rights of licensees to continue to use licensed intellectual property if the underlying license agreement is disclaimed (rejected) in the CCAA proceeding.

Conclusion. Navigating Canadian insolvency law can be complex, especially when proceedings are pending in both the U.S. and Canada. Getting advice from U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy counsel can prove invaluable if your business becomes involved in an insolvency proceeding north of the border.   

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An article my partner Adam Rogoff, associate Seth Van Aalten, and I wrote was recently published in the January 2008 issue of Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law. The article discusses the significant amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2007. Those amendments covered a range of procedures from omnibus claims objections to motions to assume executory contracts and real property leases to "first day" motions in Chapter 11 cases. 

If you don't have a copy of the Journal, you can read the article, entitled "Important Changes To Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect," by clicking on its title in this sentence. For more details on the rule changes, use the links that follow for a copy of the full, "clean" set of rule amendments as well as the redline set showing changes made by the amendments to the existing rules, together with the Advisory Committee's comments.

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For a number of years, the concept of deepening insolvency has been one of the more hotly debated issues in the insolvency arena. Two of my colleagues in the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, Michael Klein and Ronald Sussman, have written an interesting article entitled "Tide Has Turned On Deepening Insolvency - Courts Now Rejecting Theory As Cause Of Action," published in the February 2008 issue of the Journal of Corporate Renewal by the Turnaround Management Association. You can read the article by clicking on its title above.

The article gives a succinct overview of the impact of last year's Delaware Supreme Court decisions in the North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla and Trenwick America cases (as well as the Chancery Court's Trenwick decision that was adopted by the Supreme Court). In particular, the article describes how the Gheewalla decision altered the "zone of insolvency" analysis and how Trenwick's rejection of deepening insolvency as a cause of action in Delaware has led courts in other jurisdictions to follow suit. Directors of financially troubled companies and their counsel will find the article an informative read.

For more information on the Gheewalla decision, including a copy of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion, click here. For more on the Trenwick decision, including copies of the Delaware Supreme Court order and Chancery Court opinion, click here.

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This post examines a new decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida involving the enforceability of a pre-bankruptcy waiver of the automatic stay. Let's first set the stage by taking a look at a not so uncommon fact pattern involving a real estate project in financial trouble.

The Real Estate Workout: Forbearance With A Price. The owner of a troubled real estate development is about to default on a loan secured by the real property. On the eve of foreclosure, the lender agrees to forbear from foreclosing for two months to give the developer time to refinance and save the project.  However, in exchange the lender insists that the developer agree that, in the event of bankruptcy, the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose. The developer agrees and the forbearance agreement is executed.

The Bankruptcy Aftermath. Unfortunately, the hoped-for financing falls through and the developer files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy for the project just before the rescheduled foreclosure sale. The lender quickly files a motion for relief from stay, asking the bankruptcy court to enforce the pre-bankruptcy relief from stay waiver included in the forbearance agreement. The motion is opposed by the developer, now a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, as well as the official committee of unsecured creditors and junior lienholders.

Is The Waiver Of The Automatic Stay Enforceable? This was the question answered by Bankruptcy Judge John K. Olson in an 18-page decision, issued on February 12, 2008, in the In re Bryan Road, LLC Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The facts were essentially as described above, but a few additional details help put the issue in context.

• The real estate project involved a 210 unit "dry stack" boat storage facility in Dania Beach, Florida.
• The lender, which commenced a judicial foreclosure proceeding against the 191 units still owned by the debtor, had been awarded final judgment setting a foreclosure sale.
• On the morning of the foreclosure sale, the debtor and the lender entered into a forbearance agreement that was approved by the court in the foreclosure proceeding. The forbearance agreement provided for a two-month continuance of the foreclosure sale in exchange for the debtor's agreement that the lender would have relief from the automatic stay to foreclose in the event of a bankruptcy.
• The day before the continued foreclosure sale was to take place, the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.

The Bankruptcy Court's Analysis. In his decision on the lender's stay relief motion, Judge Olson first noted that prepetition waivers of the stay will be given "no particular effect as part of initial loan documents" but the "greatest effect if entered into during the course of prior (and subsequently aborted) chapter 11 proceedings." After concluding that a confirmed chapter 11 plan was not required, the Bankruptcy Court looked to four non-exclusive factors, drawn from In re Desai, 282 B.R. 527 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002), in considering whether stay relief should be granted based on the prepetition waiver:

(1) the sophistication of the party making the waiver; (2) the consideration for the waiver, including the creditor's risk and the length of time the waiver covers; (3) whether other parties are affected including unsecured creditors and junior lienholders; and (4) the feasibility of the debtor's plan.

As to the first two factors, the Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor's counsel was very sophisticated and, although the forbearance period was short, it was sufficient consideration. On the third and fourth factors, the Bankruptcy Court first noted the existence of junior lienholders and approximately $1 million of disputed unsecured claims. However, the Bankruptcy Court then engaged in a detailed analysis leading to the conclusion that the debtor's plan simply was not feasible. As such, there likely was no value for unsecured creditors in the boat storage project beyond the secured debt and the junior lienholders could protect their own interests under state law. Putting these factors together, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the forbearance agreement -- including the waiver of the automatic stay -- should be enforced and the stay was lifted.

A Few Key Take-Aways. With economic conditions continuing to strain a variety of real estate developments, workouts in the shadow of foreclosure may become more common. The In re Bryan Road, LLC decision highlights that in the right case a bankruptcy court may be willing to enforce prepetition stay relief agreements if a bankruptcy is later filed.

• This is particularly true when the debtor is a single asset real estate entity, it signs an agreement on the eve of foreclosure, and it has few unsecured creditors. In fact, the more the bankruptcy appears to be just a two-party dispute between the debtor and lender, the more likely the prepetition automatic stay waiver will be enforced.
• On the other hand, when a troubled real estate project has a real chance of reorganizing, and substantial unsecured creditor claims are involved, these agreements more likely will be rejected in favor of traditional relief from stay analysis under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion. Prepetition stay relief agreements involve complex issues. As with most bankruptcy questions, real estate owners and lenders should get advice from bankruptcy counsel on their specific situation when considering whether to include such a waiver of the automatic stay in any forbearance agreement.

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The Delaware Bankruptcy Court has recently adopted amended Local Rules, which became effective on February 1, 2008, and they include meaningful changes to the procedures governing Section 363 sales of assets. New Local Rule 6004-1, entitled "Sale and Sale Procedures Motions," requires additional disclosure and the highlighting of certain key provisions often seen in sale motions.

By following the links in this sentence you can find the redline version and clean version of the new Delaware Bankruptcy Court Local Rules.

The Section 363 Sale. As a reminder, a bankruptcy asset sale often happens in the first few weeks or months of a Chapter 11 case, rather than as part of a plan of reorganization. Frequently this will involve a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's business as a going concern. The sale is generally referred to as a "Section 363 sale" because Section 363 is the key Bankruptcy Code section that governs a debtor's sale of assets in bankruptcy. The debtor must seek bankruptcy court approval of a sale that is not in the ordinary course of business and of any effort to transfer executory contracts, intellectual property licenses, or commercial real estate leases to the buyer.

Sale Motion Requirements. The new local rule first addresses motions to sell property of the estate. A copy of the proposed or near-final purchase agreement must be attached to the motion, as well as a proposed sale order, and any request for a consumer privacy ombudsman under Section 332 of the Bankruptcy Code must be included. The most interesting changes, however, are in the list of provisions which, if included in the motion or sale order, must be highlighted together with a justification for each such provision. These include the following:

• Sale to insiders
• Agreements with management
• Releases
• Private sale or no competitive bidding
• Closing and other deadlines
• Good faith deposit
• Interim agreements with proposed buyer
• Use of sale proceeds
• Section 1146 tax exemption
• Retention of records
• Sale of avoidance actions
• Successor liability findings requested
• Sale free and clear of leases or licenses
• Credit bid
• Waiver of 10-day stay under Rule 6004(h)

A Few Specifics. To get a sense of the changes made, here's what the amended rule now requires for disclosure of agreements with management included as part of a sale motion:

Agreements with Management. If a proposed buyer has discussed or entered into any agreements with management or key employees regarding compensation or future employment, the Sale Motion must disclose (a) the material terms of any such agreements, and (b) what measures have been taken to ensure the fairness of the sale and the proposed transaction in the light of any such agreements.

Similarly, if a finding is requested regarding a tax exemption under Section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the motion must now detail the following:

Tax Exemption. The Sale Motion must highlight any provision seeking to have the sale declared exempt from taxes under section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the type of tax (e.g., recording tax, stamp tax, use tax, capital gains tax) for which the exemption is sought. It is not sufficient to refer simply to "transfer" taxes and the state or states in which the affected property is located.

Another part of the new rule requires more disclosure of efforts to sell free and clear of leases and licenses:

Sale Free and Clear of Unexpired Leases. The Sale Motion must highlight any provision by which the debtor seeks to sell property free and clear of a possessory leasehold interest, license or other right.

Sale Procedures Motions. In addition to an actual sale motion, the new local rule includes new provisions addressing motions for approval of sale and auction procedures. Although these provisions are already typically set forth in motions, the rule makes mandatory the highlighting of certain ones, including the following:

• Financial qualification procedures
• Deadlines for submitting bids
• Format of overbids
• Good faith deposit
• No-shop or no-solicitation rules
• Break-up/topping fee and expense reimbursement
• Bidding increments and use of break-up fees
• Details of auction procedures

Other Important Local Rule Changes. In addition to a number of minor changes, the amended Local Rules include three significant additions governing (1) discovery motions, (2) service of discovery materials, and perhaps most importantly, (3) electronic or e-discovery. These new rules are found at Local Rules 7026-1, 7026-2, and 7026-3, respectively. Local Rule 3007-1 on omnibus claim objections, discussed in a prior post, has been revised to reflect Delaware's continued adherence to its local practice notwithstanding the recent national rule changes. (Click on the links in this sentence for more on the national rule amendments and Delaware's decision to retain its own omnibus claim objection procedures.) Also of note, amended Local Rule 9010-1 now makes explicit the requirement that associated Delaware counsel file all papers and attend proceedings before the Court.

Conclusion. While many of the amended sale motion rules are not new to Delaware practice, Local Rule 6004-1 will change the way sale and sale procedures motions are prepared going forward. Chapter 11 debtors must comply with the new rule and that should give creditors and potential overbidders an easier time spotting the material provisions in these motions.

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Many technology companies are based in Israel and license intellectual property to companies in the United States and around the world. This raises an interesting question: what happens if the Israeli company, as licensor, goes into bankruptcy or liquidation in Israel? The latest edition of Cross Border Commentary, a publication by the International Business Practice of my firm, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, has just addressed that very question.

The U.S. Law Answer.  Before turning to Israeli law, let's look at how this issue plays out under the United States Bankruptcy Code. A licensor in bankruptcy or its bankruptcy trustee has the option of assuming (keeping) or rejecting (breaching) a license. Generally, a debtor licensor can assume a license if it meets the same tests (cures defaults and provides adequate assurance of future performance) required to assume other executory contracts.  Many licensees will not have a problem with assumption of their license as long as the debtor can actually continue to perform. Instead, the real concern for licensees is the fear of losing their rights to the licensed IP, which often can be mission critical technology, if the license is rejected.

• Special protections. Recognizing this concern, the United States Bankruptcy Code, in Section 365(n), provides licensees with special protections.  If the debtor or trustee rejects a license, under Section 365(n) a licensee can elect to retain its rights to the licensed intellectual property, including even a right to enforce an exclusivity provision. In return, the licensee must continue to make any required royalty payments. The licensee also can retain rights under any agreement supplementary to the license, which includes source code or other forms of technology escrow agreements.  Taken together, these provisions protect a licensee from being stripped of its rights to continue to use the licensed intellectual property.
• Watch out for trademarks. While many people would expect intellectual property to include trademarks, the Bankruptcy Code has its own limited definition of "intellectual property." The bankruptcy definition includes trade secrets, patents and patent applications, copyrights, and mask works.  Importantly, however, it does not include trademarks. This distinction means that trademark licensees enjoy none of Section 365(n)'s special protections and those licensees are at risk of losing their trademark rights in a bankruptcy. 

For more on these subjects, you may find these earlier posts, "Intellectual Property Licenses: What Happens In Bankruptcy?" and "Trademark Licensor In Bankruptcy: Special Risk For Licensees" of interest.

The Israeli Perspective. An article in Cooley's Cross Border Commentary, prepared by Einat Meisel of the Israeli law firm of Gross, Kleinhendler, Hodak, Berkman and Co., discusses a Tel-Aviv District Court decision involving these issues. When an Israeli company known as Commodio Ltd. entered liquidation, two of its intellectual property licensees sought to retain rights under their license agreements with Commodio. In ruling on the effort, the Israeli court made several important holdings:

• The licensees could continue to use the IP as long as they made required any royalty payments and complied with the terms of use in the agreements, with payments to be made to the liquidator.
• The licensees could gain access to the underlying source code behind the object code covered by their licenses provided this did not impose substantial expense on the company in liquidation.
• No transfer of ownership in the IP could occur due to the liquidation, as this would be contrary to Israeli bankruptcy law.
• A right of first refusal covering certain of the intellectual property would be enforceable in the bankruptcy.

Comparison To A U.S. Bankruptcy. With a few key differences, the outcome in the Commodio case is similar to the treatment under U.S. law. Under Section 365(n)'s provisions, licensees would have the ability to retain their rights to the IP, with any royalty payments being made to the bankruptcy estate. If an agreement contained a source code license, the licensees could also access the source code under Section 365(n). However, absent a license grant to the source code, the outcome would likely be different in a U.S. bankruptcy.  Provisions purporting to transfer ownership of the IP upon a bankruptcy or liquidation would not be enforceable in a U.S. bankruptcy. Finally, the right of first refusal enforced in the Israeli case might not be enforced in a U.S. bankruptcy if the agreement were rejected but could if the license were assumed. 

Get Advice. Licensing intellectual property from a foreign corporation raises a number of issues, including what happens if the foreign licensor goes bankrupt or becomes insolvent. Potential licensees should be sure to get expert advice on the applicable foreign law, including the implications of bankruptcy, when licensing IP from a foreign company. Although licensees from Israeli companies can find some comfort in the Commodio decision, it remains important to get advice on Israeli law specific to your situation. 

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Looking for a free, online and updated version of the entire Bankruptcy Code, reflecting the amendments made by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA")? Now there are two ways to access it.

• First, the Cornell University Law School's U.S. Code Collection has updated its online version of Title 11 to reflect the changes made by BAPCPA. You can find the Cornell Legal Information Institute's Title 11 site at this link. This site also includes a helpful search feature and a PDF version of each section.
• Second, the American Bankruptcy Institute has added a new wiki of the entire, amended Bankruptcy Code. You can find the ABI Bankruptcy Code wiki at this link.

These are handy resources for attorneys and others who need to find the up-to-date Bankruptcy Code online.

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Happy New Year to everyone. I'm back from a holiday blogging break with a report on the first appellate decision to address the question left open in last year's U.S. Supreme Court decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. -- whether post-petition attorney's fees can be added to unsecured claims. Although unrelated, this new decision also tackles the interesting question of whether a guarantor of a debt can become liable if the payment of the debt by the primary obligor later is returned in a preference settlement.

The Travelers Case. As a brief refresher, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's so-called Fobian rule in the Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. decision (available here) in March 2007. However, it did not decide whether unsecured creditors could recover, as part of their unsecured claims, post-petition attorney's fees incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case. For more on the Travelers decision, you may find this earlier post of interest.

A Developing Split. Since the Travelers decision, two bankruptcy courts issued decisions on the open issue, coming to different conclusions. 

• In May 2007, in the In re Qmect, Inc. decision (available here), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California held that unsecured creditors could recover post-petition attorney's fees. For more on that decision, see this earlier post on the case and its analysis. 
• In July 2007, in the In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. case (available here), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida came to the opposite conclusion, following a majority of courts that had addressed this issue unrestrained by the Ninth Circuit's Fobian decision. See this previous post for more on the Florida decision.
• Commentators, including with the recent article written by the American Bankruptcy Institute's Scholar in Residence Professor Mark Scarberry, have joined the fray as well.

The SNTL Corp. Ruling. On December 19, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") issued its decision in the In re SNTL Corp. case (