The Delaware Court of Chancery has issued another decision involving creditor claims against directors of a financially troubled corporation. In North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 2006 WL 2588971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006), Vice Chancellor Noble made two important holdings:

  • First, although derivative claims can be brought, creditors may not assert direct claims against directors of a Delaware corporation for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty that occur while the corporation is in the "zone of insolvency." 
  • Second, assuming Delaware law would allow any creditor to bring a direct, non-derivative claim against directors of an actually insolvent corporation (still an unresolved question), the suing creditor’s right to payment would have to be "clearly and immediately due." Thus, creditors with disputed or contingent claims likely will not be able to assert a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty, even if the corporation is in fact insolvent.

A copy of the decision is available here. Thanks to the Delaware Business Litigation Report blog for reporting on it first. 

No direct claim in the "zone of insolvency." The court’s refusal to permit a creditor to assert a direct claim — as opposed to a derivative claim — against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary duty in the zone or vicinity of insolvency was based on its careful analysis of the arguments for and against such claims. The court summed up its reasoning:

Indeed, it would appear that creditors’ existing protections—among which are the protections afforded by their negotiated agreements, their security instruments, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent conveyance law, and bankruptcy law—render the imposition of an additional, unique layer of protection through direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary. Moreover, any benefit to be derived by the recognition of such additional direct claims appears minimal, at best, and significantly outweighed by the costs to economic efficiency. One might argue that an otherwise solvent corporation operating in the ‘zone of insolvency’ is one in most need of effective and proactive leadership—as well as the ability to negotiate in good faith with its creditors—goals which would likely be significantly undermined by the prospect of individual liability arising from the pursuit of direct claims by creditors.

Unclear if direct claims can be brought at all, even in a case of actual insolvency. The court engaged in a different analysis, focused more on the deficiency of the actual allegations in the complaint, in dismissing direct claims against the directors during the corporation’s alleged actual insolvency. However, the court commented that, to the extent Delaware law would permit a creditor to have a direct claim against directors of an insolvent corporation for breach of fiduciary duty, the claim would have to involve invidious conduct directed at that creditor. In so holding, the court relied heavily on two earlier decisions of the Court of Chancery, one by Vice Chancellor Strine in Production Resources Group v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussed in an earlier post) and the other by Vice Chancellor Lamb in Big Lot Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII LLC, et al., 2006 WL 846121 (Del. Ch. March 28, 2006) (available here). These decisions, taken together, suggest that most if not all creditor claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of insolvent Delaware corporations will be characterized as derivative and not direct claims.

Developing trend against expanding a director’s exposure to creditor claims. The Production Resources, Big Lot Stores, and now North American Catholic Educational Programming decisions, together with the recent Trenwick America Litigation Trust case refusing to recognize a cause of action for deepening insolvency (discussed in an earlier post), reflect the Delaware Court of Chancery’s resistance to attempts by creditors to expand the liability of directors when a corporation is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. Although well-stated derivative claims by creditors for breach of fiduciary duty may be recognized by the courts in some cases, a direct claim by a creditor — if such a claim exists at all under Delaware law — seems to be limited to the rare circumstance in which that particular creditor was the only creditor harmed by an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The Delaware Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, but these four decisions from three different Vice Chancellors indicate that the Court of Chancery is developing a consistent view on these issues.