In this post I look at the second lien phenomenon and then discuss an interesting new case addressing whether a fairly common intercreditor agreement provision -- giving a senior lender the right to vote a second lien lender's claim in bankruptcy -- will actually be enforced.
Senior Debt And Mezzanine Financing. When a company borrows from a bank, it typically grants the bank a first priority, blanket security interest in all of its assets to secure this senior debt. In the past, when a company needed additional capital, whether to grow the business or to fund an acquisition, it often turned to unsecured "mezzanine" financing, so named to reflect its middle position between senior debt and equity. This type of unsecured debt typically is subject to complete payment subordination in favor of the senior lender and is considerably more expensive than bank debt.
The Second Lien Market. One of the biggest financing trends in recent years has been the move away from unsecured mezzanine credit to debt secured by a second priority security interest on all of the company's assets. Much of this "second lien" debt is coming from hedge funds and other private equity funds, although more traditional lenders have also become active in the market. According to CFO.com, the second lien market has grown dramatically over the past several years, from $570 million in 2002 to more than $16 billion in 2005. Some reports suggest it approached $30 billion in 2006.
Why the attraction to second lien financing? The main reasons are price, terms, and availability. Healthy companies generally find the pricing on second lien credit to be lower than unsecured mezzanine debt (although a bit more expensive than on senior debt) and often comes with few covenants. For distressed companies, if they can obtain additional credit at all, many times it's as part of a restructuring in which a new lender requires a second lien to protect it from an increased risk of default.
Subordination and Intercreditor Agreements. Most second liens are blanket security interests and cover the same collateral against which the senior lender has a first lien. Traditionally, senior lenders include provisions in their loan documents prohibiting borrowers from granting security interests or liens to any other lender without the consent of the senior lender. When a lender proposes to make a second lien (also known as a "junior" or "tranche B" loan), it must negotiate not only with the borrower but also with the senior or "tranche A" lender. As the size of the second lien market suggests, senior lenders have been willing to consent to second lien loans, often to help the borrower make an acquisition or to bring in additional liquidity.
- The negotiations between the first and second lien lenders usually address their respective rights to the collateral and various provisions regarding repayment of their loans. Sometimes the second lien debt will be subordinated to repayment of the senior debt, as with traditional mezzanine financing, but more often only the security interest in the common collateral will be subordinated to that of the senior lender.
- The senior lender generally insists that the junior lender be a "silent second" and waive rights to object to actions taken by the senior lender in a default or bankruptcy. The junior lender instead wants to have the ability to protect its own interests. The end result often comes out somewhere in between, but restrictions on the second lien lender are common.
- The arrangements between the senior and second lien lenders are documented in a separate agreement, usually called an intercreditor agreement or a subordination agreement.
Key Intercreditor Agreement Provisions. If everything goes well and the borrower repays its loans on time, the provisions of the intercreditor agreement won't be all that important. However, if the borrower defaults on the loans, or files for bankruptcy, the terms of the agreement can become critical.
- With bankruptcy in mind, key provisions negotiated in intercreditor agreements often include waivers or consents by the second lien lender relating to debtor in possession (DIP) financing, use of cash collateral, rights to adequate protection, conduct of a Section 363 sale of the debtor's assets (i.e., the lenders' collateral), and the extent to which the senior lender will have the right to vote the second lien lender's claim on any Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of reorganization.
- Section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a "subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Bankruptcy courts routinely enforce payment subordination provisions in which the junior lender agrees not to receive any payments (or to turn over any that it does receive) until the senior lender is paid in full.
Bankruptcy Voting Provisions. Bankruptcy voting provisions, however, have not always been enforced. Most notably, the court in In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000), held that Section 1126(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that the "holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502 of this title may accept or reject a plan," means that only the actual holder of the claim may vote and that an agreement giving that right to the senior lender is not enforceable. Other courts have been more willing to enforce voting provisions in subordination agreements. Still, the issue has not come up very often. Voting provisions have been the subject of reported decisions in only a handful of cases over the past 25 years.
The Aerosol Packaging Decision. That dearth of authority makes the decision in In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, issued by a bankruptcy court in Atlanta in late December 2006, of keen interest. (Thanks go to Scott Riddle of the Georgia Bankruptcy Law Blog for first posting on the decision.) In that case, Wachovia Bank was the senior lender under a subordination agreement entered into with Blue Ridge Investors, II, L.P., a second lien lender to the debtor, Aerosol Packaging. In its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor filed a plan of reorganization acceptable to Wachovia. When votes were solicited, both Wachovia and Blue Ridge submitted competing ballots voting Blue Ridge's claim, with Wachovia's ballot accepting the plan's primary treatment of Blue Ridge's claim and Blue Ridge's ballot rejecting that proposed treatment.
- Blue Ridge then filed a motion seeking a determination of its voting rights and allowance of its ballot instead of the one Wachovia submitted. (For reference, the subordination agreement attached as an exhibit to that motion designates Blue Ridge as the "Subordinated Creditor" and Wachovia, as successor to SouthTrust Bank, as the "Lender.")
- Wachovia opposed the motion, relying on a section in the subordination agreement that made it, as the Lender, "irrevocably authorized and empowered (in its own name or in the name of the Subordinated Creditor)" to "take such other action (including without limitation voting the Subordinated Debt. . . " as it "deemed necessary or advisable." Wachovia also argued that the In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership case, relied on by Blue Ridge, was wrongly decided and that the bankruptcy rules allowed agents to vote another party's claim.
- To complete the picture, the debtor itself also filed a response supporting Wachovia's position.
In siding with Wachovia, the bankruptcy court held that Wachovia was the agent of Blue Ridge, that under the subordination agreement Blue Ridge assigned its right to vote to Wachovia, and that Section 1126(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prohibit the enforcement of such provisions. The court therefore accepted Wachovia's ballot and rejected the one submitted by Blue Ridge. The court also pointed out that Blue Ridge is not without a remedy: it "may free itself from the ongoing effect of the Subordination Agreement by paying the Wachovia claim in full in cash." Blue Ridge has appealed the decision, so a higher court may have a chance to rule on the issue.
Uncertainty Remains. As only one bankruptcy court ruling, the Aerosol Packaging decision does not settle the issue of whether bankruptcy voting provisions will be enforced. Still, it's interesting that the court considered and rejected the reasoning of the In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership decision. Given that this subordination agreement involved both lien and payment subordination, it's unclear whether the voting provision would have been enforced if the lenders' agreement had involved only lien and not payment subordination, which is the more typical second lien arrangement. The answer to that question will have to wait for the next case.
